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Introduction
‘I want to work, I want to live. I am 20 years old. I sleep all day long. Today I got up at 11. 
This is not as it should be. My life is not as it should be’. (Asylum Seeker, Prato, 16 
July 2019)
‘Just let me work, please’. This is the persistent cry the authors of this volume 
recorded during the fieldwork that underlies the present publication. Working means 
earning a decent life for your family, making proper use of your knowledge and 
skills, expressing your individual self, climbing the social ladder, contributing to 
your community, and working to belong to a community and the wider society 
at large.
The research presented in this book investigates the legal barriers and enablers 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers experience as they seek to enter and integrate 
into labour markets across seven European countries, six of which were EU member 
states at the time of research, and five after Brexit.
The Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and the UK 
represent diversity under several aspects germane to our research: migration flows 
and migration governance regimes, labour market structure and economic parame-
ters, rules on labour market access and working conditions, as well as Europeanisation 
processes.
Examining the legal barriers migrants, refugees and asylum seekers encounter 
and the enablers they make use of provides interesting insights that allow us to 
reflect on contemporary European societies’ capacity to face the challenges and 
seize the opportunities of people moving across the planet – not only to escape from 
harsh living conditions due to wars, climate change, famines and persecutions, but 
also as they pursue better life chances and happiness for themselves and their 
families.
On the one hand, the book builds on the notion of socio- spatial legal peripheries, 
where discourses of inclusion and tolerance of diversity stand at odds with the real 
guarantee of fundamental rights in relation to democratic institutions and public 
administration services, and where basic human rights are systematically denied 
and become places where exclusion is widespread and intense.
vi
On the other hand, the present volume draws on the understanding of social, 
economic, legal and personal factors as either barriers or enablers, elements that 
may facilitate or obstruct integration processes, and as such it contributes to devel-
oping integration theories. Interestingly, often the same factor may play both roles, 
depending on the group of people to whom it refers, the particular time or spatial 
dimension, providing evidence for an iterative dynamic understanding of integra-
tion factors.
Thus, the research presented in the volume focuses on the analysis of the hierar-
chy among migration statuses in terms of rights and entitlements related to the 
labour market. This entails scrutinising the two dimensions of integration. First, 
access to labour markets (translated into a rights- language: the right to work) with 
its corollaries (recognition of qualifications, vocational training, etc.). Second, non- -
discriminatory working conditions (translated into a rights- language: the right to 
both formal and substantial equality) and its corollaries of benefits and duties deriv-
ing from the fact of being part of the labour market. Overall, this gives us a more 
critical insight into the real working conditions of migrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers (MRAs) across European states.
Highlighting both specificities and common trends through combining the ana-
lytical tools of public comparative law research and a social science and policy- -
oriented analysis creates space for a critical discussion of the gap between the 
rhetoric of inclusion on the one hand, and the reality of legal status that hinders that 
very access to the labour market and its working conditions on the other. The iden-
tification of such ‘legal peripheries’ represents the noyau dur of the book, together 
with the identification of the barriers and enablers at both national and European levels.
Results presented in this volume were obtained through the research project 
Skills and Integration of Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Applicants in European 
Labour Markets (Sirius). This project was funded by the European Commission 
under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement 
770515). The Sirius consortium was coordinated from January 2018 to March 2020 
by the Glasgow Caledonian University (UK) and since then by the University of 
Parma (Italy). It included the University of Geneva (Switzerland), the European 
University Institute, the University of Florence (Italy), Charles University (Czech 
Republic), Roskilde University (Denmark), the University of Jyväskylä (Finland), 
the National Technical University of Athens (Greece), Solidar (Belgium), Solidarity 
Now (Greece) and the Multicultural Centre Prague (Czech Republic).
Data were collected through a combination of desk research of various sources 
(e.g. legal and policy documents, national and EU case law, research reports, and 
scientific literature), information requests to relevant institutions, and novel semi- -
structured interviews with legal and policy experts and academics held from March 
until May 2018 as part of the Horizon 2020 EU- funded project ‘Sirius’, and updated 
in December 2019 where they concern legal changes.
The first three chapters of the book begin by exploring the general frame that 
guided research at country level. Baglioni and Federico (Chap. 1) introduce a theo-
retical framework used for the individual chapter analysis, while Maggini (Chap. 2) 
discusses migration and asylum figures as well as and macro indicators of 
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immigration and the labour market across the seven countries. Pannia (Chap. 3) 
discusses common trends and new developments of immigration law and asylum 
law, as well as their potential impact on MRAs labour market integration.
This contextualising opening part allows the subsequent nine chapters, based on 
a common research outline, to focus on the core business of the book: migrant, refu-
gees and asylum seekers’ integration in the labour markets in the Czech Republic 
(Čada and Hoření), Denmark (Bierre, Pace and Sen), Finland (Bontenbal and Lillie), 
Greece (Bagavos, Kourachanis, Lagoudakou and Chatzigiannakou), Italy 
(Chiaromonte and Federico), Switzerland (Mexi, Moreno Russi and Fernández 
Guzman) and the UK (Baglioni and Calò). Two chapters are devoted to the EU 
level: the first discusses the overarching legal framework related to migrants, refu-
gees and asylum seekers’ access to the labour markets and the anti- discrimination 
clauses (Gropas); the second focuses on the specific aspect of family reunification 
and labour market access in a gendered perspective (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou).
This book appears at a time when an expected global pandemic has shown once 
more how important migrants’ work is for our societies, and for our economies. In 
many European countries and beyond, the healthcare sector, which was on the front-
line of the emergency due to its role in mitigating and contrasting the devastating 
effect of COVID- 19, has heavily relied on migrant doctors, nurses and cleaners, and 
so have the agriculture and food production and supply chains, the waste collecting 
systems and the caregiving services. It will be wise for our societies and policy mak-
ers to learn from that experience and profit from what we unveil in this book about 
the too many barriers that still obstruct migrants and refugees’ access to work and 
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Chapter 1
Europe’s Legal Peripheries: Migration, 
Asylum and the European Labour Market
Veronica Federico and Simone Baglioni
1.1  Introduction
The participation of foreign nationals in European labour markets is an effective 
tool that facilitates those migrants enjoying a more fulfilling life, while at the same 
time contributing to Europe’s wealth and economic and social development. 
However, many norms that regulate migration and labour migration undermine this 
spirit by limiting, both directly and indirectly, non-EU nationals’ access to European 
labour markets.
From a legal perspective, the integration of non-EU migrants, refugees and asy-
lum seekers (MRAs) depends on the country in which they settle and the legal status 
it affords them there. Entry and settlement into European countries is subject to 
strict limitations for non-EU nationals, but such limitations, far from promoting an 
integrated European legal space, take different shapes according to the European 
country and migrant status. Being a so-called ‘economic migrant’ with a long-term 
permit to stay entitles the beneficiary to a broader set of rights than is the case for a 
migrant with a short-term permit; similarly, a refugee is entitled to a much broader 
set of rights than an asylum seeker; while an asylum seeker is endowed with a 
smaller pattern of rights and benefits to a migrant benefiting from a complementary 
(compared to Geneva 1951) form of protection status. Furthermore, when labour 
market participation is at stake, as we discuss later in this chapter, an asylum seeker 
or beneficiary of a complementary form of protection is endowed with different 
rights and opportunities across Europe: he or she can work from the time of lodging 
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their application with different time-ban limits depending on the country they enter 
(ranging from 60 days in Italy to 1 year in the UK), while they are prevented from 
working at all in others.
This chapter discusses to what extent specific legal frameworks of migration and 
asylum work as either enablers or barriers to non-EU MRAs integration in European 
labour markets across seven countries: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. It argues that, in the last 
decade, a plethora of legal acts and the spirit of border closure and securisation that 
inspires them, have created a hierarchy among migration statuses in terms of the 
rights and entitlements related to the labour market. This hierarchy considerably 
influences the degree of transferability of newcomers’ work-related capabilities 
when they move from their country of origin to the new country of settlement. At 
the top of the hierarchy in terms of rights are refugees and beneficiaries of subsid-
iary protection, along with long-term economic migrants, who are endowed with 
the stronger sets of rights, including those related to accessing the labour market 
and workers’ rights and benefits. In other words, refugees, beneficiaries of subsid-
iary protection and long-term economic migrants are those who are closer to nation-
als in terms of fundamental rights and integration into labour markets (except 
political rights that fall beyond the remit of our research and, importantly, except the 
freedom of movement and settlement reserved to EU nationals). At the bottom of 
the hierarchy come asylum seekers, and below them irregular migrants who can 
count on a much stricter set of rights and entitlements. When rights and entitlements 
are mentioned here with reference to labour markets, we do not only refer to access-
ing work but also to those services conducive to employment such as skills and the 
recognition of educational attainment, but also access to vocational education and 
training.
However, it is worth noticing the size of the migrant population to which each 
status applies. In fact, among the countries we examine here – except in Denmark 
and Switzerland – only a minority of people applying for protection are recognised 
by a status conferring access to a broad set of rights, including those connected to 
labour market participation, and even a smaller number is recognised by the Geneva 
convention status (asylum and subsidiary protection). Hence, most non-EU migrants 
who de facto stay in a given host country remain at the bottom of the rights hierarchy.
We can visualise the hierarchy of rights as a pyramid (Fig. 1.1). The status con-
ferred to the very few at the top would guarantee rights leading to an almost-equal 
to nationals’ access and use of the labour market, while the more we move down the 
pyramid, the fewer these rights are, although far more individuals find themselves at 
those lower levels of the hierarchy. Finally, we need to clarify that in this introduc-
tory chapter and throughout the book as a whole we focus on the de jure aspect, and 
do not discuss the implementation of such rights in detail (we do that elsewhere, cfr. 
Lillie and Bontebal 2019).
V. Federico and S. Baglioni
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A relevant consideration is the diversity of norms across states. As we discuss in 
Paola Pannia’s chapter in this volume, the sole convergence we notice among 
European countries – and in particular among those studied here – is a convergence 
towards limiting access and long-term settlement for all categories of non-EU 
migrants, including those who used to be preserved from stricter limitations, such as 
asylum seekers and refugees. Despite the process of harmonization at EU level and 
regardless of the rhetorical claim of a more cogent Europeanisation of migration 
governance, nation states remain the dominant actor in this field, our research sug-
gests that policy-makers are often more concerned with responding to public opin-
ion than providing a coherent legal framework [as discussed in Pannia’s and 
Maggini’s chapters].
Overall, our book contributes to debating the existence in Europe of ‘legal 
peripheries’ (Chouinard 2001: 187), those spaces where a gap exists between 
narratives of inclusion and equality, and the legal provisions and their implementation 
supposed to support and justify such narratives, and we do that by discussing labour 
market-related rights for non-EU migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.
The chapter begins with a short introduction to the selection rationale for our 
countries under study. It turns to some reflections on MRAs’ integration in European 
labour markets, distinguishing between legal provisions that grant access to those 
labour markets and provisions that ensure MRAs work as nationals do. Our 
concluding remarks point to four streams of consideration in terms of barriers and 
enablers to MRAs’ integration into European labour markets.






















Fig. 1.1 Summarises the ‘hierarchy of status and rights’ model that the chapter discusses
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1.1.1  Our Contexts
The seven countries examined here provide a variety of insights into MRAs’ inte-
gration in European labour markets. Despite the harmonisation effort at EU level, 
variety across countries persists. This is partly due to countries being affected dif-
ferently by migration flows, so that numbers of refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary 
and humanitarian protection and of asylum seekers on the one hand, and of eco-
nomic migrants, on the other, largely differ. However, states also have different legal 
and political systems that impact how authorities, citizens and organizations react to 
migration inflows. The countries we discuss in this chapter present a diverse consti-
tutional organization of state. In fact, they have been explicitly selected to encom-
pass a wide spectrum of variability, while remaining in the general frame of 
contemporary western liberal democracies. The countries under study mirror the 
diversity of European landscapes in terms of the structure of the state, the system of 
government, rights enforcement and litigation, the political system and the cultural 
and socio-economic background, while allowing at the same time for systematic 
comparison. The cleavage between the one country belonging to the common law 
system (the UK) and the others that are characterized by civil law systems is 
nuanced, and, at the same time, enriched by intertwining with other cleavages: 
centralized versus federal states; symmetric versus asymmetric decentralization (or 
devolution); constitutional monarchies versus republics; parliamentarian (in various 
typologies) versus semi-presidential and directorial systems of government; diffuse 
versus centralized (with the presence of a Constitutional Court) systems of judicial 
review. All countries except Switzerland and the United Kingdom are EU member 
states (and the UK was still part of the EU when we conducted our analyses), so 
they relate to the EU legal framework. Moreover, diverse mechanisms of rights 
enforcement and litigation among these countries add further texture to the analysis 
of the constitutional and legal framework.
Diversity is also the keyword in the discussion of the political systems, counting 
bi-party systems, pluri-party systems, even-multiparty systems, fragmented party 
systems; as well as in the discussion of the democratic model: majoritarian and 
consensus democracies, semi-direct and consociational democracies. The socio-
economic background of the countries is no less so diverse, as the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, and the UK are characterized by the 
whole range of variation, with Greece representing the most deprived economic 
landscape and Denmark and Switzerland holding the most affluent positions. 
Diversity also describes the labour markets, sufficit here to recall that when the 
countries were chosen for our study, that is in 2016, the unemployment rate in the 
Czech Republic, United Kingdom and Switzerland was under 5% (and has remained 
so according to the last OECD available data up to December 2019), well below the 
EU28 average of 8.6% (which decreased to 6.1% by December 2019), while Finland 
had an unemployment level close to the EU28 average (as is still the case), whereas 
Italy and Greece were (and still are) above EU28 average: 11.7% in Italy and 23.6% 
in Greece (respectively 9.6% and 16.6% by December 2019).
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1.2  Integration into the Labour Markets?
There is broad consensus that whether and how migrants, asylum seekers and refu-
gees integrate into labour markets, and the time it takes for them to do so, deter-
mines not only their long-term impact on European economies but also their 
prospects for integrating socially and economically into European societies, and 
therefore their capacity to contribute to the overall wellbeing of the continent (Ruiz 
and Vargas-Silva 2017, 2018; Marbach et al. 2018; Zwysen 2019; Brell et al. 2020). 
The UNHCR experience reveals that early integration is desirable for at least three 
reasons: it is the most effective, efficient and meaningful method of facilitating this 
target group’s integration into European societies; it can alleviate pressure on the 
public purse; it can help address current and future labour market shortages in the 
EU (UNHCR 2013).
We consider two main dimensions of the integration of refugees, asylum seekers 
and migrants into the labour markets: (i) access to the labour market (translated into 
a rights-language: the right to work) with its corollaries (recognition of qualifica-
tions, vocational training, etc.); and (ii) non-discriminatory working conditions 
(translated into a rights-language: the right to both formal and substantial equality) 
and its corollaries of benefits and duties deriving from being part of the labour market.
1.2.1  Accessing the Labour Market
Accessing the labour market means being entitled to work. In principle, allowing 
asylum seekers, refugees and migrants to work should be a win-win game: it 
empowers MRAs in both economic and socio-cultural terms, and it benefits the 
hosting societies that can profit from the skills, energy, competences and also taxes 
produced by MRAs’ activities (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009, 2016; Zimmermann 
2014; Blau and Mackie 2016). However, due to either a real scarcity in jobs or a 
rhetorically constructed one, ‘foreigners’ (with no distinctions made between 
refugees and economic migrants) can often be perceived and portrayed in public 
discourses as ‘job stealers’ from native-born workers, regardless of labour market 
segmentation, which, in several countries, keep natives and migrants in separate 
labour market segments and therefore not competing for the same jobs (Ambrosini 
2001; Allievi 2018).
Limits on the right to access national labour markets exist, and they are not nec-
essarily connected with dire economic conditions since they pre-existed the last 
decade of economic crisis. For example, the Italian Constitution recognises the right 
to work for citizens only (art. 4), which means that Italian workers have preferential 
access to the labour market: before applying for the sponsorship of a third country 
national worker, employers must prove there is no relevant workforce available in 
the country. The same happens, for example, in Switzerland, where according to the 
“precedence provision” of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals, third country 
1 Europe’s Legal Peripheries: Migration, Asylum and the European Labour Market
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workers can be admitted into the Swiss labour market only if no Swiss citizen or 
foreign national with a long-term residence permit or an EU/EFTA national can be 
recruited. Also in Finland, law No. 1218/2013 provides for the “availability test” to 
grant Finnish and EU/EEA citizens priority in entering employment.
There are different limitations on the right to access the labour market: limita-
tions based on the nationality of the worker (as it is the case of the aforementioned 
limits in Italy, Switzerland and Finland); limitations based on the foreign legal sta-
tus (as illustrated in Table 1.1 and discussed later in this chapter) and limitations 
based on workers’ skills and qualifications, as is discussed later.
In principle, in none of the countries considered here are refugees, beneficiaries 
of subsidiary protection and of other forms of national protection limited in their 
access to the labour market. This means that de jure they can work, if they wish to 
do so, and they do not need further work permits. However, this does not mean that 
de facto they do access national labour markets, since they may experience other 
forms of constraint such as language barriers, spatial barriers (several countries 
adopt dispersal policies which compel refugees to live in areas where there are no 
available suitable vacancies, for example, and their effective mobility in the country 
may be more limited than nationals experience), and qualifications and skills 
barriers (their qualifications may not be recognised in the host countries and the 
skills required for specific tasks may be different from those they used to in their 
country of origin).
By contrast, asylum seekers experience time limitations in all our countries 
(Greece was the only exception until December 2019, when asylum seekers were 
allowed to work as soon as they lodged their application. But since January 2020 the 
new International Protection Act L.4636/2019 has introduced a 6-month employ-
ment ban for asylum seekers). Obviously, the same considerations on the de facto 
barriers persist in this case once asylum seekers are allowed to enter the labour 
market. It is interesting to have a graphical representation of the time barriers to 
asylum seekers’ entry into national labour markets (Fig. 1.2), as this may be consid-
ered one good indicator of the country’s openness to MRAs’ integration, given that 
evidence suggests that the sooner an immigrant or asylum seeker/refugee enters the 
labour market, the quicker and smoother her/his integration path would be.
Moreover, Fig. 1.2 is clear concerning harmonisation at the EU level: seven juris-
dictions present six different time-limits for asylum seekers to access domestic 
labour markets. Actually, in Finland there are two different options: asylum seekers 
can work after 3 months since lodging their application if they travel with valid 
identification documents, or after 5 months in the case they do not possess such 
documents. Hence, there is no consistency across these European countries in terms 
of rights for asylum seekers when entering the labour market. Some allow asylum 
seekers to work after a short period (Italy after 60 days), while others prevent them 
accessing the labour market for at least 1 year (the Czech Republic and the UK, in 
the latter, the 1 year ban from the labour market stretches even longer periods given 
that only those applicants who possess high skills can enter after 1 year, the rest 
have to wait until their claim is assessed, which can take also a couple of years).
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More complex is the position of so-called ‘economic migrants’, people who 
migrate to another country primarily to seek work and better life conditions, or for 
family reunification (as is discussed in detail in Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou in this 
volume). None of our countries opens its labour market unconditionally to third 
country nationals. Work permits are required in every country for extra EU citizens, 
and the possibility of working in such countries depends on the triangulation 
between the needs of national labour (determined on an annual basis by specific 
policy documents issued either by the Ministry of Interior or by the Ministry of 
Labour, as in Italy for example), or on a case-by case approach (as it is the case in 
Finland) and migrants’ skills and qualifications. Curiously, but not surprisingly, 
limitations do not apply to highly specialised workers, who benefit from special 
conditions of entry, quite often beyond the implementation of the Blue Card directive 
2009/50/EC. In Denmark, for example, a number of job schemes aim to attract high 
skilled labour and encourage quick and facilitated employment. In Finland, highly-
skilled migrants receive their residence permits directly from the Finnish 
Immigration Service through an ad hoc procedure; in the UK ‘Tier 1 visas’ are 
reserved for people with exceptional talents in the fields of science, humanities, 
engineering, medicine, digital technology and art, or if they aim to invest at least 
£2 million in the country.
Finally, although irregular migrants’ role in European labour markets is by defi-
nition left in the ‘shadow’ of policy consideration, in some jurisdictions the position 
of undocumented migrants is not fully overlooked. In Greece, for example, a 2016 
circular opens access to the labour market in specific sectors (agriculture, domestic 
work, animal husbandry) to immigrants in the grey area between legality and ille-
gality. In Italy, no formal access for undocumented migrants exists, but the law 
offers some forms of protection to undocumented migrants, even though a recent 
law (Law 199/2016) to contrast labour exploitation and exploitative labour interme-
diation could provide more instruments to fight against informal employment (for a 
further discussion of this law see: Chiaromonte et al. 2018).
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Fig. 1.2 Time limit to asylum seekers’ access to national labour markets. (Source: Sirius project)
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1.2.2  Working as Nationals Do
The countries considered here enforce the joint principles of equality in working 
conditions and benefits and of non-discrimination for all workers once they have 
entered their labour markets, regardless of their citizenship or length of stay in the 
country. In the field of non-discrimination, a number of European directives 
(Directive 2000/43/EC against discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin; 
Directive 2006/54/EC on equal opportunities and equal treatment of women and 
men in employment and occupation; Directive 2007/78/EC against discrimination 
at work on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation) have 
played a crucial role in harmonizing legislation in the different jurisdictions.
Yet, the formal absence of discriminations in the workplace and unequal working 
conditions does not naturally lead to MRAs working as nationals do, since they may 
encounter significant barriers that elude legal provisions focusing on formal equal-
ity (everyone is equal before the law) and on non-discrimination because they per-
tain to the sphere of substantial equality. However, we focus here on several aspects 
related to the concrete enforcement of the right to work, sometimes incorporated on 
framework immigration legislation, sometimes provided for in specific regulations, 
that contribute to overcoming substantial barriers.
Linguistic barriers are paramount; all our jurisdictions acknowledge the impor-
tance of language skills as a first step to integrating into the host society. Nonetheless, 
language courses are not offered for free everywhere, this is one field where space 
is left for collaboration with non-state entities, both non-profit and for profit compa-
nies. Moreover, attending language courses is rarely a duty imposed on MRAs. The 
duty exists solely in those countries where attending civic integration programs is 
compulsory: in Denmark for all MRAs except economic migrants, but as a require-
ment for those applying for permanent residency; in Finland for refugees, beneficia-
ries of subsidiary protection as well as for short and long stay economic migrants 
some welfare benefits, such as unemployment benefits are conditional on participa-
tion in integration programs that include language courses – and this de facto cre-
ates a duty, whereas it is not compulsory for asylum seekers; in Italy language 
proficiency is requested for both integration agreements (for refugees and beneficia-
ries of the former humanitarian protection regime) and integration programs (for 
long-staying economic migrants), whereas for asylum seekers some reception cen-
tres impose a duty on language course attendance. No duty exists in the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Switzerland (except for short-term economic migrants in those 
cantons where signing an integration convention is required to access social assis-
tance), and in the UK.
The recognition of qualifications and competences is crucial for MRAs to work 
as nationals do, yet the majority of the countries examined here lag behind what 
substantial equality would entail in this field, as Table  1.2 clearly shows. Only 
Denmark, Switzerland and Italy (with the exception of asylum seekers) are open to 
the recognition of foreign titles and qualifications, even though in Italy the 
recognition process may be long and complex, substantially jeopardising the 
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legitimate expectations of migrants. The UK recognises exclusively qualifications 
from selected countries of origin, on the basis of a common table of conversion. In 
the Czech Republic and in Greece, the formal equalisation of qualifications is 
substantially undermined by the requirement of the official certificates issued by 
competent authorities. Of course, this may be considered fair towards economic 
migrants, who, in principle, can plan their migration trajectory, whereas people 
fleeing from their country will hardly bring proofs of their diplomas, and requiring 
them to national authorities once in a host country sounds undoubtedly odd. In 
between lies Finland, where not diplomas but proof of citizenship is required to 
allow for fair conversions. Noticeably, in all countries where this is allowed, MRAs 
must apply for recognition, in the most favourable of cases, as in Finland, this is 
done during the application process.
Another relevant field to consider when discussing whether foreigners work as 
nationals do is vocational training. Vocational education and training is a relevant 
component of current active labour market policies, useful for easing young people’s 
access to the labour market. It is equally a useful tool to facilitate migrants, refugees 
and asylum applicants’ integration into their host societies (Flisi et  al. 2016). 
Vocational qualifications can be particularly valuable for skilled refugees and 
economic migrants to find adequate employment, while for illiterate and poorly 
educated refugees and migrants, long-term vocational programmes could be a stra-
tegic target for investment. Does our pool of countries offer access to vocational 
training to third country nationals?
In Greece and Finland, all migrants except undocumented people can access 
vocational training on the same basis as Greek and Finnish citizens. In Italy and in 
Switzerland in addition to the undocumented migrant exception, asylum seekers 
may be restrained from vocational training either because there are no courses 
available in the reception centres (the Italian case), or because the courses length 
exceeds the asylum seeker’s temporary permit to stay. In Denmark, only refugees, 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and of temporary protection status (the Danish 
national form of temporary protection) are entitled to vocational training, from 
which economic migrants are excluded, whereas in the UK, even though not 
formally entitled to by specific legal provisions, vocational training is open to 
refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (that in the UK is named 
humanitarian protection), by contrast, asylum seekers are excluded, but not in 
Scotland, where devolved legislation opens the door of vocational training also to 
them. Economic migrants may benefit from these measures, but with limits due to 
the type of visa they hold. Finally, in the Czech Republic neither asylum seekers nor 
short term economic migrants nor beneficiaries of national forms of temporary 
protection can access vocational training, that is open to refugees, beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection and long-term economic migrants, who, in case of unemploy-
ment, can participate in the retraining schemes available to nationals.
Unemployment benefits are another important element for understanding legal 
barriers and enablers for MRAs’ integration in the labour market. Switzerland and 
Italy are the countries that present fewer restrictions in accessing unemployment 
benefits: all are entitled as nationals are, except undocumented migrants and asylum 
1 Europe’s Legal Peripheries: Migration, Asylum and the European Labour Market
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seekers not allowed to work in Switzerland, and asylum seekers after 2 years of 
contributions – which is a tricky condition to impose on people with a temporary 
status. In Denmark, only refugees and long-term economic migrants holding a per-
manent residency permit can receive unemployment benefits. In Finland, unem-
ployment benefits are made conditional upon permanent residency, which entails 
that neither asylum seekers nor short-time economic migrants are included. In 
Greece, refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and long-term economic 
migrants can access the unemployment register and receive all benefits and services 
as Greek citizens do, whereas asylum seekers can do so only after having completed 
the application procedure. The situation in the UK is not so different, since refugees 
and beneficiaries of subsidiary protections are equalised to British citizens, but 
long-term economic migrants must be granted the indefinite leave to remain in the 
UK to claim benefits. Similarly, in the Czech Republic, solely refugees, beneficia-
ries of subsidiary protection and long-term economic migrants are entitled to 
benefits.
Finally, we make a comparative assessment of the rights to self-employment and 
working in the public sector, as illustrated by Table 1.3.
Except in Greece, where the public sector is fully reserved to nationals only, in 
all jurisdictions refugees can both work as public officers (with exceptions of some 
crucial positions  – high-ranking positions or extremely delicate jobs in terms of 
national security, for example – may be reserved for nationals) and as self-employed, 
and the same applies to long-term economic migrants. The strongest restrictions 
exist for asylum seekers and short-term economic migrants, which may be explained 
by the precariousness of the status for the former and by the time element for 
the latter.
Considering the variables described so far, not all foreign workers can enjoy the 
very same rights and benefits as national workers. They may be excluded from 
certain positions because they are reserved for nationals, or because their 
qualifications and skills are not recognised or not fully recognised, or because they 
do not speak the language fluently enough, or because they have limited access to 
vocational training. Lowering the barriers that prevent MRAs from working as 
nationals do would release important energies and capacities that could positively 
contribute to host societies’ economic growth, social well-being and peaceful coex-
istence between populations.
1.3  More Barriers than Enablers? Concluding Remarks
Migrants, refugees and asylum applicants occupy a central position in public and 
political debates. The ‘migration issue’ has been the object of regular headlines in 
all the countries discussed in this chapter, and in the past 5 years much political 
tension at the EU level has stemmed from this topic. MRAs represent an asset for 
European ageing societies and their labour-demanding economies, as claimed by 
both academic and think tank literature (Benton et  al.  2014; OECD 2016; IMF 
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2016). Moreover, they have become central in the functioning of contemporary 
European societies, since without their contribution, for example in domestic work 
and care services, social structures would be very different (Ambrosini 2013). Yet, 
when we focus on their legal status, we realise that the central role migrants play in 
our societies does not reflect on their rights entitlements. On the contrary, most of 
them, in particular migrants with national temporary forms of protection, or awaiting 
an asylum decision, or living as undocumented people, hold a peripheral and often 
precarious position in terms of substantial rights and entitlements.
The comparative analysis of their right to be legally recognised the workers sta-
tus (and subsequently a permit to stay and to work) in the European countries dis-
cussed in this chapter on the one hand, and to have a number of other rights stemming 
from this – first of all the rights to work as nationals do – on the other, demonstrates 
the legal marginalization of MRAs in European jurisdictions, despite narratives of 
inclusiveness. Scholars describe this phenomenon as the “production of legal 
peripheries or places in which law as discursively represented and law lived are 
fundamentally at odds” (Chouinard 2001: 187). Similarly to spatial and geographi-
cal peripheries, legal peripheries may have a detrimental effect on the wellbeing of 
both the people populating, physically and metaphorically, the peripheries, and also 
those populating the centres. Analysing how the frontiers between centres and 
peripheries are being built and consolidated is one of the foci of our research, to 
point out possible strategies to empower MRAs and to advance those rights aiming 
at social inclusion and participation in the same spaces of life as nationals do.
The first, already understood but nevertheless disturbing, finding emerging from 
the analysis of the status quo of MRA-related legislation and of their rights and 
entitlements in the policy-domain of labour in the selected jurisdictions analyses 
here is the deep unevenness existing among countries. On the one hand, regardless 
of the European competence on asylum policy, there is no proper ‘Europeanization’ 
of asylum policy and law; immigration remains one of those domains in which 
states are reluctant to devolve their authority to supranational jurisdictions. Despite 
the numerous limitations to national sovereignty brought in by EU membership, the 
crucial state prerogative of modern, post-Westphalian statehood, that is the decision 
about who should be admitted into the state territory and with which entitlements, 
still holds when non-EU nationals and asylum seekers are at stake.
More specifically, the EU fundamental principle of non-discrimination in labour 
markets is at odds with the reality of MRAs because of both their differentiated 
legal statuses (as not all legal statuses give access to the same rights) and the 
different approaches that countries adopt concerning each migrant status. On the 
other hand, this lack of homogeneity among countries makes it difficult for people, 
both foreign workers and employers, to understand who has the right to do what, 
when, how and where in Europe. Moreover, legal uncertainty favours secondary 
movements, i.e. refugees and beneficiaries of humanitarian or subsidiary forms of 
protection moving from one host country to another in search for better life and 
working conditions (Moret et al. 2006), which is one of the phenomena the Dublin 
Convention in 1990 and the Dublin Regulations II and III aim to avoid. In turn, this 
makes the overall migration management more complex and difficult and it can 
1 Europe’s Legal Peripheries: Migration, Asylum and the European Labour Market
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provide arguments for political and social entrepreneurs willing to capitalise on 
anti-migration attitudes. In sum, the lack of homogeneity among EU member states 
about the rights associated to specific categories of migrants constitutes a barrier for 
MRAs integration in labour markets and societies, even though sometimes it may 
create comparative advantages for determined people or categories of people in 
given situations.
The second observation pertains to the complexity of the legal frameworks. In all 
countries examined here, the legal framework on labour market integration is the 
result of a complex and rapidly changing legislation and of an institutional landscape 
scattered in a multiplicity of actors at different levels of government, from 
supranational to local. Legal statuses do not equalise in terms of rights and benefits, 
so that being recognised as a refugee makes a difference in terms of general 
fundamental rights and in terms of both accessing the labour market and working as 
nationals do. Complexity is definitely not an enabler of integration and equality.
Thirdly, despite the differences among countries, if we compare legal statuses 
across types of migrants, in all the countries examined here we can see the creation 
of a hierarchy in terms of access to rights and therefore in terms of capacity and 
opportunity of integration. Refugees and, to a smaller extent, beneficiaries of sub-
sidiary protection and long-term economic migrants are at the top of the hierarchy, 
endowed with the broader and stronger sets of rights, including those related to 
accessing the labour market, workers’ rights and benefits. In other words, refugees, 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and long-term economic migrants are those 
who move closer to nationals concerning fundamental labour-related rights. 
However, the very important differences are that (a) they do not benefit from the 
freedom of movement across Europe, and (b) political rights, that fall beyond the 
remit of our analysis. Moreover, the legal status may allow refugees, beneficiaries 
of subsidiary protection and long-term economic migrants to benefit from further 
important opportunities of integration (language courses, vocational training) 
neglected by other types of migrant, strengthening their chances to join the labour 
market. This means that legal statuses play a crucial role in enabling people to 
become full members of the host societies and to contribute to the overall well- 
being of those societies through, among others, a full participation in national labour 
markets. At the bottom of the hierarchy we find irregular migrants, and just above 
them, asylum seekers, both categories of migrants with the most restrictive access 
to rights and entitlements allowing them to enter an integration path.
Legal statuses may have a strong empowering effect, and may reconcile the cen-
tre-periphery conflicts inherent to the hierarchy legal statuses create. Widening the 
access to these statuses or enlarging rights and benefits connected with other sta-
tuses would multiply the enabling effect of a legal status easing integration of for-
eign workers. It would also avoid the creation of a migrant winner-looser divide, 
which would be at odds with any human rights, and a solidarity-based understand-
ing of what a modern society should be.
V. Federico and S. Baglioni
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Chapter 2




Policy debate over immigration has intensified in a period characterised by global 
refugee crises and a wave of nationalist electoral victories. A body of literature has 
examined the reasons for the appeal of right- wing populist parties in Europe, high-
lighting the key role played by anti- immigrant attitudes and in general fears and 
concerns about immigration phenomena (Mudde 2011; Ivarsflaten 2008; Lucassen 
and Lubbers 2012). Indeed, migration is not a neutral issue from a political stand-
point: scholars stress the importance of new cultural issues, such as migration, for 
the mobilisation of political conflicts (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Kriesi et al. 2006). 
Ivarsflaten (2008), using data collected in 2002–2003 to explain support for far- -
right parties in seven European countries, finds that anti- immigrant sentiment and a 
desire for tougher restrictions on immigration is the common and prevailing factor 
which has driven support for far- right parties, compared to other grievances such as 
dissatisfaction with the economy and distrust of politicians and/or the EU. Lucassen 
and Lubbers (2012) using the same data – this time across 11 countries – find that 
perceived cultural threat (i.e. the perception that immigration and cultural diversity 
pose a threat to the country’s way of life) is a stronger predictor of support for far- -
right parties than perceived economic threat (i.e. the perception that immigration 
poses a threat to jobs and the economy). These findings are consistent with the idea 
that immigration issues are part of a new cultural cleavage emerging because of 
globalisation and integration processes: the integration- demarcation cleavage using 
Kriesi et al.’s terminology (2006) or the transnational cleavage according to Hooghe 
and Marks (2018).
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The interplay between a multiplicity of factors makes immigration a relevant 
issue on the public agenda. Scholars have focused mainly on three different factors: 
citizens’ attitudes to immigration and issue salience (Gilligan 2015); issue entrepre-
neurship by radical right parties or moderate centre- right parties (Van Spanje 2010; 
Hobolt and De Vries 2015); and socio- economic factors such as the unemployment 
rate, migration patterns and models of integration (Green- Pedersen and Otjes 2017; 
Van der Brug et  al. 2015). The increasing politicisation of immigration issues is 
relevant to explain not only citizens’ voting behaviour and party competition, but 
also policy outcomes. Although the restrictiveness of migration policies is driven by 
factors such as economic growth, unemployment and recent immigration levels (de 
Haas and Natter 2015), political factors are noteworthy explanatory variables, too 
(Abou- Chadi 2016). In particular, the rise of populist right- wing parties in recent 
years has strongly influenced immigration policies in two ways: on the one hand, 
populist right- wing parties have come to power (for example in Italy, Austria, 
Poland), on the other their electoral rise has influenced the positions and policies of 
mainstream parties (Van Spanje 2010; Abou- Chadi and Krause 2018).
Therefore, the starting point of this chapter is the idea that the determinants of 
immigration policies and labour market integration policies concerning migrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers (MRAs) might include not only changes in economic 
conditions, but also shifts in power among political actors and the salience of issues 
on the political agenda (namely, perceptions about migration and immigrants).
This chapter aims to investigate whether policy measures on migration across 
seven European countries (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, 
Switzerland and the UK) vary according to different political conditions at country 
level. It relies on the most recent data from both existing comparative datasets on 
public opinion (European Social Survey, Eurobarometer)1 and a comparative data-
base we built for the SIRIUS research,2 which includes a systematic set of macro- -
level indicators spanning the time period 2010–2017. Thus, the chapter will compare 
and contrast the main features of the immigration and labour market integration 
policies for MRAs in the selected countries in light of both current data on MRAs 
stocks and flows in each national context, along with a number of indicators related 
to perceptions about migration and migrants and features of the political context 
(e.g. electoral strength of populist radical right parties, ideological configuration of 
political space).
As we will see in more detail in Chap. 3, in recent years the immigration policies 
of SIRIUS countries have been characterised by narrowing access to both interna-
tional protection and legal entry for working reasons, although these countries are 
diverse in terms of socio- economic conditions, previous and current levels of MRAs 
and welfare state regimes. Hence, the hypothesis is that in recent years political 
1 For the analysis in this chapter, we relied on the last available data. The latter vary between 2017 
and 2019 depending on the indicators.
2 Horizon 2020 research project coordinated by the Glasgow Caledonian University on the topic 
“Skills and Integration of Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Applicants in European Labour 
Markets” (Grant Agreement n. 77051), https://www.sirius- project.eu/
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factors are more relevant to explain the law and policy- making on immigration 
issues carried out in a similar fashion in such different European contexts, rather 
than the actual number of MRAs, their integration process or the effective European 
societies’ demographic and economic needs, within each national context. More 
precisely, we hypothesise that if actual numbers of MRAs are still relatively low in 
the selected European countries despite the recent refugee crisis, then the adoption 
of restrictive policies on immigration can be better explained by political factors, 
listed as follows: prevalence of negative attitudes towards immigration among 
European citizens and salience of immigration issue; political relevance of populist 
radical- right parties who mostly mobilized on immigration issues and significant 
diffusion of their authoritarian/traditionalist/nationalist positions within each coun-
try’s party system. The underlying idea is that vote- maximising parties are condi-
tioned by public attitudes on immigration and issue salience, which in turn are 
shaped by the political entrepreneurship of radical right parties or, at least, by mod-
erate centre- right parties (Van Spanje 2010; Hobolt and De Vries 2015). In particu-
lar, the (eventual) spreading in European party systems of authoritarian/traditionalist/
nationalist positions (Hooghe and Marks 2018), which are strictly linked to the 
aforementioned new cultural cleavage between supporters of cultural demarcation 
and international integration (Kriesi et al. 2006), can be seen as a signal of the previ-
ously mentioned influence of populist- radical parties on the positions and immigra-
tion policies of mainstream parties (Van Spanje 2010; Abou- Chadi and Krause 
2018). This hypothesis is tested by contrasting legislative and policy measures on 
migration and integration issues with the numbers of MRAs in each national con-
text, as well with the above- mentioned political features. Hence, the chapter is 
structured as follows: first, it provides a general picture of the legislative and policy 
measures on migration and integration issues carried out in the selected European 
countries. Secondly, it presents and discusses the numbers of MRAs in each national 
context. Thirdly, citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards immigration and 
salience of the immigration issue in each national context are analysed, along with 
the electoral strength of populist radical right parties and ideological configuration 
of the political space in terms of party positions on the cultural libertarian- -
authoritarian and economic left- right dimension. A concluding section follows.
2.2  Legislative and Policy Measures on Migration 
and Integration Issues
The results of integration policies should be seen in conjunction with the immigra-
tion policies that try to limit or encourage migration and manage migrants. 
Nevertheless, labour market integration policies and immigration policies are cre-
ated with different goals in mind, and enforced by different sets of bureaucracies. 
Immigration policy is a widely used term, although often not clearly defined. Similar 
terms include migration regulation, control and restriction. A recent definition 
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describes immigration policy as: “government’s statements of what it intends to do 
or not do (including laws, regulations, decisions or orders) in regards to the selec-
tion, admission, settlement and deportation of foreign citizens residing in the coun-
try” (Bjerre et  al. 2015: 559). Immigration policies therefore involve controlling 
borders, selecting new arrivals and maintaining national security, but cover also 
other areas including the labour market, integration, and humanitarian/asylum, fam-
ily, co- ethnic, and irregular migration. Integration policies therefore are linked to 
immigration policies, but are more narrowly defined as “policies or programmes 
aimed at integrating immigrants into host society” (UN 2017). According to 
Goodman (2015: 12), integration policy is defined as member- enabling: “the state 
lowers itself to accommodate, promote, and alter the life changes of the immigrant”. 
Integration policies include: anti- discrimination, access to labour market, family 
reunification, political participation, education rights (Migration Policy Group 
2011). Likewise, integration policies are classified by Schibel et al. (2002) accord-
ing to the related functional domain: education, employment, housing, health or 
community development. A series of OECD publications (OECD 2007, 2008, 2012) 
focuses on the labour market integration of immigrants. In this regard, integration 
policies are involved with training, advising and matching employees with jobs that 
ideally take under consideration the interests of both the MRAs themselves to find 
work and of employers to find the needed employees (and governments, in making 
the welfare system sustainable from the point of view of public finances).
Despite being different, immigration and integration policies can influence each 
other, with, for instance, employers being prevented from recruiting the employees 
they need, or with asylum- seekers forced into inactivity while awaiting their asylum 
requests. In other words, it is clear that a tightening of immigration policies can both 
reduce the scope of integration policies (for instance, by reducing the number of 
allowed foreign workers or refugees, restricting family reunification, and so forth) 
and make them more difficult (for instance, this occurs when the procedures for 
renewing the permit to stay are complicated or when certain categories of migrants 
such as asylum seekers are not allowed to work).
2.2.1  Immigration Policies: Narrowing the Access 
and Limiting Legal Rights
As we will see in more detail in Chap. 3, in recent years, the immigration policies 
of SIRIUS countries have been characterised by narrowing the access to both inter-
national protection and legal entry for working reasons. Raising physical and legal 
barriers to foreigners’ entry went hand in hand with political discourses on migra-
tion, which tend to blend asylum seekers, economic migrants and irregular migrants. 
Reflecting narratives that question, for instance, the sincerity of asylum claims, 
restrictive asylum policies have been enacted. Furthermore, the restrictive trend is 
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further aggravated in the field of the economic migration, where the state power to 
select and control who can entry and stay is affirmed even more resolutely.
The narrowing of access is pursued through physical restrictions (migrant push-
backs –either at the borders as all SIRIUS countries experienced or at the sea – as it 
is the case in Italy and Greece; increasing border controls – best exemplified by the 
Swiss case- ; physical conditions on application lodging –for example since 2002 
asylum seekers can only lodge an application on Danish soil), and, through proce-
dural restrictions concerning reforms of both international protection procedures 
(hotspots, ‘safe third countries’, admissibility test, accelerated asylum procedures, 
suppression of levels of guarantees) and the reduction of the quota for foreign 
workers.
The restrictive domestic asylum proceedings have found a legal basis in the EU 
asylum acquis, in particular implementing procedures provided by the recast 
Asylum Procedures Directive.3 These legal and procedural devices, originally cre-
ated with the goal of favouring greater efficiency in the management of migration 
and, particularly, in the refugee status determination process, in practice seem to 
also foster aims of containment and control of flows, resulting in curtailing access 
to the international procedure (Zetter 2007).
Moreover, as already discussed in Chap. 1, MRAs have also faced a legal mar-
ginalization in SIRIUS jurisdictions, namely as regards their right both to be legally 
recognised a status (and subsequently a permit to stay), and to have a number of 
other rights deriving from their status –in primis the right to work and the right to 
do it as nationals do.
2.2.2  Labour Market Integration Policies: More Barriers 
Than Enablers
Labour market integration policies in SIRIUS countries are characterised by more 
barriers than enablers (Bontenbal and Lillie 2019). Barriers to the labour market 
integration of migrants are similar across SIRIUS countries, and include ineffective 
administrative and legal structures, lack of recognition of skills and qualifications 
acquired in the home countries, lack of language skills, lack of needed skills and 
competences, lack of networks, labour exploitation, discrimination, a general atmo-
sphere of xenophobia in society and (perceived) cultural barriers. The level of 
resources for integration programmes varies significantly across countries. This is 
due in part to the general level of resources dedicated to active labour market poli-
cies: if more resources are devoted to active labour market policy and social welfare 
generally, then there is more for MRAs as well. Hence, the national labour market 
3 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on com-
mon procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), OJ 2013 L180/60. 
The Directive recast Council Directive 2005/85/EC.
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structure and the model of welfare regime play a role (Banting 2000). In this regard, 
Nekby (2008) concludes that the same types of activation labour market policies 
work for immigrants as for the general population of unemployed workers. 
Conversely, other scholars (Rinne 2013) conclude that interventions such as work 
experience and wage subsidy programmes seem most effective: “programs that are 
relatively closely linked to the labor market (for example, work experience and 
wage subsidies) appear the comparatively most effective programs” (Rinne 2013: 
548). In Nordic countries, Ho and Shirono (2015) find that the estimated effects of 
active labour market programme spending are much higher on foreign- born unem-
ployment than on native- born unemployment (although the latter is also reduced), 
so that the foreign- native gap is narrowed as a result. Furthermore, Nagayoshi and 
Hjerm (2015) discover that labour market policies in the form of activation policies 
affect attitudes toward immigration. Pro- immigration attitudes are more widespread 
in welfare states that introduce activation of labour market policies with a robust 
safety net, compared to welfare states that spend a large amount of the budget on 
passive labour market policies.
However, political climate plays a role as well, with cuts to programmes fostered 
by anti- immigrant politics. The importance of political factors is well exemplified 
by the different policies pursued by two countries with similar and generous welfare 
state regimes: Sweden and Denmark. According to Schierup et al. (2006), Sweden 
provides a generous welfare state to both its natives and immigrants, partly via the 
accessible process to get Swedish citizenship. Conversely, in Denmark access to 
welfare benefits is harder for immigrants compared to natives, and the employment 
rate remains lower for migrants than natives. The explanation is that migration pol-
icy has become a much more salient issue to gain votes in Denmark than in Sweden 
(Green- Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). This happened because “focusing on the 
immigration issue easily leads to a conflict with the centre- right, especially social 
liberal parties. In Sweden, such a conflict would undermine mainstream right- wing 
attempts at winning government power” (Green- Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 
610). Conversely, the Danish People’s Party has – in its role as an indispensable 
coalition partner for a non- socialist government – been able to carry out much of its 
anti- immigration agenda, including the introduction of dualist welfare policies (Bay 
et al. 2013). In other words, party competition determines this difference.
Cross- country differences regard both the entitlement of specific migrant groups 
to participate in labour integration programmes and the availability of specific ser-
vices. In some countries, such as in Finland and in Greece, programmes are offered 
to all job- seeking migrants. Conversely, in other countries, such as the Czech 
Republic and Denmark, they are mainly offered to newly arrived refugees. In the 
UK, programmes are only offered for resettled refugees, which have been chosen in 
collaboration with the UNHCR. There is also huge variation in the duration of inte-
gration programmes, which range between 5 years in the UK to a few courses last-
ing a few days in Switzerland (Bontenbal and Lillie 2019). In countries with 
well- structured integration training programmes, there is a pressure to shorten these, 
and include rapidly migrants and refugees into labour market, as exemplified by the 
Denmark’s relatively rigid ‘job first’. This may lead well- qualified migrants and 
N. Maggini
25
refugees to accept unqualified positions, with the risk of wasting human capital in 
the long term. Finally, the long processing time of the asylum applications and the 
enforced inactivity of the application period – in a number of jurisdictions asylum 
applicants do not have the right to work – is a problem, both for the integration into 
the labour market of asylum seekers with good chances of having their applications 
accepted, and from the perspective of public finances.
2.3  Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Applicants: 
The Numbers
So far, we have seen how policies are characterised by many barriers to the integra-
tion of MRAs into the labour market. Chapter 3 shows how immigration laws and 
policies in the analysed countries have had a restrictive turn in recent years. Is this 
restrictive legal and policy framework ‘justified’ by the real numbers related to the 
stock and flows of MRAs in European countries? On the one hand, it is true that 
during the 2000–2017 period, the international migrant stock grew worldwide by an 
average of 2.3%. In absolute values, it means that since 2000 the estimated number 
of international migrants has been constantly increasing in the whole planet, reach-
ing 258 million in 2017. On the other hand, the share of international migrants in 
proportion to the world’s population has remained relatively stable in the last four 
decades, fluctuating from 2.2 to 3.5% (UN 2017). International migrations show 
different patterns: the share of migrants residing in high- income countries increased 
from 9.6% in 2000 to 14% in 2017, and high- income countries host 64% of the total 
number of international migrants worldwide, but the picture reverses if we consider 
solely refugees and asylum seekers. They are about 26 million, representing slightly 
more than 10% of the total migrant population. Eighty- four per cent of them are 
hosted in low and middle- income countries (UN 2017). Therefore, high- income and 
low and middle- income countries face different challenges in migration manage-
ment. In the present volume, the focus is on the first group, but keeping in mind that 
this is just a partial perspective on a broader, much more complex and diverse 
phenomenon.
The recent increase of the migrant population affected especially people of work-
ing age: in 2017, about 74% of all international migrants were between 20 and 
64 years of age, compared to 57% of the global population falling in the same age 
group. This means that, in principle, a net inflow of migrants decreases the propor-
tion of inactive population (children and elderly people), with positive effects for 
the host country’s economy and welfare. In particular, scholars have highlighted 
how migrants in the working age, being net contributors to public finances, will be 
fundamental in sustaining fiscal revenues, needed to maintain publicly funded pen-
sion schemes in a context characterised by ageing population (Storesletten 2003). 
Relying on generational accounting approaches, several studies find net fiscal gains 
from immigrants in different European countries, for instance in Spain (Collado 
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et al. 2004), in France (Chojnicki 2013), in Austria (Mayr 2005) and, especially as 
regards high- skilled immigrants, in the UK (Lee and Miller 2000) and in Sweden 
(Storesletten 2003).
Narrowing the analysis to Europe, we should highlight that there were 17.6 mil-
lion persons living in one of the EU Member States on 1 January 2018 with the citi-
zenship of another EU Member State, whereas third- country nationals residing in 
an EU Member State amounted to 22.4 million, equal to 4.4% of the population of 
the EU- 28 (Eurostat 2019).4 In terms of flows, 4.4 million people immigrated to one 
of the EU- 28 Member States during 2017, including flows between EU Member 
States. Among these 4.4 million immigrants, people of non- EU countries amounted 
to 2.0 million, EU citizens amounted to 2.3 million and stateless people were around 
11 thousand. These are not particularly high numbers, considering that the EU pop-
ulation is over 500 million people.
Moreover, in recent years, immigration has contributed to EU population change. 
This is indeed determined by two components: the natural population change – spe-
cifically the difference between the number of live births and deaths in a given 
year – and the net migration – precisely the difference between the number of immi-
grants and the number of emigrants. As reported by Fig. 2.1, since the mid- 1980s 
4 For sake of comparability, it has been decided to use Eurostat data in this section.




net migration has increased, and from the beginning of the 1990s onwards the value 
of net migration and statistical adjustment has always been higher than that of natu-
ral change. Between 2016 and 2018, the net migration change (plus statistical 
adjustment) was even higher than the total change. Conversely, since the mid- 1980s 
the natural change in the population decreased: the number of deaths increased, the 
number of live births decreased. The difference between live births and deaths nar-
rowed significantly from 1961 onwards and deaths outnumbered live births in 2015, 
2017 and 2018 resulting in a natural decrease in the population. The increase in 
population recorded between 2016 and 2018 was therefore due to net migration and 
statistical adjustment. Migration is thus fundamental to explain population change 
in the EU and during the past three decades population growth have been mainly 
driven by net migration. This trend is likely to persist in the future, given that the 
number of deaths is expected to increase because of the aging of the baby- boom 
generation.
If we look at immigration flows both from outside the EU and between EU coun-
tries, in 2017 a total of around 1.4 million people immigrated to one of the SIRIUS 
countries, with UK reporting the largest amount (644,209) and Finland the smallest 
(31,797) (Table 2.1).
Among the 1.4 million who migrated to one of the selected European countries 
in 2017, almost one million people (731,196) were from a non- EU country, with a 
constant increase over time. Again, the UK reports the largest number of non- EU 
immigrants (320,669), whereas Finland shows the smallest number (16,480) 
(Table 2.2). As regards migration stocks (Table 2.3), overall, more than eight mil-
lion non- EU nationals live in one of the SIRIUS countries in 2018 (1.6% of total EU 
population), 221,911 more than in 2014. The largest number is recorded in Italy 
(3,581,561), whereas among SIRIUS countries Finland hosts the smallest number 
(148,491).
If we look at the share of non- nationals in the resident population of 1 January 
2018 (see Fig. 2.2), Switzerland shows the highest share of non- nationals (25.1%), 
whereas Finland and the Czech Republic show the lowest shares (4.5% and 4.9%, 
respectively). The UK, Italy, Denmark and (to a lesser extent) Greece show very 
similar percentages (between 9% and 7.6%). However, if took into account only 
non- EU foreigners, the percentage in Switzerland drops, although it is still the high-
est among the SIRIUS countries (8.6%). Moreover, shares of non- EU foreigners in 
Table 2.1 Total number of immigrants in SIRIUS countries, 2013–2017 (thousands)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Czech Republic 30,124 29,897 29,602 64,083 51,847
Denmark 60,312 68,388 78,492 74,383 68,579
Greece 57,946 59,013 64,446 116,867 112,247
Italy 307,454 277,631 280,078 300,823 343,440
Finland 31,941 31,507 28,746 34,905 31,797
United Kingdom 526,046 631,991 631,452 588,993 644,209
Switzerland 160,157 156,282 153,627 149,305 143,377
Source: Eurostat
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Italy (5.9%) and Greece (5.6%) are higher than in UK (3.7%). Overall, however, 
non- EU nationals represents less than 10% of the resident population in each of the 
SIRIUS countries, contrary to the narrative about an ‘invasion’ of Europe. Many 
far- right parties in the last years have indeed campaigned showing ads like “stop the 
invasion!” or “secure our borders!”.5 However, as shown by the numbers we have 
presented so far and by previous empirical research (De Haas 2008), the reality is 
different.
Concerning the permits to stay – namely those authorisations issued by a coun-
try’s authorities allowing non- EU nationals to legally stay on its territory – Table 2.4 
clusters them by reason for issue. In 2017, slightly more than 3.1 million permits 
were released. The majority were issued for employment reasons (1.01 million; 
32.2%) followed by family reasons (829,922; 26.5%), other reasons (766,798; 
24.5%) – that include stays without the right to work or international protection – 
and education- related reasons (529,994; 16.9%). Therefore, Europe, despite the 
5 See https://www.euronews.com/2018/03/28/hungary- government- s- new- anti- immigration- ad- 
copies- ukip- s- controversial- anti- migrant- post; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/27/
world/europe/europe- migrant- crisis- change.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/world/
europe/sweden- immigration- nationalism.html
Table 2.2 Number of non- EU arrivals in SIRIUS countries, 2013–2017 (migration flows in 
thousands)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Czech Republic 10,780 9386 10,619 29,902 30,725
Denmark 19,624 24,482 32,256 28,559 23,054
Greece 16,313 13,539 17,492 69,497 63,324
Italy 201,536 180,271 186,522 200,217 239,953
Finland 13,183 13,568 13,108 19,638 16,480
United Kingdom 248,464 287,136 278,587 265,390 320,669
Switzerland 37,247 35,713 37,382 37,585 36,991
Source: Eurostat
Table 2.3 Number of non- EU nationals living in SIRIUS countries, 2014–2018 (migration stocks 
in thousands)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Czech Republic 261,302 272,993 280,907 302,579 296,072
Denmark 233,023 244,380 267,192 274,990 284,537
Greece 662,335 623,246 591,693 604,813 604,904
Italy 3,479,566 3,521,825 3,508,429 3,509,089 3,581,561
Finland 121,882 127,792 133,136 143,757 148,491
United Kingdom 2,425,012 2,434,209 2,436,046 2,444,555 2,425,737




recent economic crisis, continues to exercise a great pulling factor because of its 
ability to absorb work.
As far as statistics on asylum are concerned, the total number of asylum applica-
tions in the EU from non- EU nationals amounts to 638,240 in 2018, approximately 
half the number registered in 2015 and 2016, when applications amounted to 
1,322,845 and 1,260,910 respectively (Fig.  2.3). Therefore, asylum applications 
reached their peaks in 2015 and 2016, when the EU witnessed an unprecedented 
influx of refugees and migrants, most of them fleeing from war in Syria. Considering 
the nationality of asylum applicants in 2018 (Eurostat 2019), most arrived from 
contexts affected by years of generalized violence, insecurity, authoritarian regimes, 
etc. (e.g., the first six countries of origin are, in descending order, Syria, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria). This suggests that they will probably not come back 
soon. Therefore, it becomes appropriate to draw up strategies for their active inte-
gration into the labour market.
In the 2013–2018 period, the highest number of first instance decisions was 
issued in 2016 (1,106,395) (see Table 2.5). Out of the total number of decisions 
issued, 672,890 (61%) had a positive outcome. Furthermore, 366,470 (54%) posi-
tive decisions granted refugee status; 50,980 (8%) granted an authorisation to stay 
for humanitarian reasons; and 255,440 (38%) decided for subsidiary protection. It 
is worth mentioning that humanitarian status is specific to national legislations, 
Fig. 2.2 Share of non- nationals in the resident population, 1 January 2018 (%). (Source: Eurostat)
Table 2.4 First residence permits issued by reason, 2013–2017 (thousands)
Family Education Employment Other Total
2013 671,572 463,943 534,214 686,722 2,356,451
2014 680,388 476,845 573,321 595,423 2,325,977
2015 760,231 525,858 707,632 628,301 2,622,022
2016 780,429 499,775 854,715 889,622 3,024,541
2017 829,922 529,994 1,009,427 766,798 3,136,141
Source: Eurostat
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contrary to refugee status and subsidiary protection status which are defined by EU 
law. As for 2018, the total number of first instance decisions dropped to 581,735. 
Out of these decisions, 217,405 (37%) were positive, of which 122,070 (56%) 
granted refugee status.
As regards final decisions (i.e. those decisions taken by administrative or judicial 
bodies in appeal or in review and which are no longer subject to remedy), in 2018, 
308,830 decisions were issued, of which 115,925 (38%) were positive (Table 2.6). 
Fig. 2.3 Asylum applications (non- EU) in the EU, 2008–2018 (thousands). (Source: Eurostat)









2013 49,670 12,505 45,435 107,610 206,625 314,235
2014 95,380 15,710 56,295 167,385 199,470 366,850
2015 229,460 23,290 54,900 307,650 289,005 596,655
2016 366,470 50,980 255,440 672,890 433,505 1,106,395
2017 218,560 63,650 155,345 437,555 524,055 961,610




In particular, 41,720 (36%) resulted in grants of refugee status, 35,800 (31%) 
granted humanitarian status, and 38,410 (33%) granted subsidiary protection.
It is interesting to focus on 2018 data to highlight the success rate of international 
protection applications in SIRIUS countries, focusing on first instance decisions. 
Table 2.7 shows, on the left side, the total number of positive decisions about all 
international protection applications (including Geneva convention status, humani-
tarian status, subsidiary protection status) and their success rate; on the right side of 
the table positive decisions granting only the Geneva convention status (i.e. refugee 
status) and the related success rate are reported. As regards decisions granting any 
type of international protection, Switzerland is by far the country with the highest 
success rate (89.6%), followed by Finland (54.2%) and Denmark (50.1%). 
Conversely, the lowest success rate is definitely the Czech Republic (11.2%). 
Relatively lower rates also characterise Italy (32.2%) and the UK (35%). Greece lies 
in between (47%). People applying in Switzerland and in the Czech Republic might 
have different characteristics and different life paths, but such a wide gap in the suc-
cess rate is likely to also depend on different legal provisions and the interpretation 
of protection standards (for more details on this, see Chap. 3).









2013 14,845 5350 4480 24,675 109,965 134,640
2014 15,990 5415 4795 26,195 109,835 136,030
2015 18,110 4640 3650 26,400 152,900 179,300
2016 23,660 8275 10,700 42,630 188,355 230,985
2017 49,590 31,140 14,580 95,310 186,235 281,545
2018 41,720 38,410 35,800 115,925 192,905 308,830
Source: Eurostat
Table 2.7 International protections applications: success rate of all forms of international 
protection and success rate of refugee status in 2018 (first instance decisions)
Number of 
applications
Decisions granting any form of 
international protection











1385 155 11.2% 40 2.9%
Denmark 2625 1315 50.1% 825 31.4%
Finland 4440 2405 54.2% 1765 39.8%
Greece 32,340 15,210 47.0% 12,635 39.1%
Italy 95,210 30,670 32.2% 6490 6.8%
Switzerland 17,000 15,225 89.6% 6190 36.4%
UK 28,860 10,100 35.0% 7650 26.5%
Source: own calculations on Eurostat data
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Differences among SIRIUS countries become even wider when taking into 
account only the positive decisions granting refugee status and not considering 
other forms of protection, as shown by the right side of Table 2.7. Figures drop dra-
matically and vary from 39.8% in Finland and 39.1% in Greece to 2.9% in the 
Czech Republic. The country where the difference is minimal is Greece, whereas 
the maximum difference is in Switzerland. This means that in Greece the over-
whelmingly majority of positive decisions granted refugee status, whereas in 
Switzerland other forms of international protection prevailed. Indeed, other Eurostat 
data6 show that in Greece national forms of temporary protection are minimal, 
whereas in Switzerland refugee status is granted less than humanitarian protection 
(and even less considering also subsidiary protection). The second largest difference 
between success rate of any form of international protection and refugee status’ suc-
cess rate is shown by Italy, signalling that in 2018 other forms of international pro-
tection prevailed over refugee status. In particular, according to Eurostat data,7 
humanitarian protection status was by far the most granted form of protection.8 In 
the other countries, there is a greater balance between decisions that guarantee refu-
gee status and those that guarantee other forms of international protection, with a 
prevalence of the refugee status protection in UK, Finland and Denmark and a prev-
alence of the other forms of international protection (especially subsidiary 
protection)9 in the Czech Republic. Clearly, not all statuses are entitled to the same 
rights and benefits, as shown by Chaps. 1 and 3. Differences may be significant, 
with a relevant impact on people’s lives. In general, these data confirm the restric-
tive turn discussed in previous section.
The data we have presented so far denies once again the rhetoric of ‘the inva-
sion’. All the countries we analyzed are selective and rigid in granting international 
protection. Of course, a different discourse can be created about the fate of people 
who are denied status. Many of them, indeed, are ordered to leave the country, but 
few are actually repatriated and become illegal, with all the negative consequences 
that this fact can have for migrants themselves and host countries. This is the real 
problem that EU countries are not able to solve, and it has shown by statistics on the 
enforcement of immigration legislation presented in Table 2.8. On the one hand, the 
number of non- EU citizens who were refused entry into the EU, after a decline in 
2014, increased between 2014 and 2018, reaching its peaks in 2017 and 2018 
(439,505 and 471,155, respectively), confirming again the increasingly restrictive 
approach adopted by most EU governments. On the other, the highest number of 
non- EU citizens found to be illegally present was recorded in 2015 (2,154,675). In 
6 See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/images/f/f7/Asylum_statistics_
YB19_10_05_2019.xlsx
7 See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/images/f/f7/Asylum_statistics_
YB19_10_05_2019.xlsx
8 These data are clearly destined to change radically in the near future because the recent decree n. 
113/2018 (the so- called Salvini decree) has abolished humanitarian protection.




the same year, not surprisingly, it was registered the highest number of non- EU 
nationals who were ordered to leave the territory of one of the EU countries 
(533,395), but only slightly more than one fifth of them (196,190 third country 
nationals) were returned to their country of origin outside the EU.  In 2016, this 
number increased to 228,995 non- EU citizens, whereas in the following years this 
number decreased, thus signalling how the increasingly restrictive immigration 
measures have not gone hand in hand with the capacity to effectively implement 
repatriations. Over time, indeed, those who are returned to a non- EU country are 
only a small share of those ordered to leave. This means that the tightening of immi-
gration policies did not impede the presence of ‘illegal’ migrants within EU coun-
tries, despite ‘fighting illegal immigration’ being often the declared purpose of 
many governments. On the contrary, a restrictive approach can be seen as one of the 
causes of illegal entry: restricting legal entry may have prompted many immigrants 
to apply for asylum as the only legal access route, but many have been denied inter-
national protection, actually making them illegal. In this regard, scholars have 
talked about implementation gap and efficacy gap (Czaika and De Haas 2013). As 
regards the first, research has revealed that implementation gaps can be significant 
(e.g. Wunderlich 2010), especially when immigration policies on paper are unreal-
istic or not related to concrete migration experiences. The efficacy gap reflects the 
fact that efforts by states to regulate and restrict immigration have often failed 
(Bhagwati 2003; Castles 2004; Düvell 2005) because of unintended effects, for 
instance on other migration flows: rather than having an impact on the overall vol-
ume of inflows, immigration restrictions would mostly change the channel of access 
of immigrants, such as through an increased use of family migration or irregular 
means of entry. De Haas (2011) calls this reorientation toward other legal or illegal 
channels of immigration the categorical substitution effect. The low effectiveness of 
restrictive immigration policies is explained by structural determinants in origin and 
destination countries (such as labour market imbalances) as well as by the internal 
dynamics of migration networks and systems (Czaika and De Haas 2013). This 
explains why (illegal) migration often does not stop despite the tightening of bor-
ders control.
Table 2.8 Non- EU citizens subject to the enforcement of immigration legislation, 2013–2018 
(thousands)
Refused entry Illegally present Ordered to leave Returned to a non- EU country
2013 326,320 452,270 430,450 184,765
2014 286,805 672,215 470,080 170,415
2015 297,860 2,154,675 533,395 196,190
2016 388,280 983,860 493,790 228,995
2017 439,505 618,775 516,115 189,855
2018 471,155 601,500 478,155 157,895
Source: Eurostat
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2.4  Citizens’ Attitudes and Political Context
The demographic data presented so far show that MRAs stocks and flows are rela-
tively low – apart from the 2015/16 refugee flow’s peak (which in any case involved 
a few million people out of a European population of 550 million) – and do not 
justify the worsening of political discourse and the consequent exacerbation of the 
norms and of the policies. Against these numbers, therefore, it is worth looking at 
other data to analyse and comprehend the legislative and policy measures under-
taken by public authorities of SIRIUS countries in recent years. In particular, in 
order to test our hypothesis that legislative and policy measures on immigration are 
mainly driven by political factors rather than by the numbers of immigration flows 
and stocks, it is important to investigate citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards 
immigration and the main features of the political context (electoral strength of the 
radical right, mean distribution of parties along the relevant dimensions of the polit-
ical space) in which policy- makers have adopted their decisions. In recent years, in 
fact, immigration has been placed at the centre of the public agenda by political 
entrepreneurs who use it for electoral purposes: in this regard, scholars have stressed 
the relevance of new cultural issues such as migration for the mobilisation of politi-
cal conflicts (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Kriesi et  al. 2006) and for the success of 
right- wing populist parties (Mudde 2011). Before analysing the main indicators of 
the political context that may have influenced policy measures on immigration, it is 
important to look first at the configuration of public opinion relying on available 
survey data. These data deal with both perceptions concerning immigration and 
salience of the immigration issue. The idea, indeed, is that the magnitude of anti- -
immigration attitudes and the perceived salience of the issue are both elements that 
can lead political entrepreneurs to strategically emphasise this issue during the elec-
toral campaigns with potentially rewarding results in electoral terms, as highlighted 
in previous studies (Emanuele et al. 2019). Furthermore, public opinion data are 
important not only to understand party competition and electoral results, but also 
public policy. Indeed, the effect of public opinion on public policy is contingent on 
public issue salience: salience enhances the impact of public opinion (Burstein 2003).
We start with European citizens’ perceptions of inflows of foreign population as 
a positive or negative social factor. In particular, we have analysed the feelings of 
citizens from SIRIUS EU countries towards the immigration of non- EU people in 
the 2014–2019 time span according to Eurobarometer surveys (Switzerland data are 
unfortunately missing). If we look at the last available data (June 2019),10 the most 
remarkable result is that positive attitudes prevail over negative ones only in the UK 
(57% vs. 32%, see Fig. 2.4), whereas in all other countries negative perceptions are 
more widespread, with the Czech Republic showing the most negative attitudes 
(82%, see Fig. 2.5). If we consider trends over time, we can notice that negative 





observe a common increase of very negative feelings in 2015, namely during the 
so- called refugee crisis. This pattern characterises (almost) all the analysed 
countries,11 with some nuances: in Greece the highest increase occurred in 2018 
(reaching the same high level of fairly negative attitudes), in Italy negative feelings 
are quite stable over time (with a decrease of very negative feelings after 2016 and 
especially after 2018, counterbalanced by an increase of fairly negative feelings). 
The UK, again, is the exception: since 2016, both kinds of negative attitudes have 
decreased (with a slight increase in 2019), whereas positive attitudes have increased, 
overcoming the previous ones (see Fig. 2.4).
These findings are confirmed if we analyse other attitudes towards immigrants/
immigration retrieved from the SIRIUS dataset, which includes data from Standard 
Eurobarometer and European Social Survey (see Table  2.9). Relevant shares of 
European citizens think that immigrants make their country a worse place to live12: 
in each country, at least around 20–25% of citizens share this opinion between 2010 
and 2016, with a 75.2% peak in Greece in 2010. The Czech Republic and Italy are 
the countries that show the highest increase of such a negative perception of immi-
grants over time: in the latter, this negative attitude moved form 43.1% of 2012 to 
59% of 2016, whereas in the former the percentage declined from 54.3% in 2010 to 
50.4% in 2012 and then constantly increased reaching the peak of 60.6% in 2016. 
Conversely, the UK is the country facing the highest decrease in this negative per-
ception, moving from 43.8% in 2010 to 29.2% in 2016. Similar results can be 
noticed if we examine the share of respondents who believe that own country’s 
11 See https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/
lineChart//themeKy/59/groupKy/279/savFile/911
12 “Immigrants make country worse or better place to live”: percentage of respondents who take 
positions from 0 to 4 on a 0–10 scale where 0 means “worse place to live” and 10 “better place 
to live”.
Fig. 2.4 Citizens’ feelings about immigration of people outside the EU. (Source: Eurobarometer 87)
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cultural life is undermined by immigrants13 and that immigration is bad for the 
economy.14 In Denmark and in Finland, concerns that the economy is being jeopar-
dized by immigrants are higher than the perceived cultural damages that could come 
from incorporating more newcomers, while in the remaining countries culture- -
based fears prevail over economic ones. Probably, in the two Nordic countries, this 
result might be explained by citizens’ fear that the traditional welfare state model 
which underpins their societies could be jeopardized by the arrival of foreigners. 
Already in the late 1980s, Freeman (1986) highlighted the difficult relationship 
between generous welfare policies and immigration. More recently, Alesina and 
Glaeser (2004) have argued that the increasing arrivals of ethnically distinct, poor 
immigrants within society characterised by high social spending and ethnic and 
racial homogeneity has favoured the rise of an anti- immigrant rhetoric with poten-
tial negative consequences also on redistributive policies. Conversely, Bay et  al. 
(2013) have found that in Norway and Denmark the widespread perception that 
immigrants are less committed to work than the majority population is positively 
correlated with preferences for redistribution, although support is for welfare dual-
ism. Other studies have shown how generous welfare spending tends to strengthen 
support for restrictive immigration policies (Faist 1996).
Despite the cross- country differences in terms of strength and trends of negative 
attitudes towards both immigration and immigrants, the salience, or ‘perceived 
13 “Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants”: percentage of respondents who 
take positions from 0 to 4 on a 0–10 scale where 0 means “cultural life is undermined” and 10 
“cultural life enriched”.
14 “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy”: percentage of respondents who take posi-
tions from 0 to 4 on a 0–10 scale where 0 means “bad for the economy” and 10 “good for the 
economy”.
Fig. 2.5 Citizens’ feelings about immigration of people outside the EU). (Source: Eurobarometer)
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2010 12.7 54.3 53.5 56.46
2011 11.9 . . .
2012 7.9 50.4 49.4 53.19
2013 11.7 . . .
2014 21.3 58.0 56.3 62.05
2015 43.9 . . .
2016 67.0 60.6 63.1 52.17
2017 53.6 . . .
Denmark 2010 14.6 20.4 21.8 31.66
2011 26.4 . . .
2012 8.6 18.6 21.8 34.38
2013 7.9 . . .
2014 20.6 23.3 27.1 35.59
2015 49.7 . . .
2016 71.2 . . .
2017 55.6 . . .
Finland 2010 12.8 25.8 10.1 32.35
2011 12.7 . . .
2012 9.9 21.9 7.1 28.39
2013 7.2 . . .
2014 14.9 24.1 11.6 32.05
2015 24.1 . . .
2016 47.7 23.7 10.6 28.65
2017 33.3 . . .
Greece 2010 9.7 75.2 68.1 68.76
2011 15.2 . . .
2012 10.9 . . .
2013 10.1 . . .
2014 18.1 . . .
2015 26.6 . . .
2016 40.5 . . .
2017 32.4 . . .
Italy 2010 14.8 . . .
2011 27.2 . . .
2012 5.3 43.1 29.4 33.65
2013 6.6 . . .
2014 24.8 . . .
2015 43.3 . . .
2016 43.8 59.0 46.4 48.57
2017 40.4 . . .
(continued)
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importance’,15 of immigration as a policy matter is a common feature in all SIRIUS 
countries (data for Switzerland in this case are not available). Indeed, Table  2.9 
shows that the saliency of immigration has experienced a sharp uptick after 2013, 
reaching a peak in all countries in 2016, when it was the most important issue for 
67% of Czechs, 71.2% of Danes, 47.7% of Finns, 40.5% of Greeks, 43.8% of 
Italians and 51.3% of Britons. In 2017, in all countries there has been a decline in 
the perceived importance of the immigration issue, albeit continuing to be salient 
for relevant shares of respondents (ranging from a minimum of 32.4% in Greece to 
a maximum of 55.6% in Denmark).
As previously mentioned, data about the salience of the issue are important 
because they can have a significant effect on electoral behaviour: when voters per-
ceive immigration as highly prominent, those with pre- existing, latent, anti- -
immigration attitudes are more likely to switch their vote to populist radical right 
parties than when economic issues are considered more important (Dennison and 
Geddes 2018). To sum up, the data presented so far show that public opinion in 
SIRIUS countries represents a strong constraint for immigration policies: in fact, 
the immigration issue is very salient and negative attitudes towards immigration 
prevail over positive ones. Moreover, these are all aspects that favour the parties of 
the radical populist right (Ivarsflaten 2008; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). Indeed, as 
15 Percentage of the population that picked immigration as the most important issue facing the EU 













Switzerland 2010 . 22.2 23.3 16.86
2011 . . . .
2012 . 24.5 21.9 18.36
2013 . . . .
2014 . 24.4 23.9 18.23
2015 . . . .
2016 . 21.8 22.8 19.92
2017 . . . .
United 
Kingdom
2010 18.6 43.8 40.9 44.35
2011 23.8 . . .
2012 11.5 42.8 37.9 45.5
2013 19.4 . . .
2014 29.2 41.3 40.3 38.58
2015 36.0 . . .
2016 51.3 29.2 28.5 24.7
2017 36.8 . . .
Source: SIRIUS WP 2 Dataset (including Standard Eurobarometer, European Social Survey)
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shown in Table 2.10, the electoral strength of populist radical right parties16 (Mudde 
2011) has increased over time, although with different trends and levels among 
SIRIUS countries. The maximum of electoral strength of such populist parties has 
been reached in some countries during the so- called refugee crisis, with a decline in 
the following years. This is the case in Denmark (26.6% of votes in the 2014 
European Parliament elections and 21.1% in the 2015 national parliamentary elec-
tions) and Greece (20.5% and 16.0% in the two close national elections occurred in 
2012 and 15.6% in the 2014 European Parliament elections). Other countries, con-
versely, show a trendless fluctuation: in Finland, the highest percentages of votes for 
populist parties were obtained in the national parliamentary elections of 2011 
(19.1%), 2015 (17.7%) and 2019 (17.5%), whereas in UK the two peaks occurred 
in the 2014 and 2019 European Parliament elections (27.5% and 33.7%, 
respectively).17 In Switzerland the share of the populist right has substantially 
remained stable around 30% over time, whereas in the Czech Republic, where pop-
ulist radical right parties were irrelevant in 2010, they reached the 12.2% of votes in 
the 2017 national parliamentary elections. Finally, the most remarkable increase 
occurred in Italy, where the populist radical right moved from 6.1% of votes in the 
2013 national election to 40.7% in the 2019 European Parliament elections.
Despite the above- mentioned cross- country differences in terms of right- wing 
populist electoral strength, it is a matter of fact that these parties are relevant politi-
cal actors, which shape the public debate on immigration issues and influence deci-
sions of policy makers and mainstream parties (Van Spanje 2010; Abou- Chadi and 
Krause 2018) or even adopt such decisions when in government, as best exemplified 
by the League of Matteo Salvini in Italy. Indeed, on the one hand such parties follow 
and represent opinions (and fears) about immigration that are widespread among 
European citizens over recent years. On the other hand, they actively contribute to 
form and spread such opinions: partisan mobilisation is fundamental for the politi-
cisation of immigration issues (Green- Pedersen and Otjes 2017).
As previously mentioned, immigration issues are part of a new cultural cleavage 
opposing the winners and the losers of globalisation and integration processes: the 
so- called integration- demarcation cleavage according to Kriesi et al. (2006) or the 
transnational cleavage according to Hooghe and Marks (2018). This cleavage has 
not replaced the worker/employer cleavage, but cuts across the left- right divide 
(Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et  al. 2006). Furthermore, concerns for group 
identity and diversity in an increasingly multicultural world are strictly connected to 
16 We calculated the electoral strength by summing the vote shares obtained in the elections for the 
national and European Parliament in the 2010–2019 time span by the parties that can be classified 
as populist radical right parties as defined by Mudde (2011). In Greece, Golden Dawn was also 
included for its electoral relevance, despite being a neo- fascist party rather than a populist party. 
We included only parties that obtained seats in at least one of the elections considered.
17 The better performance of the populist radical right in European Parliament elections compared 
to national elections can be explained by the fact that a proportional representation electoral sys-
tem is used for European Parliament elections, whereas in national elections a single- member 
district plurality electoral system is used.
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Table 2.10 Political indicators by country over time
Country Year PRR electoral strength GAL- TAN Economic left- right
Czech Republic 2010 0.7% 5.0 5.1
2013 9.3% . .
2014 8.4% 5.4 5.5
2017 12.2% 5.9 5.2
2019 9.8% . .
Denmark 2010 4.5 5.1
2011 12.3% . .
2014 26.6% 4.3 4.8
2015 21.1% . .
2019 10.8% b . .
11.1% a
Finland 2010 5.1 4.9
2011 19.1% . .
2014 12.9% 4.7 5.0
2015 17.7% . .
2019 17.5% a . .
13.8% b
Greece 2010 5.0 3.4
2012 20.5% c . .
16.0% d
2014 15.6% 5.6 4.1
2015 12.1% e . .
10.7% f
2017 5.4 4.9
2019 11.1% a . .
6.6% b
Italy 2010 4.2 3.9
2013 6.1% . .
2014 9.9% 5.6 4.8
2017 5.6 4.6
2018 21.8% . .
2019 40.7% . .
Switzerland 2010 5.4 5.1
2011 27.8% . .
2014 5.7 5.2





Country Year PRR electoral strength GAL- TAN Economic left- right
United Kingdom 2010 3.7% 4.8 4.8
2014 27.5% 4.5 4.9
2015 13.2% . .
2016 . .
2017 2.7% 4.4 4.4
2019 33.7% . .
Note: PRR populist radical right
Source: SIRIUS WP 2 Dataset (including Comparative Political Dataset 1965–2015, ParlGov and 




cNational parliamentary election of May 2012
dNational parliamentary election of June 2012
eNational parliamentary election of January 2015
fNational parliamentary election of September 2015
a larger cultural conflict (Beramendi et al. 2015; Hooghe and Marks 2018) between 
libertarian and authoritarian values (Kitschelt 1994). Indeed, scholars analysing the 
ideological positions of public opinion detect a bi- dimensional structure of the 
political space (see Grasso and Giugni 2018). One dimension is linked to issues of 
economic equality, which separates pro- economic redistribution positions from 
positions in favour of laissez- faire economics (the traditional economic left–right 
distinction). The other dimension relates to issues of cultural diversity and social 
order, based on the opposition between authoritarian and libertarian positions 
(Kitschelt 1994). These two dimensions are relevant not only in terms of citizens’ 
positions on policy issues, but also in terms of party positions. Restrictive positions 
on immigration are part of the so- called TAN (traditionalist/authoritarian/national-
ist) pole of the cultural dimension, whereas pro- immigration positions are part of 
the GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) pole (Hooghe et  al. 2002). Therefore, in 
order to capture the influence of the populist radical right on a given party system, 
it is not sufficient to consider only its electoral strength: it is necessary to investigate 
how culturally authoritarian/traditionalist/nationalist positions are widespread in 
that party system. Table 2.10 includes, indeed, indicators of the economic left- right 
dimension18 and cultural libertarian- authoritarian dimension.19 As shown by the 
18 It is the mean of the mean values of parties on a 0–10 economic left- right scale, where 0 means 
Extreme Left and 10 means Extreme Right. Parties have been classified in terms of their stance on 
economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the econ-
omy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatiza-
tion, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.
19 This is the so- called GAL- TAN index and it is the mean of the mean values of parties on a 0–10 
‘libertarian- authoritarian’ scale, where 0 means Extreme Libertarian and 10 means Extreme 
Authoritarian. Parties have been classified in terms of their stance on democratic freedoms and 
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data, party systems of the SIRIUS countries are not particularly polarised. In gen-
eral, however, socio- culturally TAN positions prevail, also in contexts in which eco-
nomically left- wing positions prime. For instance, in Greece the cultural 
libertarian- authoritarian index (the so- called GAL- TAN index) ranges from 5.0 in 
2010 to 5.6 in 2014, while the economic left- right index ranges from 3.4 to 4.1 in 
the same years (in 2017 the GAL- TAN index is still higher than the left- right one, 
5.4 vs. 4.9). A very similar pattern is observed in Italy. In Switzerland and the Czech 
Republic, where both socio- culturally authoritarian and economically right- wing 
positions prevail, the former are more widespread than the latter. Czech Republic is 
the country that shows the highest level of the GAL- TAN index (5.9 in 2017), con-
firming to be a context not particularly favourable to pro- migrant positions. The UK 
is again an exception, being the context with an increasingly slight prevalence of 
both socio- culturally libertarian and economically left- wing positions over time.
The prevalence of TAN positions on the cultural dimension, even in contexts in 
which economically left- wing positions prime, confirm on the one hand that the 
cultural GAL- TAN and economic left- right divides are different dimensions of the 
political space, with some parties taking both TAN positions on the cultural dimen-
sion and left- wing positions on the economic dimension. On the other, these data 
show again that party positions in SIRIUS countries generally favour the adoption 
of restrictive policy measures on immigration.
To conclude, citizens’ perceptions and political context are closely related phe-
nomena that can explain the restrictive approach to immigration adopted by several 
European governments as mentioned in the first section, despite the factual reality 
which does not corroborate claims about an “invasion of immigrants in Europe” and 
regardless of evidence about immigration’s positive effects in economic and demo-
graphic terms for European countries (Storesletten 2003; Lee and Miller 2000; 
Mayr 2005).
2.5  Conclusions
The European countries analysed in this study are characterised by very different 
socio- economic conditions, different stocks and flows of MRAs, and diverse wel-
fare state regimes. Nevertheless, the law and policy- making on immigration issues 
in such different contexts has been characterised by a broadly restrictive approach, 
as shown more in detail in Chap. 3. Therefore, in the introduction we hypothesised 
that this policy approach is better explained by political factors, rather than the 
actual number of MRAs, their integration process, the effective European societies’ 
rights. “Libertarian” or “post- materialist” parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, 
access to abortion, active euthanasia, same sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. 
“Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and 




demographic and economic needs, within each national context. More precisely, we 
hypothesised that if actual numbers of MRAs were still relatively low in the selected 
European countries despite the recent refugee crisis, then the adoption of restrictive 
policies on immigration could be better explained by the following political factors: 
prevalence of negative attitudes towards immigration among European citizens and 
salience of the immigration issue; political relevance of populist radical- right par-
ties who mostly mobilized on immigration issues and significant diffusion of their 
authoritarian/traditionalist/nationalist positions within each country’s party system. 
The underlying idea was that vote- maximising parties are conditioned by public 
attitudes on immigration and issue salience, which in turn are shaped by political 
entrepreneurship of radical right parties or moderate centre- right parties (Van 
Spanje 2010; Hobolt and De Vries 2015). In particular, populist- radical parties have 
become relevant political actors because on the one hand they have politicised 
immigration issues (Green- Pedersen and Otjes 2017) and have become more popu-
lar electorally by exploiting citizens’ fears and concerns about immigration phe-
nomena (Mudde 2011; Ivarsflaten 2008; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012); on the other, 
these parties have influenced the positions and immigration policies of mainstream 
parties (Abou- Chadi and Krause 2018) spreading in European party systems their 
authoritarian/traditionalist/nationalist positions (Hooghe and Marks 2018), which 
are strictly linked to the aforementioned new cultural cleavage between supporters 
of cultural demarcation and international integration (Kriesi et  al. 2006). This 
hypothesis has been tested by contrasting legislative and policy measures on migra-
tion and integration issues with the numbers of MRAs in each national context, as 
well with the above- mentioned political features.
The analysis has shown that there is a certain inconsistency between legal and 
policy measures adopted by SIRIUS governments on immigration issues and the 
numbers of immigration. On the one hand, in fact, over time there has been both a 
narrowing of the legal access channels and a legal marginalization of MRAs as 
regards the access to social benefits and their right to work, thus making legal immi-
gration more difficult and producing the phenomenon of the so- called legal periph-
eries (Chouinard 2001). In terms of labour market integration policies, there is a 
huge variation across countries in terms of duration of integration programmes, 
availability of services offered and migrant groups entitled to such programmes, 
with asylum seekers being usually the most disadvantaged. Despite national differ-
ences, which can be explained by the different welfare regimes and amount of 
resources dedicated in general to active labour market policies, several and similar 
barriers to labour market integration are a common feature of the analysed coun-
tries, which are not properly addressed by a usually short- term approach towards 
integration.
On the other hand, data on MRAs stocks and flows tell us that Europe is not fac-
ing an invasion: the amount of migrants and asylum seekers entering and living in 
Europe is perfectly manageable. It is true, indeed, that between 2014 and 2016 
European countries faced a critical moment, with a clear rise of asylum seekers. 
However, in the following years there has a been a sharp decline in these figures and 
the number of first instance and final decisions granting a form of international 
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protection have dropped. Moreover, it should be stressed that non- EU nationals 
represent less than 10% of the resident population in each of the analysed countries 
in 2018. Finally, the numbers of immigration tell us not only that the latter is not 
‘out of control’, but also that it is somehow necessary from a demographic and eco-
nomic standpoint: indeed, net migration has been the main driver of EU population 
growth during the last years and has reduced the proportion of inactive population 
given that most migrants are of working age (and the amount of work residence 
permits reflects this reality). Restrictive policy measures, therefore, seem to be not 
justified by the reality of immigration in the selected European countries. In addi-
tion, the claimed goal of fighting illegal immigration has not been achieved, given 
that the restriction of legal entry for non- EU migrants has not stopped illegal immi-
gration and repatriations proved to be difficult: indeed, as shown by previous studies 
(De Haas 2011), restrictive immigration policies often result in being ineffective 
because they are unrealistic.
If policy- measures seem to be disconnected from data about immigration, they 
are totally connected with the political climate, with cuts to integration programmes 
and narrowing the access fostered by anti- immigrant politics. Anti- immigrant atti-
tudes and in general fears and concerns about immigration phenomena, indeed, rep-
resent a constraint for decision- makers and are the main reason for right- wing 
populist parties’ appeal in Europe (Mudde 2011; Ivarsflaten 2008; Lucassen and 
Lubbers 2012). In this regard, our data show that immigration issue is salient and in 
most countries negative attitudes towards immigration prevail. Such negative atti-
tudes keep being widespread, albeit with different degrees according to national 
contexts, even after the so- called refugee crisis of 2014–2016. A clear example of 
this inconsistency between real data and perceptions is represented by the Czech 
Republic: among those discussed here it is the country with the lowest share of 
legally resident immigrants in 2018 (together with Finland) and it is the country 
showing the most negative attitudes towards immigration according to the 
Eurobarometer survey of 2018. These perceptions usually are disconnected from 
real data as shown by a recent study (Valbruzzi 2019), but they do count for both law 
and policy- making. Indeed, populist radical parties on the one hand follow and rep-
resent citizens’ fears and negative perceptions of this phenomenon, on the other 
they shape the public debate on immigration issues, actively contributing to form 
and spread such negative attitudes and misperception about immigration numbers: 
hostility towards immigrants and misperception about the real presence of immi-
grants in one’s own country are indeed very related phenomena (Valbruzzi 2019) 
and partisan mobilisation is fundamental for the politicisation of immigration issues 
(Green- Pedersen and Otjes 2017). As shown in this chapter, the electoral strength of 
populist radical right parties has increased over time, although with different trends 
and levels among SIRIUS countries. Despite these cross- country differences, the 
political relevance of populist right- wing parties in recent years is a matter of fact. 
These parties have strongly influenced immigration policies in two ways: on the one 
hand, populist right- wing parties have come to power in some countries (for exam-
ple in Italy, Austria, Poland), on the other their electoral rise has influenced the 
positions and policies of mainstream parties (Abou- Chadi and Krause 2018).
N. Maggini
45
The overall influence of populist radical right parties on European party systems 
is finally shown by the fact that socio- culturally authoritarian/traditionalist/nation-
alist positions prevail in SIRIUS countries, even in contexts where economically 
left- wing positions prime. These data confirm the increasing salience within the 
European political spaces of the cultural dimension related to issues of cultural 
demarcation vs. cultural integration (Kriesi et  al. 2006). This new cleavage cuts 
across the economic left- right divide and is increasingly shaping party competition 
and voting behaviour (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2006). To conclude, 
citizens’ perceptions and party systems’ features are closely related phenomena, 
which influence one another and are all key factors that need to be considered to 
explain the law and policy- making of recent years on immigration issues.
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Chapter 3
Tightening Asylum and Migration Law 
and Narrowing the Access to European 
Countries: A Comparative Discussion
Paola Pannia
3.1  Detecting Patterns of Convergence on Immigration 
Policies Across EU Member States
Migration has not ceased to occupy a prominent role in the EU agenda over recent 
years, even if numbers of arrivals and asylum applications have considerably 
reduced. Indeed, in 2018, 141,472 arrivals were recorded, with a steady drop com-
pared to the flows of foreigners approaching European coasts between 2014 and 
2017.1 The so- called ‘refugee crisis’,2 or at least its most acute peaks, seems to 
belong to the past – and yet political discourses on migration show no sign of quiet-
ing down. Discussions about the entry and stay of foreigners continue to enflame 
public debate on both European and domestic levels, informing policies and 
triggering packages of legislative reform (Green- Pedersen and Otjes 2017; Meyer 
and Rosenberger 2015; Maggini in this volume).
What may appear as a kind of political schizophrenia, as yet another symbol of 
institutional detachment from reality, instead unfolds the tight and mutual 
1 See UNHCR, Mediterranean situation, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediter-
ranean. Data includes refugees and migrants arriving by sea to Italy, Greece, Spain, Cyprus and 
Malta and refugees and migrants arriving by land to Greece and Spain.
2 The use of the expression should not be intended as an adherence to the emergency discourse 
spread both in the political and media spheres. Conversely, coherently with the theoretical frame 
presented below, in this contribution, the expression ‘refugee crisis’ aims to underline the complex 
web of relationships linking international migration and how it has been perceived and understood 
by the main actors of the management of migration (Triandafyllidou 2018).
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relationships intertwining international migration debates and perceptions of poli-
cies that aim to regulate the entry and stay of foreigners.
People do not move in an empirical or legal vacuum. How international move-
ments are perceived, comprehended and managed also depends on the intricate web 
of institutional, normative, social narratives and labels that are produced on migra-
tion by the ‘hosting countries’ (Geddes 2005). Against the understanding of interna-
tional migration as an independent variable that challenges states, it is important to 
underline that migration “acquires meaning when it meets the borders (territorial, 
organisational and conceptual) of destination states” (Geddes and Scholten 2016: 
4).3 Policies, legislative acts and even case law attribute a specific quality, value and 
scope to international migration. Narratives generated by the policies and legislative 
acts on migration, but also case law, contribute to conditioning and shaping the 
identity, scope and character of international migration. Analysing these factors 
may help us to intercept some of the complex dynamics surrounding migration and 
its governance, while advancing our understanding of this complicated subject.
Against this heuristic backdrop, our contribution aims to analyse how selected 
EU states (namely the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, 
the UK, hereinafter also SIRIUS countries) respond to post- 2014 migration flows. 
The purpose of the chapter is to compare and contrast how immigration laws are 
discussed and elaborated in these countries, through which tools and with what 
objectives.
The chapter thus departs from evidence provided by national reports within the 
SIRIUS research project. These data are adjourned, analysed and complemented by 
statistics, reports, research and specialist literature, in line with the multidisciplinary 
and socio- legal approach of this contribution. While acknowledging the peculiari-
ties of each national context, discussed thoroughly in this book, the analysis here 
focuses on the main trends managing international migration.
The comparative analysis of migration governance presents multiple challenges. 
Amongst them are the dynamism and continuous changes that affect the institu-
tional and normative framework over time (Menski 2006; Scarciglia 2015); the flex-
ibility of categories used across national legislations (Zonca 2016); and the multiple 
levels of governance involved in the management of migration (Zincone and 
Caponio 2006). Being aware of these difficulties, the current contribution wants to 
avoid standard and definitive schemes to conceptually organize what is a complex 
reality. Instead, the research adopts an inductive strategy, departing from the obser-
vation of empirical data to identify tendencies and patterns of convergence across 
European countries. In using a flexible methodological approach, this comparative 
study attempts to grasp the main trends in legal and political responses to migration, 
while acknowledging the dynamism of the multifaceted processes that surround the 
phenomenon (Amico di Meane 2018).
3 Further analysis should be conducted to better understand how migration governance affects 
migration, in particular the decision to integrate the perspective of third country nationals (Kraler 
2006; Federico and Pannia 2018).
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The chapter begins by giving an account of political representations and legal 
categorizations on migrants and asylum seekers produced by SIRIUS countries in 
the aftermath of the ‘refugee crisis’ and beyond. Relying on narratives that question 
the sincerity of asylum claims, and that criminalise migration and humanitarian 
assistance, restrictive measures are enacted in most SIRIUS countries. The legisla-
tive landscape of the countries under scrutiny is populated by symbolic laws that 
downgrade foreigners’ rights and weaken standards, explicitly aiming to dissuade 
migrants from coming to the respective countries. The analysis then turns to look at 
international protection. The recourse to push- back operations, and/or, more bla-
tantly, the construction of physical walls or fences, are not the only measures that 
prevent third country nationals from lodging an asylum claim. Indeed, restraining 
access to protection is also the consequence of a sophisticated procedural toolbox 
intended to streamline the refugee status determination procedure (i.e. hotspots and 
accelerated and fast- track procedures), often at the price of severe violations of 
fundamental guarantees, such as the right to defence. Final observations are devoted 
to the restraining tendency enacted by SIRIUS countries in the field of economic- -
related migration. Here, state power to select and control who can enter and stay in 
a country is exercised even more openly, in an attempt to respond to domestic elec-
toral consensus- building while welcoming foreigners who cannot represent a bur-
den to the national welfare system.
3.2  Gathering the Interplay Among Narratives on Migration 
and Asylum and the Restrictive Turn of Policies 
and Legislations
The right to asylum is explicitly entrenched in the Constitution of the Czech 
Republic, Italy and Finland, although to different degrees.4 All countries discussed 
in the volume have signed the 1951 Geneva Convention and its additional protocols, 
they are bound by the EU acquis aimed at the creation of a Common European 
Asylum System, with the exception of Switzerland which is not a EU Member 
State,5 of Denmark, which opted out,6 and the UK, which only abides by the first 
4 The right to asylum is also entrenched in art. 18 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. For a 
panorama of law references of this right on EU Member States’ national constitutional law see the 
following web page: https://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/18- right- asylum. The Switzerland 
Constitution also mentions the right to asylum. However, this right is not proclaimed, but only 
regulated in its main aspects. The Switzerland Constitution can be consulted here: https://www.
admin.ch/opc/en/classified- compilation/19995395/201809230000/101.pdf
5 Switzerland is bound by the Return Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC), the Dublin III Regulation 
(Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013) and Eurodac Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 
603/2013 of 26 June 2013). Full titles of legislations are mentioned in the list of legislations below.
6 Denmark only abides Dublin III Regulation and Eurodac Regulation.
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phase of the Common European Asylum System7 as a result of its opting out from 
the ‘Asylum Recast Package’. Finally, most of the SIRIUS countries, such as 
Denmark, Finland and Italy, have incorporated the European Convention of Human 
Rights, together with its principle of protection against torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatments (art. 3 ECHR), in their Constitutions.
Despite these national, regional and international obligations, an overall restric-
tive approach can be observed among the surveyed countries, where the tightening 
of migration law conflates with both a discourse and normative categorizations that 
label migration and asylum as a threat.
3.2.1  Questioning the Authenticity of Asylum Claims
Throughout most of the SIRIUS countries, the regressive approach taken in the field 
of migration and refugee law seems to rely on a specific political construal of the 
‘bogus asylum seeker’ or the ‘illegal asylum seeker’ (Lynn and Lea 2003; Zetter 
2007; Squire 2009; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008).8
Illustrative of this tendency is the so- called ‘deport first, appeal later’ provision, 
introduced in the UK with the Immigration Act 2014. In the words of the Home 
Office, the new measure provides the power to deport foreigners pending their 
deportation appeal, and allows halting foreigners’ “opportunity to launch spurious 
claims under the Human Rights Act or falsely claim asylum” (Home Office and the 
Rt Hon James Brokenshire MP 2015). In 2017, the Supreme Court declared that 
deportations issued under this scheme were unlawful, they contravene the right to 
family and private life entrenched in article 8 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, and undermine the right to an effective appeal (R (on the application of 
Kiarie) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) 
[2017] UKSC 42). Meanwhile, research shows that, in the UK media- based public 
sphere, migration is reduced to an issue of border controls or political management 
(Montgomery et al. 2018).
As the ‘detention fast track procedure’ exemplifies, discourses that surrepti-
tiously associate asylum seekers with economic or illegal migrants instil doubts 
7 Namely the ‘Refugee Qualification Directive’ (2004/83/EC), the ‘Asylum Procedure Directive’ 
(2005/85/EC) and the ‘Asylum Reception Conditions Directive’ (2003/9/EC).
8 The terms ‘bogus asylum seeker’ and ‘illegal asylum seeker’ are often used in the political and 
media discourse and carry varied connotations depending on the context. The term ‘bogus asylum- 
seeker’ is often used in opposition to the term ‘genuine asylum seeker’. Instead, the term ‘illegal 
asylum seeker’ often refers to people who arrive by boat without documents and express the will 
to apply for protection. Nonetheless, as UNHCR (2018b) has pointed out, “There is no such thing 
as a bogus asylum seeker or an illegal asylum seeker. As an asylum seeker, a person has entered 
into a legal process of refugee status determination. Everybody has a right to seek asylum in 
another country. People who don’t qualify for protection as refugees will not receive refugee status 
and may be deported, but just because someone doesn’t receive refugee status doesn’t mean they 
are a bogus asylum seeker”.
P. Pannia
53
about the truthfulness of asylum seekers’ protection needs. In turn, this provides the 
theoretical framework to speed up and simplify the refugee status determination 
(hereinafter also RSD) procedures, sometimes in breach of procedural guarantees 
and the quality of assessment. Governments try to dispel doubts by immediately 
distinguishing the ‘bogus asylum seeker’ from the ‘true’ one. Therefore, when the 
authenticity of a foreigner’s asylum claim is regarded as suspicious, his/her rights 
and guarantees are also questioned. Sometimes, legal presumptions and categoriza-
tions that inhabiting the refugee law of SIRIUS countries serve the same end. The 
concept of ‘vulnerability’ used in the frame of resettlement programs offers a good 
illustration of this trend (AIDA 2017; Peroni and Timmer 2013).
As a long- term, durable solution,9 resettlement undoubtedly represents a funda-
mental tool to provide refugees with sound legal protection and guarantees. Although 
the number of people effectively resettled is much lower than pledges made by 
European states, in 2017 more than 26,400 refugees were resettled to Europe, the 
majority of whom were transferred to the UK. Although contributing to a lesser 
extent, Finland and Switzerland also provide active resettlement programs (UNHCR 
2018a: 17), while Denmark declined to receive the UN refugees quota under the 
resettlement pact in 2016, and further extended the suspension to 2017 and 2018 
(Wallis 2019).10
Nonetheless, it has been observed that the UK applies the label of ‘vulnerable’ to 
refugees in order to qualify those eligible for its resettlement programs. Among the 
resettlement programs put in place by the UK Government, three explicitly target 
the most vulnerable: the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS), 
the Vulnerable Children Resettlement Scheme and children relocated under the 
‘Dubs amendments’. Whereas the latter programs address children specifically, the 
former scheme concerns vulnerable Syrian refugees, including the elderly, the dis-
abled, persons who have experienced trauma, children, orphans and minorities 
(Home Office 2018). However, this may send the message that the general refugee 
population is either not vulnerable, or else not vulnerable ‘enough’ to deserve reset-
tlement. Indeed, the approach favours the creation of two categories: the more 
deserving and the less deserving refugees. Only the former are protected and taken 
in charge by the state (Hirst and Atto 2018). Similarly, the EU relocation program,11 
which has realized the transferral of almost 22,000 asylum seekers from Greece and 
about 12,700 from Italy across Europe (EU Commission 2018), has reproduced the 
same rationale, considering as ‘vulnerable’ and therefore eligible only those asylum- -
seekers of nationalities with an average recognition rate of 75% or higher at EU level.
9 A ‘durable solution’ is one that enables refugees to ‘rebuild their life’ (UNHCR 2003).
10 In 2017, an amendment to the Aliens Act also left the decision on resettlement refugees to the 
Minister of Immigration and Integration alone, so potentially put an end to resettlement programs 
to Denmark. However, the new government, led by a different political party (social democratic) 
and in place since June 2019, might decide to again join the UN resettlement program.
11 The relocation programme was a two year scheme provided by the ‘Provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece’ adopted by the European 
Council in 2015, aimed to reduce the migratory pressure on frontline states (Italy and Greece).
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This ‘fractioning’ of the refugee label (Zetter 2007; Costello and Hancox 2015) 
creates a quasi- hierarchy among refugees. On the one hand, it reduces or slows 
access to international protection, while on the other, it regulates access according 
to reasons of social acceptance rather than the right to asylum.
3.2.2  The Criminalization of Migration 
and Humanitarian Assistance
Closely related to the narrative presented above, we can observe the tendency to 
merge the status of the ‘protection seeker’ with a condition of ‘illegality’ or ‘irregu-
larity’, or to juxtapose migration to security concerns. Following this pattern, and 
increasingly frequently, governmental authorities deploy the punitive arsenal of the 
criminal law against migrants in an attempt to manage and control migration. 
Consequently, the distinction between criminal law and immigration law is progres-
sively blurring. This may not only entail dangerous consequences for foreigners’ 
human rights, but also contributes to throwing a negative light on social perception 
about them (Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights 2010).
Evidence of the above scheme is analysed and theorized into what has been 
called the ‘crimmigration law’ (Stumpf 2006). Concrete manifestations of this 
understanding of migration are found in all the countries under scrutiny. Indeed, all 
SIRIUS countries consider unauthorised crossing of the border a criminal offence, 
punished with imprisonment and/or fines or with fines only (FRA 2014). Meanwhile, 
narratives that portray immigrants as a threat to national security and social welfare 
flourish across EU states. In both Greece (Bagavos et al. 2018) and Italy (Chiaromonte 
et al. 2018), the stereotypical correlation ‘immigrant- criminal’ is widely promoted 
by policymaking, and echoed by the media.
Similar criminalization processes may also affect people who enter Europe to 
seek protection. For instance, in the UK, according to section 2 of the Asylum and 
Immigration Act 2004, asylum applicants who cannot provide identification docu-
ments may be charged with a criminal offence, punishable by a prison sentence of 
up to 2 years. As Hirst and Atto report: “In the first 6 months since s2 of the Act 
came into force, at least 230 asylum seekers were arrested, and 134 convicted of this 
new offence. Multiple asylum seekers have received jail sentences” (2018: 854).
The ‘criminalization trend’ targets not only migrants, but also members of civil 
society who provide humanitarian assistance to foreigners’ entry into Europe, 
including NGOs and volunteers involved in search and rescue (hereinafter also 
SAR) at sea. In 2018, more than 2000 people lost their lives crossing the 
Mediterranean, the death rate for numbers of arrivals almost triplicated compared to 
2017 (UNHCR 2019). In this context, NGOs’ intervention proved crucial in saving 
lives (Italian Coast Guard 2017), due also to the reduction of states- run SAR 
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operations at sea (Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 2019). 
Nonetheless, this did not prevent some policy- makers from running a delegitimiza-
tion campaign focused on the media- based public sphere, and approving measures 
to restrict and criminalize NGO activities. In this regard, Italy is a quite paradig-
matic case.
In 2017, the Italian Ministry of the Interior in consultation with the European 
Commission issued a ‘code of conduct’ for those NGOs operating in the rescue of 
migrants at sea, aiming to regulate the search and rescue operations in the 
Mediterranean conducted by non- governmental actors. Under the code, measures 
such as the presence of law enforcement officers on board, the prohibition from 
entering Libyan territorial waters and collaboration in the fight against smugglers 
were imposed on NGO vessels (ASGI 2017; MSF 2017). In 2018, since taking 
office as Minister of Interior, Mr. Salvini has restricted the entry of NGO vessels 
into Italian ports on several occasions, inaugurating a policy of ‘closing ports’ 
which significantly delayed migrants’ disembarkation as well as their access to suc-
cour, reception and asylum procedures. In June 2019, an emergency decree was 
approved, establishing, among the other provisions, hefty fines (from 150,000 to 
1,000,000 euro) on any boat entering the Italian sea without permission, with the 
possibility of suspending or revoking their licences in case of reiterated contraven-
tions of the ban (arts. 1 and 2).12
Furthermore, as shown by the report released by the Fundamental Rights Agency 
of the European Union, since 2018, in both Italy and Greece, NGO ships have been 
seized and subjected to administrative and criminal proceedings. None of these pro-
cedures has resulted in conviction.13 Meanwhile, numerous allegations that NGOs 
collaborate with smugglers are denied by the NGOs involved (del Valle, 2016) and 
dismissed by public institutions (Italian Senate, 2017). Empirical research also 
demonstrates that claims portraying NGOs as a ‘pull factor’, somehow encouraging 
people to migrate to Europe, are unsubstantiated (Cusumano 2017).
Despite concerns expressed by the UN and the Council of Europe in recommen-
dations and official letters, this trend, which obstructs and criminalizes humanitar-
ian acts, does not seem to stop. As a result, only a few NGOs currently operate in 
the Mediterranean, leading to a drastic reduction in the possibility of saving 
lives at sea.
12 Law- Decree No. 53, 14 June 2019 ‘Urgent dispositions on order and public security’, converted 
with amendments by Law No. 77, 8 August 2019.
13 The list of current legal proceedings in the EU against private entities involved in SAR operations 
in the Mediterranean Sea is provided by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. The 
list, up- to- date until 1 June 2019, is available here: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_
uploads/fra- 2019- ngos- search- rescue- mediterranean- table- 2_en.pdf
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3.2.3  Law as Communication: Normative Provisions Aiming 
to Create a ‘Hostile Environment’14
Over recent years, this restrictive trend in migration policies and legislations across 
Europe has is also expressed through progressive curtailment of foreigners’ rights 
and guarantees. The explicit aim is to dissuade new arrivals, while at the same time 
catering to (some) natives’ fears about migrants, thus making European states a 
‘less attractive’ destination.
Denmark offers a paradigmatic example. In February 2019, the government 
passed a new immigration bill announcing a ‘paradigm shift’ from integration to 
repatriation. Indeed, Law L140 substantially amends residence rules, allowing per-
mit renewals only when conditions in home countries are deemed unsafe, or else in 
the case of strong family attachment. Following the reform, the degree of integra-
tion into Danish society has ceased to have any relevance when it comes to allowing 
the stay of international protection holders. It is difficult to predict the concrete 
effects of this paradigm shift. However, the message conveyed by the law is clear: 
refugees’ stay in Denmark should only be temporary. Even if a softer agenda on 
migration were adopted by the new government, the idea that refugees will not 
become permanent residents has been recently reiterated by the new Prime Minister, 
Mette Frederiksen: “When you are a refugee and come to Denmark, you can be 
granted our protection. But when there’s peace, you must go home” she stated in 
June (Wallis 2019).
Although challenged by scholars who demonstrate that stricter rules do not stem 
migrant flows (Thielemanne 2004; Mayblin and James 2016), the proposition of 
stricter rules to staunch the flow of asylum seekers has found wide support among 
SIRIUS countries, where policies and legislation have led to the progressive down-
grading of foreigners’ fundamental rights and guarantees. Within these measures, 
the right to family reunification has been significantly eroded. This is again the case 
of Denmark. Here, over recent years, the steady reduction of integration benefits 
and the limited access to family reunification given to refugees serves the stated aim 
“to make sure that it is not attractive to come to Denmark”, as declared by the previ-
ous immigration minister, Inger Støjberg (Walter- Franke 2019: 3). Coherent with 
this rationale, the new law L140 allows the minister to activate a limit over the 
number of family reunifications in the event “asylum applications ‘increase signifi-
cantly over a short period’, – without specifying what a significant increase would 
mean” (FRA 2019a: 4). Meanwhile, complicated bureaucratic procedures and the 
caseload in immigration services cause waiting times of up to 2  years, which 
severely affects refugees’ right to reunite with family members (Bendixen 2019).
Similarly, in Greece, due to persistent administrative shortcomings, in 2018 only 
a few refugees were able to trigger a procedure for family reunification (Council of 
14 The expression appears in  the  speech that Theresa May gave on  10th October 2013, 




Europe Commissioner of Human Rights 2018). Beyond this, in a highly symbolic 
way, the Labor and Social Affair Minister of the newly (August 2019) installed 
Greek government cancelled a circular concerning the issuing of social security 
numbers (AMKA) to migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, unaccompanied refugee 
children and non- EU nationals. As observed, the circular “actually codified a law 
passed under the New Democracy government in 2009” (Lefkofridi and 
Chatzopoulou 2019). Nevertheless, this measure makes it difficult for foreigners to 
access social rights, being the AMKA essential to access services in Health, 
Education and Labor. A very similar provision was approved by the Italian govern-
ment in 2018, when ‘Security Decree’ No. 113/2018 stipulated that the asylum 
applicant status would not anymore allow enrolment on the Civil Registry or obtain-
ing a residence card (art. 13). This has severe implications for the recognition of 
social rights and benefits, with foreigners increasingly turning to the Court to claim 
the right to be enrolled on the Civil Registry. Finally, in August, the Tribunal of 
Milan questioned the constitutional legitimacy of art. 13, referring the case to the 
Constitutional Court (referral order of 16.08.2019).
In Finland, since normative changes introduced in 2016, refugees and those ben-
eficiaries of subsidiary protection who want to apply for family reunification must 
demonstrate they have sufficient means to cover family expenses (Law 43/2016). 
The purpose of the reform is “to make sure that the society does not have to pay for 
foreigners residing in Finland” (Bontenbal and Lillie 2018: 206). Under these mea-
sures, the requirements for family reunification became extremely difficult for many 
to meet.
Sometimes, messages are conveyed through symbolic legislation, such as the so- -
called ‘jewellery law’ approved in Denmark in 2016 (Bill No. L 87). According to 
this controversial normative provision, police officers have the power to search and 
confiscate asylum seekers’ assets with a minimum value of 10,000 Dkk (€ 1.340), 
as a contribution to the expenses related to their stay in Denmark. Denmark is not 
an isolated case among SIRIUS countries. Indeed, similar provisions are currently 
also in place in Switzerland, where asylum seekers are required to declare all their 
valuables on arrival, and anything which is worth more than € 900 can be taken 
away by immigration authorities.15
The real impact of these laws seems, so far, modest. In Switzerland a total amount 
of € 200,000 has been collected from 112 individuals (Hartmann and Feith Tan 
2016), whereas in Denmark, a car and about €24.000 have been confiscated (Barret 
2019). Nonetheless, the anti- migrant signal sent by these manifesto- laws (laws 
adopted for their symbolic meaning rather than to effectively regulating the issue at 
stake) is powerful, and it can realise multiple aims. Indeed, these legislations, 
intended to discourage asylum seekers from coming to the country, may trigger a 
race to the bottom among SIRIUS countries and beyond insofar as they try to 
become the most ‘unattractive destination’. Meanwhile, such measures 
15 Unlike the Danish case, the Swiss law provides the return of asylum seekers’ confiscated assets, 
if they decide to leave the country (Hartmann and Feith Tan 2016).
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symbolically construct asylum seekers as ‘abusive individuals’ who threaten the 
welfare state. Relying on these narratives, states may more easily neglect protection 
seekers’ claims and weaken their legal status, in breach of international 
conventions.
The creation of a ‘hostile environment’, often the stated aim of legislative 
reforms, is mirrored by the complex and hypertrophic legal milieu featuring SIRIUS 
countries in the field of migration and asylum. Indeed, national legislations have 
been modified continuously, and not necessarily coherently, often in the aftermath 
of a change in government.16 This is consistent with other evidence: over recent 
years, migration has become a salient argument that often dominates elections and 
referendum debates at both European and national level. In the UK, for instance, the 
2016 EU referendum can be considered a paradigmatic case, since the Leave cam-
paign mostly revolved around anti- migration discourses. The same can be said for 
arguments used by the UK Conservative Party in the last elections (Calò et al. 2018).
Overt manifestations of the labyrinthine landscape currently governing migra-
tion and asylum can be found in almost all the SIRIUS countries. For instance, in 
the UK, 12 Acts of Parliament regulating immigration issues have been approved in 
the last 20 years (Hirst and Atto 2018). In Italy, the Consolidated Law on Immigration 
is the result of multiple, fragmentary normative stratifications that jeopardise inter-
nal consistency and effectiveness. The same complexity and rapid evolution is seen 
in the legal frameworks of Greece, Switzerland and Denmark, too. With respect to 
Demark, it is noteworthy that from 2002 to 2011 the Aliens Act, one of the main 
laws regulating immigration, was changed 57 times – and since 2015, more than 85 
times (Sen et al. 2018). The same also applies to the Czech Republic, where, due to 
the numerous amendments, Act No. 326/1999 regulating the residence of foreigners 
became a chaotic and confusing law (Čada et al. 2018). Paradigmatically, in 2018 
and 2019 changes occurred in the legal framework of all the surveyed countries, 
whereas further legislative amendments have been announced in Denmark and 
Finland by those governments established in 2019.
To add further complexity, in most SIRIUS countries the acts of primary legisla-
tion only provide for the general framework, while specific immigration issues are 
de facto regulated in detail and implemented by a congeries of acts of secondary 
legislation (by- laws, regulations, ministerial circulars, administrative rules, etc). 
This trend is particularly relevant in the UK, where a number of secondary immigra-
tion laws had been rushed through Parliament once a month on average (Clayton 
2016). Between 2014 and 2016, reportedly, “two primary provisions were enacted 
(Immigration Act 2014 and 2016), while 79 orders and rules were promulgated” 
(Calò et al. 2018: 465). This not only makes the legal framework difficult to access 
and navigate, but also divorces a significant part of immigration regulation from 
democratic control. Indeed, secondary acts are rarely subjected to Parliamentary 
16 Finland seems to constitute an exception to this trend. Indeed, according to research carried out 
so far and the opinion of some interviewed experts, since the peak of arrivals in 2015, Finland has 
not experienced changes in legislations, but a trend of more restrictive interpretation of the legal 
framework already in place (Bontenbal and Lillie 2018).
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debate. Hence, away from any adequate parliamentary control, governments retain 
considerable spaces of discretion and room of manoeuvre in the regulation of migra-
tion issues.
3.3  Preventing or Restraining Access 
to International Protection
Focusing on the legislation governing international protection, this section discusses 
the tendency of most SIRIUS countries to narrow and sometimes even to obstruct 
access to the international protection process. SIRIUS countries have designed and 
deployed a sophisticated toolbox, including both physical and procedural barriers.
Concerning physical barriers, during the timeframe 2011–2017, all over Europe 
migrants were physically prevented from accessing territory and consequently sub-
mitting their asylum claim through the systematic recourse to push- back operations, 
and/or, in a more blatant way, by building actual walls or fences. Greece is maybe 
the most typical case of restricting analysis to a SIRIUS country. In 2012, in the 
Greek- Turkish border of the Evros area, a 12 km wall was built to impede access to 
the country by land. At Evros, multiple complaints about push- backs were reported 
in 2017, 2018 and 2019 by both NGOs and governmental institutions (Strik 2019; 
Greek Council for Refugees 2019). Meanwhile, extreme difficulties in lodging an 
application for international protection are observed in Greece, as a result of illegiti-
mate practices. As recorded by the Greek Council for Refugees, in 2018, there were 
cases of people who, after several attempts to lodge an asylum application, were 
arrested due to being found “in the lack of legal documentations” and then detained, 
in view of removal (FRA 2019a: 12).
However, in the majority of cases, SIRIUS countries have not resorted to the 
aforementioned practices. Instead, restraining access to international protection has 
resulted from the implementation of tools and procedures already provided by the 
EU asylum acquis. Among them, the hotspots approach and procedures enacted in 
line with the recast Asylum Procedures Directive can be regarded as some of the 
main tools, making part of an overall European strategy of controlling access to the 
state, and more broadly, to Europe.
On this legal basis, extensive reforms involve the legal frameworks of SIRIUS 
countries, reshaping domestic asylum proceedings. However, as discussed later in 
this chapter, asylum policies and legislations intended to speed up the procedure are 
often oriented more towards deterrence than efficiency.
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3.3.1  The Hotspots Approach
First presented in the European Agenda on Migration (EU Commission 2015), the 
‘hotspot approach’ was intended to assist frontline Member States facing an excep-
tional migratory pressure at the EU external border. Hotspots identify a geographi-
cal space. At the same time, hotspots identify an approach where the European 
Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol “work on the ground with frontline 
Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants” (EU 
Commission 2015: 6).
As pointed out by the EU Court of Auditors, hotspots have been found effective 
in improving operations of identification, registration and fingerprinting. Considering 
the whole of 2016, Italy could count for a 97% registration and fingerprinting rate 
(this was 60% in the first half of 2015). Greece witnessed a significant increase in 
the rate of registration of incoming migrants as well, with 78% of migrants regis-
tered and fingerprinted, compared to the 8% registration rate of September 2015. 
Thereby, “in this respect the hotspot approach contributed towards an improved 
management of the migration flows” (European Court of Auditors 2017: 38–39). 
However, as the EU Court of Auditors further observes, the effectiveness of the 
hotspot approach is strictly linked to the proper functioning of the follow- up pro-
cess, namely asylum, relocation and return. But the “implementation of these fol-
low- up procedures is often slow and subject to various bottlenecks, which can have 
repercussions on the functioning of the hotspots” (European Court of Auditors 
2017: 7; 40–44).
More specifically, the state of play of hotspots in Greece has been dramatically 
affected by the EU- Turkey statement of 2016, which aims to curtail the migratory 
flow to the Aegean Sea. Indeed, initially intended to channel newly- arrived migrants 
into procedures of international protection or return, after March 2016, hotspots 
were substantially transformed into closed centres of detention to implement returns 
to Turkey (Guild et al. 2017). This reportedly led to collective expulsion and push- -
backs (ECRE 2016). Harshly criticized by national and international organizations 
(UNHCR 2017a), the detention of migrants has been substituted by an order of 
blanket geographical restriction imposed to newly arrivals, who are obliged to 
reside in the identification and reception centre for an indefinite period of time 
(AIDA Country Report: Greece 2018). Meanwhile, running short of staff, the Greek 
Asylum service experienced significant difficulties in handling the high number of 
asylum applications, which significantly raised after 20 March 2016. As a result, in 
September 2016, “the majority of migrants who arrived after 20 March had still not 
had the opportunity to lodge an asylum application” (European Court of Auditors 
2017: 41).
In Italy, according to the Consolidated Law on Immigration, undocumented for-
eigners intercepted within Italian territory and helped during rescue operations at 
sea are conducted to hotspots, where they are fingerprinted and receive information 
on international protection, relocation and assisted voluntary return (art. 10 ter of 
the Consolidated law on Migration). However, in 2016, fewer than one third of 
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incoming migrants were identified in hotspots, while others were registered in other 
ports of arrival. Undoubtedly, the crucial part of the identification procedure is pre- -
registration, a phase in which migrants are qualified as either ‘undocumented’ or 
‘asylum seekers’. In this regard, there have been allegations of migrants who have 
been delayed or denied access to international protection (UNHCR 2017b). In 2016, 
the Italian government put in place a comprehensive training program for police 
authorities responsible for receiving asylum applications. Nonetheless, several 
scholars have reported practices such as “profiling on grounds of nationality, treat-
ing arrivals from non- relocation countries directly as ‘non- refugees’, selectively 
(mis- )informing them about their options and swiftly expelling them” (Guild et al. 
2017: 47).
Although numbers of arrivals significantly dropped, resulting in a general 
improvement of hotspot conditions,17 some shortcomings persist. February 2019 
saw allegations that 32 foreigners detained in the hotpots of Messina, Italy, had their 
access to the procedure of international protection unlawfully delayed while their 
legal status remained indefinite for long time, pending the negotiation of their reset-
tlement to another EU state.18
3.3.2  The Proliferation of Asylum Procedures
Beyond hotspots and tightening borders, the narrowing and slowing down of access 
to international protection has also been the (secondary) effect of procedural tools 
intended to streamline the RSD process. The growing number of arrivals and asy-
lum applications from 2011 to 2017 placed a strain on the asylum system of EU 
states, which responded, inter alia, with legislative reforms to boost the efficiency of 
RSD procedures.
Indeed, building on the set of rules and procedures provided by the recast Asylum 
Procedure Directive, all SIRIUS countries introduced procedural tools in their 
domestic asylum system to determine who should and should not have protection, 
without examining the merit of the asylum claim. Specifically, domestic legislations 
could rely on procedures provided by the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (here-
inafter also APD) with the aim to streamline the RSD process, namely:
a) an ‘admissibility procedure’ which does not examine the merit of asylum claims protec-
tion needs, for asylum seekers who may be the responsibility of another country or have 
lodged repetitive claims (arts. 33 and 34); b) an ‘accelerated procedure’ to examine protec-
tion needs of ostensibly unfounded or security- related cases (art. 31(8)); and c) a ‘border 
17 However, as FRA reports, “As the hotspots are underused, it is difficult to assess whether the 
system is equipped to handle future fundamental rights emergencies adequately, should arrivals 
increase again” (FRA 2019b: 7).
18 The letter that a number of NGOs sent to the Ministry of the Interior, the Prefect of Messina and 
the Police Headquarters of Messina, urging them to clarify these foreigners’ legal status can be 
consulted here https://www.asgi.it/allontamento- espulsione/immigrazione- hotspot- messina/
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procedure’ to speedily conduct admissibility or examine the merits under an accelerated 
procedure at borders or in transit zones (art. 43). (AIDA 2016: 8)
Among the procedures mentioned above, the ‘Accelerated Procedure’ raises multi-
ple concerns in reference to asylum applicants’ rights and procedural guarantees. 
By way of example, the short time limits featuring this specific procedural regime 
end up with severely limiting the right to effective defence. Recital 20 of the recast 
APD states that,
In well- defined circumstances where an application is likely to be unfounded or where there 
are serious national security or public order concerns, Member States should be able to 
accelerate the examination procedure, in particular by introducing shorter, but reasonable, 
time limits for certain procedural steps, without prejudice to an adequate and complete 
examination being carried out and to the applicant’s effective access to basic principles and 
guarantees provided for in this Directive.
Although the recast APD does not offer a definition of the ‘manifestly unfounded 
claim’, art. 31(8) lays down the grounds upon which Member States may provide an 
accelerated procedure. Currently, following reforms mainly intervened in 2015, all 
SIRIUS countries apply the accelerated procedure. However, significant diver-
gences can be observed concerning the various aspects of the accelerated procedure, 
such as the grounds on which the procedure is initiated, the time- frame within 
which the procedure should be conducted, the determining authorities.
Despite the difficulty in conducting a considered comparison, a convergence can 
be pointed out: all SIRIUS countries applying the accelerated procedure incorporate 
the notion of ‘safe country of origin’ in their domestic legislation. Based on this 
concept, asylum applications of migrants from a list of countries are presumed to be 
manifestly unfounded, unless applicants prove otherwise.
Among the accelerated procedures, the one approved in Switzerland has pro-
duced opposite reactions. Triggered by a referendum in 2016, after a 4- year testing 
phase in Zurich, the reform entered into force in 2019, mainly aiming to expedite 
the asylum procedure, with a strict timeline and defined steps. Indeed, according to 
the new law, asylum procedures are expected to be completed within 140  days, 
down to 100 days in case of accelerated procedures, intended to deal with the so- -
called ‘easy cases’. From registration until the end of the first instance procedure, 
asylum applicants are provided with free legal assistance, including during the 21- 
days preparatory stage, when the applicant’s file is prepared and channelled into the 
accelerated or the extended procedure. The accelerated procedure imposes a par-
ticularly pressing timeline: the decision is taken in eight working days, with an extra 
deadline of seven working days to lodge an appeal.
The new measures are enthusiastically supported by the Swiss Refugee Council, 
which highlights the many advantages stemming from: “the acceleration of proce-
dures, along with fairness for asylum seekers, quality of decisions, suitable accom-
modation, efficient integration and return procedures” (Hruschka 2019). However, 
in contrast, some NGOs express concerns about the consequences of the contracted 
timescale on the quality of the refugee status determination. Hence, it has been 
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contested that the very purpose of the reform was to speed up returns, as opposed to 
procedures (OSAR 2017).
3.4  Is Europe a Fortress or an Exclusive Club? Selecting 
Migration Legal Pathways
Although ‘a new policy of legal migration’ has been presented as the third pillar of 
the 2015 EU Agenda for Migration (EU Commission 2015), few steps have been 
taken so far to enhance the creation of legal channels for labour migration (EU 
Commission 2019a). However, these failures do not target all third country nation-
als in the same way. The Legal Migration Fitness Check, released by the EU 
Commission in March 2019, reveals a number of gaps between objectives and 
needs, which together undermine a comprehensive EU migration policy. This 
mainly results from the sectorial approach of the EU acquis, whose scope fails to 
cover some category of third country nationals, such as non- seasonal low- and 
medium- skilled workers (EU Commission 2019b).
Against the lack of EU legal labour migration policies, immigration for eco-
nomic purposes remains an almost exclusive domain of national states. Indeed, the 
decision about who should be admitted in the state territory and with what entitle-
ments is still one of the main prerogatives of modern, post- Westphalian, statehood. 
This prerogative is somewhat exacerbated for people who migrate for economic- -
related reasons, in respect to which fewer limitations to national sovereignty are 
brought in by EU membership and international obligations (Joppke 2005; 
Sohn 2014).
Hence, immigration on economic grounds can be considered a breeding ground 
for enacting restrictive policies to deliver government pledges to curtail overall net 
immigration. This was the case in the Czech Republic, where, in 2010, in the after-
math of the economic crisis, restrictive measures on migration were enacted, target-
ing mainly economic migrants and the issuance of employment permits. For 
instance, labour offices “were asked not to issue employment permits to foreigners 
for such job positions that can be filled by persons with free admission to the Czech 
labour market. The length of the stay or the level of integration of individual for-
eigners was completely disregarded.” (Čižinský et al. 2014: 47).
However, more often, most of the SIRIUS countries have laid down policies to 
screen and accept potential migrants based on certain characteristics, such as sectors 
of labour shortage, short- term work, income and skills, so as to align immigration 
with the country’s economic and political interests and needs. Following this trend, 
the traditional image of Europe as an impregnable fortress appears less fitting. 
Indeed, this fortress has some drawbridges, available only to those who are consid-
ered eligible due to their economic resources or talent.
In this regard, across the SIRIUS countries, several policies have been put in 
place to favour labour market access for two categories of economically suitable 
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migrants: high- skilled foreign workers and international students. In Denmark, the 
immigration of third country nationals for work purpose is mostly limited to high- -
skilled professionals. In the UK, the ‘Highly Skilled Migrants Programme’, replaced 
by Tier 1, has allowed exceptionally talented foreigners to enter and settle in the 
UK, without the obligation to prove an offer of employment before arrival. Another 
programme (the ‘International Graduate Student Scheme’) was also launched to 
attract international students, allowing them to work in the UK for one year after 
completing their course of study. In recent years, the number of highly skilled work-
ers has significantly increased, while international students’ enrolment in UK uni-
versities grew by 92% between 2000 and 2014 (Hirst and Atto 2018). Beyond these 
specific programmes, the selectivity of the UK immigration policy is unveiled also 
by the so- called points- based system (PBS), a comprehensive system based on the 
accumulation of points across different categories (e.g. level of English language or 
amount of savings) which determines the success of foreign visa applications. As 
Hirst and Atto reports (2018), the PBS is complex and expensive and it “is also 
subject to rapid change, with work visa categories regularly being established and 
discontinued, reflecting the Government’s attempts to both limit immigration, and 
be responsive to employer demands to have the skilled employees they need” 
(2018: 863).
In other countries, such as Italy and Switzerland, the control and selection pro-
cess on economic- related migration has been enacted by introducing national 
numerical migration limits or other systems, which give priority to national job-
seekers. Through these tools, states may easily cap the number of migrants allowed 
to enter the domestic labour market and target candidates for immigration according 
to economic necessities and social acceptance. Thus, in Switzerland, in July 2018, 
new measures entered into force aiming to support the domestic workforce in jobs 
and sectors with high rates of unemployment compared to the national average (art. 
21a Foreign National Act). In these cases, job offers are announced, as a priority, to 
unemployed persons registered at the Regional Unemployed Office. This de facto 
entails giving precedence to Swiss nationals, who can more easily fulfil the require-
ment of registration (Moreno Russi and Nicole 2018). In Italy, since 2011, also due 
to the economic crisis, the government has decided to limit the entry quota only to 
few foreigners: mainly high- qualified workers, rich entrepreneurs and ‘seasonal 
workers’ in the field of agriculture and tourism (Chiaromonte et al. 2018). Following 
this trend, in Italy, Law No. 232 of 2016 (2017 Budget Law) modified the Italian 
Consolidated Law on Immigration, granting foreign investors entry and staying ‘out 
of quota’ (art. 26 bis of the Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998). Beyond Italy, 
among SIRIUS countries, also Greece, the Czech Republic, Switzerland and the 
UK provide programmes that offer residence permits to investors (Dzankic 2019).
As this overview shows, access to national job markets is increasingly reserved 
for specific categories of third country nationals, with European states devoting 
their efforts to becoming more attractive to investors, entrepreneurs, talented stu-
dents and professionals. After all, the promotion and development of a common 
space for research, scientific knowledge and technology was one of the main objec-
tive of the EU, as already stated in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, (see in particular Title 
XIX). However, in countries where the domestic workforce has reached high levels 
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of education and aspires employment in medium and high- skilled positions, many 
low- wage jobs such as the care of children and the elderly, construction and agricul-
ture, remain performed by immigrants (Newland and Riestrer 2018). Nonetheless, 
given the almost complete unavailability of legal migration avenues, both employ-
ers and low- skilled migrants often turn to informal employment, as analysis of 
Italy’s and Greece’s labour market displays. Within the extra- legal pattern, migrants 
are exposed to various forms of exploitation, subjected to risks of sanctions, and/or 
detention and excluded from basic rights and legal guarantees.
3.5  Concluding Remarks
The entangled interplay of political discourses, policies and legislations in the field 
of asylum and immigration is a common thread running across all the SIRIUS 
countries.
As observed earlier, immigration, asylum and security concerns have become 
increasingly fused in the public discourse, triggering a number of measures that try 
to criminalize both migration and humanitarian assistance. The narrative of ‘bogus 
asylum seekers’, together with open discourses of deterrence, have underpinned 
reforms which curtail foreigners’ guarantees, rights and social benefits, and also with 
the purpose of making European countries unattractive to certain types of migrant. 
The tightening of migration law, together with the increasing politicization of the 
‘refugee crisis’, have contributed to creating a ‘hostile environment’ for migrants. 
Meanwhile, SIRIUS countries’ legal and institutional frameworks on migration and 
asylum are extremely difficult to navigate. This is mainly the result of a complex and 
rapidly evolving legislation and of a fragmented legal framework, difficult to be cor-
rectly and consistently implemented and duly interpreted and applied.
Furthermore, an overall restriction of access to international procedure features 
in all SIRIUS countries. This is pursued through physical restrictions (i.e. push-
backs and the construction of fences), and procedural measures (including hotspots, 
acceleration procedures, the concept of ‘safe countries of origin’) to streamline the 
RSD procedure. However, procedural simplification is often realized at the expense 
of the principles of transparency and predictability, through the introduction of 
restrictions of rights and procedural guarantees, such as the right to effective 
defence. Meanwhile, access to Europe is narrowed for third country nationals who 
migrate for economic reasons, reserving permits to entry and stay to those who are 
deemed good for the economy, such as high- skilled workers, investors or rich 
entrepreneurs.
The restrictive approach that permeates narratives, policies and legislation risks 
becoming a ‘logic trap’ that effects not only on migrants but society as a whole. The 
anti- immigrant attitude of politicians, together with hostile public sentiment, mutu-
ally reinforcing each other, create a toxic environment. However, cultivating a cul-
ture of fear and defensiveness not only affects prospects of encounter and 
socialization for migrants who are already in the country, but also prevents govern-
ments from enacting reforms that would allow the country to benefit from migrants’ 
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presence and support their active engagement. The lack of legal migration pathways 
able to fill the demand for labour at all skills levels can be regarded as one of the 
most indicative implications of this blind and counterproductive ‘policy of fear’ 
which is taking over (and replacing) migration policies in Europe.
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Today there are around 22 million third- country nationals legally residing in the EU, 
constituting approximately 4.2% of the EU’s total population. Almost half have 
lived in their host country for 10 years or longer. Among working- age third- country 
nationals (TCNs) residing in the EU, 64.5% are in employment (Eurostat 2019a). 
This is almost 10 percentage points lower than host- country nationals, and the gap 
is wider for migrant working age women and youths (OECD and European 
Commission 2018).
As the number of people migrating to Europe has steadily increased and migra-
tion pathways into the EU have diversified, migration management and integration 
have risen to the very top of the political agenda for all EU Member States. Given 
the wider context of regional instability and global power- shifts, and the deeply 
transformative demographic, technological and economic transitions that the EU is 
undergoing, migration has become an ever- pressing priority for the EU institutions. 
Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, but particularly over the course of the past 
two decades, the role of the EU level of governance in formulating migration 
policies to support the labour market and wider integration of migrants, refugees 
and asylum seekers has widened and deepened. The Union has developed a 
substantial framework to support Member States by establishing: (a) a legislative 
framework for integration, which includes common basic principles (CBPs); (b) 
specialised funding instruments to promote and support migrant inclusion; (c) a set 
of policy instruments that contribute to social cohesion, integration and anti- 
discrimination; and (d) a space for exchange of information, good practices, mutual 
learning and cooperation.
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This chapter first takes a look at the drivers that led to an EU framework for the 
integration of legally residing TCNs. It then traces the development of the most 
important instruments from the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Juncker Commission 
(2014–2019), which declared migration management and the need for effective 
migrant integration policies as being among the top political priorities for the EU 
(Juncker 2014; COM(2015) 240). It examines the Union’s legislative framework in 
the field of migration, as well as its wider toolbox elaborated to contribute to 
immigrant integration. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the most 
important challenges that hinder fair and effective integration in the EU.
4.2  A Look Back at the Drivers and Motivations 
for a Common EU Framework
A European approach to migrant integration dates to long before the EU ‘formally’ 
acquired competence in this field in the late 1990s. An overview of various 
Commission communications and reports dating back to the 1970s–1980s indicates 
the attention accorded to ensuring equal treatment of individuals within the EEC/
EU as regards living and working conditions, social security provisions, vocational 
training, adult education and especially the education of migrant workers’ children. 
Nationality acquisition, unemployment, education, housing and living conditions, 
as well as the participation of TCNs in local elections are all underlined as crucial 
elements for the social integration of third country migrants residing on a permanent 
and lawful basis in the Member States. Just as importantly, there is a consistent and 
clear invitation to Member States to guarantee the free movement of Community 
migrant workers, and to coordinate national policies on migrants from third 
countries (see Gilardoni et al. 2015). Beyond simply attempting to steer Member 
States towards a common approach to migration and integration, the Commission 
and the European Parliament have taken a prescriptive approach in terms of 
highlighting specific measures which would promote fair treatment and non- -
discrimination and effective integration of both male and female TCNs in the 
labour market.
Community competence for immigration and asylum was established in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), laying the ground for a common EU framework on 
integration for legally residing third- country nationals (TCNs) to gradually develop. 
Political impetus was subsequently provided by the 1999 Tampere European 
Council Presidency, which declared that:
The European Union must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside 
legally on the territory of its Member States. A more vigorous integration policy should aim 
at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. It should also 
enhance non- discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and develop measures 
against racism and xenophobia.
By acknowledging the need for approximation of national legislations on the condi-
tions for admission and residence of third country nationals across Member States, 
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and the need for approximation of the legal status of third country nationals to that 
of Member States’ nationals, the European Council provided the European 
Commission with the opportunity to develop a range of policies and instruments 
aimed at supporting the integration of migrants in the EU Member States. Tampere 
thus rendered comparable treatment of TCNs and EU citizens in terms of rights and 
obligation as a core objective of a common immigration policy.
The following articles have since served as the basis for common policies and 
instruments to be developed:
According to Article 79(1) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), the Union aims among others at ‘fair treatment of third- country 
nationals residing legally in Member States.’ On the basis of Article 79(2)(a) and (b) 
TFEU, the Union therefore has the power to legislate on ‘the conditions of entry and 
residence, and standards on the issue by Member States of long- term visas and 
residence permits’ as well as on ‘the rights of third- country nationals residing 
legally in a Member State.’ Article 79(5) TFEU lays out the rules on admission, 
stating that it is up to Member States to determine how many third- country nationals 
can be admitted to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self- -
employed. And, further on, Article 153(1)(g) TFEU stipulates that as part of its 
social policy support, the Union shall complement the activities of the Member 
States as regards the ‘conditions of employment for third- country nationals legally 
residing in Union territory’. The competences to legislate on ‘standards concerning 
the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum’ and ‘a uniform status of 
asylum for nationals of third countries’, along with the power to agree to rules on 
‘freedom of movement within Member States for workers from the countries and 
territories’ in association agreements with third countries, are laid out in Articles 
78(2)(a) and (f) and in 202 TFEU respectively.
Furthermore, Article 15(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights stipulates 
that ‘Nationals of third countries who are authorised to work in the territories of the 
Member States are entitled to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of 
the Union.’ In other words, this right is granted solely to lawfully employed third- -
country nationals and guarantees ‘equivalent’ working conditions. The Charter is 
relevant for the rights of TCNs also in that Article 30 grants ‘every worker (…) the 
right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Union law and 
national laws and practises’, and Article 31 grants ‘every worker (…) the right to 
working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity, and to 
limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an 
annual period of paid leave’. Article 31 does not have a restricting reference to 
Union law and national laws and practises and it explicitly refers to the dignity of 
the worker (drawing on Article 1 of the Charter which states that ‘Human dignity is 
inviolable. It must be respected and protected.’)
Before exploring the legislative framework that has been put in place over the 
course of the past two decades, it is useful to consider the motivations and arguments 
that have both encouraged and framed an inclusion agenda at EU level.
First, the EU’s rights- and- responsibilities based approach to integration drew 
from the universal nature of the principles and values laid down in the Charter of 
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2001) and on Community law. In its 
2000 Communication on Integration, the Commission introduced the concept of 
civic citizenship, based on civic coexistence and shared values within the 
transnational common space of the Union. Civic citizenship was seen as guaranteeing 
certain core rights and obligations to immigrants which they would acquire gradually 
over a period of years, so that they are treated in the same way as nationals of their 
host state, even if they are not naturalised  (European Commission 2000). The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights established a basic framework for civic citizenship: 
some rights applying because of their universal nature, and others derived from 
those conferred on citizens of the Union. As mentioned above, these include the 
right to free movement and residence, the right to work, to establish oneself and to 
provide services, the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament and in municipal elections, the right to diplomatic and consular 
protection, the right to petition, to access documents, and the right to non- -
discrimination on the basis of nationality. This also involved guaranteeing a degree 
of mobility for legally resident TCNs within the Union’s area of freedom, security 
and justice, and the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member State in 
which they are resident (Tampere European Council Presidency 1999; COM(2000) 
757; COM(2003) 336).
Second, calls for EU policies in the field of migrant inclusion have drawn on a 
market- related functionality perspective and on concerns of economic performance. 
Better integration of migrants contributes to higher long- term economic, social and 
fiscal gains for the country where they settle (Kancs and Lecca 2017; World Bank 
2015). So, EU policies have been drawn up to primarily support Member States’ 
efforts at improving migrant’s labour market inclusion. Given that 40% of employers 
in the EU report difficulties in finding employees with the required skills (Cedefop 
2014), the European Commission has argued that migration and successful 
integration of third- country nationals can mitigate these effects and positively 
contribute to the competitiveness of the EU economy (see Andor 2014; COM(2018) 
635). At the same time, given the employment shortages in some Member States 
and the higher unemployment levels in other Member States, the mobility of long- -
term residents has long been seen as making economic sense and a positive 
contribution towards more flexible labour markets (Hansen 2005). Thus, migrant 
inclusion has come hand in hand with facilitating the free movement of persons in 
order to stimulate the rather limited overall levels of intra- EU labour mobility, 
contribute to strengthening the internal market, and improve the competitiveness of 
the EU economy (European Commission 2016a, b, c).
Third, measures to support migrant integration were boosted by the incorpora-
tion of Article 13 in the Amsterdam Treaty, which gave the Community the power 
to take legislative action to combat discrimination. The landmark Racial Equality 
Directive (Council of the EU 2000/43/EC) along with the Employment Framework 
Directive (Council of the EU 2000/78/EC) put into practice Article 13 thereby giv-
ing effect to the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial 
or ethnic origin or on grounds of religion, including in the labour market.
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Fourth, after the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties, and again after the 2015–2016 
polycrisis (Juncker 2016), EU institutions sought to define new roles for themselves 
and to expand their competences, tasks and functions. Already back in 1997, the 
Commission  put forward proposals on temporary protection for refugees;1 
similarly, its efforts to guarantee certain common standards for the rights of third 
country nationals led to the EU Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration 
Policy which was adopted by the European Council in 2004  (European Council 
Conclusions 2004);  in 1998  the action plan on free movement, immigration and 
asylum and the 2008 proposals to extend anti- discrimination competencies furthered 
the scope of EU actions. More recently, the 15 December 2015 proposal for a 
regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the 4 May 2016 
proposal to expand and strengthen the European Asylum Support Office (EASO)2 
further reflect an appetite to exceed support functions, and move towards monitoring- -
like functions as well as functions which have the potential of steering policy 
implementation (Tsourdi 2019).
Finally, there exists a mutually reinforcing relationship at play between institu-
tions and relevant interest groups. Empirical research has observed that once 
European policy commitments and networks are established in any field – migration 
and integration included – access- points and opportunities for influence for relevant 
(and most frequently pro- EU) interest groups multiply. This in turn feeds further 
institutionalisation whereby interest groups and networks pursue solutions which 
require ‘more Europe’ to the ‘problems of Europe’ and call for more powers and 
functions for the Commission, the Court and the European Parliament (Geddes 
2000). In the case of migration and integration, widening the role of EU institutions 
has offered scope for more progressive policy outcomes to counterbalance lowest 
common denominator decision- making in the Council and the ‘securitisation’ of 
migration (Geddes 2013).
4.3  The EU Legislative Framework
Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) stipu-
lates that the Union shall develop a common immigration policy: ‘The Union shall 
develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient 
management of migration flows, fair treatment of third- country nationals residing 
1 Already in 1997 the Commission submitted a proposal for Joint Action on Temporary protection. 
Eventually the Temporary Protection Directive was adopted in 2001 but to date it has not been 
implemented.
2 For a detailed account see the European Parliament’s legislative train schedule: at https://www.
europarl.europa.eu/legislative- train/theme- towards- a- new- policy- on- migration/file- 
european- border- and- coast- guard- agency and https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative- train/
theme- towards- a- new- policy- on- migration/file- jd- strengthening- the- european- asylum- support- office- 
 (easo)
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legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, 
illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings’.
It is important to underline that the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU) expanded the 
Union’s competences while also clarifying the division of competences between the 
Union and its Member States. For one, the EU level has shared competences with 
the Member States in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 4(2)(j) 
TFEU), whereas in the field of integration, the EU has supporting competences. In 
other words, while national governments firmly retain the right to decide how many 
immigrants from outside the EU they admit, the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e. co- 
decision and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the latter) can adopt measures in 
the following areas: (a) the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the 
issue by Member States of long- term visas and residence permits, including those 
for the purpose of family reunification; (b) the definition of the rights of third- -
country nationals residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions 
governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States; (c) 
illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and repatriation 
of persons residing without authorisation; (d) combating trafficking in persons, in 
particular women and children.
As regards integration, supporting competences mean that the EU provides sup-
port in orientating national policy and promotes the exchange of information among 
stakeholders; it is able to intervene insofar as it does not aim to coordinate national 
policies. Thus, integration policies remain within the remit of States’ competence 
and the objective of integration is not a competence conferred upon the Union 
(Neframi 2011).
Finally, as regards asylum issues, the Treaty of Lisbon broadened the compe-
tences of the EU. According to Art. 78 TFEU, a common policy on asylum is devel-
oped through the ordinary legislative procedure. There is no mentioning of minimum 
standards as before which sets the aim to convergence and it provides for the legal 
basis for the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
The competences to legislate on immigration of TCNs granted by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in the current Articles 78 and 79 of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) led to a set of directives adopted between 2003 and 2016 
(see Table 4.1). These directives cover various categories of third- country nationals 
and regulate admission and residence conditions, equal treatment rights and mobility 
within the EU.
The first set of directives lays out the rules on access to employment and employ-
ment related rights for the main categories of third- country nationals who are law-
fully resident in the Member States. This includes the Family Reunification Directive 
(2003/86), the Long- Term Residents Directive (2003/109), the Students Directive 
(2004/114), the Reception Conditions Directive, originally 2003/9 now 2013/33, 
and the Qualification Directive on the status of refugees and beneficiaries of subsid-
iary protection, originally 2004/84 now 2011/95. These directives, and particularly 
the directive on family reunification, essentially cover the largest number of TCNs 
living in the EU (as an illustration, in 2018 alone, 915,000 first residence permits 
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2003/109/EC of 25 
November 2003 as 
amended by Directive 
2011/51/EU
Long- term residents – All migrants residing legally in the territory of 
an EU country for at least 5 years of continuous legal residence, are 
granted long- term resident status.
Council Directive 
2003/86/EC of 22 
September 2003
Family Reunification – Sets the rules and conditions under which 
migrants who are legally residing in the EU and bring their non- EU 
national spouse, under- age children and children of their spouse to 
the Member State in which they are residing.
Directive 2011/98/EU of 
13 December 2011
Single Permit – Single application procedure for a single permit for 
migrants to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on 
a common set of rights for migrant workers legally residing in a 
Member State.
Directive 2014/66/EU of 
15 May 2014
Intra- corporate transferees – Conditions of entry and residence of 
migrants to facilitate intra- corporate transferees.
Directive 2014/36/EU of 
26 February 2014
Seasonal workers – Minimum rules for the admission of low skills 
migrant workers.
Directive 2016/801 of 11 
May 2016
Students and researchers – New rules for the entry and residence of 
migrant students and researchers as well as for school pupils, 
trainees, volunteers and au pairs.
Council Directive 
2009/50/EC of 25 May 
2009
EU Blue Card (revision currently on hold) – Conditions of entry and 
residence of third- country nationals for the purposes of highly 
qualified employment.
Directive 2013/32/EU of 
26 June 2013 (recast)
Revised Asylum Procedures – Sets common procedures for granting 
and withdraw international protection. Currently under revision 
Commission Proposal COM(2016) 467
Directive 2013/33/EU of 
26 June 2013 (recast)
Revised Reception Conditions – Sets standards for the reception of 
applicants for international protection Currently under revision 
Commission Proposal COM(2016) 465
Directive 2011/95/EU of 
13 December 2011 
(recast)
Revised Qualification directive – Standards for the qualification of 
third- country nationals as beneficiaries of international protection, for 
a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection granted. Currently 
under revision Commission Proposal COM(2016) 466
Council Directive 
2001/55/EC of 20 July 
2001
Temporary Protection - Minimum standards for giving temporary 
protection in the event of a mass inflow of displaced persons and on 
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in 
receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof.
Note: Denmark does not apply EU- wide rules relating to migration, visa and asylum policies. 
Ireland and the United Kingdom (while it was an EU Member State) choose, on a case- by- case 
basis, whether to adopt them.
Source: European Court of Auditors; European Parliament legislative train schedule
See: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative- train/theme- towards- a- new- policy- on- migration/
file- jd- revision- of- the- blue- card- directive
See: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative- train/theme- civil- liberties- justice- and- home- -
affairs- libe/file- jd- reform- of- the- asylum- procedures- directive/12- 2019
See: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative- train/theme- civil- liberties- justice- and- home- -
affairs- libe/file- jd- reform- of- the- reception- conditions- directive/12- 2019
See: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative- train/theme- civil- liberties- justice- and- home- -
affairs- libe/file- jd- reform- of- the- qualification- directive/12- 2019
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issued for family migration purposes were issued to third- country nationals across 
the EU28 (i.e. 28.4% of total) (Eurostat 2019b); for more see also Irina Isaakyan’s 
chapter in this volume).
The second set of directives take a more ‘sectoral’ approach given that the efforts 
of the Commission to formulate a general directive on admission for employment 
were blocked by Member States in the mid- 2000s. This set consists of the Blue Card 
Directive (2009/50), the Directive on admission for seasonal employment (2014/36) 
and the Directive on intra- corporate transferees (2014/66).
The third set of relevant EU instruments facilitates short- term employment and 
implicitly opens ways for third- country nationals to enter the Union and remain 
lawfully in a Member State for a short time and work or look for employment. 
These include the Visa Code (Regulation 810/2009), the EU Visa Regulation 
(539/2001) and the Regulation on local border traffic at external borders (1931/2006). 
In addition to these, the Single Permit Directive stipulates procedural rules to be 
applied by Member States and ensures equal treatment of third- country workers 
who have been issued the single permit with the nationals of the Member State 
where they reside (Groenendijk 2015).
A final set of directives falls under the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS). The CEAS has consistently suffered from a lack of common implementation 
and substantial divergences between Member States as regards reception conditions, 
the procedures and qualifications for the examination of asylum applications, and 
the international protection offered to refugees. During the 2015–2016 crisis, 
CEAS’ limitations became untenable, demonstrating the depth of the gridlock 
among EU Member States. The European Agenda on Migration which was launched 
in May 2015 aimed to replace the current directives on qualification and asylum 
procedures with regulations in an attempt to harmonise by decreasing the scope of 
Member States’ discretion; recast the Dublin III Regulation No. 604/2013 and the 
Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU extend the scope of the Eurodac 
Regulation No. 603/2013; and establish a permanent Union resettlement network, 
in order to address the secondary movement of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of 
international protection and improve the mechanism of responsibility- sharing 
(Jakulevičiene 2019). Efforts to render the CEAS more efficient, harmonised and 
responsive to the changing nature of migratory pressures and to future anticipated 
flows reached a deadlock in the period 2016–2019 as the political divisions between 
the Member States intensified, with a new round of initiatives launched by the von 
der Leyen Commission in the course of 2020.
As mentioned earlier, the fact that the EU level has shared competences with the 
Member States in the field of immigration and supporting competences regarding 
integration issues, has contributed to substantial discrepancies and a difficulty to 
adopt a holistic approach to migration and integration in spite of repeated declared 
intentions to do so. Thus, since the Lisbon Treaty (2009) it has been clarified that as 
regards integration policy, the EU is only able to adopt measures which aim to 
coordinate national policies, provide support in orientating national policy, and 




Having a shared EU legal framework for legal migration has led to a degree of 
harmonisation of conditions and rights, as well as a simplification of administrative 
procedures, helping to create a level(er) playing field across Member States. It has 
improved legal certainty and predictability for third- country nationals, employers, 
and administrations, and it has improved recognition of the rights of third- country 
nationals (namely the right to be treated on an equal basis with nationals in a number 
of important areas, such as working conditions, access to education and social 
security benefits, and procedural rights). In the case of specific categories of third- -
country nationals (e.g. ICTs, researchers and students), it has facilitated intra- EU 
mobility (European Commission SWD(2019)1056). Additionally, through the use 
of its funding instruments, by establishing networks of experts, as well as events and 
conferences aimed at bringing together multiple stakeholders, it has created a 
community spanning across the EU Member States and far beyond of civil society 
organisations, migrant associations, experts, researchers and practitioners who have 
been actively engaged in working to find ways to improve policies and instruments 
aimed at promoting migrant integration and to tangibly advance immigrant 
integration on the ground.
Notwithstanding these advantages, the current legal migration framework falls 
short of achieving the Treaty objective of developing a common legal migration 
policy as a key element of a comprehensive policy on management of migratory flows.
For one, there is a set of gaps which essentially lead to a fragmented system. The 
directives that have been adopted do not cover various problems occurring in the 
course of the various ‘migration phases’, such as the procedures for obtaining an 
entry visa. Nor do they fully cover  – at least as far as admission conditions are 
concerned – major categories of third- country nationals, such as non- seasonal low- 
and medium- skilled workers, job seekers, service providers covered by the EU’s 
trade commitments except intra- corporate transferees, and self- employed people/
entrepreneurs that tend to be covered by national rules (European Commission 
SWD(2019a, b, c, 1056).
Furthermore, although EU directives on migration only provide a set of mini-
mum entry and residence conditions as well as equal treatment rights, the discretion 
that Member States have in how they transpose these directives into national law 
means that rules applied to migrants are not identical in all Member States. This has 
been identified as one of the factors that might motivate migrants, including refu-
gees and asylum seekers, to move from the country they first arrive in to another 
country (European Commission COM(2016)456). As an illustration, data from 
EURODAC, the EU’s database that matches fingerprints to make it easier for EU 
states to determine responsibility for examining an asylum application by compar-
ing fingerprint datasets, has shown that 30% of asylum applicants in 2016 had previ-
ously lodged an application in another Member State (European Parliament 2017). 
The significant increase in the number of persons seeking asylum in the EU particu-
larly since 2015, raised awareness of the urgent need to ensure stronger enforcement 
of the directives, to improve their implementation and practical application – and 
therefore their overall effectiveness.
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Similarly, different national implementation choices and the possibility for 
Member States to retain parallel national schemes have added to complexity and 
lack of coherence of the EU framework. For instance, the existence of national 
permits for permanent residents has limited the intended harmonisation of different 
types of long- term residence status provided for by the Long- Term Residents 
Directive. With 2.9 million EU long- term residents’ permits issued at the end of 
2018 vs. ten million national ones,3 this Directive has been less successful than 
intended (European Commission COM(2019)161). The situation is similar for 
highly- skilled workers. The Blue Card Directive left Member States ample leeway 
on a variety of admission and residence criteria leading to the emergence of a 
confusing landscape of 25 distinct Blue Card systems (Denmark, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom (when it was an EU Member State) have opted not to take part) 
often in parallel to already well- developed national channels for the highly skilled. 
This confusion has not contributed to the Blue Card’s stated goal of facilitating the 
mobility of highly qualified professionals across Europe, nor has it served its 
intended purpose to be a magnet for international talent (Desiderio 2016). In 
addition, given the differences between Member States as regards the policies and 
resources devoted to integration issues, the outcomes of Europe’s TCNs differ 
greatly across the Union. The impact of the EU framework on promoting the 
integration of third- country nationals and preventing labour exploitation, has been 
limited.
Moreover, one of the main objectives of the aforementioned directives is to con-
tribute to the effective attainment of an internal market. The way that most Member 
States have implemented the intra- EU mobility provisions of the long- term resi-
dency directive has not really contributed to the attainment of the EU internal mar-
ket. There is limited, and only partial data (survey data collected by the European 
Migration Network in 2013) on how many long- term residents have exercised their 
right to reside in another Member State, but what is clear is that intra- EU mobility 
rights provided under Directive 2003/109/EC seem to be consistently underused 
throughout the EU (European Commission COM(2019)161). A number of reasons 
could explain this. For one, in some cases, exercising this right is subject to as many 
conditions as the ones for a new application for a residence permit. In others, the 
competent national administrations do not have enough knowledge of the procedures, 
or they find it difficult to cooperate with their counterparts in other Member States. 
The Commission has declared its intention to monitor the implementation of the 
directive and encourage Member States to improve the implementation of the 
intra- EU mobility provisions, also by promoting the cooperation and exchange of 
information between national authorities (European Commission COM(2019)161).
Lastly, the structural deficiencies of the CEAS impact not only the reception and 
processing conditions of asylum seekers and refugees; they also impact the 
integration potential of would- be refugees. Delays in registration and lengthy 




asylum procedures hinder applicants’ access to the labour market, while also 
increasing the reluctance of employers to recruit and hire asylum seekers due to the 
uncertainty of their legal status – including in situations when the person has a legal 
right to work (see the other relevant contributions in this volume). Moverover, the 
integration trajectory of asylum applicants is shaped by the economic conditions, 
the resources, networks and institutions that exist in the city or province where s/he 
is placed during the reception phase. This involves not only access to the labour 
market and the availability of employment opportunities; it also involves access to 
social services, health care, education and training, all of which impact integration. 
Beyond these tangible dimensions, the shortcomings  of the CEAS have wider 
effects on the politics and social fabric of the receiving society which in turn impact 
deeply on the integration of TCNs. When asylum and migration policies appear 
deficient or unfair, then political polarisation, the rise of populist forces across 
almost all Member States, and public opinion affect the receiving society’s overall 
commitment to integration of TCNs, and to integration as a ‘two- way’ process 
(Beirens 2018; European Social Survey and MPG 2017).
4.4  The EU’s Integration Toolkit
In its 2003 Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment, the 
Commission defined integration as a ‘two- ways process’ based on mutual rights and 
corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host 
society (European Commission 2003). While recognising that priorities will vary 
between countries and regions, the Commission underlined the need for integration 
policies to be planned within a long- term, coherent overall framework, and to be 
responsive to the specific needs of particular groups and tailored to local conditions. 
Integration, it was argued, was to be addressed through a holistic approach taking 
into account ‘not only the economic and social aspects of integration but also issues 
related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and political 
rights.’ (European Commission COM (2003) (Box 4.1).
The Common Basic Principles for Integration Policy adopted by the Council in 
2004 and reaffirmed a decade later (Council Conclusions 2014), are the foundations 
for EU policy cooperation on the integration of migrants and comprise 11 non- -
binding principles against which Member States can assess their own efforts. These 
Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy (CBPs), refer to access 
to the labour market and recognition of qualifications, education and language 
skills, housing and urban issues, health and social services, social and cultural 
environment, nationality and civic citizenship. Even though they are not binding, 
the CBPs have played a central role in defining and orienting integration policy and 
measures across EU Member States as they identify all issues involved in integration 
policy and have served to set future priorities.
Beyond the establishment of a legislative framework described above – and to 
compensate for the limitations of EU competences – the Commission has worked to 
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put these CBPs into practice by developing a wide- ranging toolkit aiming to 
stimulate Member States to assess their integration policies and practices, and, 
where necessary, to rethink them.
First of all, from the perspective of policy orientation and guidance, a number of 
documents underline core priorities and offer instruments in support of member 
States’ integration policies. Already in 2011, the Commission’s European agenda 
for the integration of third- country nationals (European Commission COM(2011) 
455) highlighted the challenges of migrant integration and suggested areas for 
action by both the Commission and Member States to foster integration policies. 
Box 4.1 A Shifting Definition of Integration
Over the course of these past 20 years, a number of shifts have occurred with 
regards to how integration is defined. When integration policy was first 
defined as a ‘two- way process’ the guiding thinking was that institutions, both 
at national and European level, had the main responsibility in regard to 
migrants’ integration into the receiving society, and integration was a way to 
promote social inclusion, non- discrimination and access to rights. Integration 
was defined as a dynamic, long- term, and continuous two- way process of 
mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. The participation of immigrants 
and their descendants on the one hand to meet the rights and responsibilities 
in relation to their new country of residence was matched with the receiving 
society’s efforts to create the opportunities for the immigrants’ full economic, 
social, cultural, and political participation. Accordingly, Member States were 
encouraged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in 
integration policy, and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and 
responsibilities (Carrera and Atger 2011).
By the mid- 2000s however, a number of Members States started to shift 
the burden to the TCNs in terms of their responsibility to learn the language 
and norms of the host country. For example, in the Netherlands and the UK 
(for specific target groups), immigrants have to pay for language instructions, 
thereby placing a burden particularly on low income TCNs (Gilardoni et al. 
2015). For most Member States, integration increasingly became about TCNs 
demonstrating certain achievements and understandings in order to become 
socially included, to acquire a regular residence status and to have access to 
family reunion (Gilardoni et  al. 2015). To the growing concern of migrant 
organisations, researchers and the EU institutions, integration was gradually 
transformed into a regulatory technique based on conditionality for the state 
to manage access by the foreigner to social inclusion and rights. As Member 
States began to add on obligations and requirements to TCNs, the Commission 
highlighted its concern with the shift from incentives to integrate to sanctions 
when requirements were not fulfilled and questioned the legal validity of 




More recently, in 2016, the Action Plan on the Integration of Third- Country 
Nationals (excluding second and third generation migrants), was formulated to 
support Member States’ efforts in developing and strengthening their integration 
policies following the 2015–2016 crisis. The Action Plan, together with over €5 
billion of additional funding for migration up to 2021 mobilised from within the EU 
budget, encompasses a wide range of measures for the EU Member States and other 
organisations to focus their efforts on. These include pre- departure and pre- arrival 
measures aiming to support migrants at the earliest point of the migration process 
(for example: language and job- related training); education and training (particularly 
language learning), as well as the right to childcare and to quality education for 
children; measures aimed at increasing awareness of the laws, culture and values of 
the receiving society; employment and vocational training to support the timely and 
full integration of migrants in the labour market and help mitigate the need for 
specific skills in the EU; access to basic services such as housing and healthcare 
enabling migrants to start a life in a new country and to have a reasonable chance of 
employment; active participation of migrants in the receiving communities through 
social, cultural and sports activities. It should be reminded that these actions fall 
under the competence of the Member States, therefore, the Commission does not 
monitor them in terms of how these funds are disbursed or what their outcomes are. 
In 2018, the European Court of Auditors conducted a survey in the EU Member 
States to assess the support provided by the Commission for the development and 
implementation of their integration policy. Among those Member States who did 
respond, the Commission’s support was considered as partially or fully relevant; 
nonetheless, the majority did not wish to see the current competences of the 
Commission in the field of migrant integration further increased (ECA 2018).
Second, through its funding tools, the EU has been able to influence national 
developments on the ground and a degree of European convergence. The European 
Integration Fund (EIF) (2007–2013) has directed its funding to integration projects 
conceived and implemented in line with the CBPs framework. EIF funding has been 
mainly directed towards Member States’ public authorities and services, and used 
largely for implementing, developing and testing language skills, as well as civic 
courses and programmes in the context of immigration and citizenship legislation 
(Carrera and Atger 2011).
Articles 77–80 of the TFEU have served as the basis for specialised funding 
instruments covering projects on immigrant integration to be developed. The EIF 
was transformed into the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) in the 
2014–2020 financial cycle with a total of €3.137 billion4 earmarked for the 27 
Member States (excluding Denmark)5 to be spent on: strengthening and developing 
the Common European Asylum System by ensuring that EU legislation in this field 
is efficiently and uniformly applied; supporting legal migration to EU Member 
4 See European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs: https://ec.europa.eu/home- affairs/
financing/fundings/migration- asylum- borders/asylum- migration- integration- fund_en
5 88% of the AMIF is spent under shared management and 12% under direct management, to be 
divided between EU actions and emergency assistance.
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States in line with the labour market needs and promoting the effective integration 
of non- EU nationals; enhancing fair and effective returns, which contribute to com-
bating irregular migration with an emphasis on sustainability and effectiveness of 
the return process; and ensuring that EU States which are most affected by migra-
tion and asylum flows can count on solidarity from other EU States. In 2019, the 
European Parliament endorsed the renewed Asylum, Migration and Integration 
Fund (AMIF) for the 2021–2027 budget with an increase up to €9.2 billion (€10.41 
billion in current prices). This will constitute 51% more than in the previous financial 
framework to contribute to these objectives (European Parliament 2019).
The AMIF regulation stipulates that at least 20% of the funds should be allocated 
to integration and at least another 20% to asylum. All Member States adhere to these 
requirements except Greece, which spends a share well below the 20% minimum on 
integration and legal migration, and Poland and Portugal, which fall marginally 
below the 20% threshold for spending on asylum (for further details and breakdown 
see Darvas et al. 2018). AMIF also provides financial resources for the activities of 
the European Migration Network (EMN) which has been set up to provide up- to- -
date, objective, reliable and comparable data on migration and asylum in order to 
support Member States’ and EU institutions’ policy- making. Special financial 
incentives for EU States have been built into the AMIF to support the Union 
Resettlement Programme through which, on the basis of Regulation EU 
No.516/2014, EU States voluntarily aim to provide international protection and 
effective integration in their territories to refugees and displaced persons identified 
as eligible for resettlement by UNHCR. Concrete actions funded through AMIF can 
include a wide range of initiatives, such as the improvement of accommodation and 
reception services for asylum seekers, information measures and campaigns in 
non- EU countries on legal migration channels, education and language training for 
non- EU nationals, assistance to vulnerable persons belonging to the target groups of 
AMIF, information exchange and cooperation between EU States and training for 
staff on relevant topics of AMIF.
Beyond this Fund, various dimensions of migrant integration are supported 
through a number of EU funds alongside other objectives (see Table  4.2) (ECA 
2018). These include inter alia promoting labour market integration and addressing 
social exclusion; alleviating poverty and promoting social inclusion, including in 
rural areas; providing immediate support regarding food and other basic material 
assistance; or supporting medium and long- term measures regarding social, health, 
education, housing and childcare infrastructure. Moreover, EU funds implemented 
directly by the Commission or by delegated bodies such as Horizon 2020, Erasmus 
+, COSME, Europe for Citizens and the Employment and Social Innovation 
Programme, are also used to finance actions aiming at migrant integration.
Third, in order to help Member States assess, develop, monitor and evaluate their 
national frameworks on integration, the EU has encouraged the exchange of 
information and the sharing of best practices. For this, National Contact Points on 
Integration (NCPIs), i.e. national experts identified within the ministries responsible 
for integration policy in each of the member states, are brought together to exchange 
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85,455 20 Those who can 
legally 
participate in the 
labour market or 
who are minor
Education, training, 
actions to facilitate 
access to the labour 
market
European Regional and 
Development Fund 
(ERDF) (reinforces 
economic, social and 
territorial cohesion)
21,906 4 Not directly 
targeted
Education, social, 
health and housing 
infrastructures
European Agriculture 




15,218 3 Not directly 
targeted
Assistance in housing, 
health care, education 
and employment
European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund (EMMP) 
(promotes balanced 
development of fisheries 
and aquaculture areas)
581 0 Not directly 
targeted
Professional training 
and start- up support
Fund for European Aid 
to the Most Deprived 
(FEAD) (alleviates 
poverty)
3814 4 As defined by 
member states
Food, basic assistance 
and social inclusion 
activities outside 
active labour market 
measures
Notes: (1) As of March 2018; (2) Specific objective 2 (Integration/Legal migration). Specific 
objective 1 (Asylum) could also contain integration related actions, but the amount is not known 
and has not been included in the European Court of Auditors’ (ECA) calculations; (3) Total 
available ESIF allocations for all target groups to thematic objectives 8 (Promoting sustainable and 
quality employment and supporting labour mobility), 9 (Promoting social inclusion, combating 
poverty and any discrimination) and 10 (Investing in education, training and vocational training for 
skills and lifelong learning); (4) Use of the fund for migrant integration measures as stated by 
Member States in the ECA’s survey; (5) Regarding applicants for international protection, Member 
States may also grant access to vocational education and training prior to having access to the 
labour market
Source: European Court of Auditors (ECA), based on adopted amounts in the EU programmes as 
of January 2018, Commission’s website https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu; ECA survey in the EU 
Member States; and European Commission’s notes on synergies
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insights, monitor progress and disseminate ‘best practices’ on integration policies at 
the national and EU levels.
These exchanges have been critical to the preparation of the European 
Commission’s annual reports on immigration and integration and the elaboration of 
integration handbooks.6 Similarly, the establishment of the European Integration 
Forum established in 2009 by the Commission and the European Economic and 
Social Committee was established to discuss on issues of migrant integration. In 
2015, it was replaced by the European Migration Forum and has since served as a 
platform for dialogue where civil society and migrants’ organisations are represented 
and which serves as a space for consultation, exchange of expertise (technical 
know- how and good practices) and identification of policy recommendations. The 
creation of a research- rich European website on integration,7 along with other 
relevant policy and research networks have been among its outcomes. Networks 
such as the European Migration Network (EMN) or the European Integration 
Network (EIN) bring together representatives of national public authorities from all 
EU Member States and two EEA countries (Iceland and Norway) to consult with 
the European Commission on current developments and policy agenda in the field 
of integration. They also participate in targeted study visits, peer reviews, workshops 
and mutual assistance actions on specific integration aspects, with the main aim of 
exchanging knowledge.
As regards data availability and monitoring, since 2010 the Council agreed on a 
set of common EU core indicators (Zaragoza indicators) to measure migrant 
integration in the areas of employment, education, social inclusion and active 
citizenship. Although in principle these indicators are valuable in defining integration 
and identifying where the biggest challenges are, in practice their use is limited 
because data on the migrant population is not always harmonised, indicators are not 
always reliable, and the different groups of migrants cannot be identified. Indeed, a 
2017 survey by the European Court of Auditors concluded that half of the Member 
States/national authorities do not use the Zaragoza indicators to monitor the 
outcomes of their integration policies and about a third do not use any indicator at 
all to monitor the outcome of their integration policies. None the less, monitoring is 
a fundamental tool for policy- makers and an area with significant EU added value. 
Monitoring enables the mapping of migrants’ needs so that appropriate political 
responses are brought about, whether through integration policies or through more 
general social and economic policies. And, it allows policy- makers to watch over 
changes in the target groups’ situation and to adjust policies accordingly, provided 
of course that monitoring is conducted regularly and comprises a set of relatively 
consistent and stable indicators (Gilardoni et al. 2015).
6 The European Commission’s Directorate- General Justice, Freedom and Security, has produced 
three editions of its Handbook on Integration for policy- makers and practitioners (2004, 2007 
and 2010).




To improve the availability of data, indicators of immigrant integration and 
research and strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to prospective challenges posed 
by migration, the Commission set up a Knowledge Centre on Migration and 
Demography under the Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) in 20168 and 
deepened its collaboration with the OECD. The experience of the 2015–2016 crisis 
was a game changer as regards the importance of readily available, robust, reliable 
and timely data on migration flows, trends and integration outcomes. It also led the 
Commission to mainstream integration across all policy sectors and in 2015 set up 
an Inter- Service Group on the integration of TCNs to better coordinate policies 
under the 2016 EU Action Plan on the Integration of TCNs.
Finally, other EU measures beyond the area of freedom, security and justice have 
contributed to EU immigrant integration though in limited ways. As mentioned 
above, the Race Equality Directive 2000/43/EC allowed for anti- discrimination 
laws to be set up and/or extended across the EU Member States. The Equal Treatment 
Directive 2000/78/EC, which concerns different grounds of discrimination and is 
limited to employment, provided the grounds for important judgments on religion 
thereby contributing to immigrant integration beyond the legal scope of the Tampere 
conclusions and the area of freedom, security and justice (see Tsourdi 2019; 
Triandafyllidou and Martin 2009; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009). Nonetheless, 
the fact that EU competences are limited in the fields of social policy, education or 
political participation, restricts the effectiveness of EU integration policies (see inter 
alia Beirens et  al. 2016; De Bruycker et  al. 2019). Given Europe’s increasingly 
diverse societies and given that integration in practice has very tangible dimensions 
and happens in the workplace, at school, in housing or in everyday civic and political 
life, it seems warranted for the EU to move to a more holistic approach of integra-
tion linking these diverse policy areas (OECD and European Commission 2018).
4.5  Looking Ahead to the EU’s Integration Policies
Ensuring that migrants, asylum seekers and refugees can actively participate in the 
labour market and contribute to the receiving society is key to the well- being, 
prosperity and cohesion of European societies. Migrant integration is a dynamic 
process that is shaped both by the changing composition of the migrant flows and 
by the changes in the receiving country’s economy and society. It also requires a 
series of reforms and new initiatives both in Member States and at the EU level, as 
well as coordinated measures to be pursued on three fronts. First, to work towards 
effective partnerships with third countries of origin or transit in order to be able to 
manage migration flows. Second, to work towards consolidating the CEAS and 
finding alternative solutions to unblock the Dublin deadlock. And third, to elaborate 
8 European Commission, Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD), https://ec.
europa.eu/knowledge4policy/migration- demography_en
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a robust framework for legal migration and integration which ensures TCNs with 
the fair treatment and opportunities they deserve so that they can contribute to 
Europe’s prosperity, economic development and well- being.
In these times where discrimination, prejudice, racism and xenophobia are ris-
ing, and in spite of its weaknesses, the EU has a unique arsenal of legal, moral and 
economic tools and foundations on which to uphold the EU’s fundamental rights, 
values and freedoms and contribute to more inclusive and cohesive societies. The 
commitment by the incoming President of the European Commission Ursula von 
der Leyen to develop a ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’ offered a much needed 
new impetus to address some of its important gaps and deficiencies.
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Chapter 5
“Enchanted with Europe”: Family 




During the last 15 years, the number of third- country nationals (TCNs) and mobile 
EU citizens living in the EU has increased from 34 million to 57 million, and EU 
Member States have experienced some common trends in what concerns integration 
of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (MRAs). First of all, intra- EU mobility 
has grown, in terms of numbers and diversity (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016; 
Lafleur and Stanek 2017). Second, the labour market integration of TCNs has come 
to the top of the EU agenda (ibid; Recchi 2015). However, Member States differ 
greatly in their policies on integration and citizenship acquisition as well as on 
reception and protection of refugees and asylum seekers. As noted by Geddes et al. 
(2020: 8), ‘the EU does not have a comprehensive migration policy’. Finally, 
lengthy asylum procedures and low return rates of MRAs without appropriate per-
mit to stay have led a considerable part of the MRA population to be in an irregular 
or insecure status (ibid; Kahance and Zimmermann 2016).
In this fluid milieu, scholars stop to view MRAs as holders of the fixed permit to 
work or stay but start to acknowledge the fragility – or ‘fluidity’ – of their status 
(Engbersen and Snel 2013). From this point of view, ‘labour migrants’ should not 
only be considered as those who enter the EU with the permit to work on pre- -
determined jobs but also a larger stream of refugees, asylum seekers and statistically 
dominating beneficiaries of family reunification (Geddes et al. 2020; Kahanec and 
Zimmermann 2016).
Family migrants, who actually make 40% of all TCNs in the EU (OECD 2019), 
represent a diverse MRA category with ‘fluid boundaries’ (Engbersen and Snel 
2013). This group is comprised of a large range of people who enter the EU as 
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dependent migrants to reunify with their EU- based family members, who may be 
either EU citizens or TCNs who migrated earlier (Castro et al. 2019; Geddes et al. 
2020; Peña & Neufeld 2017; OECD 2017, 2019). This group includes skilled MRAs 
while marital ties and emerging social networks often provoke the ‘fluidity’ of their 
status: supported by their families, MRAs can get better access to jobs and 
employment- related educational resources, often benefiting from both the informal 
market and authorized work, and resuming or confirming the status of the skilled 
migrant (Castro et al. 2019; Costello 2016; Engbersen and Snel 2013; ETUC 2018; 
Isaakyan 2015). When discouraged by their families and diasporic communities, 
such MRAs may alternatively end up disqualified and unemployed (OECD 2019).
Studies note that TCNs, in general, and family migrants, in particular, encounter 
a number of legal barriers in their labour- market integration (LMI) across all EU 27 
countries. The main LMI barriers for MRAs are insecure status (which also applies 
to legal economic migrants) and unrecognized qualifications. In this reference, the 
EU primary law represented by a number of directives: the Family Reunification 
Directive (2003/86/EC),1 Long- Term Residence Directive (2003/109/EC),2 Free 
Movement Directive (2004/38/EC),3 Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC),4 and 
revised Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU).5 These directives respectively con-
cern the rights of family members of TCNs legally staying in the EU, long- term 
residents and their family members, family members of EU citizens, high- skill 
TCNs who come to the EU for qualified employment, and beneficiaries of interna-
tional protection. However, these directives only provide guidelines to Member 
State. While the above mentioned barriers are mostly regulated on the national level 
and Member States differ significantly in their approaches (ETUC 2018). It is within 
this context that we may ask to what extent the European Court of Justice/ECJ (as 
the EU law enforcement organ) can help to foster harmonization.
This is not an easy question to answer because at the core of the EU constitu-
tional basis lie two competing discourses: ‘national security’ versus ‘free movement 
of people’. The EU is seen as a ‘fortress’ but also as a ‘space without borders’. The 
theme of free movement becomes the red line in all EU documents and discourses 
on labour- market integration, stressing an unrestricted mobility throughout Europe 
for employment and a respective mobility of services such as recognition of profes-
sional qualifications. A deeper insight leads to see this enchanting project as limited 
mostly to intra- EU mobility (Recchi 2015).
It is within this context that the majority of studies argue that labour market inte-
gration on the EU level does not exist (ETUC 2018; Huddleston et  al. 2015). 
Nevertheless, the EU has taken several steps in seeking to streamline, coordinate 
1 See Council (2003a).
2 See Council (2003b).
3 See Council (2004).
4 See Council (2009).
5 See European Parliament (2011).
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and support the policies and practices of MRA integration across the continent 
(Kumric and Zupan 2016; Manko 2017; O’Cinneide 2012).
It is true that the ECJ does not support all MRA cases, and many of their claims 
are eventually refused. There are, however, a number of cases resolved by the ECJ 
in favour of the MRA- plaintiff (Jesse 2016; Leneartz 2015). And although their 
nuances are not precisely understood and are often interpreted differently by 
Member States, such ECJ decisions form the EU case- law platform for LMI. In this 
connection, legal studies scholars note on the ‘intersectionality’ of the ECJ’s judge-
ments, meaning that the ECJ considers a variety of EU Directives (or various sources 
of the EU primary law) while making a decision (Kortese 2016; Lenaertz 
2012, 2015).
In the light of the discussion above, the chapter looks at barriers and enablers to 
skills recognition at the EU level by investigating the role of the ECJ in interpreting 
the rights of TCNs and their access to the labour market. We focus on the role of 
family reunification and EU citizen mobility provisions which tend to affect the 
court decisions in rather unexpected ways. We ask the following two research ques-
tions. Under what conditions are the permit to work for insecure TCNs and the 
recognition of TCNs’ outside- the- EU qualifications supported by the ECJ? What 
role does the factor of family migration play in such decisions?
The following theoretical resources inform our work. First, we acknowledge the 
above- mentioned ‘fluidity’ of migration, which conveys the instability of the TCN’s 
status. Given this, the ECJ often operates on the principle of ‘intersectionality’, tak-
ing into consideration various sources of EU primary law. In this connection, we 
finally assume that the ‘free mobility’ factor (which affects all EU discourses) and 
the ‘family ties’ factor (which is recognized in literatures as the most supportive of 
LMI) should presumably interact with the ECJ’s decisions.
The discussion of our findings illuminates that the ECJ case- law on European 
LMI is affected by the overall EU atmosphere of ‘positive contagion’ by – or ideo-
logical attraction to  - the idea of free movement (European Citizenship), which 
particularly crystalizes in the LMI of family migrants. This leads us to see family 
migration as a potential area of investment; whereas, at the same time, pointing to a 
complex interplay between intra- EU mobility, family reunification, gender bias and 
European case- law. While using the factor of family building in support of the 
TCN’s claim, the ECJ in some cases reproduces gender bias in its reference to ‘rela-
tional dependency’ – a factor that often works to the detriment of even financially 
independent female MRAs and becomes a ‘negative symbolic contagion’ for 
European LMI.
The chapter has the following structure. Section 5.2 provides the background 
information on the family migration in the EU. It starts with an overview of family 
migration as a prevailing type of European immigration. In particular, it introduces 
the ‘dependent migrant’ (to be shown later as a specific group of ECJ plaintiffs). 
Then we briefly discuss the EU Family Reunification Strategy and the main LMI 
barriers that family migrants face when in the EU, posing the question about what 
the ECJ can practically do to assist such MRAs in confronting the LMI barriers.
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In reference to this question, the Professional Qualifications Directive (PQD) 
and the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) are discussed in Sect. 5.3, 
which also analyzes ECJ cases that make precedent for evaluating foreign qualifica-
tions. This section argues that recognition of foreign qualifications stumbles over 
the MRA’s permit to stay, the nuances of which are explored in Sect. 5.4. Looking 
at the ECJ case- law in relation to migrants who try to confirm on their permit to 
work, Sect. 5.4 points to the ‘relational dependency’ factor as the one that may not 
always act in favour of the (female) MRA when the case about her status transfer is 
assessed in court.
The chapter ends with the discussion of complex relations between qualifica-
tions, free mobility, law and gender (Sect. 5.5). It shows that some social forces 
(marriage to a EU national) may support the ECJ’s decision in favour of the MRA, 
while others (dependency of the relationship) may actually work in the opposite 
direction, implying that the European space is not open for everyone.
5.2  Family Migration in the EU: Tendencies and Laws
5.2.1  ‘Dependent Migrants’: Statistics and Basic Concepts
As observed by Eurostat (2019), 40% of the 37 million TCNs in the EU (that is, 
almost 15 million) are dependent migrants – or married adult MRAs who join their 
spouses abroad.6 (Their incidence obviously wins the comparison with the 1.3 mil-
lion MRAs who have entered the EU within the international protection scheme 
(European Parliament 2017a, 2017b).) Over the last 10 years, family migration 
associated with spouses’ mobility has become the prevailing form of EU immigra-
tion (ibid). As noted by Geddes et al. (2020), ‘family migration is a major compo-
nent of immigration flows to the EU’ (p. 29) and ‘a key migration route’ (p. 83).
According to the OECD Factsheet from 2018, such family migrants make 40% 
of all permanent migrations in the OECD countries (OECD 2018). This percentage 
has been relatively robust over the last 5 years (Chaloff 2013; OECD 2018), sur-
passing 30% of intra- EU mobility, 20% of refugees and asylum seekers, and 10% of 
economic (labour) migrants (ibid). Moreover, the inflows of family migrants to the 
EU become more and more dynamic with time. Thus almost 2 million family 
migrants have migrated to the OECD countries over the last 3 years, 1.6 of whom 
through the family reunification category (ibid).
Family migrants enter the country of destination (CoD) as ‘dependent migrants’ 
either simultaneously arriving with their principle migrant spouses (accompanying 
6 In this research, we do not include or refer to minors who are either biological children of prin-
ciple migrants or international adoptees by EU citizens (although these two categories also fall 
under the overall umbrella of family migration.) By ‘family migrants’, we only mean married 
adults who are within the active working age and to whom the issue of LMI is at the moment 
related directly.
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family migration), or later joining their long- term spouses who come to the CoD 
earlier as MRAs (family reunification), or migrating as newly- wedded spouses of 
residential foreigners and nationals (family formation).7 In the EU, they all fall 
under the umbrella of Member States’ national family reunification schemes, which 
are in theory informed by the European Family Reunification Strategy (Geddes 
et al. 2020).
Although marriage/family migration is an articulate migrant group, it conveys 
the characteristics and realities of other migrant types such as ‘labour migration’ 
and especially ‘high- skill migration’ (OECD 2018). In the EU, family migrants 
represent 40% of all MRAs. While their share specifically in the EU labour migra-
tion is also almost 40%, although a little lower than compared with 2000, mostly 
because of difficulties related to the recognition of their qualifications (Chaloff 2013).
5.2.2  EU Family Reunification Policy: Directives 2003/86 
and 2004/38
The phenomenon of family reunification directly relates to the question of labour 
market integration since migrating spouses (dependent family migrants) should also 
have the right to work in the country of destination, thus adding to the EU workforce 
(Acosta Arcarazo 2009, 2010; Groenendijk 2007; Groenendijk et  al. 2007; 
O’Cinneide 2015; Staiano 2017).
The multitude of cross- border marriage patterns in Europe leads toward a recog-
nition of the overall EU Family Reunification Policy. The Family Reunification 
Policy consists of two Directives: the Family Reunification Directive 2003/868 and 
the European Citizens’ Rights Directive (also known in press as the Free Movement- 
or EU Citizenship- Directive).9 The reunification of family members of TCNs is 
covered by the provisions in the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86. As for 
TCNs who are overseas spouses of intra- EU mobile citizens, the EU Citizenship 
Directive 2003/38 comes into force.
Van den Broucke et  al. (2016) explain that beneficiaries of the Family 
Reunification Strategy can be divided into two basic reunification categories, which 
have implications for their employment. The Family Reunification Directive entitles 
married spouses and unmarried under- age children of non- EU nationals who reside 
legally for at least 1 year in a Member State to reunite with them exactly in this 
Member State. Within this scheme, the reunifying family members (dependent 
migrants) have the right to work and access educational and vocational programmes 
immediately upon arrival, and also the right for the independent permit to stay after 
7 See Ibid.
8 See: Council (2003a).
9 See: Council (2004).
5 “Enchanted with Europe”: Family Migration and European Law on Labour-Market…
100
the 5 years of their legal residence. This directive does not cover the reunification of 
family members of refugees and EU nationals.10
The research conducted by Van den Broucke et al. (2016) shows that the reunifi-
cation of overseas TNCs with their EU national spouses is covered by the European 
Citizenship Directive if the EU national sponsor has experience of intra- EU mobil-
ity. His/her family members can join him/her in the EU and live or travel with him/
her all the time. In other words, if the EU national sponsor has worked, is now work-
ing or going to move to another Member State, his family members will be allowed 
to join him/her in the EU – given that they reside in a place of the sponsor’s base-
ment. Otherwise, the should apply under the national law.
Scholars argue that there is no European law on the harmonization of reunifica-
tion procedures for TCNs who are family members of non- mobile EU nationals 
(Barbulescu 2017; Geddes et al. 2020; Van den Broucke et al. 2016). Such cases are 
often decided within the national law framework and are not resolved positively by 
the ECJ (Lanaertz 2015). There is, however, a special survival tool applied by such 
couples: to preserve the family integrity, the EU- national spouse finds a job in 
another EU Member State to where he/she can invite his/her TCN family for living 
and working.11 Studies show that, although ‘salient’, the overall ides of Free 
Movement remains ‘controversial’ (Lafleur and Stanek 2017: 2015) because mem-
ber states ‘create hierarchies of family migrants by imposing conditions that define 
their eligibility, waiting periods and also integration measures (Geddes et  al. 
(2020: 215).
Although the European Citizenship Directive remains fragmented and not appli-
cable to all MRA categories, in those cases where it works it provides for the status 
that is equivalent to ‘permit to work’ – a strong factor that affects the rest of the 
labour market integration.
10 The only entry condition is sponsorship, or the adequate financial support of the principle migrant 
of his/her incoming family. However, such nuances as the sponsor’s financial threshold (for invit-
ing his/her overseas- based family to the EU) and the composition of his/her immediate family are 
decided individually by national laws of Member States (Acosta Arcarazo 2009; Bonjour 2014; 
Block and Bonjour 2013; Bonjour and Vinck 2013; Van den Broucke et al. 2016). Moreover, the 
Directive grants Member States optional provisions to extend some parameters while restricting 
others. Member States differ a lot along this family reunification continuum, while the ECJ cannot 
force them to modify these additional parameters.
11 This European Citizenship Directive makes the process of family reunification fast and effec-
tive– yet fragmented because some categories of MRA (such as long- term residents, specific visa 
holders and non- mobile EU nationals) are marginalized within this scheme as sponsors. Neither 
does this Directive clarify whether the EU- national sponsor’s periods of study or vocational train-
ing in another EU country can count toward his/her intra- EU mobility experience.
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5.3  Recognition of Professional Qualifications
As noted by a senior DG Empl officer, ‘Everything starts from job search and skill 
match, where of vital importance are professional qualifications, which often remain 
unrecognized by the Member State’.12 Within this pessimistic context, we may fur-
ther ask if nothing at all can be done on the EU level, or if there are still any loop-
holes in EU law on LMI for TCNs. One such loophole is European citizenship and 
associated intra- EU mobility.
5.3.1  The European Space but for Whom?
In 1979, the Lebanon- issued medical degree of the Lebanese dental surgeon Dr. 
Tawil- Albertini was recognized in Belgium but later rejected in Ireland in 1986. In 
1982, Hugo Fernando Hocsman, a Spanish doctor with all his degrees and profes-
sional qualifications from Argentina, was authorized to practice in Spain as part of 
the bi- lateral agreement between these two countries, but was later denied an oppor-
tunity to practice in France in 1992.
We may ask why the ECJ supported Hocsman’s claim against France but opposed 
Tawil- Albertini’s appeal against Ireland if they both had had their foreign degrees 
recognized in the EU.  Why did the principle of mutual recognition work for 
Hocsman but not for Tawil- Albertini? The answer is: Hocsman was a EU national 
while Tawil- Albertini was not. Neither was the latter married to a EU national. 
Their ECJ cases, which have paved the platform for the 2005 Professional 
Qualifications Directive (PQD), point to the huge discrepancy between recognition 
services provided to EU citizens and those provided to TCNs.
Recognition refers to the ‘free movement’ rhetoric in the EU policy, which 
became an essential part of EU law after its endorsement in 1992 by the Amsterdam 
Treaty [TFEU Articles 4(2)(a), 20, 26 and 45–48]. The main freedom granted to EU 
citizens and their family members within this framework is the freedom of move-
ment of professionals, which includes their fundamental right to move to and work 
in another Member State on the principle of Equal Treatment with nationals of that 
Member State (Papagianni 2014; Stetter 2008).13 This freedom leads directly to a 
number of other freedoms such as establishment and service provision [TFEU 
Article(49)] – or the right to settle and to develop career so that the person would be 
able to provide professional services in a new Member State. This further conveys 
12 Interview held in Brussels on 12 December 2018 as part of the SIRIUS research. Available at: 
https://www.sirius- project.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/SIRIUS%20WP3%20- %20
D3.2_0.pdf
13 The constitutional basis of the EU has been paved by the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and 
Amsterdam (1999) have paid the, with the Maastricht Treaty focusing on human rights while the 
Amsterdam Treaty dealing with the EU employment and immigration policies.
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the idea of the harmonization and mutual recognition of academic and professional 
qualifications by Member States, without which the freedom of establishment 
would not be possible (Maciejewski et al. 2019).
These ideas are further elaborated on in a number of EU Directives, including the 
EU Citizenship Directive 2004/38/EC on the free movement of EU nationals and 
their family members (which is also part of the European Family Reunification 
Strategy) and the Professional Qualifications Directives (PQD) 2005/36/EC and 
2013/55/EU.
5.3.2  Professional Qualifications Directive and European 
Case-Law on Recognition
Evaluating the labour market situation in the EU, it is important to note that training 
standards for regulated professions actually differ across Member States. However, 
the Professional Qualifications Directive (PQD), which is the primary EU law on 
the recognition of professionals’ qualifications, simplifies the recognition process.14 
The directive even makes the recognition automatic for some regulated professions 
including doctors, dentists, nurses, midwives, pharmacists, veterinary surgeons and 
architects. In other cases, the principle of mutual recognition is applied. The only 
problem is that the PQD provisions are applicable only to qualifications received 
in the EU.
To be more specific, the main rule of the PQD is the automatic assessment of 
EU- based qualifications in the absence of significant differences between educa-
tional systems and professional requirements in two Member States (Kortese 2016). 
The mutual recognition principle ensures that the qualifications obtained according 
to the laws and regulations in one Member State are to be recognized as such in 
another Member State. In such cases of mutual recognition, additional accreditation 
and minimum training period apply. As for the non- EU based qualifications of EU 
citizens, they are recognized automatically in the case of ‘second recognition’, 
meaning that it has been recognized by another Member State where the person has 
also practiced for at least 3 years (which is seen in the Hocsman case). The auto-
matic mutual recognition thus often becomes synonymous to the automatic ‘sec-
ondary recognition’ (Ibid).
However, cases of significant discrepancies between Member States’ educational 
systems and professional requirements may involve support from the European 
Qualifications Framework (EQF) for lifelong learning. The main EU reference 
framework for evaluating qualifications and credentials that enable education and 
employment within the EU, the EQF was established in 2008 and revised in 2017 to 
guide the Member States’ National Qualifications Frameworks. As noted in the 
EQF Brochure (Thyssen 2018: 5), it is a European ‘translation device between 
14 For more on the PQD provisions, see: European Parliament (2013).
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different qualifications systems and their levels’. As stated by Devaux (2013: 3), 
‘the general objective of the EQF is to promote lifelong learning, increase employ-
ability, mobility and the social integration of workers and learners’. In Member 
States, formal credentials are assessed against the EU benchmarks from the EQF by 
either national or regional coordinating mechanisms. Informal credentials are usu-
ally assessed by employers through alternative methods such as job interview 
(CEDEFOP 2018).
Kahance and Zimmermann (2016: 440) point to a number of serious ‘recognition 
problems’. In line with this, studies and policy reports agree that neither the PDF 
nor the EQF provides any imperatives – or even clear guidelines to Member States – 
on how to assess overseas qualifications of foreign nationals or the absence of such 
in refugees and asylum seekers (Devaux 2013; Kortese 2016; Thyssen 2018). In its 
latest bi- annual update on the European Inventory of Formal and Informal Learning, 
CEDEFOP (2018) notes that, in reference to overseas credentials, many EU Member 
States still have serious problems with their validation systems and coordinating 
mechanisms, which prove to be successful mostly on the level of intra- EU mobility.
For the recognition of outside- the- EU qualifications of EU citizens and their 
family members, there is abundant ECJ case- law, including the iconic precedents 
such as Vlassipoulou v. Germany (1991) and the above- mentioned Hocsman v. 
France (2000) and Tawil- Albertini v. Ireland (1986), among many other cases that 
were considered by the ECJ before the adoption of the first PQD. Although they 
mostly refer to the recognition of cases that fall under the mutual recognition, they 
provide the case- law guidance for the recognition of TCN degrees. For example, the 
case of Irene Vlassipoulou v. Germany (about a Greek lawyer who held degrees and 
professional experience from both Greece and Germany and who tried to practice in 
Germany)15 gives the precedent on evaluating all circumstances of the person’s 
career in the EU  – thus supporting the idea of a multi- faceted evaluation with 
emphasis on prior professional experience in any part of the EU for the EU citizen 
or for a person with derivative (equal treatment) status.
This rule applies to the evaluation of TCN qualifications of EU citizens, which is 
further illuminated by the earlier discussed case of Hugo Fernando Hocsman v. 
France.16 According to TFEU Article 49 and the Vlassipoulou precedent, the ECJ 
confirmed, in Hocsman, on the rule of the second within- EU recognition for the EU 
citizen or a person with the derivative (equal treatment) status specifically in rela-
tion to TCN qualifications. However, the ECJ- rejected case of Tawil Albertini shows 
that the second within- EU recognition does not apply to un- naturalized TCNs who 
are not family members of EU citizens.17
These cases had enabled the consequent PQF 2005 and its modernized 2013 ver-
sion, whose Article 3(3) provides that ‘qualifications obtained by EU nationals and 
issued by a third country shall be regarded as evidence of formal qualifications by 
15 See: Case C- 340/89 Vlassipoulou [1991] ECR I- 2357.
16 See: Case C- 238/98 (2000) Hocsman ECR I- 6623.
17 See: Case C- 154/93 Tawil- Albertini [1991’ECR I- 451.
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the Directive, if the holder has three years’ professional experience in the profession 
concerned on the territory of the MS which initially recognized this qualification’ 
(Kortese 2016; European Parliament 2013). This means that the EU- national would 
only benefit from this second- recognition procedure if he/she moves to a dif-
ferent MS.
While TCNs (with EU qualifications) definitely fall under the PDF, they become 
excluded from its beneficiary list when they aim at the recognition of qualifications 
received outside the EU. In this case, they become subjected to national laws and 
may be placed under strict conditions of evaluation (Kortese 2016; Maciejewski 
et al. 2019). As professionals, they may in some cases be recognized under the EU 
law, subjected, however, to ‘a patchwork of secondary legislation [Directives]’ that 
determines their EU status (Jesse 2016: 146). Among the Directives that grant the 
equal treatment in the recognition of professional qualifications to TCNs are the 
Long- term Residence Directive18 and the European Citizenship Directive, which 
apply to TCNs who are family members (spouses). In such cases of family reunifi-
cation, TCNs must undergo the above mentioned second within- EU recognition (as 
supported by the EU primary law in the face of the PQD and TFEU, and also by the 
EU case- law in the face of the Vlassipoulou and Hocsman cases). Marriage thus 
becomes an important factor of recognition because it changes the status.
5.4  The ‘Relationship of Dependency’: A Loophole 
for a Fluid Status?
5.4.1  Looking at the Zambrano Case
The recognition procedures show that, for TCNs, everything stumbles over their 
status in the country of destination. MSs have different entry bans on MRAs and 
different citizenship and immigration approaches. Because of the existing contra-
dictions within their immigration policies, one and the same TCN may appear both 
as an irregular and regular migrant, who is both prohibited and allowed to work.
For example, the Columbian national Ruiz Zambrano came to the EU as an asy-
lum seeker and soon married a Belgian citizen of the Colombian origin. His applica-
tion for asylum in Belgium was soon refused, and in spite of his non- refoulment due 
to dangerous political situation in his country of origin, he had no permission to 
work in Belgium. He had still managed to work in that MS for 6 years (2001–2006), 
during which he had regularly and officially paid all taxes, and his Belgian- national 
son and daughter were born (Hailbronner and Thym 2011). However, the Belgian 
18 Directive 2003/109 gives the long- resident status to TCNs who have been legally residing, with-
out an interruption, in an EU MS for at least 5 years. The acquisition of this status is subject to 
evidence of the applicant’s financial resources and integration exams established in the MS. See: 
https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32003L0109
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Office National de L’Emploi rejected his claim for unemployment benefits and cre-
ated a strong case for his expulsion from the country. Zambrano’s consequent appeal 
to the ECJ was based on ‘a derived right of residence as the ascendant of minor 
children who are nationals of a Member State’ and was supported by the Court (ibid).
The revolutionary Zambrano case, which took place in 2011,19 illuminates the 
ECJ’s acknowledgement of factor of relational dependency between the plaintiff 
and his/her EU family. If Ruiz Zambrano had left the country, he should have taken 
his children with him because they were his dependents. This would mean that they 
would not be able to exercise their right of free movement around the EU. With 
emphasis on the ‘citizenship of the Union as intended to be the fundamental status 
of nationals of the Member States’ (Case C- 34/09, EU:C:2011:124, para 41), the 
ECJ concluded its judgment with the recognition that ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes 
national measures that have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genu-
ine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as 
citizens of the Union’ (Case C- 34/09, EU:C:2011:124, para 42).
The ‘relationship of dependency’ between the TCN and his/her EU- national 
minor children, which had become the key factor influencing the ECJ’s decision in 
favour of the plaintiff, should be assessed both in financial (or care- providing) terms 
as well as from the point of view of European citizenship (which is in itself rather 
restrictive as applied not to anyone) (Hailbronner and Thym 2011). Thus in order to 
fit the requirements of Article 20, the minor children should be first of all directly 
dependent on the plaintiff in physical and emotional terms. At the same time, they 
should be EU citizens (or Member States’ nationals) either by birth or through natu-
ralization. If any of these two conditions is missing, the relational dependency 
becomes no more than a ‘hypothetical’ factor, and it would support more the idea of 
expulsion (in lines with the ‘national security’ rhetoric) rather than the idea of free 
movement (in favour of the ‘one- Europe- for- all’) (Lenaerts 2015).
5.4.2  Broken Relational Dependency
An example of the broken relational dependency is the Lida case (2012), which was 
rejected by the ECJ as ‘falling outside the scope’ of the TFEU provisions on EU 
citizenship (Adam and Van Elsuwege 2012: 176–183; Lida Case 2012, para 56). In 
that case, Mr. Iida, a Turkish national and a legal migrant in Germany, whose permit 
to work was expiring, applied for a permit to stay as the husband and father of EU 
citizens. However, both German authorities and the ECJ denied his claim on the 
basis of separation. This meant that his German- national wife and daughter were 
not dependent on him either in financial- or EU- mobility terms as living in Austria 
(another MS) and already exercising their Article 20 right (Lenearts 2015).
19 See: Case  C- 34/09, EU:C:2011:124  (Ruiz Zambrano). For case analysis, see also: Lenaertz 
(2012, 2013, 2015).
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There have been recently many cases (including the K.A. et al. Case C- 82/16), 
where the ECJ confirms on the relational dependency as a way to avoid violation of 
the fundamental EU citizenship right, and successfully advises Member States on 
considering all circumstances around this complex LMI factor that work in favour 
of the TCN and his/her labour market participation (Progin- Theukauf 2018).
However, the gender bias illuminated by the 2017 Chavez- Vilchez et al. case20 
adds to the ‘big puzzle’ around both the European citizenship and the TCN status 
(Progin- Theukauf 2018). Although the Venezuelan national Mrs. Chavez- Vilchez 
completely fitted the relationship of dependency as the other of a EU national 
daughter and her main care- provider, the ECJ had rejected her claim. In fact, Mrs. 
Chavez- Vilchez and seven other TCN women whose claims were simultaneously 
considered and rejected had been lawfully living with their Dutch families in the 
Netherlands for years. As (former) asylum seekers, they were balancing between 
regular and irregular status for years. All eight women had, in their full custody and 
maintenance, minor Dutch- national children from Dutch- national men (Khan 
2017). However, their claims were rejected by both the Dutch authorities and by the 
ECJ on the grounds of inadequate dependency factor: by the decision of the ECJ, 
the care provider is always the man unless he is imprisoned or institutionalized 
(placed in a mental institution) (Lenearts 2015).
The comparison of the Zambrano and Chavez- Vilchez cases shows that the EU 
citizenship- and family provisions create a non- playing field for women, where the 
father is considered indispensable as a career and provider for the children while the 
mother is not, even in spite of her financial eligibility.
5.5  Case-Buffers: Law and Gender
5.5.1  The Contagious Attraction of European Citizenship
The Chavez- Vilchez case adds to the overall rather pessimistic situation for depen-
dent female MRAs in the EU, who reunite with their husband- sponsors. Even 
though independent financially (as the Chavez- Vilchez case demonstrates), female 
MRAs continue to experience various kinds of socio- economic barriers in their inte-
gration, including the ‘double labour market disadvantage’. Because of their fre-
quently unrecognized credentials and insecure status, they are sidelined in the job 
market against local women, while the lack of specific professional experience and 
impeded access to additional training fosters their marginalization also in relation to 
foreign men (Castro et al. 2019; Dumont 2007; Rubin 2008; OECD 2017). Such 
women are, in fact, among the ‘most vulnerable populations for labour market inte-
gration’ (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016: 4). Often having restricted access to job 
postings, they also suffer from various forms of indirect discrimination in relation 
20 C- 133/15 ECLI:EU:C:2017:354 (10 May 2017).
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to employment (ENAR 2013; UNHCR 2016), which is illuminated by a number of 
ECJ- rejected claims (Groenendiijk 2007; Romic 2010; Rubinstein 2015).21
Yet in spite of all this fragmentation of European integration and free movement, 
there is still a powerful unionization tool for recognition and labour market acces-
sion. Thus the exception to laws that create barriers and hierarchies for family 
migrants (and other TNCs) is the segment of the EU free movement framework that 
‘guarantees rights of family reunion for all mobile EU citizens’ (Geddes et  al. 
2020: 83).
The ‘EU legitimacy tools’ of free movement and intra- EU mobility ‘go together 
in the legitimization of the integration process’ (Recchi 2015: 47). From this angle, 
the free movement regime has become ‘the single piece of EU legislation that most 
explicitly alludes to a federalization of the Union’ (ibid: 43).
When some attractive potential facilitates choices of people, including court 
judges, its effect is akin to moral (or symbolic) contagion, about which sociologists 
of post- modern consumption often write (Argo et al. 2008; Nemeroff and Rozin 
1994). According to their approach, the moral contagion (or moral contamination) 
takes place when symbols that are attached to the subject [such as a piece of law or 
a directive] make very strong influence upon human action – the influence that, by 
its strength, resembles contagion (ibid). For example, we can see from the discus-
sion above and also from literatures on integration that the idea of European citizen-
ship (with accent on free movement) becomes both attracting attention and positively 
contagious (as affecting EU law in favour of the TCN). Argo et  al. (2008: 692) 
explain that positive contagion occurs because people want to be close to something 
for which they have strong positive feeling and attitudes’.
From this point of view, the work of the ECJ in respect to TCNs’ obviously 
becomes positively contaminated by the European Citizenship Directive, as many 
of the ECJ’s pro- MRA decisions demonstrate. When ECJ considers cases of MRAs, 
the decision is, in fact, often taken as a result of intersectionality, meaning that the 
issue can be interpreted by more than one directive (Kortese 2016; Romic 2010). 
This produces the effect of legislative contamination, which means that the Court’s 
decision can be influenced by an article from an additional directive. Positive con-
tamination means that the decision is in favour of the plaintiff, which is due to the 
additional application of the European Citizenship Directive in our case. Among the 
examples of such positive legislative contamination is the Zambrano and 
Hocsman cases.
These two cases show that the legislative positive contagion with the EU may 
work for TCNs through the principles of ‘relational dependency’ and ‘second rec-
ognition’. This can be illuminated by the functioning of recognition loopholes.
21 The European Anti- Discrimination Policy is actually represented through the two Directives – 
the Racial Equality Directive 2000/43 and the Employment Equality Directives 2000/78 – which 
identify three main forms of discrimination: direct discrimination, indirect discrimination and 
harassment. And there is a huge divergence in national cultures of the EU MSs on criteria for clas-
sifying something as indirect discrimination (Niessen et al. 2016; Tymowski 2016). As a result, 
indirect discrimination is often justified by exceptional cases (ENAR 2015).
5 “Enchanted with Europe”: Family Migration and European Law on Labour-Market…
108
5.5.2  Thoughts on LMI, Marriage and Gender
These loopholes take place as supported by various bi- lateral agreements and his-
torical alliances that can make the first EU recognition easier for TCNs. For exam-
ple, the Baltic States automatically accept foreign papers issued in Russia, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. Qualifications from these countries 
are, in many cases, also accepted in such former socialist states as Bulgaria and 
Romania (which belong to the EU periphery).
TCNs from India, Pakistan and a large number of African countries, which con-
stitute the British Commonwealth, may benefit from the Commonwealth Professional 
Qualifications Comparability Programmes, also known as Commonwealth 
Recruitment Protocols (Keevy and Jansen 2006). Commonwealth countries pro-
mote harmonization in the recognition of professional qualifications, as based on 
established common standards. To some extent, ‘education and training routes and 
qualifications in a number of professions are standardized and transferrable with 
cross- recognition among Commonwealth countries’ (Commonwealth 2019).22 This 
applies to professional qualifications for a number of both regulated and unregu-
lated professions (financial, legal, health and technological qualifications) as well as 
general certificates of secondary education.23
Such harmonization may work together with the principles of ‘intra- EU mobil-
ity’ and ‘second recognition’ for a large number of skilled TCNs. For example, a 
Russian or Ukrainian woman can easily receive the first EU recognition in such a 
state as Lithuania or Estonia, and then marry a EU national living anywhere in 
Europe. This means that, as the spouse of a EU- national, she will be automatically 
granted the right for the EU second recognition. A similar example could be a 
Pakistani woman who holds a university degree or a professional qualification from 
Pakistan, marries a diasporic Pakistani man who is also a British citizen, reunites 
with him in the UK and easily receives the UK recognition of her qualifications as 
her first EU recognition. This would mean that, she could then find a job anywhere 
in Europe as a beneficiary of mutual recognition. The EU family migration patterns 
are, in fact, dominated by female spouses of EU nationals or of TCN permanent 
residents (Chaloff 2013). Making 60–80% across Europe, such women hold high 
levels of education from their countries of origin (Ibid; OECD 2018), and many of 
them could definitely benefit from the herein emerging complex patterns of skill- 
and family migrations.
In reality, there are not, however, many cases of female MRAs challenging the 
PQD because they remain marginalized within their families and ethnic communi-
ties and lack motivation as well as financial and informational resources in order to 
make an appeal (ENAR 2013; ETUC 2018; FRA 2013, 2017). The gender bias that 
penetrates all layers of European societies (ENAR 2013; FRA 2013) may also affect 
the ECJ’s decisions [as the Chavez- Vilchez case shows].
22 See: http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors/business/human_resources/
23 See Ibid.
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5.5.3  Conclusive Remarks
As Geddes et al. (2020: 92) conclude in reference to the intersections between free 
movement and family migration, ‘the development of the EU capacity in the area of 
family integration fits with an understanding of the EU as sovereignty- enhancing 
rather than sovereignty- denuding (Geddes et al. 2020: 92).
Having examined some of the ECJ cases - both in direct and indirect relation to 
insecure status and recognition of qualifications of TCNs – we argue that, in spite of 
the overall implementation of LMI by MSs, the ECJ can still do something tangible 
to help TCNS overcome the main LMI barriers. The legislative loophole that clearly 
crystallizes in its rulings is the factor of free mobility and family building. Marriage 
becomes supportive in the process of recognition while having minor children may 
help the TCN to transfer his ‘fluid’ status into a stable permit to work.
Using this loophole, the Court operates on the principle of intersectionality of 
EU Directives, which creates the effect of positive contagion, or enchantment, with 
intra- EU mobility. This enchantment works in favour of the married TCN such as 
the dependent family migrant. Marriage thus becomes an important area to invest 
under certain conditions.
However, the intersectionality and symbolic contagion do not work in the same 
way in the recognition of professional qualifications and in the status transfer. Here 
we can observe two different forms of legislative intersectionality and symbolic 
contagion. In the Recognition of TNC qualifications of TCNs, a number of Directives 
(on Long- Term Residence, Family Reunification and PQD) work together to sup-
port free movement from various angles – and produce the effect of multi- vector 
positive contagion with Europe. On the contrary, in the ‘status’ cases, the Long- -
Term Directive becomes surpassed by the MSs immigration policies. This creates 
the effect of negative legislative contamination, which is reflected in the ECJ’s 
decisions.
Summing up, the work of the ECJ illuminates a complex interplay between 
European law, marriage migration, free movement and gender. The complexity is 
added by the gendered asymmetry in the above mentioned EU citizenship- and fam-
ily provisions. These provisions end up, inadvertently, creating LMI barriers for 
some TCNs while facilitating the LMI of others.
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With low unemployment levels and a large industrial sector, over the last decade the 
Czech Republic has faced a significant shortage in the workforce that migrants have 
been able to fill, and migration has begun to feature in economic debates. Despite 
the pressing need for foreign employees, migrants still face complicated administra-
tion, precarious working conditions and a lack of support from public bodies. 
Migration policy is primarily driven by the vision of short- term labour migration 
that is regulated according to economic needs. This does not take into account the 
perspective of migrants or any need for them to integrate into broader Czech society.
This chapter summarizes the current situation of labour migration in the Czech 
Republic, focusing on migrants from non- EU countries. We here give an overview 
of the policies and legal framework that govern migration based on an analysis of 
the governmental Strategy of Migration and the Act on Residence of Foreign 
Nationals in the Czech Republic. The development of these official documents is 
explained together with the broader social and historical context of the Czech 
Republic. Our overview is accompanied by a description of the integration tools 
established over the last decade, which represent important milestone in dealing 
with migration.
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This evidence is based on analysis of existing documents and statements pro-
duced on a long- term basis by various actors in the field of migration: non- -
governmental organisations, labour unions and employers’ organisations, alongside 
interviews with twenty- five experts and practitioners (representatives of non- -
governmental organisations and public bodies).
We employ the concept of regulatory ritualism to grasp the distinctive features 
of the Czech system. Regulatory theorists (Braithwaite et  al. 2007; Braithwaite 
2008; Braithwaite 2009; Adcock 2012; Heimer and Gazley 2012; Ford 2016) use 
this term to describe a way of adapting to a normative order. The authors build on 
sociologist Robert Merton’s typology of five modes of individual adaptation to cul-
tural values: conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion (Merton 
1968) and on ‘new institutionalism’ that conceives institutions as myths or ceremo-
nies (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
Merton (1968) argues that following the rules becomes an end in itself rather 
than a means to an end. Following Merton, Braithwaite (2008: 141) defines regula-
tory ritualism as the “acceptance of institutionalised means for securing regulatory 
goals while losing focus on achieving the goals or outcomes themselves”. Policies, 
as organizations, might be conceived along a continuum with, at one end, produc-
tion policies under “strong output controls” and, at the other, policies “whose suc-
cess depends on the confidence and stability achieved by isomorphism with 
institutional rules” (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 346). Institutional means that have lost 
focus on their outcomes play a more ceremonial or ritual function in relation to 
gaining external legitimacy (Charlesworth 2017), or in relation to comforting the 
public and cementing the dominant normative order (Power 1997). In particular, 
there might be a ritual or ceremonial function to the introduction or implementation 
of new rules. The mechanism for introducing rules usually results from a history of 
institutional layering (Mahoney and Thalen 2009), in which new rules have been 
introduced on top of or alongside existing ones. This creates a complicated and 
complex regulatory framework that migrants will struggle to navigate. In relation to 
rules implementation, we also face classical ‘bureaucratic rituals’ (Cicourel 2005) 
or ‘administrative rituals’ (Samier 1997) that construct the social roles of clients and 
personnel.
This chapter sheds light on the causes of such institutional settings and the con-
sequences of complex, centralized and rigid systems for migrants and their integra-
tion. What kind of normative order is produced by this institutional setting, and how 
is migration governed through administrative practice and institutional work? We 
introduce the historical and political context of migration policy, its institutional 
design, the Act on Residence of Foreign Nationals in the Czech Republic, the posi-
tion of foreigners in Czech labour law, and at the end of the chapter we describe the 
contours of Czech integration policy and the consequences of such a status quo.
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6.2  Historical and Political Context
The Czech Republic has the lowest unemployment rate in the EU, i.e. 1.9% in 
August 2019 (Czech Statistical Office 2019). It is the only EU country where the 
unemployment rate of third country nationals is very close to that of the overall 
population (European Migration Network 2019). The labour market is segmented, 
as in other European countries. As Drbohlav (2003) argues, one of the characteristic 
features of the Czech labour market is that individual ethnic immigrant groups have 
found specific economic niches in mostly manual, low paying, low quality positions 
that are unattractive to the domestic labour force: Ukrainians in construction, 
Vietnamese in retail trade and Mongolians in manufacturing. Generally speaking, 
foreigners represent 13% of the workforce in construction, 6% in the manufacturing 
sector, and 5% in commerce (see Consortium of Non- Governmental Organisations 
Working with Migrants in the Czech Republic 2015). Consequently, immigrant 
labour plays more of a complementary than a competitive role.
During the communist regime (1948–1989), Czechoslovakia was a sending 
country – an estimated 200,000 citizens left – and the important migration flows 
were domestic. Slovaks and minorities from the Slovak part of the federation 
(Roma, Hungarians) moved into Czech industrial cities. Nowadays, Slovaks are the 
second biggest group of foreign nationals, but their status is special both in the sev-
eral aspects of the legal system and the perceptions of the wider society (there is no 
major language or cultural difference). In terms of international migration, 
Czechoslovakia is historically an industrial country with a need for a workforce, and 
therefore, migration from other socialist countries (Yugoslavia, Cuba, Vietnam) was 
organised in the 1970s and 1980s. There were no specific integration efforts from 
the state and those workers left after the fall of communism in 1989. However, a 
strong current of migration from Vietnam is a legacy of networks that were estab-
lished in this period. Currently, the strongest migrant flows are also from other post- -
socialist countries because of close cultural, language and personal bonds. These 
migration flows started in the early 1990s.
The number of foreigners has been growing since 1990 with a short break during 
the financial crisis. Especially between 2004 and 2008, the country saw a significant 
increase in the number of immigrants due to a favourable economic situation and 
labour shortages. In 2018, the total number of foreign nationals living in the Czech 
Republic was 552,000, approximately 4.5% of the population. The national struc-
ture of incoming migrants is stable: the main routes are from post- socialist countries 
(the Ukraine, Slovakia, Russian Federation or Moldova) and from Vietnam. The 
biggest groups by nationality are consistently Ukrainians, Slovaks, Vietnamese and 
nationals of the Russian Federation, who altogether constitute around 75% of non- 
 EU migrants in 2018 (Czech Statistical Office). There are important streams of 
labour migration from other EU countries: Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. However, 
there is also a significant number of expats from the UK or Germany who occupy 
white collar jobs in big cities.
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The highest share of foreigners lives in the capital of Prague (14.5%). Prague’s 
migrant population is also the most diverse. The three largest non- EU migrant com-
munities (Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Russians) comprise only half of the foreigners in 
Prague. The second highest share of foreigners in the population is in the Karlovy 
Vary region (6.5%) and the third highest share is seen in the Plzeň region (5.1%) in 
the west of the Czech Republic, close to the border with Germany. Migration flows 
to these regions have deeper historical roots. Migrant communities from Vietnam 
developed their businesses through cross- border trade in the 1990s. A sizable popu-
lation of foreigners, mostly males, can be found in the city of Mladá Boleslav, the 
seat of the Škoda car factory (Czech Statistical Office 2018a, b).
Because of relatively low numbers of migrants1 and the export- oriented econ-
omy, the domestic workforce is becoming dependent on foreign labour. The main 
characteristic of public debate and migration policy is the current clash between the 
insufficient labour force and the needs of employers on the one hand, and a general 
reluctance towards migrants on the other. Generally, a reluctant attitude2 could be 
observed in Czech society during and after the recent refugee crisis, although the 
number of actual refugees was very low at the time in the country (Čada, 
Frantová 2019).
Until the so- called refugee crisis of 2015, migration was not significantly present 
in political discourse, but since then anti- migration rhetoric has been shared on dif-
ferent scales by both far- right political parties (Dawn of Direct Democracy, later 
Freedom and Direct Democracy), and mainstream parties on both the left and the 
right proposing the securitization of migration policies. However, the Czech 
Republic is not an exception. The general refusal to redistribute refugees, along 
with a wave of anti- Muslim sentiment, are common features in all the post- socialist 
countries of the EU (Pachocka 2016). This demand for securitization and tighter 
control of migration is a significant driver for regulatory rituals. In 2018 and 2019, 
when the Act on The Residence of Foreign Nationals in the Czech Republic was 
changed for the last time and discussed in the Czech Parliament, the Members of 
Parliament repeatedly emphasized the need to protect Czech citizens.3
The securitization trend can be seen as a version of penal populism, “a punish-
ment policy developed primarily for its anticipated popularity” (Roberts et al. 2003: 
6) or “a political style that builds on collective sentiments of fear and demands for 
punitive politics” (Curato 2016: 93) which is driven by increasing popularity of 
1 Even though, in 2017, the number of third- country nationals holding a valid permit was the high-
est among post- socialist Central European states. In the Czech Republic, there were 26 valid per-
mits per 1000 people in the total population. There were nine in Slovakia, six in Hungary and 16 in 
Poland. However, in Germany, there were 56 valid permits per 1000 inhabitants (see European 
Migration Network 2019).
2 According to a poll organised by the Public Opinion Research Center in April 2019, 53% of the 
Czech population thinks that ‘incoming foreigners’ represent a problem for the Czech Republic 
(Public Opinion Research Center 2019).
3 Parliamentary Discussions in 19the September 2018, 7th December 2018 and 13th March 2019 
(see http://www.psp.cz/sqw/historie.sqw?T=203&O=8 – Accessed 7the November 2019).
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populist radical right- wing parties and the tabloid media (see Boda and his col-
leagues 2015). The extension of rules intended for tight control over migration 
might be seen as a response to fear discourses that portray migrants as a danger for 
domestic societies.
6.3  Migration Policy
The Czech migration policy is highly centralized with the Ministry of Interior being 
a crucial actor. The Ministry is responsible for both migration regulation and inte-
gration policy. This is a result of a change in 2008 that moved the responsibility for 
integration policy from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to the Ministry of 
the Interior. In the economic boom between 2004 and 2008, the Ministry of the 
Interior was responsible for asylum policy, visa and residence permits, and the 
Ministry of Labour and Social affair for integrating foreigners. However, in the 
aftermath of economic crisis, both streams of policy were integrated into the 
Ministry of the Interior.
This high level of centralization is not only typical for migration policy in the 
Czech Republic. The proportional electoral system tends towards a coalition gov-
ernment with strong ministries but a weak prime ministerial cabinet, so cross- -
section issues like migration, social inclusion or drug policy are seized by one 
ministry at expense of the others. The position of the Ministry of the Interior in the 
Czech migration policy partly stems from the restrictive tendencies towards migra-
tion in the Czech policy discourse but also from the Czech governmental tradition, 
which is marked by strong departmentalization and a lack of coordination in 
government.
Switching between liberal and restrictive tendencies has been symptomatic of 
the development of the Czech migration policy framework since 1989. Bauerová 
(2018), with a reference to Baršová and Barša (2005), distinguishes six periods of 
the Czech integration policy: (1) the laissez faire period (1990–1995) with relatively 
liberal conditions of entry, but an absence of tools for the integration of immigrants; 
(2) the restrictive period (1996–1999): the conditions of entry were tightening due 
to the economic crisis and fears of increasing numbers of immigrants from western 
Balkan and post- Soviet states; (3) the EU accession period (1999–2004), in which a 
complex migration policy was formulated4; (4) the neoliberal period (2005–2008), 
in which the state formulated a long- term framework for the integration of foreign-
ers, however, this contained only a vague call for cooperation to be developed at the 
local level; (5) the neo- restrictive period (2008–2014), in which the Czech Republic 
introduced a more restrictive policy to reduce the numbers of foreigners because of 
the economic crisis and to deal with corruption problems at embassies in Ukraine or 
4 This was reflected in two documents: (1) Principles of Integration of Foreigners in the Czech 
Republic and (2) The Conception of Integration of Foreigners in the CR, which “promotes the 
integration of foreigners as individuals” (Baršová and Barša 2005, pp. 233–236).
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Vietnam5; (6) the migration crisis period (since 2015), when the Czech Republic 
actively negotiated with the European Commission and the Czech Republic refused 
to accept a quota system.
Different migration policies are also reflected in the numbers of foreigners. 
These numbers culminated during the neo- liberal period, so more than 45,000 
incoming MRAs in 2008 (Czech Statistical Office 2019), and they later stagnated 
during the restrictive phase after the economic crisis (8177  in 2010). In the last 
period, the numbers have increased again (more than 30,000 incoming MRAs in 
2018), despite the restrictive frame of migration regulation that has prevailed. The 
increase can be assigned to the labour shortage and the economic boom.
Czech migration policy is marked by the coexistence of national and European 
levels, which has created somewhat schizophrenic conditions. On one hand, efforts 
have been made to introduce more restrictive conditions of entry and stay, while on 
the other, Czech migration policy must comply with EU regulation that strengthens 
civil rights and supports permanent settlement (Kušniráková 2014).
In the most recent period, the main document that states the goals of the govern-
ment is the Strategy of Migration Policy (Czech Government 2015). The Strategy, 
proposed by the Ministry of the Interior, strengthens the security aspects and empha-
sizes that migration should be regulated or even prevented with development aid. 
The particular situation of economic migrants is reflected only in the final goal, 
while labour migration is treated pragmatically and only from the perspective of the 
needs of the labour market.
6.4  Legislation Governing Migration
The Constitution of the Czech Republic should ensure basic rights to all citizens and 
migrants with regular status, and it incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms as a component of the constitutional order.6 The main document that 
guides regulation of stay for different groups of foreigners is Act No. 326/1999 
5 The Government Resolution No. 1205/2009 of 16 September 2009 limited foreigners’ options to 
apply for a long- term visa (in excess of 90 days), the amendment to Act No. 326/1999 Coll., on the 
Stay of Foreigners in the Czech Republic tightened conditions for foreigners, who had to indicate 
the purpose of their business as the reason for their stay, there was a change in the conditions of 
travel health insurance for foreigners and the introduction of biometric ID cards for foreigners (see 
Bauerová 2018).
6 The Charter includes, among other important rights, guarantees of citizens’ economic, social and 
cultural rights. Among these are the right to the free choice of occupation (Article 26/1), the right 
to acquire the means of one’s livelihood by work (Article 26/3), the right of employees to fair 
remuneration for work and satisfactory working conditions (Article 28/3), the right of women, 
young persons and persons with disabilities to increased safety and health at work, including spe-
cial working conditions and assistance in vocational training (Article 29), the right to freely associ-
ate with others with a view to protecting economic and social interests (Article 27/1), or the right 
to strike (Article 27/4).
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Coll., the Act on Residence of Foreign Nationals in the Czech Republic, and by Act 
No. 325/1999 Coll., on Asylum.
In the context of the Act on Residence of Foreign Nationals in the Czech 
Republic, one can distinguish four categories of permit: (1) short- term visas (for 
stays of up to 90 days); (2) long- term visas (for stays of over 90 days); (3) long- term 
residence (for the purpose of doing business, an employee card, for the purpose of 
a family living together in the Czech Republic); and (4) permanent residence. Short- -
term visas are valid for one or more entries, they give the right to stay in the 
Schengen area for the period indicated in them. The length of continuous residence 
or the total length of successive stays in the Schengen area must not exceed 90 days 
within any 180- day period. In terms of a long- term visa, the Czech law distinguishes 
long- term visas for the purposes of a business, family reunification, studies, excep-
tional leave to remain and other (Section 42 of Act 326). The foreigner must apply 
for a long- term visa 14 days before his or her visa expires, at the latest. The Ministry 
is very restrictive and, with the exception of serious health problems or a proven 
impossibility of contacting the public administration, the Ministry does not accept 
applications lodged after the deadline (Koldinská et al. 2015).
Long- term residence for business purposes can be applied for if a foreigner is a 
self- employed person in the Czech Republic, a statutory authority (executive direc-
tor, manager) or a member of the statutory bodies of a company or cooperative. 
With respect to long- term residence for the purpose of family reunification, MRAs 
face a number of obstacles to the realization of their right to family life, such as 
unreasonably long deadlines for processing their application and poor information 
about processing their applications (Organization for Aid to Refugees 2016).
A renewal application for a long- term residence permit (over 90 days) can be 
submitted only between the 120th and the 14th day before the expiry of such a per-
mit. The Ministry is also highly restrictive in this issue. The recent practice is criti-
cized by Czech NGOs: “The current arrangement is an unnecessary impediment in 
terms of the costs of such procedures” the NGOs wrote in their manifesto 
(Consortium of Non- Governmental Organisations Working with Migrants in the 
Czech Republic 2015).
Permanent residence (Section 63 Act 326) can be applied for after five years of 
uninterrupted temporary stay in the territory of the Czech Republic. Without com-
pliance with the condition of five years of uninterrupted temporary stay, permanent 
residence can still be applied for under certain exceptions, e.g. for humanitarian 
reasons, for reasons deserving special consideration, in some cases following the 
conclusion of proceedings on international protection, etc. The application can be 
submitted at a branch of the Ministry of the Interior, or in some cases at a Czech 
embassy. The foreigner must pass Czech language exams (A1 level). Foreigners 
with permanent residence have very limited legal possibilities for political partici-
pation. They cannot vote in local elections. They cannot establish political parties 
and cannot be members of established parties.
In terms of refugees and asylum seekers, administrative proceedings for granting 
international protection are held by the Ministry of the Interior (Act No 325/1999 
Coll., on Asylum). These proceedings are launched by the foreigner’s declaration 
6 Governing Through Rituals: Regulatory Ritualism in Czech Migration and Integrati…
122
that he or she is willing to apply for international protection. The asylum seeker is 
obligated to appear at a reception centre within twenty- four hours after the declara-
tion, and there he or she files an application for international protection and the 
Foreign Police performs identification processes. The asylum seeker is also required 
to undergo a medical examination. The Ministry may detain the applicant at the 
reception centre for up to 120 days if his or her identity has not been verified (he or 
she does not have a valid travel document, or the identity document is falsified) or 
there is a danger to state security, public health or public order.
During the application for international protection, the reasons that led refugees 
to depart from the country where he or she was staying are determined. When the 
required tasks are completed, the applicant is transferred to a reception centre, 
where he or she awaits the first instance decision. The Ministry grants asylum 
according to the Geneva convention to the applicant, if it is proved that the foreigner 
was persecuted for the exercise of political rights and freedoms or has a justified 
fear of persecution on the basis of race, gender, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group or certain political views in the state of which he or she is 
a national or, if he/she is a stateless person, in the state of his/her last permanent 
residence. Over the course of this period, an interview is conducted with the appli-
cant, which is intended to verify the reasons for international protection that were 
stated in the application.
The Ministry issues a decision within six months. If a decision cannot be made 
within this timeframe due to the specific nature of the matter, the Ministry can 
extend it appropriately, up to 18 months, the maximum allowed by EU regulation. 
As the Consortium of Migrants Assisting Non- Governmental Organizations (2015) 
points out, undocumented refugees routinely wait up to 120 days in special deten-
tion facilities, which house families with children, traumatised people, and torture 
victims. In addition to detention, undocumented refugees are added to a database to 
prevent them from applying for any form of visa in the Czech Republic or the EU.
The Act on Residence of Foreign Nationals in the Czech Republic has been 
incrementally changed many times. As Čižinský and his colleagues (2014) note, 
due to numerous amendments, the Act on Residence of Foreign Nationals in the 
Czech Republic has become an unclear and chaotic piece of legislation. For exam-
ple, between 2017 and 2019, the Parliament passed two extensive amendments and 
the Constitutional Court cancelled a number of provisions of the first one.7 Layering 
new rules on top of old rules seems to be common practice in the Czech policy. In 
the Czech system, Members of Parliament have rights to legislative initiative – they 
are allowed both to propose amendments to government bills and to propose their 
own bills. The legislative process combined with the multiple party proportional 
system and fragile government coalitions create a chaotic and unpredictable legisla-
tive environment.
7 See the Judgment 41/17 in which the Constitutional Court cancelled the number of provisions of 
the act because they do not comply with the EU law or Czech constitutional principles.
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These problems can be illustrated by the story of the last two amendments of the 
Act on Residence of Foreign Nationals. Both amendments were justified by the 
need to adapt the EU directives into Czech law. The first concerned Directive 
2014/66/EU and the second Directive 2016/801/EU.  However, in both cases the 
transposition of European law was used to tighten residency rules beyond the scope 
of the original directives. In the first case, the transposition of the EU directive intro-
duced a special type of permit for foreign investors and seasonal workers; however, 
the amendment also limited possibilities for transition to a business residence, it 
made it more difficult to change employer or request permanent residence. In the 
second amendment, which passed in 2019, the transposition of the EU directive 
should significantly improve the situation of university students and scientific per-
sonnel who, after they finish their studies or scientific work, will be allowed to stay 
in the Czech Republic for a period of up to nine months to search for employment 
or commence business activities.
Besides this transposition, the amendment introduces the duty of non- EU for-
eigners to attend an eight- hour adaptation and integration course within one year of 
the date they receive their permanent or long- term residency permit, and the possi-
bility for government to introduce quotas of permits for specific countries of origin, 
sectors of the Czech economy and types of work. The amendment also introduces 
into Czech law a model of temporary labour migration (Gastarbeiter), in which 
foreigners are able to come to the country for only one year, then leave and arrange 
a new visa again abroad. This model thus reduces foreigners to a mere labour force, 
explicitly excluding foreigners from integrating into the Czech Republic. As critics 
of the amendment point out (Consortium of Non- Governmental Organisations 
Working with Migrants in the Czech Republic 2018), experiences of countries such 
as Germany (which applied the model in 50s and 60s) prove that a significant por-
tion of seasonal workers settled down in the new country and lived there, but with-
out sufficient integrational support.
Instead of comprehensive change based on dialogue among governmental actors, 
public authorities, employers, NGOs and representatives of migrants, The Act on 
Residence of Foreign Nationals in the Czech Republic has been being changed 
piecemeal without any clear implementation plan. The compulsory adaptation and 
integration courses can easily illustrate this feature of Czech policy- making. There 
is no guarantee the state will be able to build the necessary infrastructure to run the 
adaptation and integration courses compulsory from 2020. The amendment lists 
selected groups of foreigners who are exempted from this duty. However, it does not 
deal with individuals who cannot complete the course because of language, physical 
disability or, indeed, lack of available courses.
With respect to the anti- migration discourse, the tightening of rules driven by the 
need to protect domestic citizens might be interpreted as a ‘ritual of comfort’ (Power 
1997) in a situation where Czech public and political elites are aware of the negative 
consequences of migration. Tightening rules serves a ceremonial function by claim-
ing boundaries between Czech citizens and migrants. Through the implementation 
of new rules, politicians and policymakers prove they act in the name of citizens. 
However, such a ritualistic character is mostly rooted in the idea that migration can 
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be governed by the rules alone, without complex policies of rule enforcement, 
implementation and institution- building. There are rules proposed without clear evi-
dence, such as in the case of the model of temporary labour migration, or without a 
clear implementation plan, such as in the case of compulsory integration courses. 
The large number and complexity of rules does not improve migrant selection, how-
ever, it does drive inconsistency in how standards are enforced. Moreover, a prolif-
eration of more specific laws is a resource that expands discretion, rather than limits 
it (Baldwin and Hawkins 1984).
The experiences of migrants can substantiate such uncertainty and arbitrariness 
in administrative decisions. Elena Tulupova, a Russian scientist living in the Czech 
Republic, summarizes her experience with the Czech system in this way: “Public 
officers do not manage to deal with requests in a timely manner and cases last for 
several years and decisions are questionable” (Rahimi 2017).
Czech migration policy seems locked in a mutual circle of suspicion. The admin-
istrative bodies look at migrants through lenses of suspicion, while migrants through 
lenses of suspicion interpret administrative decisions. These circles of suspicion 
broaden barriers between migrants and the state. They significantly decrease the 
level of trust between migrants, administrative bodies and, in the end, the rest of the 
society. But institutional trust is key currency in integrational policies.
6.5  Labour Market Integration
The access of third- country nationals to the labour market is regulated both by the 
Labor Office of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech 
Republic. Work permits may be issued in various forms, such as: (1) an Employee 
Card (dual or non- dual); (2) a Blue Card (for highly qualified professions); or a (3) 
permit to work issued for a previously authorized stay (usually for other purposes 
such as business, family reunion, study, etc.) or to seasonal work up to six months.
The Employee Card works as a permit for a long- term residence, granting the 
foreigner temporary residence in the territory for a period exceeding three months 
and allowing work performance in the position for which the Employee Card was 
issued. The Employee Card can be either dual (combining a work- permit and a resi-
dence permit) or single- purpose (it grants the foreigner only residence in the terri-
tory). The dual Employee Card is issued by the Ministry of the Interior for a specific 
job position, which is listed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in the 
central register of vacancies occupied by employee cardholders (a job that has not 
been filled within 30 days of its notification to the regional branch of the Labour 
Office). If the job position is listed and cannot be filled by the domestic labour force, 
the labour office is obliged to issue a work permit. Then, the foreigner must demon-
strate his or her professional competence. In justified cases, especially when there is 
reasonable doubt whether the foreigner has the required education or whether this 
education corresponds to the character of the job, the foreigner is obliged to 
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prove – upon request of the Ministry of the Interior – that his/her education was 
recognized as equivalent by a competent authority of the Czech Republic.
A non- EU migrant may apply for the single- purpose Employee Card if he or she 
wants to stay in the territory of the Czech Republic for more than three months for 
the purpose of employment and he or she is: (1) a foreign national who is obliged to 
apply for an employment permit; or (2) a foreign national with free access to the 
labour market. In such cases, the job position in question is not listed in the Central 
Register of Job Vacancies and the Ministry of the Interior does not look into the 
professional competence of the applicant: it is monitored either by the labour office 
as a part of the procedure for granting an employment permit, or it is up to the 
employer to decide whether or not it is required.
For both types of card, it is required that a form of labour- law relationship exists 
between the foreigner and the employer, which the applicant must prove by submit-
ting an employment contract, an agreement to perform work or a letter of intent. In 
all cases, the weekly working hours must amount to at least 15 hours and the 
monthly wage, salary or remuneration may not be lower than the basic monthly rate 
of the minimum wage.
A job vacancy, which can be filled under the Blue Card regime, means such 
vacancy that has not been filled within 30 days since it was reported to the regional 
labour office and for performance of which a high qualification is required – i.e. 
regularly completed higher education or higher professional education provided 
that the study lasted for at least three years.
An employment permit has to be applied for at the regional branch of the Labour 
Office within whose remit one plans to work. The employer must announce the 
intention to employ a migrant to the regional office of the labour office. The office 
will carry out the so- called labour market test to assess the demand of employers for 
the given profession in the given region and the probability of its satisfaction by 
Czech workers or EU citizens.
An employment permit is valid only for a specific employer (who is mentioned 
in the decision) and for a specific type and place of employment (if one plans to 
work for one employer on two job positions, then one needs an individual employ-
ment permit for each job; if one wants to perform the same job position for another 
employer, then one must obtain a new employment permit as well). An employment 
permit is non- transferable (another person cannot make use of it) and it is issued for 
a fixed period of time, two years maximum. An employment permit can be applied 
for repeatedly.
A work permit, Employee Card or Blue Card is not required for the employment 
of a foreigner with a permanent residence permit, a foreigner who has been granted 
asylum, a foreigner whose work in the Czech Republic does not exceed seven cal-
endar days or a total of 30 days in a calendar year or a foreigner who is a performer, 
scientist, student under 26 years of age, an athlete or a person who supplies goods 
or services in the Czech Republic on the basis of a commercial contract, or performs 
warranty and repair work. Foreigners can also do business in the Czech Republic in 
the same way as Czech citizens without any limits. The number of foreigners hold-
ing a trade licence has been gradually increasing year by year. At the end of 2017, 
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there were 472,354 registered with the Employee Cards, Blue Cards or permits to 
work and 87,228 holding a valid trade licence. Among those registered at labour 
office, there were 142,200 third- country nationals. Among them, 101,48 did not 
need a work permit, 15,162 holding a valid work permit, 24,753 Employee Cards 
and 413 Blue Cards. A total of 55,439 third- countries nationals had a valid trade 
licence. The vast majority comes from Vietnam (21,773) and the Ukraine (21,746) 
(Czech Statistical Office 2018b).
The rules governing the issuing work permits have changed in different periods 
of migration policies. In 2010 as a part of restrictive migration policy after the finan-
cial crisis, for example, labour offices were asked to act more strictly in issuing 
employment permits to foreigners:
They were asked not to issue employment permits to foreigners for such job positions that 
can be filled by persons with free admission to the Czech labour market. The length of the 
stay or the level of integration of individual foreigners was completely disregarded. 
(Čižinský et al. 2014:47)
The attempts to make work permits more restrictive continued in 2012 when 
granting employment permits to low- qualified positions was heavily discussed 
among politicians and employer organisations. A fundamental change came into 
effect in June 2014. The reason for the amendment was to implement Directive 
2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 
on a single application procedure for a single permit for third- country nationals to 
reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for 
third- country workers legally residing in a Member State.
In the last decade, labour migration was influenced by the establishment of sev-
eral nation- specific migration programmes. These were promoted mainly by the 
Ministry of Trade and supported by employers’ associations, such as the Czech 
Chamber of Business. Due to these programmes, registered employers can more 
easily hire workers from countries such as the Ukraine, Mongolia, the Philippines 
and Serbia. Specific programmes to hire highly skilled workers were also estab-
lished, such as The Programme India, but its quotas were never filled and the pro-
grammes to hire workers for unskilled positions were always more successful.
In the last amendment of the Act on Residence of Foreign Nationals in the Czech 
Republic, these specific programmers were re- formed into three main programmes. 
The programmes ‘Highly- qualified employer’ and ‘Key and Research Personnel’ 
are open to all countries. The Programme ‘Middle or Low Qualified Employer’ is 
open to nine countries (Belarus, Montenegro, the Philippines, India, Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, Moldavia, Serbia, the Ukraine). The government will settle migration 
quotas for these countries. Other than these, the ‘Extraordinary Labour Visa’ was 
introduced, which can be activated in the case of a lack of workforce in a certain 
segment of the economy. Visa programmes for low- skilled professions are short- -
term, there are limits if the holder wants to bring their family to the country and 
limits to its prolongation. These recent changes are in accordance with the Strategy 
of Migration, with its vision of circular and short- term labour migration.
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In practice, the quotas in programmes for specific countries have been quickly 
filled quickly. Especially Ukrainian embassies are notoriously well known for long 
waiting periods, and in the past also for illegal practices for obtaining a slot to apply 
for the visa.
A time- consuming, rigid and unreliable system of hiring third- country nationals 
has led to an increasing number of irregular workers. The year 2017 saw a total of 
2151 foreign citizens performing irregular work (1530 in 2016), of whom 234 were 
EU nationals (193 EU nationals in 2016) and 1917 third- country nationals (1337 
third- country nationals in 2016) (Czech Statistical Office 2018b). Milena Jabůrková, 
vice president of the Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic, comments: 
“The lack of workers is critical. Some companies opt for the employment of for-
eigners without the necessary documents” in Czech media (Zelenka and 
Štěpánek 2018).
Companies also avoid this dilemma by subcontracting a workforce from employ-
ment agencies. Subcontracting represents a significant factor that contributes to the 
labour exploitation of migrants (see Čaněk et al. 2016). Agency employees are often 
disadvantaged compared to other employees regarding fixed- term contracts. Many 
of the workers work without a contract, sign a contract they do not understand, or 
are given an Agreement to Complete a Job, which legally allows them to work for 
only 300 hours per year per employer and forces them to pay medical insurance on 
their own.
Labour unions characterise the current situation:
For the Czech- Moravian Confederation of Labour Unions, the employment of foreigners 
who are lured to the Czech Republic and have wages that are on the poverty level is unac-
ceptable. The Czech Republic can’t work against social dumping and support it at the same 
time. (Czech- Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions 2017)
However, this position is mostly supported by economic arguments rather than 
paying attention to the situation of migrants:
Unregulated labour migration is a dangerous factor leading to destabilisation of the labour 
market, social dumping and the end of rising wages. (Ibid.)
Labour unions do not support the change in the situation of foreign workers but 
use critical descriptions of the situation to oppose the growth of migration: The 
Czech Confederation of Labour Unions will oppose attempts to broaden the influx 
of cheap work labour from the third- party countries to the Czech Republic. We will 
support maximal usage of the inner workforce (Svoboda 2015).
Widespread praxis is to use agency employment workers. These workers are 
recruited by private agencies rather than by employers themselves and their working 
contracts often do not cover overtime hours or secure their wages. A strict set of 
regulations on these agencies is recommended by the Confederation of Labour 
Unions. On the other side are employers organisations who prefer flexible condi-
tions in labour contracts.
The precarity of foreign workers is further multiplied by the limited social rights 
foreign workers enjoy compared to Czech citizens. Third- country migrants living 
and working in the Czech Republic but without permanent residence are obligated, 
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in the same way as Czech citizens, to contribute to the social security system and the 
state employment policy, however, they cannot use unemployment benefits and they 
have only limited amount of social benefits. Furthermore, if they lose their job, they 
will be at risk of having their permanent residency revoked. Non- EU migrants who 
are not employed by a Czech company are excluded from the public health insur-
ance system, and therefore must opt for commercial insurance which does not guar-
antee the same level of coverage as public health insurance (see The Consortium of 
Non- Governmental Organisations Working with Migrants in the Czech 
Republic 2015).
It seems that the regulatory ritualism of Czech migration law is creating a situa-
tion that is not favourable either for employers or for employees because it slows 
down the process of issuing of work permits and makes the process more insecure. 
Both by foreigners and by employers, the administrative process is perceived as 
very difficult. Especially the whole length of issuing of work permit and strict pro-
cess of extending those permits. (Multicultural Centre Prague 2013).
If the focus of regulation is supposed to be the protection and stabilization of the 
labour market, the recent regulation framework does not work well.
Instead of clear, well- founded and lawful conditions, the migration is regulated rather by 
processual obstructions and administrative barriers. (Consortium of Migrants Assisting 
Organisations in the Czech Republic 2015)
Public authorities often provide unreliable and incomprehensible information. 
Information provided by different staff members from the same institution can dif-
fer, while foreigners are forced to deliver new documents and repeatedly visit these 
offices. According to interviews conducted with members of the two largest migrant 
communities (Vietnamese and Ukrainian communities) in the framework of SIRIUS 
research, this lack of support creates a space for commercial companies to offer 
their guidance services, which are sometimes connected with semi- legal practices 
(such as re- selling time slots for visa applications or selling bank account state-
ments) and which could lead to the exploitation of foreign workers.
With actual labour shortage, when Czech companies need to fulfil more than 
half- million vacant jobs (Czech Chamber of Commerce 2018), the labour market 
tests carried by the Labour Offices seem to be another example of regulatory rituals. 
However, through these rituals, the dominant normative framework of securitization 
and protection of domestic workforce is reinforced. In contrast to the strict admin-
istrative scrutiny of work permits, the conditions in which foreign workers are 
employed is loosely monitored and protection of foreign workers is significantly 
weaker than their Czech counterparts.
6.6  Integration Policy and Barriers to Integration
The main vehicle of integration policy in the Czech Republic is the network of 
regional Centres to Support the Integration of Foreigners. These centres, initiated by 
the Ministry of the Interior, are operated on the basis of projects and partially funded 
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from the European Fund for the Integration of Third- country Nationals (EIF) from 
2009 to 2015, and the European Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 
starting from 2015. From July 2016 to June 2019, such centres have been operating 
in all of the Czech regions under individual projects. Nine are funded by the Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), whereas four are operated by NGOs or 
regional governments and only co- financed from this fund. The task of each centre 
is to ensure the formation of regional counselling platforms to address the current 
problems of foreign nationals.
In each region, the Centre mainly cooperates with the regional government and 
municipalities, the Foreign Police, state and municipal police, labour offices, tax 
authorities, trade licence offices and other entities. The goal is to create opportuni-
ties for improved information exchange and to stimulate measures to respond to the 
current demand of issues related to the integration of foreign nationals. All services 
are free of charge. They are not limited to the city where each centre is established 
and should cover the entire region. The centres offer: (1) social counselling; (2) 
legal advice (by external providers); (3) Czech language courses; (4) translation and 
interpreting services (mostly by Vietnamese, Mongolian, Ukrainian and Russian 
interpreters); (5) socio- cultural courses (fostering orientation mainly in the social 
security, health and educational systems); (6) an internet point and library; and (7) 
community outreach.
The Ministry of the Interior has also initiated the implementation of municipality 
projects. Funded predominantly from its subsidies, these projects are implemented 
by local governments, particularly in municipalities with significant numbers of 
foreign nationals in direct collaboration with those foreign nationals living in the 
municipality, with non- governmental organisations, schools and other local integra-
tion actors. The projects aim to provide comprehensive support for integration at the 
local level, to prevent the potential risk of – or to mitigate the tension between – 
foreign nationals and other inhabitants of the municipalities as well as to prevent the 
risk of residential segregation. The Ministry has supported municipal projects in 
Pilsen, Pardubice, Havlíčkův Brod (where extremist actions had occurred, such as 
burning the Mongolian flag and the dissemination of hate leaflets), or in Prague’s 
district of Libuš (where the biggest Vietnamese open market, ‘SAPA’, is located).
The Ministry of the Interior also finances NGOs that focus on integrating for-
eigners through specific programmes. The non- governmental sector is an important 
and vocal player in the field of integration because, until the establishment of inte-
gration centres, all services were provided by non- governmental organisations. 
Until now, regional integration centres were unable fulfil the demand for services. 
Other than financing from the Ministry of Interior, NGOs are also dominantly 
financed by the Ministry of Social Affairs or municipalities. Therefore, NGOs are 
fulfilling governmental or local strategies of integration.
Even though Centres to Support the Integration of Foreigners represent an impor-
tant hub for integration policies, these policies face numerous obstacles as the local 
level. Local authorities are active only when there are serious problems that require 
a change in the situation between the majority society and foreigners. The absence 
of local integration strategies means local authorities are unprepared for such 
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situations and they cannot effectively prevent them. Local municipalities also do not 
map the needs of foreigners on their territory to ensure adequate availability of ser-
vices, including language courses, social and legal counselling.
The main challenge for integration is a lack of knowledge of the Czech language. 
This problem is identified by almost all actors when evaluating the level of educa-
tion of both adult and young migrants and the support of teachers. Lack of language 
knowledge prevents migrants who work in low- skilled positions from applying for 
high- skilled jobs. In research interviews, stories of refugees and migrants provide 
evidence about problems finding a job. Stakeholders mainly report that courses have 
insufficient capacity and inappropriate structure.
Existing subsidized and therefore affordable language courses cannot meet the 
demand and are often not available in smaller cities. There are not enough advanced 
or specialised courses (for technical or health professionals), which prevents edu-
cated migrants from using their skills in more specialised positions.
Young migrants who attend Czech schools have a higher chance of learning the 
language but also face important obstacles. Notwithstanding the importance of the 
education system for integration processes, until now schools and teachers have 
lacked both experience and support in the integration of foreigners. Schools can 
apply for funding from the Ministry of Education, but the application process takes 
place prior to the start of the school year when they do not yet know whether they 
will be taking students with a foreign background. Furthermore, they receive the 
funding too late during the school year and the filing process is complicated. All 
these factors contribute to the low number of applications for funding from schools. 
Funding from the Ministry of Education is also not available to secondary schools.
Bigger cities with a higher share of foreigners have schools that specialise in the 
integration of students with a foreign background, and students might concentrate 
here. Educational experts interviewed for the SIRIUS research point out that there 
is a growing number of students with a foreign background who either will not be 
accepted into secondary school or will not be able to graduate due to poor language 
knowledge.
6.7  Conclusion
The specific legal history of the Czech Republic has created a complicated and 
complex regulatory framework, dominated by regulatory ritualism. The dominant 
frame of migration policy results from the institutional design where the Ministry of 
Interior is a central player. Many related agendas fall within the remit of other min-
istries, in particular the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Sports. However, these ministries often do not perceive for-
eigners as their target group, which leads to shortcomings in public policies and a 
lack of necessary funding. Excessive centralization has led to the low engagement 
of local authorities, local communities and civil society (The Consortium of Non- -
Governmental Organisations Working with Migrants in the Czech Republic 2015).
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Migration policy is driven by a vision of primarily short- term labour migration 
regulated according to economic needs. The services offered by public integration 
centres are not available everywhere and for all groups of migrants. The absence of 
integration services for EU citizens who face the same challenges as non- EU 
migrants (lack of language knowledge and poor orientation in the Czech legislation) 
is particularly striking. Integration services depend heavily on the availability of EU 
funding, and their future is therefore uncertain. These integration tools are not 
underpinned by a broader vision of integration, while the integration programmes 
provided by municipalities and schools are not universal and depend on the will of 
local political representation or principals, which might be influenced by the atti-
tudes of parents and their voters.
The unwillingness of Czech political authorities to offer stronger structural solu-
tions is linked to the general reluctance of the Czech population when it comes to 
migrants. We saw this erupt particularly during the period of the migrant crisis. 
Therefore, no major political party considers integration a priority. In the context of 
weak broader societal integration of foreigners, labour market integration policies 
have barely materialised and remain unimplemented. Due to the absence of any 
systematic and structural approach towards integration into the labour market, any 
progress in labour market integration policies will, therefore, be made in small 
steps, individual efforts and short- term solutions in the future. It is expected that 
these steps will be driven not only by the involvement of public authorities but also 
by other actors, primarily from the non- governmental sphere.
The regulatory ritualism that results from chaotic and unsystematic legislative 
work is characterized by a loss of focus on achieving goals and the outcomes them-
selves. This is especially visible in Czech migration policy, whose complex and 
unpredictable administrative system prompts migrants to use the services of prob-
lematic intermediaries. The time- consuming procedures that regulate getting work 
permits strengthen the illegal job market and the opaque system of subcontracting 
instead of protecting the domestic workforce and stabilizing the labour market. 
Furthermore, regulatory ritualism establishes a climate of mutual distrust among 
those actors involved and places obstacles to collaboration between public authori-
ties, non- governmental organizations and the migrants themselves.
As Braithwaite (2008) notes, the defeat of ritualism requires networking between 
all the leading stakeholders and critics into a macro- project of transforming ritual-
ism. However, this transformation through networked governance is conditioned by 
acuity in grasping micro- macro linkages. To transcend ritualism means changing 
both how policy is formulated and how policy is implemented, establishing a dia-
logue and mutual learning between different levels of regulation. However, this 
seems a difficult task in the environment of mistrust and long- lasting conflicts 
among involved actors in populist times.
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Chapter 7
Accessing the Danish Labour Market: 




Denmark is often considered a “first mover” when it comes to the formulation, rati-
fication and implementation of liberal international and national migration conven-
tions and laws. It was the first country to sign and ratify the UN Refugee Convention 
which was adopted in 1951. Denmark has also been resettling refugees since 1956 
and officially established a refugee resettlement program in 1979 (Olwig and 
Paerregaard 2011: 3). In 1983 Denmark ratified the Aliens Act, which is often con-
sidered one of the most liberal immigration laws in Europe.1 The law specified that 
refugees2 were legally entitled to family reunification, language training, financial 
and residential support and a work permit (Pedersen 1999; Hedetoft 2006). To an 
extent, these measures reflected the existence of a “general principle of welfare 
community inclusion” (Mouritsen and Olsen 2013: 694; see also Soysal 1994). 
And, to that end, the Aliens Act was an outgrowth of Denmark’s long- standing 
effort to “cultivate a self- image of tolerance” encapsulated in a welfare state that 
guarantees “high levels of public provisions (healthcare, education, unemployment 
benefits, old- age pensions, etc.), accessible to all citizens and residents in the coun-
try” (Pace 2018: 786).
In recent years, however, Denmark – on the basis of a political discourse that 
insists that refugees in particular are a burden to the welfare state and their culture 
incompatible with Danish values – has aspired to be a different kind of “first mover”; 
namely, as a pioneer of some of the most restrictive asylum policies in Europe 
1 This, in spite of the problematic title (i.e. Aliens Act) of the law.
2 As well as non- refugee migrants.
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(Delman 2016; Abend 2019; Khalid and Mortensen 2019; Westersø 2019; Agerhold 
2016.). As we go on to demonstrate later in this chapter, the cultivation of this new 
image as a “bad destination” for those seeking asylum included ever- more restric-
tive immigration regulations, limited access to family reunification and cuts in the 
social and financial assistance guaranteed by the welfare state (Taylor 2015). 
Instinctively, one would expect that policies restricting entry into Denmark will be 
paired with antagonistic policies towards refugees within Denmark. To an extent, 
Denmark has indeed witnessed the creation of a far more hostile integration policy 
landscape targeting not just refugees but also economic migrants and Danish citi-
zens with a migrant background in the aftermath of the 2015 European “refugee 
crisis”. In this chapter we demonstrate, however, that while barriers to entering 
Denmark have been mirrored in some integration- related restrictive measures within 
Denmark, this has not been the case with regard to refugees’ integration into the 
Danish labour market. Surprisingly perhaps, we argue that the structure and norms 
of the Danish labour market are such that they in fact facilitate refugees’ integration 
in the work force and legally protect their rights.3 To be sure, this protection, often 
guaranteed by key labour market stakeholders, is a way of securing the rights of 
Danish workers who would be adversely affected by the proliferation of an unregu-
lated labour market where refugees are compelled to work under worse legal and 
economic conditions. Nevertheless, and in effect, the case of refugees’ integration 
into the Danish labour market ends up being one where, counterintuitively, legal 
barriers to entering Denmark coexist alongside enabling legal guarantees of refu-
gees’ rights in the Danish labour market.
This chapter begins by describing Denmark’s shift in stance, both in terms of 
rhetoric and policy- making, from “being a first mover” with regard to progressive 
migration policies to pioneering some of the most restrictive and antagonistic mea-
sures in the region and globally. Subsequently, we demonstrate that Denmark’s pos-
turing externally is not entirely reflected in the manner in which refugees encounter 
the Danish labour market. We elaborate that refugees’ rights and privileges within 
the Danish workforce are guaranteed by the Danish labour market model that 
ensures that safe and fair working conditions are guaranteed to all workers in 
employment.
3 It is important to note that while migrants with a humanitarian residence permit or with a resi-
dence permit on the grounds of family reunification can take up any job, non- Nordic/EU/EEA 
migrant workers’ access to Denmark is conditional upon the existing job schemes. The current job 
schemes aim at attracting high- skilled labour and include among others: The Fast- track Scheme, 
the Pay Limit Scheme, the Positive List, schemes for researchers, employed PhDs and guest 
researchers and Start- up Denmark (scheme for self- employment). But while, ostensibly, the main 
entry routes for migrant workers are reserved for high- skilled professionals, a report from the 
Nordic Council of Ministers from 2010 concludes that Denmark fares very poorly in comparison 
to the other Nordic countries in regard to attracting high skilled workers. “An immediate explana-
tion for this may be the tightening of the regulatory framework for access to Denmark from coun-
tries which were implemented in 2002″, as stated in the report (Kornø 2010).
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7.2  The Proliferation of Restrictive Measures
Claiming that Denmark, in the past, has been a front runner in the implementation 
of liberal migration policies is not, however, to argue that the political landscape 
within the country has been devoid of any criticism of the influx of foreigners. 
Especially with the implementation of the Aliens Act, conservative politicians con-
sidered migrants to be an invasive demographic presence that would have a detri-
mental impact on the economic, socio- political and cultural character of Danish 
society (Hvenegaard- Larsen 2002; Mouritsen and Olsen 2013; Jørgensen 2006; 
Nannestad 2004). This antagonistic narrative has only intensified over the years and, 
especially in the past decade, public intellectuals and politicians have consistently 
raised severe concerns regarding immigrants in general and refugees in particular 
becoming a burden on the Danish welfare state – not least in terms of their limited 
integration into the Danish labour market (The Ministry of Finance 2017). For 
instance, on the basis of a 2011 study conducted by the conservative Danish think-
tank CEPOS that claimed that immigrants from “non- Western countries and their 
dependents” cost the Danish state €2 billion every year, the far- right Danish People’s 
Party (DF) politician Pia Kjærsgaard declared that unemployed immigrants were 
the most significant challenge faced by the welfare state (Lehmann 2011; see also 
Bloch 2017). Similarly, in 2015, the Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening or the 
Confederation of Danish Employers’ (DA) administrative director Jørn Neergaard 
Larsen said, “It is catastrophic that we are so bad at integrating refugees into the 
Danish job market. That is not acceptable for our refugees, and as a society we sim-
ply cannot afford to let this group be taken care of by public benefits” (The Local 
2015; also see Andersen 2003).
Of course, any discussion of the antagonism towards migrants in the political 
discourse would be incomplete without recognizing the securitization of the figure 
of the migrant (Sen and Pace 2018; Barrett 2018, 2019; Mouritsen and Jensen 
2014). In this regard, a “watershed” moment came in the aftermath of the Muhammad 
Cartoon Crisis and the outrage it led to among Muslim communities within and 
outside Denmark. When on 30th September 2005 Jyllands Posten published car-
toons depicting the Prophet Muhammad (i.e. a practice considered blasphemous in 
Islam), the newspaper claimed that it was practicing its right to freedom of speech 
and encouraging a critical public discourse of Islam (Jyllands Posten 2006). Yet, for 
some commentators, the response to the cartoons was evidence of rampant religious 
intolerance and radicalism among (often, young) non- Western immigrants in 
Denmark (Ammitzbøll and Vidino 2007). Evidently, this narrative coincided with 
the post- 9/11 global concerns regarding Islamic radicalism and terrorism and a 
2007 survey showed that 42% of Danes were concerned about terrorism, criminality 
and (the lack of) integration of non- EU residents in Denmark (Avisen 2007; also see 
Ottesen 2017). This narrative was further encouraged by the so- called 2015 “refu-
gee crisis” and related security concerns. Following the 2015 attack on the Danish 
synagogue DF politician Pia Kjærsgaard accused Danish Muslims “of living at a 
lower stage of civilization, with their own primitive and cruel customs” (The 
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Economist 2015). In the same vein, following the wave of terror attacks in several 
European countries, DF’s Martin Henriksen claimed in parliament that “there is a 
direct correlation between refugees and terrorism” (quoted in Ritzau 2016).
Expectedly, this political discourse has encouraged the implementation of stricter 
immigration regulations in the last decade. And, since the beginning of the “refugee 
crisis”, Danish authorities have engaged in a concerted campaign to portray 
Denmark as less attractive to asylum seekers. For example, the discretionary powers 
of the police were expanded to handle asylum seekers (Hvidtfeldt and Schultz- -
Nielsen 2017: 53). The police were given greater powers to withhold people, for 
instance, in order to ensure his/her presence during the asylum phase and during any 
appeal. A new and lower integration benefit system replaced social assistance for 
those who have not been in Denmark for more than seven of the last eight years 
(Kvist 2016). Fines for irregular stay, entry and work were raised in 2015, along 
with fines for aiding so called “irregular immigrants” cross the border (Hvidtfeldt 
and Schultz- Nielsen 2017: 52). Moreover, carrier sanctions (Schengen internal)4 
and border controls were introduced (Hvidtfeldt and Schultz- Nielsen 2017: 53). In 
February 2016 the right to family reunification for people with temporary protection 
status was restricted. Now it can only be availed after three years of residency, as 
opposed to the previous residency requirement of one year (Hvidtfeldt and Schultz- -
Nielsen 2017: 53, Kvist 2016). More stringent eligibility requirements for perma-
nent residency were also introduced (Hvidtfeldt and Schultz- Nielsen 2017: 54). 
Moving on from these strict restrictions implemented to limit immigration to 
Denmark, the next section focuses on the legal guarantees of labour rights within the 
Danish labour market model.
7.3  Legal Guarantees of Labour Rights
The Danish private labour market consists of small and medium- sized enterprises 
(SMEs) as well as large multinational companies. The business sector is generally 
characterised by a high degree of individual specialisation and flexibility in terms of 
adapting to market changes. Denmark has a strong reputation for high quality food 
and design, as well as in telecommunications, IT, pharmaceuticals, electronics and 
biotech more recently. A majority of the population has either a vocational or a 
higher education. As far as the workforce is concerned, the labour market comprises 
more than 50% of the population – a relatively high percentage compared to other 
countries, partly due to the very high employment rate of women (Norrbom Vinding 
2014). The overall employment rate was 78.2% in 2018 (Eurostat 2018). To be sure, 
4 Carrier sanctions – meaning that air carriers as well as bus, train and maritime carriers can be 
subject to criminal liability if they bring a foreigner without the required travel ID across external 
Schengen borders – have been in place since the late 1980s. What is however new is that, as of 
2015, there are now carrier sanctions for bringing people across an internal Schengen border 
(Hvidtfeldt and Schultz- Nielsen 2017: 53).
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Denmark has a long history of mass emigration, primarily to the United States 
(Semmingsen 1972; Larsen 1982; Hatton 1995). However, its increasingly robust 
economy and labour market has meant that Denmark has witnessed a greater influx 
of migrants and has been a net- migration country since the 1960s. Today, the 
foreign- born population makes up 10% of the total population. Of these, 25% have 
Danish citizenship, and 3.9% are born in other EU/Nordic countries. The majority 
of the (non- EU/Nordic) foreign- born population originates from Syria, Turkey, 
Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia and 
China. A smaller share of the foreign- born population (as compared to the Danish- -
born population) falls within the age groups <18  years and 60  +  years, while a 
greater share falls within the working age.5 Since 2014, more than 65,000 foreigners 
arrived in Denmark each year, with a peak in 2015 with more than 75,000 arrivals. 
The 2015 peak is mirrored in the subpopulation of immigrants who are non- EU citi-
zens. In 2015, 38,353 non- EU citizens immigrated to Denmark compared to 
29,019 in 2014 and 34,564 in 2016. This peak is primarily a result of the increase in 
the number of asylum seekers. The success rate (recognition rate) of applications 
processed in Denmark has dropped in recent years. It reached a record high of 85% 
in 2015, dropped to 72% in 2016 and came down to 36% in 2017, primarily reflect-
ing the source countries of the applicants (the percentage of Syrians and Eritreans 
dropping, meaning that a greater share now come from other countries, who have a 
smaller chance of being granted refugee status) (Bendixen 2018).
Evidently, Denmark has adopted an increasingly hardline approach to its immi-
gration policy- making and, as we have discussed earlier, the discursive construction 
of migrants as a burden to the Danish welfare state seems to be the key narrative 
driving recent immigration policies. One would then instinctively expect such 
restrictive immigration policies directed towards refugees to be “paired” with 
equally restrictive integration policies – especially with regard to refugees’ integra-
tion into the Danish labour market. Yet, we would argue, labour market integration 
policies largely enable refugees’s integration into the Danish labour market. For one 
thing, their enabling nature is shaped by the particular (institutional) character of the 
way in which integration policies in general and labour market integration policies 
in particular are implemented. With its three- tier system comprising the state, the 
region, and the municipality, the Danish governance structure leaves it to munici-
palities to implement integration policy – housing for refugees, integration/intro-
duction programs, welfare benefits and finding jobs/education. All 98 municipalities 
in Denmark have complete discretion and independence in interpreting, managing 
and adapting integration policies, which further allows them to cater for the specific 
needs of local communities: municipalities are thus seen as best suited to address 
their communities’ needs especially with regards to employment, education and 
language skills (Jørgensen 2014). The discretionary power in regard to the imple-
mentation of the law allows for diverging strategies and measures across munici-
palities, which might result in different outcomes. For instance, a memo from The 
5 See here: https://www.sirius- project.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/WP2_D2.2.pdf
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Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (2017) shows significant 
municipal differences in the employment rate of female refugees arriving during the 
period 2015–2017, potentially as a consequence of differences in the administration 
of the integration law. These differences could also be attributed to other factors, for 
example, differences in the refugees’ countries of origin across municipalities. Yet, 
despite differences in the way in which municipalities implement integration poli-
cies, a key consequence of this governance structure is that the restrictive approach 
undertaken with regard to Danish immigration policy does not necessarily impact 
the implementation of integration policies at the municipal- level, wherein the pri-
mary responsibility of municipality authorities is to enable refugees’ (and non- -
refugee migrants’) integration into the Danish labour market.
This said, the foundational character of the Danish labour market is conducive to 
refugees’ integration into the workforce. Here we can look to the so- called 
September Compromise – often considered the constitution of the Danish labour 
market  – that was signed on 5 September 1899. The agreement was seen as a 
national agreement for Danish industrial relations. It was signed by the Danish 
Employers’ Confederation (DA) and the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(LO). The intention of the agreement was to end long periods of strikes by employ-
ees and lock- outs. Considering the industrial cost of these negotiation ‘tactics’ the 
settlement was to both secure the employers’ right to regulate the work environment 
and to establish a bargaining system that had an embargo on strikes and lockouts. 
Through the September Compromise employers were able to secure their right to 
regulate the work environment. Additionally, both parties recognized each other’s 
right to implement work stoppages. However, work stoppages needed to be approved 
by three quarters of the members and sufficient notice would need to be given prior 
to work stoppages. The agreement resulted in a centralized bargaining system 
whereby negotiations would take place between the two confederations represent-
ing the employers and the unions (Jørgensen 1999). As a consequence then, in 
Denmark, wage and work conditions are primarily regulated by collective agree-
ments (or individual employment contracts) and not by law. This system of labour 
market regulation is referred to as The Danish Labour Market Model and is charac-
terized by the fact that “the social partners themselves determine the rules of the 
game on the labour market” (The Ministry of Employment 2018). The underlining 
assumption here is that employers and employees are organized in associations and 
unions that protect their interests during collective agreement negotiations. This 
means that pay and work conditions are agreed freely between employers and 
employees through the various employers’ organizations and trade unions (3F 2015).
This system of labour market regulation as well as its implications for the inte-
gration of refugees is important because it is this character of the labour market that 
shapes the nature of their entry into the Danish labour force. For one thing, in 
Denmark access to the labour market is considered an important pillar for integra-
tion. Article 1 of the Integration Act explicitly stipulates that: “making newly arrived 
aliens self- supporting as quickly as possible through employment” is a key objec-
tive of integration efforts (Integration Act No. 1115 of 23 September 2013). To be 
sure, asylum seekers are not allowed to take up work during the first six months 
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from their arrival, meaning that they have little chance of an everyday life outside 
the asylum centre. Refugees and family reunified persons, on the other hand, are 
obliged to take part in an integration program, with a clear focus on labour market 
participation (The Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2016: 51). This pro-
gram, catering for refugees and their family members, consists of Danish education 
and employment- oriented offers in the form of guidance and upgrading, business 
practice, and employment with wage subsidies (The Ministry of Immigration and 
Integration 2018). The integration program is implemented in the municipalities 
and goes hand in hand with an integration contract that must be signed in order to 
receive an integration allowance. The integration contract must entail a description 
of the immigrant’s employment and education goals together with a detailed 
description of the activities ensuring that the goals are met. Thus, the contract is 
tailored to each individual and specific goals and the identifiable means leading to 
employment must be described in the contract (The Ministry of Immigration and 
Integration 2019).
The Integration program is a one- year program, as the intention is to get refugees 
(and their family members) into employment within one year. It can, however, be 
extended with up to four additional years if employment is not achieved (The 
Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2016: 51). The guiding principle is that 
those that have been granted asylum must “work from day one” (The Ministry of 
Immigration and Integration 2016: 52). To this end, refugees and family reunified 
persons in the integration program are automatically regarded as “job- ready”; 
meaning that they should be enrolled in job training unless considered ineligible 
(due to health issues etc.) (The Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2016: 51).
In Denmark, the Assessment of Foreign Qualifications Act entitles all holders of 
foreign qualifications to an assessment through the central recognition agency 
(OECD 2017: 13). To this end, the Danish Agency for Higher Education (Styrelsen 
for Institutioner og Uddennalesestøtte) is able to provide qualification assessments 
to authorities responsible for the integration of MRAs as well as individual MRAs 
free of charge. (The Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2016: 58). This service 
is provided for the assessment of all levels of education (The Ministry of Immigration 
and Integration 2016: 58), and Denmark is among the relatively few countries that 
grants special recognition of prior learning procedures for humanitarian migrants 
who do not have documentary proof of their qualification (OECD 2017: 39). Even 
immigrants who do not formally require recognition (i.e. because they intend to 
work in a non- regulated profession) are encouraged to use this offer (OECD 
2017: 13).
Since the Danish labour market leaves its regulation to the social partners, focus 
on antidiscrimination at the national level has not been strong in Denmark (Jørgensen 
2014: 18). As a result of Denmark’s (lack of) anti- discrimination policies, the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) ranks Denmark number 27 out of 38 
countries in the field of antidiscrimination policies, among others because Danish 
anti- discrimination legislation is split into several acts (Huddleston et  al. 2015). 
Section 70 of the Danish Constitution states that nobody can be deprived of any civil 
or political rights on grounds of faith or origin, but there is no general prohibition 
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against discrimination in the Danish Constitution. According to Jørgensen, this lack 
of a general prohibition against discrimination allows the state to promote the 
majority culture in specific areas, for example religion (2014: 18). The conse-
quences of this were evident back in 2000, when a trainee was turned away from the 
Danish department store Magasin for turning up to work wearing a headscarf. The 
store management claimed that the headscarf did not comply with their rules gov-
erning employee clothing. The case was instantly taken up in the courts and the high 
court (Østre landret) ruled that Magasin’s reason had no legal foundation and there-
fore constituted indirect discrimination. The young woman received compensation. 
The high- court decision resulted in many companies having to change their 
employee clothing policies. Following the ruling, employees now had the right to 
wear a headscarf at work (Lukowski 2010). Yet, in 2005, the Danish Supreme Court 
ruled in the so- called “Føtex case”, where a woman had been fired for refusing to 
take off her headscarf at work in the department store (Supreme Court of Denmark 
2005). The unanimous verdict stated that the dismissal was justified and was not a 
case of illegal discrimination because an employer has the right to stipulate a dress 
code for its employees. The ruling was significant in terms of its implications for the 
labour market integration of immigrants wearing a headscarf or other religious sym-
bols as it limits not only their freedom of expression but the range of potential 
workplaces. Further, it provided employers with a potentially “easy tool” to dismiss 
employees who carry religious symbols. In 2018 Danish lawmakers also passed a 
law that banned the burqa and niqab. Responding to the ratification of the law, 
Amnesty International’s Europe Director Gauri van Gulik said, “If the intention of 
this law was to protect women’s rights, it fails abjectly. Instead, the law criminalises 
women for their choice of clothing and in so doing flies in the face of those free-
doms Denmark purports to uphold”. While only a “few Muslim women in Denmark 
wear full- face veils,” the law would expectedly affect their ability to integrate into 
the Danish labour market (The Guardian 2018).
For undocumented migrants residing in Denmark without residency documenta-
tion is extremely difficult. There is a general societal belief that undocumented 
immigration challenges the Danish universalist welfare tradition as undocumented 
immigrants do not enjoy any protection, have no right to social benefits, have 
extremely limited access to health care, have no political rights and do not pay taxes 
(Tranæs and Jensen 2014: 7). In Denmark, the personal ID number (CPR) is the 
gateway to basically everything, from healthcare to opening a bank account, getting 
a Danish phone number, registering at a Danish language school or even getting a 
gym membership (Bahgat 2018). In this way, the Danish system can be said to work 
in favour of legal stay and against undocumented migration. At the same time, how-
ever, the total lack of access to Danish society without proper documents puts the 
undocumented population in Denmark under pressure and makes them vulnerable 
to exploitation and abuse as they become dependent on employers and/or alternative 
sources of income and assistance in a “shadow” society (Tranæs and Jensen 2014: 
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74). This precarity of undocumented life in Denmark may then explain the rela-
tively few (reported) undocumented workers in the country.6
Overall, therefore when we look at the balance sheet of Denmark’s legal barriers 
and enabling factors to in particular labour market integration for MRAs we have 
quite a mixed picture. However, we sustain that while “barriers” exist in terms of 
entering Denmark, the Danish labour market model facilitates refugees’ integration 
and legally ensures the protection of their labour rights. Therefore, the Danish case 
study shows that legal barriers (to entering the labour market) coexist alongside 
enabling factors (legal guarantees) of refugees’ rights.
7.4  Conclusion
Following a general election in June 2019, Denmark now has a new government 
made up of left- wing parties (that won an overall majority in said election). Prior to 
the election, Social Democrat leader Mette Frederiksen (now Denmark’s prime 
minister) had stressed that she would continue the “broad” approach of the previous 
government on refugees as well as immigration, including the so- called ‘paradigm 
shift’  – referring to the then government’s policy of returning refugees to their 
source countries once it is deemed safe to do so, rather than integrate them in 
Denmark: “We are still focused on repatriation and temporary asylum. When you 
are a refugee and come to Denmark, you can be granted our protection. But when 
there’s peace, you must go home” (Wenane 2019). The other three parties – the 
Social Liberals, the Socialist People’s Party and the Red- Green Alliance – had all 
called for a more lenient approach to refugees. The coalition agreement reflects this, 
with pledges to improve conditions for families of rejected asylum seekers and to 
move families with children from Sjælsmark deportation centre to a more humane 
facility.7 Other aspects of the agreement include opening the doors for more high- -
skilled foreign workers.
The new Social Democratic government and its support parties also announced 
that refugees who lose their residence permit if conditions in their home country 
improve will be allowed to stay if they had a job for a minimum of 2 years and still 
have it. According to refugees.dk this may already be relevant for some of the 900 
Somali refugees who lost their permits during the last year, and for many Syrians in 
the future (Bendixen 2019). The Red/Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) added that all 
refugees will get the same right to free education – which the 4500 Syrians with a 
6 The Danish Police reported only 190 cases of undocumented workers in the third quarter in 2019 
(Politi 2019).
7 A study conducted by the Danish Red Cross expressed severe concern regarding the psychologi-
cal welfare of children at the deportation centre and reported that a large proportion of the children 
displayed significant levels of mental health issues (Red Cross 2019; Nilsson and Hergel 2019; The 
Local 2019).
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temporary protection 7(3)- status8 do not have today. Another announcement was 
made in regard to refugee families with less than 9 years stay in Denmark, receiving 
integration benefit: These families will now not be subject to the previously 
announced reduction in benefits (which was part of the annual finance act for 2019), 
and they will be receiving a special child benefit given temporarily to the poorest 
families with children while a commission will be looking into poverty benefits in 
general.
This new government is thus trying to change the course on immigration policy 
in a more humanitarian direction. However, we are cautiously optimistic and sustain 
that since historically restrictive measures have been imposed while at the same 
time embedded in a climate that emphasizes and guarantees workers’ (social and 
legal) rights, we cannot be overly sure that these more recent moves go beyond 
symbolic politics. As we have highlighted throughout this chapter, Denmark is a 
clear case of how a first mover of a positive kind in terms of immigration laws and 
policies quickly shifted to a first mover of a highly negative and often symbolic 
kind – albeit with real impacts for MRAs. However, we conclude that, in spite of the 
highly securitized and “burden” narratives that have sought to portray MRAs in a 
negative light, Denmark remains overall a success story for MRAs’ integration into 
the labour market. As 51- year- old Ghais Sangari, formerly an Afghan war refugee, 
but now a successful businessman with a Danish passport, puts it: “Many immi-
grants speak negatively about Denmark. I would rather talk about all the positive 
things about Danish society. I always say to my children: ‘If you work hard, read 
and get good grades, you can do whatever you want in Denmark.’ It is the most 
important thing” (own translation from Danish, Euroman 2019: 91).
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Finland’s legal framework for migrant labour market integration aims to facilitate 
the official and broadly accepted policy goals of actively encouraging and support-
ing migrants to enter working life on terms similar to those of native born Finns. 
The integration legal framework sets out the basis for active labour market policies, 
which have been shown to be effective at reducing migrant unemployment. Despite 
reducing what would be an even higher unemployment rate, these policies are 
unable to completely overcome the various structural disadvantages of foreigners 
on Finnish labour markets. While Finland has a strong framework for labour rights 
protection in its labour laws and centrally negotiated collective agreements, anti- -
discrimination protection for migrants and ethnic minorities are weak. The unem-
ployment percentages among foreign born individuals (15.8%) is significantly 
higher than among native born (8.4%) (OECD data from 2017).
This chapter examines the integration of migrants into the Finnish labour market 
from a legal perspective, asking the question: how does the Finnish legal framework 
facilitate and/or hinder the integration of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees into 
the Finnish labour market? The chapter will describe and analyse the legislative 
basis for the management of migration and integration, and the central labour mar-
ket legislation.
The sources of law in Finland are national legislation, international law and 
European Union law; there is no subnational legislation. Juridical power in Finland 
is vested in independent courts, which are bound only by the law in force. The inde-
pendence of the courts is guaranteed by the Constitution. Finland has been ranked, 
according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, as the 
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country with most judicial independence in the world (The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2017–2018: Judicial independence). In practice this means that also regard-
ing migration legislative issues the courts are not subject to improper influence from 
the other branches of government or from private or partisan interests. Finland also 
scores highest on the protection of fundamental rights according to the Rule of Law 
Index (Rule of Law Index 2018) and it is signatory to most international agreements 
and legal instruments relating to immigration, free movement, human rights and 
non- discrimination (Nykänen et al. 2012, 24). Finland has ratified all the fundamen-
tal conventions of the International Labour Organization, as well as all of the gover-
nance conventions (International Labour Organization 2018). In international 
comparison, there is broad public and political support for complying with interna-
tional human rights norms and legal obligations. Although these norms have been 
questioned by the right wing populist True Finns party, whose power has increased 
in recent years, there have been only minor actual changes to the law. Under the 
conservative coalition government that was voted out in May 2019, there was an 
apparent tightening of interpretation of migration rules, which disadvantaged 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (hereinafter MRAs).
Most of Finland’s migration law is newly developed. The percentage of the 
Finnish population which is of foreign origin has historically been small, and it 
continues to be quite minor compared to many other European countries. Up to until 
the 1980s, there were more people migrating out of Finland than migrating to 
Finland. A few hundred refugees from Chile and Vietnam migrated to Finland dur-
ing the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s (Kyhä 2011, 21). The first official 
refugee quota was set in 1988 (Saukkonen 2013, 87). During the 1990s, the number 
of asylum seekers grew due to international conflicts. Finland received asylum seek-
ers mainly from Somalia and Yugoslavia and between 1990–1994 Finland granted 
asylum to about 5000 individuals (Sarvimäki 2017, 3). By the end of the 1990s, c. 
18,000 refugees and their family members were living in Finland (Sarvimäki 2017, 
3). Whereas before the 1990s, almost half of the immigrants to Finland had been 
from Western countries, now greater numbers of migrants came from countries in 
the former Soviet Union and Asia. In 1990, c. 1.3% of the population of Finland was 
born abroad. Due to a steady rise in migration flows, the percentage had grown to 
7.02% in 2018. (Statistics Finland – Population by country of origin 2019.) In the 
beginning of the twenty- first century, Finland took refugees from, among other 
places, Afghanistan and Iraq (Martikainen et al. 2013, 37). The number of asylum 
applications to Finland grew significantly and suddenly in 2015. Since 2010 asylum 
application numbers had been around 3200–4000 a year but in 2015 the number 
suddenly grew to 32,476 applications. Most applications were made by individuals 
of Iraqi, Albanian, Somali and Afghan nationality. The following year the number 
dropped to 5651 applications. (Migri  – Yearly statistics by nationality; Migri  – 
Asylum Applications 2019.)
As Fig. 8.1 illustrates, immigration flows in Finland, since the 1990s, have been 
growing steadily, whereas emigration flows have remained stable. In the end of 
2018, there were 257,572 individuals with a foreign nationality living in Finland, 
which is 4.67% of the entire population (Statistics Finland – Number of individuals 
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with foreign background 2019). The largest migrant groups by country of origin are 
Russians and individuals from the former Soviet Union (14,868 + 57,144), Estonians 
(46,206), Swedes (32,654), Iraqis (17,889), and Somalians (11,797) (Statistics 
Finland, 2018 – Population by country of origin 2018). The most common reason to 
apply for a first residence permit was on family grounds (43.6%), after which came 
work (31.4%), studies (22.9%) and other grounds (2%). (Migri  – Statistics on 
Residence Permits 2018.)
8.2  Finnish Legislation on Migration
We first look at the legislative basis for the management of migration and integra-
tion in Finland, the Aliens act and the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration. 
These two acts set out the framework for determining who can stay in Finland, on 
which grounds and how integration is managed. These acts fundamentally affect the 
opportunities that MRAs have for employment in Finland.
Migration and integration issues have in Finland been dealt with cross adminis-
tratively e.g. by the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education and Culture, 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (Saukkonen 2013, 93). For example, the Ministry of Education and 
Culture is responsible for the education of migrants whereas the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health is responsible for the health care of migrants. The Act on 
Administration (FINLEX 434/2003) regulates the administrative procedures carried 
out by the authorities dealing with immigration. General legislation on administra-
tive procedures and administrative juridical procedures apply in immigration proce-
dures. (Nykänen et al. 2012, 21).
In Finland, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for preparing legislation 
related to immigration and for steering immigration management. The Ministry is 
also responsible for the Finnish Immigration Service. The Ministry states its aim is 
“to develop a more forward- looking migration policy and managed migration, and 
to make Finland a safe and open country, where everyone can find a role to play”. 


































Fig. 8.1 Data from statistics Finland – Emigration and immigration flows
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Interior was also in charge of coordinating the integration process in Finland. Since 
2012, the main responsibility for integration has however been at the Ministry of 
Economic affairs and Employment. Other migration issues have remained at the 
Ministry of the Interior. In 2013, the Ministry published the first overall integration 
report of Finland (Saukkonen 2013, 94; Saukkonen 2017, 39–40.) The Finnish 
Immigration service has the main responsibility for carrying out decisions on immi-
gration related issues. The office was established in 1995 (Aer 2016, 40).
In Finland, the basis for legislation related to immigration is found in the Aliens 
Act (FINLEX 301/2004) which constitutes the backbone of the regulation of immi-
gration. The Aliens act contains rules on entry and stay in Finland, removal from 
Finland in relation to different forms of immigration, rights and obligations of for-
eigners in Finland, and procedures in matters of immigration. (Nykänen et al. 2012, 
21.) The first Aliens act came into force in 1984. Before this, issues regarding for-
eigners were ordained by decrees, the last of which was given in 1958 (Aer 2016, 
16). The law set in 1984 was soon found outdated and it was reformed in 1991, 1999 
and 2004 (Makkonen and Koskenniemi 2013, 71; Aer 2016, 17) and 2016 (FINLEX 
646/2016). During the preparations for the 2004 reform, the public discussion had 
started to shift towards labour migration (Aer 2016, 19). Finland joined the EU in 
1995 and the Schengen agreement was introduced in 2001 (Makkonen and 
Koskenniemi 2013, 69). All Finnish migration policies are in accordance with the 
The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy set by the European 
Union regarding integration in 2004 (Saukkonen 2017, 17).
In 1997, the government’s first migration- and refugee programme was published 
(Kyhä 2011, 16; FINLEX 493/1999). A general aim was set, that migrants should 
be effectively and flexibly integrated into Finnish society and into the labour market 
(Saukkonen 2017, 16). Before this, there was no official migration policy, in the 
sense of articulating goals and implementing government measures to achieve them 
(Kyhä 2011, 22). The framework for migrant integration is set out in the integration 
law. The first law on migrant integration came into force on May 1st 1999 (Saukkonen 
2013, 92; VATT- Research Group 2014, 42; Makkonen and Koskenniemi 2013, 78). 
The Finnish Integration Act is similar to integration programmes introduced in 
other countries, such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in 
the US, the New Deal in the UK and the welfare- to- work policies adopted in 
Denmark and the Netherlands (Hämäläinen and Sarvimäki 2008, 3). The focus of 
the integration law in Finland has been on humanitarian migration and on the labour 
market integration of unemployed migrants (Makkonen and Koskenniemi 2013, 
78). When the act was introduced, it brought along various reforms:
• The responsibility for supporting immigrant integration was placed with the cen-
tral administration and municipalities, who were given the responsibility for 
coordinating existing resources at the local level (Hämäläinen and Sarvimäki 
2008, 4; FINLEX 493/1999.) This also obliged all municipalities to prepare their 
own integration programmes and follow their execution and impact (Saukkonen 
2013, 94; FINLEX 493/1999).
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• The law set a new focus on the preparation of individualized integration plans. 
The content of these integration plans depends on the personal characteristics of 
the immigrant. The integration plans can include, for example, measures for 
acquiring language skills, career counselling, preparatory and/or vocational 
training, rehabilitation and/or work practice, depending on the specific needs of 
the migrant. The labour administration (TE- office) is responsible for preparing 
and implementing the integration plans of 18–64- year- old (working age) 
migrants, whereas municipalities take care of other age groups. (Hämäläinen and 
Sarvimäki 2008, 4; FINLEX 493/1999.)
• In addition, the communication between caseworkers and immigrants and the 
importance of training courses specifically designed for immigrants, such as lan-
guage courses, increased as a result of the reform. Moreover, the importance of 
learning one of the local languages (Finnish or Swedish) was emphasised. 
Resulting from these reforms, the time spent in courses specifically designed for 
migrants and in language courses increased, whereas time spent in traditional 
activation labour- market programmes, such as job- seeking courses decreased. 
(Sarvimäki and Hämäläinen 2016, 480, 482–483, 498; VATT- Research Group 
2014, 46; FINLEX 493/1999.)
• As part of the integration act, welfare benefits were made conditional on partici-
pation in activation measures. Refusal to participate or to follow the integration 
plan was made sanctionable by a reduction or withdrawal of integration benefits. 
(Hämäläinen and Sarvimäki 2008, 2, 4; FINLEX 493/1999.)
Only those migrants who had arrived after May 1st. 1997, and who were regis-
tered as unemployed job seekers or living in a household that received social assis-
tance were affected by the new policies in the 1999 law (Hämäläinen and Sarvimäki 
2008, 2, 4). Neither rules on the use of sanctions nor funding systems changed dur-
ing this reform (Sarvimäki and Hämäläinen 2016, 483). The changes that were 
made in 1999 had a positive and significant effect on the integration of MRAs into 
the labour market. The integration plans increased participation and decreased the 
use of social benefits. (Hämäläinen and Sarvimäki 2008, 2, 9.) Researchers attribute 
the improvement to the more efficient use of existing resources, since the reform did 
not bring any new funds for active labour market policies (Sarvimäki and Hämäläinen 
2016, 480).
The law on integration was changed several times to improve it. In 2006, migrants 
were also given the right to extend their integration plan by up to 2 years. In addi-
tion, the schedule for making the first integration plan was expedited so that integra-
tion plans are made sooner after arrival in Finland. (VATT- Research Group 2014, 46.)
The law on the integration of immigrants and reception of asylum seekers was 
reformed in 2010 and the new law (1386/2010) came into force the following year 
(Saukkonen 2016). During this reform, the main content of the law remained the 
same (Saukkonen 2013, 95; Saukkonen 2017, 16). However, the focus of the law 
shifted somewhat towards work and family- based migration. Due to this, more peo-
ple became entitled to integration services. (Makkonen and Koskenniemi 2013, 
78–79.) Before only those that were unemployed jobseekers and living on income 
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support were included into the integration policies, whereas since 2011 all migrants 
were included (Eronen et al. 2014, 26). Integration services were made available to 
all that need them, regardless of which category of migrant the individual belonged 
to (Saukkonen 2013, 95). According to the renewed law, all individuals migrating to 
Finland have to be informed about their rights in society and in the labour market 
(FINLEX 1386/2010 7§).
According to Saukkonen (2013), the problem of Finnish integration has been in 
how to get municipalities to implement the official state policies set by the central 
government. This is because the controlling instruments of the government and the 
financial resources have been limited. (Saukkonen 2013, 94.) The integration laws 
in Finland however require municipalities to form local integration programmes, to 
be able to receive state funding to cover some of the costs related to accepting refu-
gees (FINLEX 1386/2010 32 § & 33 §).
At the moment, the migrant integration law is being revised to meet the needs of 
the ongoing health, social services and regional government reform in Finland. In 
the future, the focus areas of the law will be on structuring the education paths and 
entering of MRAs into the labour market, and on family orientated integration. 
Special attention will also be given to the different needs of various migrant groups. 
Municipalities will still have the main responsibility for managing integration ser-
vices. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment –Briefing 5.5.2017.)
8.3  Legislation on International Protection
The management of asylum seekers has a different legislative basis than that for 
migrants arriving for other reasons. The right to international protection is set out in 
the Alien act (2004/301 87 §). An asylum seeker may enter the country even if she/
he is not able to present travel documents or permission for entry, since the applica-
tion for asylum is in itself a sufficient reason for entry (Nykänen 2012, 45, 58; 
FINLEX 2004/301 35 §). In 2011, a law on the reception of individuals in need on 
international protection and on the recognition and helping of victims of human 
trafficking was introduced (FINLEX 746/2011). The aim of the law is to secure 
protection and income for those seeking international protection, for those in need 
of temporary protection and to victims of human trafficking. (Martikainen et  al. 
2013, 75.)
A residence permit based on a successful asylum application is granted for 
4  years. After this the individual has to apply for an extended residence permit. 
(Migri  – Asylum 2018; FINLEX 2004/301.) Asylum can only be applied for in 
Finland, and not for example at Finnish embassies in other countries or through a 
letter or email. Asylum applications always need to be left personally with the police 
or border control. (Migri – Asylum in Finland 2018; FINLEX 2004/301 95 §.) Once 
the asylum application has been left, the individual is referred to a refugee centre 
where he/she can live and wait for the asylum interview. The refugee centres take 
care of needed subsistence for living and offer accommodation and guidance 
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regarding getting legal aid. The centres also organize the necessary social and health 
care services as well as work and study activities and if the needed interpreter ser-
vices. (Kotouttaminen.fi – Vastaanottokeskukset 2018.) The applicant can also find 
accommodation her/himself, for example with family or friends (FINLEX 
746/2011 18 §).
The Finnish Immigration Service conducts the asylum investigation and inter-
view. The purpose of this investigation is to establish the identity and travel route of 
the applicant, as well as the reason for applying for asylum and the evidence to 
substantiate the reason. In 2016 the asylum application process took on average 
8 months (Ministry of the Interior, Usein kysytyt kysymykset turvapaikanhakijoista 
2018). Once asylum is granted, the person will receive a residence permit card 
(Migri – Information for asylum seekers 2018). If the decision on the application is 
negative, the applicant can appeal the decision to the Administrative Court and if 
needed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Pakolaisneuvonta 2018). Once the 
procedure is over, the applicants who are granted asylum in Finland are placed in 
municipalities that have made arrangements to receive refugees (FINLEX 
2010/1386, chapter 5). The local level coordination regarding receiving refugees is 
done by the Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment 
(ELY Centres), who negotiate with the municipalities of their area about municipal-
ity places for refugees, living arrangements and needed services (Kotouttaminen.
fi – Pakolaisten kuntaan osoittaminen 2018). Although there is effort to settle MRAs 
around the country, so they are not concentrated in certain areas, most MRAs still 
eventually end up living in growth centres (Rasinkangas 2013, 134–135). There are 
no legal restrictions on this, since all people in Finland are free to choose where they 
reside (FINLEX 731/1999 9 §). Those individuals who are not allowed to stay, can 
apply for assisted voluntary return (Migri – Information for asylum seekers 2018; 
FINLEX 2010/1386 85 §).
Quota refugees are individuals designated by UNHCR as being in need of inter-
national protection. The decision about the number of quota refugees to accept is 
made annually by the Parliament in connection with the approval of the state bud-
get. The proposal is made by the Ministry of the Interior together with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (FINLEX 
2004/301 91 §).The UNHCR presents a group of people from which Finnish author-
ities choose the quota refugees that can come to Finland. The selection is done by 
interviewing. (Ministry of the Interior – Quota refugees 2018.) Yearly 100 places 
from the quota are reserved for acute cases and for those that the UNHCR has esti-
mated to be in need of urgent resettlement. These emergency cases are chosen 
directly based on UNHCR documents. (Migri – Quota refugees 2018.) Since 2011, 
750 quota refugees have been accepted to Finland annually. In 2014 and in 2015, the 
quota was however increased to 1050 refugees a year due to the situation in Syria. 
(Migri – Quota refugees 2018.) Quota refugees are granted residence permits and 
other rights on the same basis as refugees recognized in the asylum procedure 
(Nykänen et al. 2012, 102). Quota refugees are placed directly into municipalities, 
which take care of their reception and integration (Pakolaisten vastaanotto  – 
Tietopaketti kunnille 2016).
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The number of asylum applications filed in Finland greatly increased in 
2014–2015, causing the Finnish government to take several measures. The first was 
to establish new reception centers and expand the Immigration Service’s staff. 
(Sarvimäki 2017, 7.) Regulations for establishing reception centers are set out in the 
Act on the Reception of Individuals in Need of International Protection and on the 
Recognition and Helping of Victims of Human Trafficking (FINLEX 746/2011 9 § & 
10 §). The government also responded to the increase in migration by publishing an 
action plan “to stop uncontrolled migration” (Finnish Government 2015). The idea 
was to try to make Finland a less attractive destination by changing various policies 
considered as “pull factors”. The government, for example, tightened the require-
ments for family reunification and reduced social benefits (Sarvimäki 2017, 7; 
FINLEX HE 43/2016.) Due to these changes in policy, it has among other things 
become more difficult for many MRAs to bring their families to Finland. One 
important change made in 2016 was that individuals who have been granted subsid-
iary protection or refugee status must show sufficient income to cover each family 
member’s living expenses, in order to be eligible to bring their family members. The 
purpose of the reform was to make sure that the Finnish society does not have to pay 
for foreigners residing in Finland but that instead the expenses would be taken care 
of by the residing person or his/her family. (FINLEX HE 43/2016.) Fees were also 
introduced for family reunification applications in 2016 by a decision by the 
Ministry of the Interior (FINLEX 872/2017).
Besides making Finland seem less attractive, the government also revised inte-
gration policies. On this note, an action plan was published by the government in 
May 2016 (Finnish Government 2016). The action plan included measures such as 
improving recognition of education certificates obtained abroad, the integration of 
language studies into other studies and the streamlining of the starting phase of 
integration services. (Sarvimäki 2017, 7.)
An empirical study by the Institute for Human Rights at Åbo Akademi University 
and the Non- Discrimination Ombudsman on official decisions on international pro-
tection in Finland in 2015–2017, found the decisions made by the Finnish 
Immigration Service on international protection had become stricter during that 
period. The research focused on decisions made on international protection regard-
ing 13–34- year- old Iraqi nationals. The research report notes that the tightening of 
decision cannot be explained by changes in the migration law but rather by stricter 
decision made by the Finnish Migration Service. (Saarikkomäki et al. 2018.) The 
tightening of decision made about asylum was much discussed in the media, and the 
expressed opinions of people working with migration issues seem are similar. The 
Migration Institute however, maintains that there has been no weakening of legal 
protection for migrants, in this case Iraqi migrants, or that asylum decisions are 
affected by political control or pressure (Interview by the chief director of the 
Migration Institute Jaana Vuori for the newspaper Etelä- Suomen sanomat 
22.3.2018). Since the project undertaken by the Åbo Akademi and partners was only 
a pilot research, this issue is something that should be looked at more specifically 
and comprehensively. The effect of political pressure on administrative decision 
makings in the asylum process is something that has been discussed increasingly 
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since the recent increase in asylum applications, not just in Finland but in other 
European countries as well.
8.4  Right to Stay, Residence Permits and Citizenship
According to the constitution, only Finnish nationals have the undisputed right to 
reside in Finland and the right of foreigners to stay in Finland is governed by legis-
lation (Aer 2016, 24; FINLEX 2004/301). Finnish citizens and foreigners legally 
resident in Finland have the right to freely move within the country and to choose 
their place of residence. Everyone has the right to leave the country. (9 §.) When a 
foreigner enters Finland, he/she must have the required travel documents. What 
constitutes a valid travel document depends on the citizenship of the person. 
(Nykänen et al. 2012, 36.) The visa regulations in Finland have their background in 
common Schengen- area norms (Nykänen et  al. 2012, 39). Visas are issued for a 
maximum of 90 days and they do not give the right to work in Finland (Juvonen 
2013, 17). If foreigners entering the country intend to stay for longer than 90 days, 
they need a permit of residence. In general, the residence permit must be applied for 
in a country where the foreigner resides lawfully before entering Finland (Nykänen 
et al. 2012, 59; FINLEX 2004/301 60 §). This however is not imperative, and the 
first residence permit can also be applied for in Finland (FINLEX 2004/301 60 §). 
A residence permit needs to be applied for personally and it cannot be done by 
another person, such as a spouse or employer. EU- citizens as well as citizens from 
Iceland, Norway or Liechtenstein do not need a residence permit but only need to 
register their residence. (Migri – Residence permit 2018.)
The residence permit can either be temporary or permanent (FINLEX 2004/301 
33 §). The first residence permit is always for a fixed- term, which is generally 1 year 
(Nykänen et al. 2012, 55; FINLEX 2004/301 53 §). The issuance of a residence 
permit must always be justified on particular grounds, such as, for example, work-
ing or studying in Finland or for international protection. Because of this, the appli-
cants must meet the requirements for the form of permit she/he is applying for. In 
general, the family members of person (defined as nuclear family) who reside in 
Finland by virtue of a residence permit may be issued a residence permit on the 
basis of family ties. In this case the family must have sufficient income to cover each 
family member’s living expenses. (Nykänen et al. 2012, 56–57, 63, 67; FINLEX 
2004/301 39 §). Those individuals that have lived in Finland continuously for 
4 years with a continuous residence permit may get a permanent residence permit 
(Migri – permanent residence permit 2018; FINLEX 2004/301 56 §). If an EU citi-
zen resides continuously in Finland for 5 years, they receive the right to perma-
nently stay in Finland (Makkonen and Koskenniemi 2013, 73–74; FINLEX 
2004/301 161 g §). Marriage does not give an automatic right to a residence permit 
(Säävälä 2013, 108). The issuance of a residence permit opens up access to the 
Finnish social security system, since the right to social security is based on perma-
nent residence (Aer 2016, 75; FINLEX 1993/1573). In general, the legal position of 
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long- term residents in Finland is fairly strong. A continuous fixed- term residence 
permit provides its holder with a stronger legal status, including a wider range of 
rights and freedoms, than that provided by a temporary fixed- term residence permit. 
(Nykänen et al. 2012, 55, 71.) A continuous fixed- term residence permit for exam-
ple provides its holder with a permanent right to work in Finland (FINLEX 2004/301 
78 §). Foreigners who reside in Finland have the right to move freely in the country 
and to choose their place of residence (Nykänen et  al. 2012, 63; FINLEX 
731/1999 9 §).
Access to citizenship is a part of the integration process. The basis of Finnish 
citizenship is hereditary (ius sanguinis) (Aer 2016, 26; FINLEX 731/1999 5§; 
FINLEX 359/2003 9 §), but Finnish citizenship can also be acquired after an indi-
vidual has lived in Finland for a sufficient time. Figure 8.2 illustrates the number of 
citizenships granted in Finland since 1990. The number has increased significantly 
since 1990, which can be expected since also the number of total immigration has 
grown steadily. The sharp increases in granted citizenships in 2004 and 2012 are 
explained by changes in legislation: since 2004 it became possible to maintain one’s 
previous citizenship and thus become a dual- citizen and in 2012, the required time 
of living in Finland before being able to become a citizen was dropped from 6 years 
to 5 years (Statistics Finland – Suomen kansalaisuuden saaneet 2017). Having the 
host country’s citizenship can facilitate integration e.g. by signalling motivation and 
an intention to stay (OECD 2017, 84). Other requirements are the knowledge of one 
of the official languages (Finnish or Swedish), integrity, means of support, estab-
lished identity and fulfilled payment obligations. (FINLEX 359/2003 13 §) The 
application cost is c. 350–440 euro. Finland accepts multiple citizenship. (Migri– 
Finnish citizenship 2018; Migri – Citizenship application 2018; FINLEX 2003/359.)
Grounds for removal from Finland are laid down in section 148 of the Alien Act 
(2004/301 148 §). The main grounds are invalid residence permits, being found 
guilty of a criminal offence, or being found to be a danger to public safety or 
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Fig. 8.2 Citizenships granted, 2016. Data from Statistics Finland
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Finland and 1447 individuals were deported. Romanians, Iraqis, Russians, 
Estonians, and Ukrainians were the nationalities most often refused entry. The larg-
est numbers of deportations were persons of Russian, Iraqi, Vietnamese, Somali and 
Ukrainian nationality. Of all the individuals deported in 2018, c. 88% were deported 
for unauthorized stay, whereas 12% had been found guilty of a criminal offense. 
According to the Immigration Service the number of deportations and refusals of 
entry has remained about the same in recent years. (Migri – Removal 2019.)
8.5  Permits to Work
In Finland, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy is responsible for imple-
menting labour legislation (Ministry of the Employment and the Economy – Labour 
Legislation 2018). The integration of MRAs into the labour market is important 
considering both their individual life and the public economy of the state. By work-
ing migrants earn money to take care of themselves, and participate in funding 
public services through paying taxes. Employment also provides migrants with net-
works, social contacts and information about how the society functions. (Saukkonen 
2017, 18.)
The Finnish constitution provides that everyone has the right to earn his or her 
livelihood by employment in the occupation or commercial activity of his or her 
choice. Legislation also asserts that the public authorities are responsible for labour 
protection, for promoting employment and for working towards guaranteeing every-
one the right to work. Provisions regarding the right to receive training that pro-
motes employability are laid down by an Act. No one shall be dismissed from 
employment without a lawful reason. (18 §.) Those who cannot obtain the means 
necessary for a dignified life have the right to receive indispensable subsistence and 
care. This applies if there is no subsistence from anywhere else and in practice this 
indispensable subsistence is channelled through income support policies. (19 
§ 1 mom.)
Regulation for work- based migration is set in migration law. To work in Finland, 
foreign citizens must first establish they have the right to work in Finland, and the 
employer has the responsibility to check this (2004/301 86 a §). The right to work 
depends on how long the individual intents to stay, what kind of work he/she is com-
ing to perform and what country citizenship he/she has. Individuals who want to 
move to Finland from the European Union or the European Economic Area (EEA) 
are not required to apply for a permit to work (Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration – Foreign Employee 2018; FINLEX 2004/301 chapter 5). There are 
also other excepted groups such as seasonal workers and certain defined professions 
such as researchers, interpreters, professionals, athletes, and so on. (FINLEX 
2004/301 79 §). In general, third country nationals cannot work in Finland without 
a valid permit to work (Aer 2016, 179).
Third Country Nationals, in general, need a residence permit, which allows them 
to work. Migrants who are coming specifically to work must apply for specific 
8 Legal Issues Affecting Labour Market Integration of Migrants in Finland
160
residence permit applications based on the type of work they plan to do. Migrants 
coming for dependant employment can apply for a residence permit for an employed 
persons and self- employed persons can apply for a residence permit for self- -
employed persons (FINLEX 2004/301 11 §). To be able to apply for a residence 
permit for an employed person, the migrant must comply with certain income 
requirements, i.e. have a confirmed job waiting and the salary must be sufficient to 
support the migrant for the entire time that the residence permit is valid (Migri – 
Working in Finland 2018). The minimum salary from gainful employment is 
reviewed annually. The salary of a full- time employee must at least correspond to 
the salary specified in the collective agreement that applies to the employment rela-
tionship. For specialists and EU Blue Card holders salary requirements are stricter. 
Specialists must have a salary of at least approximately 3000 euro per month and the 
salary of a Blue Card Holder must be at least 4732 euro per month in 2019. (Migri – 
Income requirement 2019.)
To get a residence permit for a self- employed person the migrant must register 
his or her business with the Trade Register, and must demonstrate having a secure 
means of support while in Finland. Moreover, the migrant in question must actually 
work in the business enterprise, and this work must be done in Finland. In practice 
this means that ownership in a company is not sufficient grounds for issuance of a 
residence permit. (Migri–EnterFinland 2018.) Even though the workers’ residence 
permits are in principle the main category issued for employment in Finland, other 
types of residence permits also permit the migrant to work (Nykänen et al. 2012, 
147). The adequacy of the work contract and the employer’s ability to function as an 
employer will be checked, as well as the migrant’s qualifications and his/her possi-
bilities to earn an adequate livelihood (Kyhä 2011, 27). Families of those that have 
been granted a residence permit for work may usually apply for a residence permit 
on the basis of family ties (Migri – Working in Finland 2018).
For residence permits based on work for third country nationals, the Employment 
and Economic Development Offices (TE Offices) will estimate whether there is a 
labour market need for the type of job the migrant is filling (the “availability test”) 
(The Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions, 2017; FINLEX 1218/2013 73 
§). This availability test is made so that EU and European Economic Area (EEA) 
citizens have priority to get employed (Nykänen et al. 2012, 140). Some have noted 
that the availability policy tends to restrict the possibilities that enterprises have for 
hiring workers and slows down the process of finding suitable employers (Mäkelä 
2019). Moreover, in Finland the availability consideration clause is interpreted 
rather strictly and it can actually be quite difficult to determine which sectors need 
labour and which do not (Punto 2018). The availability test is done only for manual 
labour jobs such as cleaning personnel, chefs, car drivers or construction workers. It 
does not apply to experts or professionals who receive their residence permits 
straight from the Finnish Immigration Service without having to go through this 
process. An estimation of the workforce need always uses a case- by- case approach. 
Individuals wanting to come from outside of EU or EEA will only receive a permit 
to work if it is estimated that there is a labour shortage in their field. (The Central 
Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions 2017.) The application of the availability test 
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has been controversial. Since 1.6.2019 those migrant employees who have been 
working in Finland for at least 1 year are no longer subject to the availability test, if 
they want to change occupation while in Finland (Finnish Government 2019.) This 
change in legislation is expected to make it easier for professional workforce to 
change working places and it will thus improve the position of migrant workers 
already living in Finland. A need for this has been building up since in some sectors 
there are shortage of labour force. In practice, the change is expected to affect only 
a very limited number, only a few dozen, of migrant employees already working in 
Finland annually. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 2019.)
The Employment and Economic Development Offices (TE- offices) are in prac-
tice responsible for the integration of migrants into the labour market at the local 
level. If found useful, an initial mapping is done with individual migrants who are 
not part of the labour force, or who register as job seekers. Based on the initial map-
ping an individual integration plan is made (FINLEX 2010/1386 10 §). The integra-
tion plan is not compulsory, neither for employed nor unemployed migrants 
(FINLEX 2010/1386 11 §). The integration plan can include e.g. language training, 
internships, education, courses preparing for working life, and career counselling. 
(Eronen et al. 2014, 25.)
In many OECD countries, the time during asylum procedures is actively used to 
facilitate integration by for example offering applicants language training, skills 
assessment and labour market preparation (OECD 2017, 87). An asylum seeker can 
work in Finland 3 months after arrival if her/his travel documents are in order. This 
means that asylum seekers must present a valid and authenticated passport or other 
travel document to the authorities upon arrival. Those asylum seekers that do not 
have the needed travel documents can start working after 5 months has passed in 
Finland. (FINLEX 2004/301 79 §.) An employed asylum seeker can also apply for 
a residence permit based on work during the same time that the asylum application 
is being processed. (Ministry of the Interior – FAQ asylum seekers and employment 
2018.) Asylum seekers may also take part in comprehensive education in schools 
and after this they may apply and accept a study place if they meet the general selec-
tion criteria (Opintopolku.fi 2018). Attending comprehensive education is not com-
pulsory for adults. In Finland, all school- age children resident in Finland must 
participate in compulsory education (FINLEX 1998/628).
8.6  Regulations Regarding Working in Finland
The Finnish labour market is largely regulated by collective bargaining agreements, 
which are extended to all workers and employers over most economic sectors, and 
which set e.g. salary levels and working hours. The most important laws on labour, 
for individuals in an employment relationship in Finland, are the Employment 
Contracts Act (FINLEX 55/2001), Working Hours Act (FINLEX 605/1996) and the 
Annual Holidays Act (FINLEX 162/2005). The most central laws regarding collec-
tive labour rights on the other hand are the Collective Agreement Act (FINLEX 
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436/1946) and the Act on Co- operation within Undertakings (FINLEX 334/2007). 
The Finnish law on employment, at least in regards to its minimum requirements, 
applies to all work done in Finland regardless of what the nationality of the employee 
is. (Ministry of the Employment and the Economy – Report 2015, 5–6.) When the 
work is done in Finland the same laws and labour agreements apply to both Finnish 
and foreign employees (Finnish Institute of Occupational Health 2014, 17).
In Finland, employers’ and labour organisations have a political role, particularly 
in issues concerning work and social security, even though they are not among the 
classical Parliamentary actors (Laine 2015). Trade unions are a visible presence in 
most work places, and many are active in recruiting and representing migrant- -
specific interests (Alho 2015a). About 70% of employees in Finland belong to a 
trade union and 95% of employees work under a collective labour agreement nego-
tiated by a labour union (The Finnish Confederation of Professionals 2018). The 
right to join a union is protected legislatively (FINLEX 2001/55, Chapter 13 1 §) 
and employers are forbidden from discriminating against employers on the basis of 
union membership (FINLEX 1325/2014 8 §). In the event of unemployment, union 
membership entitles a worker to access that unions’ unemployment insurance fund 
(Finnish Institute of Occupational Health 2014, 22). This means that union mem-
bers receive much higher income support than non- members, if they become unem-
ployed. The so called “Ghent system” is thus in place, in which unions have 
responsibility for managing unemployment insurance schemes, which are also sup-
plemented by tax subsidies (Andersen et al. 2007, 106). There are three main central 
trade union confederations. These are the SAK (the Central Organisation of Finnish 
Trade Unions), STTK (the Finnish Confederation of Professionals) and Akava (the 
Confederation of Unions for Professional and Managerial Staff in Finland) (The 
Infopankki website –Trade Unions 2018). There is no exact information about the 
union membership rate of migrants in Finland. Alho (2015a) has estimated that the 
number of migrant members in Finnish labour unions grew 71–78% between 2006 
and 2011 (Alho 2015b, pp. 13.). Furthermore, Alho estimates that for example the 
unionization density of migrant construction workers is somewhere between 
12–14%, which is far lower than the national average in Finland (Alho 2013, 
pp. 144).
There are several mandatory regulations in the labour legislation that cannot be 
breached by a local contract, especially not in such a way that it would be harmful 
to the employee. The Collective Agreement Act (FINLEX 436/1946) regulates the 
rights of employers, employer associations and labour unions to negotiate binding 
collective agreements on behalf of all employers and workers in a sector, respec-
tively. Collective agreements establish working time, payment for work, overtime 
and sickness pay, holidays, and other terms of employment (Finnish Institute of 
Occupational Health 2014, 22). If there is a universal collective agreement, all 
employers must for example comply with the minimum standards set out in that 
collective labour agreements. (Ministry of the Employment and the Economy– 
Report, 2015, 5; FINLEX 436/1946.) Each sector follows its own collective agree-
ment and those establishments that do not have their own agreement must follow the 
nationally applicable and binding agreements of that sector (Ministry of the 
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Employment and the Economy  – Report 2015, 7). There is a government board 
which declares collective agreements universally binding when the unions are 
deemed sufficiently representative of workers in that the sector (Ministry of the 
Employment and the Economy – Report 2015, 7–8.) According to this system about 
95% of the workforce becomes covered by the collective agreements and also those 
individuals that do not belong to labour unions are protected (Ristikari 2012, pp. 22, 
34). This also means that the collective agreements govern the working conditions 
of foreign workers in a similar way than those of Finnish workers. The tripartite 
collective bargaining system which leads to the collective agreements has in Finland 
been as especially important tool for labour unions (Alho 2015a, pp. 14). The tripar-
tite decision making system is a typical feature of Nordic labour markets, and cre-
ates a tendency toward uniform pay increases within industries. Instead of 
negotiating wage adjustments separately in each firm, adjustments are negotiated 
collectively at the sectoral level. This means that all members of a particular union 
receive the same wage increase, in relative terms. (Andersen et al. 2007, 105, 120.)
Anti- Discrimination legislation may have an effect on the labour market posi-
tion of MRAs, by establishing their nationality or ethnicity should not be consider-
ing in recruitment or deciding salaries. In practise, equality on the labour market 
means that only those kinds of qualities that are meaningful for conducting the work 
tasks should be demanded of job applicants. (Forsander 2013, 236, 238.) As with 
immigration law generally, norms prohibiting discrimination against migrants are a 
recent development in Finland.
There are now a number of laws against discrimination against MRAs in work. 
The law (FINLEX 1325/2014; FINLEX 2001/55 2 §) demands that employers must 
treat their employees equally, unless there is a reason not to do so. Reasons not to 
do so include, inter alia, different positions or different tasks (Ministry of the 
Employment and the Economy –Report, 2015, 7). Also, positive discrimination can 
however be a reason for treating employees differently (Ministry of the Employment 
and the Economy  – Report 2015, 17). The Non- Discrimination Act (FINLEX 
1325/2014), the Act on Equality between Women and Men (FINLEX 1329/2014) 
and the Employment Contracts Act (FINLEX 55/2001) together regulate the equal-
ity and parity of employees (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment  – 
Työsopimuslaki 2017, 13). The Non- Discrimination Act (FINLEX 1325/2014), 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, ethnic or national origin, nationality, 
language, religion, conviction, opinions, health, disability, sexual orientation or any 
other personal quality. The Act on Equality between Women and Men (FINLEX 
1329/2014) on the other hand prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. According 
to the law (1325/2014, Chapter 2, 7 §) all employers must promote equality between 
women and men in work life and ensure that both sexes have the same opportunities 
for career progression. (Finnish Institute of Occupational Health 2014, 50.) The law 
also includes a discrimination prohibition and it requires that public officers must 
advance equality in all their actions (FINLEX 1325/2014, Chapter 2, 5 §). 
Discrimination has also been criminalized in the criminal law (FINLEX 39/1889). 
Still, enforcement seems to be poor, since discrimination is a structural feature of 
the Finnish labour market (Heikillä 2005). Structural factors that exclude MRAs 
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from the labour market include the high minimum wage (de facto) and other labour 
costs, which demand high productivity. Employment possibilities for workers who 
lack the required human capital have been decreasing and in fact hardly any low 
paying jobs remain for unskilled or semiskilled workers in industry. The high cost 
of labour also hinders the expansion of the low- productivity, labour- intensive ser-
vice sector. (Forsander 2004.) Moreover, MRAs are also disadvantaged as jobseek-
ers. Liebkind et al. (2016) found that foreign applicants from a low- status ethnic 
minority groups, such as Polish, had significantly lower chances of being selected 
for a vacant position when paired with a majority Finnish applicant, or with an 
applicant from a high- status ethnic minority, such as Australian (Liebkind et  al. 
2016, pp. 417). Moreover, another study found that individuals with a foreign sur-
name are significantly less often selected for job interviews compared to individuals 
with a Finnish surname (Ahmad 2019). According to results from the Eurobarometer 
2015, 67% of respondents in Finland estimated that discrimination based on ethnic 
background is common and 66% estimated that skin- color and ethnic background 
may affect employment decisions. (Eurobarometer – Finland 2015).
Enforcing compliance with the labour legislation is mostly the responsibility of 
The Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) authorities. The Occupational Safety 
and Health are part of OSH Divisions of the Regional State Administrative Agencies, 
which come under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. (Ministry of the 
Employment and the Economy – Labour Legislation 2018.) Employers who violate 
the provisions of the Alien Act relating to employment can receive administrative or 
criminal sanctions (Nykänen et al. 2012, 151). Employers have the responsibility to 
check (2004/301 86 a §) that foreign employees are eligible to work. If the employer 
does not comply with the responsibility to check, on purpose or due to negligence, 
he or she may be sanctioned. In some severe cases, a foreigner working in Finland 
without the right to gainful employment may be fined for violation of the Aliens 
Act. (Nykänen et al. 2012, 153.) This however, has not been common and more 
often the employee faces sanctions.
8.7  Conclusions
Overall, Finnish legislation on immigration can be characterized by a rather late 
awakening to the requirements of democratic principles and human right concerns. 
It reflects modern standards and a pragmatic approach to the needs of society. 
(Nykänen et al. 2012, 20.) Finland is a strongly constitutional state that has law- -
abiding, independent and educated public officials. Issues regarding MRAs and 
migrant administration are discussed openly and critically. Open discussion also 
functions as an instrument of control since officials know that they not only must 
address the immediate issue, but also have to answer to civil society at large. 
(Pirjatanniemi 2018)
The two central acts which govern migration and integration issues in Finland 
are the Aliens Act (FINLEX 301/2004) and the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant 
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Integration (FINLEX 1386/2010). Regarding asylum procedures the Act on the 
reception of individuals in need on international protection and on the recognition 
and helping of victims of human trafficking (FINLEX 746/2011) is most central. In 
practise, these acts define e.g. who can enter the country and on which grounds, who 
is permitted to stay in Finland on which grounds and what kind of integration mea-
sures are taken. The legislation also defines who is responsible for which part of 
migration management.
The Aliens act functions as the backbone of the general regulation of immigra-
tion into Finland and the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration is the back-
bone for migrant integration policy in Finland. Various integration measures have 
been tested and some have been found more effective than others, which is also 
reflected in the changes of the integration law. The increased number of asylum 
seekers coming to Finland since 2015 has not caused major changes in legislation 
regarding migration and integration. The interpretation of migrant legislation seems 
to however have somewhat tightened, reflecting public opinion.
A central cross- cutting aspect of labour market legislation regarding MRAs is 
that when work is done in Finland the same laws and labour agreements apply to 
both Finnish and foreign employees. Overall, the integration of MRAs into the 
Finnish labour market has not always been successful. Although there may be some 
aspects of the Finnish legislation (e.g. the availability tests) that may at times hinder 
the labour market integration of some MRAs it seems that other factors in society 
may have a larger role in this, such as a lack of language skills, networks, qualifica-
tions, recognition of qualification and ineffective integration procedures (Bontenbal 
et al. 2018). However, it seems that even though urging equality and prohibiting 
discrimination are taken seriously in the legislation the practical reality may not 
always respond to the laws in place and this may in fact hinder labour market 
integration.
Based on earlier research, the reforms brought about by integration legislation, 
in the end of the 1990s, seem to have had a positive effect on the labour market 
integration of MRAs. Especially the individual integration plans are of interest and 
could also be considered as a possible policy recommendation for other countries.
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Chapter 9
Between Reception, Legal Stay 
and Integration in a Changing Migration 
Landscape in Greece
Christos Bagavos, Nikos Kourachanis, Konstantina Lagoudakou, 
and Katerina Χatzigiannakou
9.1  Introduction
Greece, historically considered a typical emigration country, experienced two sig-
nificant periods of outward migration: the first took place in the early twentieth 
century (1900–1920), while the second extended from the end of World War II to 
the first half of the 1970s (Bagavos 2015; Hassiotis 1993; Lazaretou 2016). The 
United States was by far the main destination country over the first period, whereas 
in the second period the largest majority of emigrants moved to the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Between 1900 and 1920, around 400,000 people emigrated abroad; 
during 1955–1975 the figure was almost 1.2 million (Bagavos 2015). From 2009 
onward, a third emigration period occurred as a result of the economic downturn 
(Labrianidis and Pratsinakis 2016). Estimates for the entire 2009–2017 period indi-
cate that emigration, including both national and foreign populations, accounts for 
around 850,000 persons (EL.STAT. 2019a).
As for immigration, the 1990s mark a turning point in the history of Greek 
migration since the country had by this period received a significant number of 
immigrants. Although the second half of the 1970s and the whole of the 1980s can 
be considered as the starting period of migration inflows to Greece, the last decade 
of the twentieth century is marked by unprecedented immigration waves of foreign-
ers coming mainly from the Balkans and to a lesser extent from Asian countries 
(Cavounidis 2015). Moreover, from 2014 onward, subsequent to the refugee crisis, 
a substantial number of arrivals, estimated at around 1.2  million third-country 
nationals and almost 850,000 in the year 2015 alone (UNHCR 2019), was recorded. 
Consequently, the foreign population increased from 167,000 to more than 800,000 
between 1991 and 2018 (Bagavos 2015; EL.STAT. 2019b) and the share of 
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foreigners to the total population went from 1.6% to 7.6% (from 1% to 5.6% for 
third-country nationals). Inevitably, immigration, either in terms of transit or of 
settled immigrants, has become a major policy issue and has mobilized the national 
authorities, international bodies as well as formal and informal civil society organi-
zations. In addition, the shifting immigration landscape in Greece has led to the 
changing composition of migrants and of migrants’ needs; immigrants from the 
period before 2014, who are quite well integrated in Greek society, coexist with 
refugees and asylum seekers for whom reception conditions have been the main 
concern.
Changes in the immigration landscape were coupled with adverse economic con-
ditions from 2009 onwards. Unemployment rose sharply and GDP fell significantly. 
Unemployment rates increased from 7.8% in 2008 to 24.9% in 2015 and reached 
23.6% in 2016. Long-term unemployment rates as a percentage of total unemploy-
ment rose from 47.0% in 2008 to 73.4% in 2014, reaching 71.8% in 2016. In addi-
tion, GDP decreased by around 28% between 2008 and 2016. In this context along 
with austerity measures the labor market has undergone a number of major changes, 
among them the stifling control over the shaping of the labor law. Thus, despite the 
end of the economic tutelage of Greece by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the EU in August 2018, the situation in the Greek labor market, after several 
years of austerity, is still one of deregulation. This gloomy economic and labor mar-
ket environment did not favor the integration of MRAs into the labor market. With 
widespread unemployment, the prospect of developing targeted employment poli-
cies for MRAs seems impractical, since employment policies are mainly oriented 
towards the fight against overall unemployment. At the same time, economic hard-
ship has particularly affected those sectors where MRAs are mainly employed, such 
as construction, retail and personal and domestic services.
The chapter deals with the main legislative developments in migration and the 
integration of MRAs into the labor market over recent years. It seeks to highlight the 
significant differences between migrants and refugees in terms of the legal frame-
work put in place by the public authorities to effectively manage the migration phe-
nomenon and the integration of MRAs into the labor market. The chapter stresses 
that changes in the immigration landscape, along with adverse economic condi-
tions, have led to further efforts by the public authorities for the effective manage-
ment of refugee flows and reducing the risks of irregular stay for a significant 
number of migrants. These efforts, however, underestimate the importance of issues 
relating to the integration of MRAs into the labor market. The paper is structured as 
follows: Section 9.2 presents the legislative framework on migration and asylum, 
while Sect. 9.3 deals with legislation on the integration of migrants, asylum seekers 
and refugees into the Greek labor market. The main concluding remarks are included 
in Sect. 9.4.1
1 As this chapter was being finalised a new law was adopted (the International Protection Act L 
4636/2019) which establishes a 6-month employment ban for asylum seekers to occur from 
1.1.2020.
C. Bagavos et al.
175
9.2  The Legislative Framework in the Fields of Migration 
and Asylum
9.2.1  Developments in the Legislative Framework of Migration
The Immigration and Social Integration Code (Law 4251/2014) voted in by 
Parliament in April 2014 is the most significant development in managing migration 
over the recent period. The modifications introduced aim to simplify procedures, 
revise terms for access to the labor market, encourage investment by third-country 
nationals, modify terms and conditions for granting long-term residence permits, 
and to ensure the legal stay of the second generation of third-country migrants.
One of the most relevant aspects of the Code is that it seeks to simplify and better 
manage the procedures for residence permits, with the aim of reducing the risks of 
irregularity for a significant number of migrants, in particular within the context of 
the persistent economic recession (Greek Parliament 2014; Kapsalis 2018a; The 
Greek Ombudsman 2013). The promotion of the legal stay of migrants is reflected 
in various provisions, such as the increase in the length of the validity of the initial 
permits and the renewed residence permits, from 1 to 2 years and from 2 to 3 years 
respectively, and the issuing of a document, in practice a temporary permit to stay 
which is valid for 12 months and that certifies that a third-country national has sub-
mitted a complete application for the issuing or renewal of a permit to stay 
(Triandafyllidou 2015).
The Code also promotes the status of long-term residence for third-country 
nationals who have lived in Greece for a long period, enabling the holder to move to 
and work in all EU countries, a right not granted to holders of the 10-year residence 
permit. In addition, a second-generation residence status has been adopted (Article 
108), which grants a 5-year residence permit that can be renewed simply by present-
ing the previous residence permit to adult third-country nationals born in Greece or 
those who have successfully completed six Greek school grades in Greece before 
their 21st birthday, and who are legally resident in Greece.
The Code’s provisions, further strengthened by Law 4332/2015, also offer a 
2-year residence permit and access to the labor market to third-country nationals on 
the basis of exceptional grounds (The Greek Ombudsman 2015). This permit is 
granted if the interested third-country national has procured a visa issued by a Greek 
consular authority at least 3 years before submission of the application, or a perma-
nent residence permit even if it had expired in the previous 10 years, or that he or 
she can prove by way of dated documents the actual fact of his or her residence in 
the country for at least seven instead of 10 consecutive years, as foreseen by the 
Code. In the above cases, the third-country national must prove that he or she has 
long-lasting ties2 with the country unless he or she had a residence permit for Greece 
for at least 5 years in the decade prior to the application (Spirou 2017).
2 Factors considered as proof of strong ties with the country are: very good Greek-language skills; 
attendance of a Greek primary or secondary school by the applicant or his or her children; duration 
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Another important aspect is that the Migration Code and Law 4332/2015 regu-
late the entry and residence of seasonal3 migrants in order to work in agriculture and 
the fisheries industry (EMN 2015; Triandafyllidou 2015). On the basis of a simpli-
fied entry procedure, permits are provided to third-country nationals for seasonal 
residence and work and several guarantees are foreseen as regards social rights (for 
more details see Sect. 9.3.2).
Further provisions were introduced by Joint Ministerial Decision 30651/2014 
and Law 4332/2015, which regulate the reasons and procedures for granting a 
2-year residence permit on humanitarian grounds to several categories of third- 
country nationals, such as victims of trafficking, crime and domestic violence, or 
those who work in inappropriate working conditions, or suffer from serious health 
problems or follow an approved mental health treatment programme. Those provi-
sions are also applied to victims of violations of Article 3 of the European Convention 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms or Article 3 of the New York Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment etc., that is to people who have suffered “inhuman 
or degrading treatments or punishments” (Council of Europe 1950).
This legislative framework, implemented in the context of a long-standing eco-
nomic recession, led to a simplification of the procedure and extending the legal 
residence of third-county nationals (Triandafyllidou and Gemi 2018). In this respect, 
there is no doubt that the legislation has contributed to regularizing the stay of a 
significant number of irregular migrants even on humanitarian or exceptional 
grounds. Nevertheless, developments in the legal and institutional aspects of migra-
tion issues mainly reflect the efforts to manage existing migration rather than to 
provide a perspective for facilitating and sustaining future legal labor migration.
9.2.2  Migrants, Refugees and the EU-Turkey Statement
The EU-Turkey Statement provides the main framework for the management of 
refugee flows over the last 4 years in Greece. The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe led 
to the involvement of the European Union through the identification of measures 
aiming to better manage refugee flows. At the beginning of 2016, the Member States 
recognized the need for further measures to manage issues emanating from the refu-
gee crisis, which led to the EU-Turkey Statement.
Of course, the issues covered by the EU-Turkey Statement and its importance in 
controlling the number of arrivals, the protection of a migrant’s fundamental rights 
and compliance with international standards have been widely discussed over the 
of residence, primarily legally, in Greece; social security contributions; fulfilment of tax obliga-
tions; and blood relations with a Greek national or expatriate.
3 Seasonal work refers to activity performed in Greece for up to 3 months in total within a 12-month 
period, in a field related to provisional and seasonal employment.
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recent period. The basic content of the Statement is that all people irregularly arriv-
ing in the Greek islands will be transferred back to Turkey. For each Syrian return-
ing to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be relocated from Turkey 
to the EU (the ‘One for One’ procedure). In addition, the agreement includes a 
commitment for the EU to cooperate with Turkey in order to facilitate the provision 
of reception services to refugees returned to Turkey, and to establish so-called ‘safe 
areas’ inside Syria.
The statement has been criticized as being legally problematic, impractical to 
implement, and in contravention of refugee law (Amnesty International 2017; 
Kourachanis 2018). The statement, without being a convention of the Union with a 
third country, from a legal aspect introduces a host of derogations from the EU regu-
latory framework (The Greek Ombudsman 2017). It is also seen as unclear on how 
individual needs for international protection would be fairly assessed during the 
mass expulsions (Amnesty International 2017). Indeed, Turkey has ratified the 1951 
Refugee Convention, but only by applying a geographical limitation whereby only 
Europeans can be granted refugee status in the country, making the EU’s recogni-
tion of Turkey as a safe third country rather problematic (Spyropoulou and 
Christopoulos 2016). At the same time, the scope for establishing ‘safe areas’, in the 
current situation, seems to be unrealistic.
Although the EU-Turkey Statement is not related in a direct way to issues of 
asylum seekers’ integration into the labor market, many scholars comment that it 
provides a preparatory stage for their deployment in low-status sectors (Kourachanis 
2018; Xypolytas 2017). The unfavorable living conditions of asylum seekers in 
hotspots and camps risks making them willing to take up any job and any employ-
ment relationship and hence being more vulnerable to exploitation.
9.2.3  Developments in the Legislative Framework of Asylum
Changes in the legislation on asylum over the recent period were undertaken in the 
context of the refugee crisis and Greece’s international legislative commitments. 
These changes mainly concern four distinct developments: (a) the increase in (sea) 
refugee flows; (b) the closure of the so-called Balkan route in March 2016; (c) the 
EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016;4 and (d) the transposition into Greek law of 
EU Directive (2013/32/EU) on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection. Those developments resulted in new asylum legislation, in 
particular Law 4375/2016, adopted in April 2016 and amended in June 2016 (Law 
4399/2016, Article 86). This law aimed to implement the aforementioned EU-Turkey 
Statement and the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (AIDA 2017; Greek 
Parliament 2016).
4 The EU-Turkey Statement contains actions to address the refugee and migration crisis, including 
the return of all persons irregularly entering Greece after 20 March 2016 to Turkey.
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Through various provisions, the new asylum legislation reforms reception and 
asylum procedures, introduces a special regime applicable at border areas, regulates 
the backlog of cases (in particular those of the ‘old regime’5), restructures the 
Appeals Committees and regulates matters relating to beneficiaries of international 
protection. A main aspect of the implementation of the new legislation is the differ-
ent asylum procedures for those applicants who arrive in Greece after 20 March 
2016 compared to those who were relocated to the mainland and had reached the 
country before this date (Koulocheris 2017; GCR 2016).
Developments in the legislative framework of asylum over the recent period, as 
reflected in particular in Law 4375/2016, in response to the EU-Turkey Statement, 
resulted in a clear division between reception and asylum procedures for those 
entering the country before and after 20 March 2016 and consequently for those 
staying on the mainland or on the islands. Thus, the Greek administration faced a 
double challenge (The Greek Ombudsman 2017): (a) to enable people who were 
transferring to and living in temporary accommodation facilities on mainland 
Greece to access the asylum process; and (b) to rapidly evaluate the asylum applica-
tions of those who crossed the sea borders after 20 March and were being held in the 
hotspots for readmission to Turkey.
The Administration addressed the first challenge in a quite satisfactory way 
since, by April 2017 over 27,000 1-year legal certificates for residence in the coun-
try had been granted through the pre-registration procedure. In contrast, the fast- 
track border procedure has not operated adequately. One of the reasons for this was 
the limited number of national and EASO staff, which was not sufficient to tackle 
the number of applications they received (AIDA 2017; The Greek Ombudsman 
2017). Another reason is the lack of coordination and insufficient distribution of 
competencies between public agencies, services, international organizations, NGOs 
and local authorities (Koulocheris 2017). Furthermore, the fast-track border proce-
dure has predominantly taken the form of an admissibility procedure to examine 
whether applications may be dismissed (AIDA 2017), and asylum seekers have 
been practically excluded from relocation. Moreover, due to the priority of national-
ity for the submission and evaluation of the asylum applications, the asylum proce-
dure has been severely delayed for non-prioritized nationalities. Consequently, the 
hotspots were overcrowded, reception conditions deteriorated in terms of sanitation 
and hygiene, and access to health care was limited, in particular for vulnerable 
groups (ECRE et al. 2016; NCHR 2017). There is no doubt that reducing the risk of 
the Reception and Identification Centres being transformed into permanent deten-
tion centers remains a major challenge.
5 Asylum procedure governed by Presidential Decree 114/2010, applicable to claims lodged before 
7 June 2013 (AIDA 2017).
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9.3  The Legislative Framework on the Integration 
of Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees into 
the Greek Labour Market
9.3.1  Migration and the Labour Market in the Context 
of the Economic Recession
The Greek labor market has undergone a number of major changes in recent years 
due to the economic crisis and fiscal adjustment programs. The emergence of eco-
nomic hardship and austerity policies led to rising unemployment and steadily fall-
ing GDP. In addition, the institutional protection framework for the labor market is 
not regulated. The main changes since 2010 are based on five key axes: first, the 
decline in the role of full employment and the expansion of flexible industrial rela-
tions, which favor sectoral rather than collective agreements between social part-
ners. Secondly, the weakening of collective agreements and the shrinkage of wages. 
Thirdly, the spread of flexible working hours, fully adapted to the needs of markets. 
Fourth, the gradual liberalization of the institutional framework of redundancies. 
Fifth, the convergence of working conditions in the public and private sectors, lead-
ing to significant cuts in the employment protection of civil servants (Kouzis 2016).
At the same time, issuing residence permits has often been an obstacle to inte-
grating migrants into the labor market. Greek migration policy and the subsequent 
access of migrants to the labor market was for a long time connected to the issuing 
of two permits, a work permit and a residence permit, particularly since the work 
permit was a prerequisite for the residence permit required for the purposes of 
working (Kapsalis 2018b). In addition, migration law aimed mainly to regularize 
illegal migration rather than promoting legal migration for employment purposes. 
Practically, the only two options for legal migration (that are often interconnected), 
that of recall/metaklissis6 and seasonal work are almost exclusively connected to the 
agricultural sector and their effectiveness is questionable (Triandafyllidou 2014). 
The ineffective application of these schemes results from the fact that, given the 
flexibility of labor needs in those sectors where migrants are employed, employers 
frequently demand changes to the needs they have for a workforce. It also seems 
that no substantive procedures for a dialogue between the various actors involved in 
the planning process have been put in place.
The interconnection between the economic recession, subsequent changes in the 
labor market and those legislative initiatives that aim to offer illegal migrants the 
opportunity to gain a legal status have led to the following paradox: there is a trend 
towards the greater convergence of the labor relations of Greek workers with those 
of MRAs than in the past. However, this trend is not necessarily due to any 
improvement in the working conditions of foreign workers. On the contrary, it is the 
6 A procedure that enables a non-EU national to enter and reside in Greece in order to provide paid 
work to a specific employer, in a specific field of employment.
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shrinking of labor rights and deregulation of the labor market that have exacerbated 
the working conditions of Greek citizens. As a result, there is a kind of convergence 
of common labor law with migration law, in a downward spiral (Kapsalis 2018a). 
As Kapsalis (2018a) states, it is of particular interest that in Greece, before the eco-
nomic crisis, a migrant labor law with residual labor protection features was estab-
lished, while during the Great Recession a corresponding residual labor protection 
framework was applied to native workers. Therefore, the labor protection both for 
native workers and MRAs has become a race to the bottom.
9.3.2  The National Legislation on Migrant Access to the Greek 
Labor Market
Since the beginning of the 1990s and the transformation of Greece from a sending 
to a receiving migration country, migration laws have clearly connected the stay of 
immigrants to their employment status and financial resources. In reality, the basic 
requirements for the legal residence of immigrants in Greece were, and remained so 
to a lesser extent, structured around the existence of a job, the filing of a formal 
employment contract, the compulsory presentation of a minimum number of social 
security (insurance) stamps7 per year and the obligation to have an annual mini-
mum income.
As mentioned above, the method of metaklissis, first introduced by Law 
1975/1991, remains one of the main paths for legal immigration in Greece, despite 
the fact that its previous application in the main sectors in which migrants are 
employed (construction, catering, small factories and retail services) proved rather 
unrealistic (Triandafyllidou 2014). In this procedure, there is a pre-approval of the 
entry of a foreign worker for a specific employer and for a specific type of work. 
Individual employment contracts are then concluded, with state control being 
exerted at all stages of their implementation. In the last quarter of each second year, 
the maximum number of dependent jobs allocated to Non-EU nationals per region 
and occupation is determined by the regional authorities. The same decision may 
provide for an increase in the maximum number of positions by up to 10% in order 
to cover unforeseen and emergency needs.
Given the difficulties for an effective application of the metaklissis scheme, in 
particular during the period of the economic recession, national legislation aimed at 
reducing the risk of increasing irregularity among migrants by increasing the valid-
ity of residence permits and reducing financial and duration of employment require-
ments for their renewal. In this respect, one of the most significant innovations of 
the 2014 Code (Law 4251/2014) was the abolition of the obligation to produce a 
written employment contract as a condition for renewal of a residence permit for the 
7 The completion of a minimum number of insurance stamps, through minimum working days per 
year, is a prerequisite for the renewal of a residence permit for employment purposes.
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purposes of paid employment. Thus, the reduced number of insurance stamps, the 
fulfilment of tax obligations and the existence of a valid health booklet are now the 
main requirements for the renewal of the residence permit related to employment. It 
is worth noting that, with the adoption of a Joint Ministerial Decision (51738/2014), 
the number of stamps needed for the renewal of legal residence becomes equal to 
the number of stamps required for the renewal of health insurance (50 stamps). 
These developments entail moving from a framework of work-centric immigration 
legislation to a framework geared towards maintaining legal residence due to the 
long-standing social ties immigrants may have developed (Kapsalis 2018a). This 
shift was due to the high unemployment rates, which meant that immigrants were 
unable to complete the minimum number of stamps per year and consequently, 
large groups of immigrant populations who have lived in the country for years 
would return, after many years, once again to an illegal residence status.
It is also worth noting that the Code regulates the situation of migrant investors 
wishing to settle in Greece. Thus, Article 16 states that Non-EU nationals are per-
mitted to enter and stay in Greece in order to make an investment that will have a 
positive impact on national growth and the economy. A prerequisite for allowing 
them to enter and reside in Greece is a motion from the Department of Intragroup 
Services and Direct Investments to the Ministry for Development and 
Competitiveness, which means that immigrants with a high financial standing 
(250,000 euros or more) have the opportunity to pursue professional activities in 
Greece as they are granted a 5-year residence permit.
In 2015 a new law sought improvements to issues related to the participation of 
migrants in the labor market. More than the amendments of the Code of Greek 
Citizenship and the Migration Code, the new Law (4332/2015) aimed at incorporat-
ing two EU directives into national legislation. Directive 2011/98/EU concerned the 
single application procedure for a single permit to stay and to work, already intro-
duced by previous national legislation (Law 3386/2005), to be issued to Non-EU 
nationals, and a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a 
Member State. It also incorporates Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry 
and residence of Non-EU nationals for seasonal work. The most relevant provisions 
of Law 4332/2015 are related to the equal treatment of migrant workers, holders of 
a single permit, and of seasonal workers with EU nationals. Thus (in Articles 21A 
and B), both categories of Non-EU workers are entitled to equal treatment with EU 
nationals as regards the terms of employment (including minimum working age, 
working conditions, working hours and leave and holidays), the right to strike and 
take industrial action, education and vocational training, as well as the recognition 
of diplomas, certificates and other professional qualifications.
In 2016 the Greek state issued the special Circular 27430/2016, which gives 
access to the labor market to those immigrants who find themselves in a situation 
between illegality and legality, known as ‘para-legality’ (Kapsalis 2018b). This 
intermediate category includes irregular immigrants whose order to leave the coun-
try was postponed for humanitarian reasons and so they were granted a special 
certificate to remain in the country for 6 months, without the right to access social 
integration programs, and which is renewable for 6  months. The status of 
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‘para-legality’ offers limited access to the labor market in specific sectors (such as 
agriculture, animal husbandry and domestic work) and geographical destinations 
(mainly rural areas).
9.3.3  National Legislation for the Participation of Asylum 
Seekers and Refugees in the Greek Labor Market
Aside from migrants, national legislation aims to regularize access to the labor mar-
ket for the beneficiaries of international protection and asylum seekers (along with 
holders of a residence permit for humanitarian reasons).
In particular, refugee legislation is based on the Geneva Convention (1951) and 
mainly on Articles 17, 18, 19 and 24, which refer to the social rights of recognized 
refugees to social security and employment. In Greek legislation those rights are 
currently extended to persons who have been granted residence on subsidiary pro-
tection grounds. A relevant special regulation for the access to the labor market of 
the two groups of beneficiaries of international protection is contained in Presidential 
Decree 141/2013. This Presidential Decree aims to incorporate Directive 2011/95/
EU into domestic law. Article 27 of the Presidential Decree (incorporating Article 
26 of the Community Directive) provides that beneficiaries of international protec-
tion are permitted to engage in employed or self-employed activity, in accordance 
with the provisions of Presidential Decree 189/1998 (A 140). This means that the 
beneficiaries of international protection must hold a permit to work, in the case of a 
salaried activity, or prove the existence of the necessary capital in the case of an 
independent economic activity.
Although Presidential Decree 141/2013 does not contain anything new regarding 
the preconditions for the access of the beneficiaries of international protection to the 
labor market, it provides clear improvements for other relevant issues. In particular, 
articles 27–31 foresee that persons who have been recognized as refugees or benefi-
ciaries of subsidiary protection can participate in employment-related adult educa-
tion programs, vocational training, including training courses for upgrading skills, 
workplace practice and counselling by employment services with the same condi-
tions applicable to Greek citizens. These articles also allow these groups to utilize 
the available procedures for the recognition of diplomas, certificates and other for-
mal qualifications as well as be assessed according to the same conditions as Greek 
citizens as regards the social security system, working conditions and health care. 
Nonetheless, despite the institutionalization of access to these benefits, policies and 
services for delivering these provisions have not yet been developed as public poli-
cies but take more the form of specific activities undertaken by NGOs (see 
Sect. 9.3.4).
The access of beneficiaries of international protection to the labor market was 
further facilitated by Law 4375/2016. This Law, which governs the current legisla-
tion on access to employment, is an adaptation of Greek Legislation to the 
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provisions of Directive 2013/32/EU. The most important change brought about by 
the law is the abolition of the requirement for the possession of a permit to work as 
a condition for participation in the labor market (Ministerial Circular 
17131/313/12-04-2016). Thus, beneficiaries of international protection and their 
families have the right to employment under the same conditions as nationals. The 
only condition for their participation in the labor market is the possession of the 
required residence permits. The Law also contains similar provisions (Article 69) as 
those of Presidential Decree 141/2013 on the same work conditions and access to 
services for beneficiaries of international protection and EU nationals. In practical 
terms, the labor rights and obligations of beneficiaries of international protection are 
defined by the same legal regime as for Greek workers. This arrangement concerns 
both the individuals themselves and the members of their families (Marouda and 
Sarandi 2017).
As for asylum seekers, Law 4375/2016 also facilitates their access to the labor 
market. As mentioned, the law abolishes the requirement for the possession of a 
permit in order to work, a provision foreseen by Presidential Decree 189/1998. 
Thus, according to article 71, asylum seekers have access to salaried employment 
and to the provision of services or work if they are in possession of the ‘interna-
tional protection applicant card’ or ‘asylum seeker’s card’. In practical terms, there 
is no time restriction from the moment that an application is submitted to when the 
applicant can access the labor market. A last important point is that, as regards free 
access to public health services and medical treatment for uninsured citizens and the 
vulnerable population (Joint Ministerial Decision 25132/4-4-2016), asylum seekers 
now have access to health services on the same terms as nationals.
Despite the formulation of an institutional framework that gives asylum seekers 
and beneficiaries of international protection access to the Greek labor market, the 
reality is that these people remain mostly in the camps, with only a minority living 
in housing structures (Niemann and Zaun 2017; The Greek Ombudsman 2017; 
Kourachanis 2018). Their integration into the Greek labor market is thus extremely 
difficult in practice. The development of mechanisms8 to diagnose labor market 
needs that are compatible with their professional skills and the formulation of 
coherent employment policies are key challenges for their integration into Greek 
society (Karandinos 2016; Koulocheris 2017). Applying such mechanisms to chan-
nel MRAs into the gaps found in the labor market may in the future be a viable 
solution for their integration into the labor market.
8 The Labor Market Needs Diagnosis Mechanism was set up by the Ministry of Labor, Social 
Solidarity in 2016, following the Action Plan adopted by the European Commission in 2015. It 
offers an extensive business network of stakeholders and social partners as well as a dedicated 
Information System. The National Institute of Labor and Human Resources (EIHRD) is responsi-
ble for presenting results, coordinating the network and managing the Information System.
9 Between Reception, Legal Stay and Integration in a Changing Migration Landscape…
184
9.3.4  Further Involvement of NGOs in Issues Related 
to the Integration of Refugees and Asylum Seekers  
into the Labor Market
The 2015 refugee crisis marked a kind of turning point in the role of Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) as service provider for refugees and asylum seekers in Greece 
(Bagavos et al. 2019). First, the institutional involvement of NGOs is foreseen by 
recent asylum legislation (Law 4375/2016). In particular, if a Regional Asylum 
Office, Reception and Identification Centre, Temporary Reception Structure or 
Temporary Accommodation Structure has problems in operating smoothly, the pro-
cessing of some tasks can be entrusted for a set period of time to civil society actors 
that meet the appropriate standards of quality and safety and have received the nec-
essary permission. Exceptions to this option include those tasks that involve the 
exercise of public authority, such as the issuance of administrative acts, the exami-
nation of applications for international protection, the conduct of interviews and 
providing applicants with travel or identity documents.
Second, CSOs and NGOs in particular have undertaken a large spectrum of 
activities related to humanitarian aid, human rights, human trafficking, legal and 
administrative assistance, advocacy work, accommodation and housing, dissemina-
tion and information, socio-economic integration and culture. In practice, CSOs 
especially are attempting to manage the governmental gap of a migration policy 
designed with the integration of MRAs in mind. In this context NGOs in particular 
have been overseeing a majority of services, such as the provision of language 
courses, skills development training, and employability programs which aim to help 
integrate refugees and asylum seekers into the labor market. The focus is mainly on 
job searching techniques and curriculum vitae improvements rather than actually 
finding job positions for the persons concerned.
Empirical findings based on the opinions of refugees and asylum seekers them-
selves (Bagavos et al. 2019) seem to indicate that although CSOs have made an 
extremely significant contribution to humanitarian aid, legal and administrative 
assistance, the protection of human rights and the dissemination of information, 
they did not appear to be as successful in meeting refugees’ and asylum seekers 
needs’ in terms of their integration into the labor market. This was for a variety of 
reasons, such as: there were no expected results from the services provided; the 
actions did not have a follow-up; fragmented funding meant that services were pro-
vided for a limited period of time; or because CSOs and NGOs in particular were 
being asked to fill the gap created by the inability of public actors, supported by the 
public administration, to provide a clear integration policy. It is also probably related 
to the fact that, in some cases, refugees and asylum seekers perceive CSOs and 
NGOs as employment services providers that therefore have expectations that ulti-
mately are not met.
It is, however, worth noting that although NGOs are key actors in the provision 
of employability services, public authorities have recently attempted to take a much 
more active role in this area. The trend towards the greater involvement of public 
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authorities in the socio-economic integration of MRAs is reflected in the skills rec-
ognition activities. In that respect, perhaps the most typical example is the European 
Qualifications Passport for Refugees,9 which assesses refugees’ education level, 
work experience and language proficiency in the absence of full documentation, by 
using a tested methodology and a structured interview. This was started in 2017 as 
a pilot project under the responsibility of the Council of Europe and involves several 
national and international actors, in particular the Greek Ministry of Education, 
Research and Religious Affairs. At the same time, the initiative of the Athens 
Coordination Centre for Migrants and Refugee10 Issues, where someone can attend 
job counseling sessions as well as other services, such as Greek and English lan-
guage courses, must be seen as a sign of the further involvement of the public 
authorities in the social integration of MRAs.
9.3.5  Anti-discrimination Legislation and Legal Instruments 
to Fight Informal Employment and the Exploitation 
of Workers
The fight against discrimination is another dimension that can facilitate MRAs’ 
access to the labor market. This is foreseen in Law 4443/2016 (Article 14), which 
aims to promote the principle of equal treatment and anti-discrimination: (a) on 
grounds of race, color, national or ethnic origin and generations; (b) religious or 
other beliefs, disability or chronic illness, age, or social status, sexual orientation, 
gender identity or gender in the field of employment and work; and (c) on the exer-
cise of workers’ rights in the context of the free movement of labor.
Under the 2016 law, the principle of equal treatment concerns: (a) conditions of 
access to employment and in the area of employment in general; (b) access to all 
types and levels of vocational guidance, apprenticeship, vocational training, retrain-
ing and vocational retraining, including the acquisition of practical professional 
experience; (c) working and employment conditions, in particular with regard to 
remuneration, dismissal, health and safety at work and, in the event of unemploy-
ment, reintegration and rehabilitation, as well as re-employment; and (d) member-
ship of and participation in a workers’ or employers’ trade union or in any 
professional organization.
Over the recent period, the Greek state was more actively involved in the fight 
against undeclared work, an issue of significant importance for the country’s labor 
market (ILO 2016; The Greek Ombudsman 2016). Specifically, according to the 
unpublished report regarding the plan ‘Artemis’, the percentage of undeclared work 
9 https://blog.refugee.info/european-qualifications-passport/
10 https://www.accmr.gr/en/
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decreased from 19.2% in 2014 to 9% in 2018.11 The introduction of the method of 
payment and the retention of insurance contributions on the basis of the ergossimo 
was introduced, as a measure against undeclared work, for the first time in Greek 
legislation with Law 3863/2010. This is a kind of a special pay cheque for workers 
doing non-fixed or casual work (a form of employment in which the worker is not 
entitled to the regular provision of work) with one or more employers. The ergos-
simo does not focus on businesses or individual employers, but on workers, in par-
ticular those in specific disciplines, occupations or jobs (such as domestic workers, 
construction workers and agricultural workers). Consequently, it is a means of com-
bating undeclared work, in particular tax evasion, and it is as such that it has been 
classified in the Greek legal order. It mainly concerns providers of services to 
households, such as domestic workers, (Kapsalis 2015). Several modifying inter-
ventions for the measure regarding were made in the following years. These amend-
ments are mainly related to procedures for extending the measure of ergossimo to 
other sectors of employment as well as the procedures for monitoring its implemen-
tation. It is also worth noting that Article 2 of Law 4225/2014 attempts to include 
ergossimo in the labor inspections carried out by IKA (Social Insurance Institute). 
A large proportion of recipients who were targeted by this measure were immi-
grants, both domestic and farm workers. This is a positive measure that can lead to 
a greater reduction of undeclared work.
Lastly, in 2012, the Greek state incorporated EU Directive 2009/52/EU with Law 
4052/2012. This Directive imposes minimum standards for the sanctions and mea-
sures against employers who illegally employ third-country nationals. The aim is to 
combat illegal immigration by preventing the illegal employment of migrants with-
out residence permits in the Member States of the European Union. In Greek law 
this is reflected in Article 79 of the relevant law, which explicitly mentions the ban 
on the employment of illegally resident third-country nationals and in Article 80 
which details the obligations of employers. These provisions set the framework for 
the application of labor protection measures.
9.4  Conclusion
There can be no doubt that migration remains one of the most significant socio- 
economic issues for Europe – and Greece in particular. After the transformation of 
Greece from a sending to a receiving country, which resulted in the entry of a large 
number of economic migrants, the recent refugee crisis has modified the features of 
the migrant population. At the same time, contextual factors and changes in the 
economic environment over time have had a significant impact on the framing and 
implementation of policies on the legal status of MRAs, i.e. the first step towards 
11 Indicatively see https://www.efsyn.gr/oikonomia/elliniki-oikonomia/183580_meiosi-tis-adilotis- 
ergasias-sto-894-2018
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their socio-economic integration into the host society. Indeed, the legal stay of 
migrants and the availability of reception facilities for refugees and asylum seekers 
have been two significant issues as regards implementation of the policy. In this 
respect, immigration policy has undoubtedly contributed to simplifying and better 
managing the procedures for residence permits by reducing the risks of irregularity 
for a significant number of migrants. This is in the context of the persistent eco-
nomic recession. In reality, since 2014, there has been a shift in Greek immigration 
law, which now aims to reduce the employment requirements that immigrants must 
fulfil for their residence permits to be renewed. There is no doubt that removing 
those requirements, in the context of a significant increase in unemployment, has 
enabled their further integration into the labor market.
Nevertheless, despite the great efforts made, both policies and public administra-
tion fail to fully address the challenges presented for the effective reception of refu-
gees, which is a determinant preliminary stage for their future integration into the 
labor market. Developments in the legislative framework have led to a clear division 
between reception and asylum procedures for those entering the country before and 
after 20 March 2016 – the cut-off date established by the EU-Turkey Statement – 
and consequently for those staying on the mainland or on the islands. Although the 
government addressed the challenge of enabling people who were transferring to 
and living in temporary accommodation facilities on mainland Greece to access the 
asylum process in a fairly satisfactory way by accelerating the procedure for issuing 
decisions on claims for international protection, it failed to provide means to rapidly 
evaluate the asylum applications of those who crossed the sea borders after 20 
March and were being held in the hotspots for readmission to Turkey. Consequently, 
the hotspots were overcrowded and reception conditions were poor in sanitation and 
hygiene, while access to health care was limited. In such a context, the hope for 
integration into the labor market sounds fanciful.
The economic downturn and subsequent austerity measures were and remain 
important barriers for the integration of MRAs into the labor market. High unem-
ployment rates among the overall population make targeted job creation for MRAs 
even more daunting since priority is given mainly to the fight against overall unem-
ployment. Additionally, because of the economic downturn and decreasing house-
hold incomes, migrants’ reduced employment in sectors such as construction, retail, 
cleaning, private care and domestic services has resulted in a challenging and unfa-
vorable environment for the participation of MRAs in the labor market. In reality, 
given that third-country nationals are mostly low-skilled workers who are employed 
in low-skilled jobs, they remain extremely vulnerable to unfavorable economic con-
ditions. This environment is likely to be more gloomy for refugees and asylum seek-
ers than for migrants who are in a better position to secure a long legal stay, given 
the existence of informal ethnic networks among them, their knowledge of the 
Greek language and familiarization with the State administration. In other words, 
the factors enabling their integration into the labor market. Consequently, it is likely 
that MRAs’ integration into the labor market will be further connected to an ethnic 
dimension; for example, migrant groups such Albanians and Pakistanis entering 
Greece in the first period of its transformation from a sending to a receiving country, 
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are more likely to be better integrated in the labor market than the recent refugee 
streams from Afghanistan and Syria.
In practice, the framing and implementation of policies fail to deal with the bar-
riers in place, such as the inability to transfer skills and credentials to a European 
context, the precarious legal status, limited education and language skills and lim-
ited work experience that immigrants are most of the time confronted with when 
they seek stable jobs in the European receiving countries. Those barriers are even 
more significant in Greece which is characterized by the polarization and fragmen-
tation of policies aiming to facilitate the access of MRAs into the labor market and 
the limited involvement of the Public Employment Services in the labor market 
integration of MRAs. Barriers are also related to the features of the Greek labor 
market itself. Third-country nationals, particularly those who have resided in Greece 
for only a short time, are mostly pushed into the underground economy and unde-
clared work, an issue relevant in the context of adverse economic conditions. 
Despite the intensification of labor inspections, there has been no sign of improve-
ment up to now (2020), mainly because of the non-systematic application of those 
inspections as well as common views among many people, who very often consider 
undeclared employment as something legitimate. Thus, migrants are trapped in low 
wage and low-skilled occupations, very often in the informal sector with no labor 
rights, without social insurance and with limited opportunities for any improvement 
in their socio-economic status. Although sectors such as catering, tourism and agri-
culture, which have experienced continuous growth in recent years, offer increasing 
opportunities to migrants for entering the labor market, those sectors are character-
ized by flexibility, irregularity, discrimination and undeclared work.
In addition, given the persistent economic recession in Greece and the lack of job 
search assistance programmes, the integration of MRAs, in particular refugees and 
asylum seekers, is hindered by the fact that they most likely desire relocation to 
another European country and are unwilling to be fully integrated into the labor 
market of a country which is seen more as a transit than a settlement country. It is 
worth noting that, according to empirical findings on the aspirations of young Syrian 
refugees, 74% of them intended to remain in the UK, compared to just 12% and 
39% in Greece and Lebanon respectively (Karyotis et al. 2018). In addition, three 
out of four young Syrians in Greece aimed to reach another European country 
whereas the same ambition was expressed only by 13% and less than 2% of those 
living in Lebanon and the UK respectively. There is no doubt that this aspect acts as 
an important barrier for access and integration into the labor market of the newly- 
arrived refugees and asylum seekers in Greece.
The limited role played by the public authorities as a provider of services such as 
language courses, employability services and skills development training must be 
seen as significant barriers for the integration of MRAs into the labor market. 
Although NGOs have significantly contributed in these areas, public authorities 
have still not implemented many monitoring and validation processes, such as vali-
dation of the level of language knowledge or validation of skills. In general, despite 
the recent trend for the further involvement of the public authorities in the integra-
tion of MRAs into the labor market, the current increase in refugee flows risks 
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diverting the attention of public actors to issues relating to the reception rather than 
to the integration of MRAs.
It is evident that the integration of refugees and asylum seekers will be a signifi-
cant issue in the years to come. The management of the increased refugee flows of 
the last 5 years is being performed within a more protected humanitarian frame-
work, while the labor integration of asylum seekers and refugees is still governed by 
a residual framework. To date, targeted employment policies have still not been 
designed. The consequence of this situation for asylum seekers and refugees may be 
the resumption of the labor integration paths followed by immigrants in the 1990s 
and 2000s, when there were high rates of undeclared work and any form of unfavor-
able employment was accepted in order to survive.
References
AIDA (Asylum Information Database). (2017). Country Report: Greece-2016 update. http://www.
asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece
AIDA (Asylum Information Database). (2019). Country Report: Greece-2018 update. http://www.
asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece
AIRE (Advice on Individual Rights in Europe), ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles). 
(2016). With Greece. Recommendations for refugee protection. Report on Greece. http://www.
asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/with_greece.pdf
Amnesty International. (2017). Greece: A blue print for despair. Human rights impact of the EU-Turkey 
deal. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR2556642017ENGLISH.PDF
Bagavos, C. (2015). Chapter 11: International migration: The transformation of Greece from send-
ing to receiving country. In A. Tragaki, C. Bagavos, & D. Ntounas (Eds.), On demography 
and population changes. e-book. https://repository.kallipos.gr/handle/11419/4670 (in Greek).
Bagavos, C., Xatzigiannakou, K., & Kourachanis, N. (2019). Civil society barriers and enablers – 
Report on Greece. Report prepared for the SIRIUS research. https://www.sirius- project.eu/
Cavounidis, J. (2015). The changing face of emigration: Harnessing the potential of the new Greek 
diaspora. Report prepared for the Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
research/changing- face- emigration- harnessing- potential- new- greek- diaspora
Council of Europe. (1950). Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental free-
doms as amended by protocols No. 11 and No. 14 (European Treaty Series – No. 5). https://
rm.coe.int/1680063765
ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles). (2016). Successful completion of pre- 
registration of asylum seekers in Greece – More needed to meet long term concerns. News. 
https://www.ecre.org/successful- completion- of- pre- registration- in- greece- more- needed- to- 
meet- long- term- concerns/
ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles), GCR (Greek Council for Refugees), et  al. 
(2016). The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece – A study. https://www.ecre.
org/wp- content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS- Report- 5.12.2016.pdf
EL.STAT. (Hellenic Statistical Authority). (2019a). Estimations of emigrants by age group and sex. 
http://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/- /publication/SPO15/- . Accessed 21 June 2019.
EL.STAT. (Hellenic Statistical Authority). (2019b). Population estimates by age group, sex 
and broad group of citizenship. http://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/- /publication/SPO18/- . 
Accessed 21 June 2019.
EMN (European Migration Network). (2015). Annual policy report 2015 – Annual report 2015 on 
Asylum and migration – Part 2. https://ec.europa.eu/home- affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what- 
we- do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/annual- policy/annual- policy- 12a_
greece_apr_part2_english.pdf
9 Between Reception, Legal Stay and Integration in a Changing Migration Landscape…
190
European Commission. (2017). Seventh report on the Progress made in the implementation of 
the EU-Turkey. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 
Brussels, 6.9.2017, COM(2017) 470 final. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood- enlargement/
sites/near/files/20170906_seventh_report_on_the_progress_in_the_implementation_of_the_
eu- turkey_statement_en.pdf
GCR (Greek Council for Refugees). (2016). Remarks by the Greek Council on Refugees on Law 
4375/2016. http://www.gcr.gr/index.php/el/news/press- releases- announcements/item/551- oi- 
paratiriseis- tou- esp- epi- tou- nomou- 4375- 2016. (in Greek).
Greek Parliament. (2014). Explanatory report on the draft law on Ratification of immigra-
tion and social integration code. http://www.parliament.gr/UserFiles/2f026f42- 950c- 4efc- 
b950- 340c4fb76a24/k- koinent- eis.pdf. (in Greek).
Greek Parliament. (2016). Explanatory report to Law 4375/2016. http://goo.gl/RGbrKD. (in Greek).
Hassiotis, I. K. (1993). Historical overview of the Greek diaspora. Thessaloniki: Vanias. (in Greek).
ILO (International Labour Organization). (2016). Diagnostic report on undeclared work in 
Greece. Geneva: International Labour Organization. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/%2D%2D- ed_emp/documents/projectdocumentation/wcms_531548.pdf
Kapsalis, A. (2015). Undeclared work in Greece. Assessment of modern anti-fighting measures, 
stay of immigrants stay of immigrants. Athens: Labour Institute of GSEE (Greek General 
Confederation of Labour), Study No 43. https://www.inegsee.gr/wp- content/uploads/2015/06/
Meleti- 43- INE.pdf. (in Greek).
Kapsalis, A. (2018a). Migrant workers in Greece. Industrial relations and migration policy in 
times of memorandums. Athens: Topos. (in Greek).
Kapsalis, A. (2018b). The development of Greek migration policy and the invention of “Para- 
legality” in labour relations of immigrants. Koinoniki Politiki/Social Policy, 9, 67–87.
Karandinos, D. (2016). Labour market integration of asylum seekers and refugees-Greece. Report 





Karyotis, G., Colburn, B., Doyle, L., Hermannsson, K., Mulvey, G., & Skleparis, D. (2018). 
Building a new life in Britain: The skills, experiences and aspirations of young Syrian refugees 
(Building Futures Policy Report No 1). Glasgow: Policy Scotland. http://www.RefugeePolitics.
net and www.PolicyScotland.gla.ac.uk.
Koulocheris, S. (2017). Integration of refugees in Greece, Hungary and Italy. Annex 1: Country 
case study Greece. Report prepared for the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/614194/
IPOL_STU%282017%29614194%28ANN01%29_EN.pdf
Kourachanis, N. (2018). Asylum seekers, hotspot approach and anti-social policy responses 
in Greece (2015–2017). Journal of International Migration and Integration. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s12134- 018- 0592- y.
Kouzis, I. (2016). Crisis and memorandums deconstruct the employment. Koinoniki Politiki/Social 
Policy, 6, 7–20. (in Greek).
Labrianidis, L., & Pratsinakis, M. (2016). Greece’s new emigration at times of crisis (GreeSE 
Paper no. 99). Hellenic Observatory on Greece and Southeast Europe, LSE. http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/66811/1/GreeSE- No.99.pdf
Lazaretou, S. (2016). Fleeing of human capital: Recent trends in migration of Greeks over the 
years of the crisis. Bank of Greece, Bulletin of Economics, 43, 33–58. (in Greek). http://www.
bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/oikodelt201607.pdf.
Marouda, Μ. Ν., & Sarandi, V. (2017). Refugee law. Interpretation, charts, patterns. Athens: 
Nomiki Vivliothiki. (in Greek).
C. Bagavos et al.
191
Ministry for Migration Policy. (2018). National Register of Greek and Foreign Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) dealing with international protection, migration and social integration 
issues. https://mko.ypes.gr/home_in_mitroo_report
Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, UNHCR and ESPO. (2016a). What is pre- 
registration? Information Poster. http://asylo.gov.gr/wp- content/uploads/2016/06/W001- 2- 
What- is- Pre- Registration- Poster.pdf
Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, UNHCR and ESPO. (2016b). End of large scale 
pre-registration on mainland Greece Joint Press Release. http://asylo.gov.gr/en/wp- content/
uploads/2016/08/EN- 01.08.2016- Press- Release- end- pre- registration.pdf
Ministry of Migration Policy. (2018a). 2 Years since the Common Statement between 
European Union and Turkey, March 2016–March 2018. http://asylo.gov.gr/en/wp- content/
uploads/2018/03/EU- Turkey- Common- Statement- 2- years_EN.pdf
Ministry of Migration Policy. (2018b). The work of the asylum service in 2017. Press Release 
25.01.2018. http://asylo.gov.gr/en/wp- content/uploads/2018/01/Press- Release- 25.1.2018.pdf
NCHR (National Commission for Human Rights). (2017). Annual report 2016. http://www.nchr.
gr/images/ekthesi2016.pdf
Niemann, A., & Zaun, N. (2017). EU refugee policies and politics in times of crisis: Theoretical 
and empirical perspectives. Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(1), 3–22.
Spirou, C. (2017). Exceptional reasons: Restoring legality and the notion of ties with the country. 
Problems in the correct application of Law 4251/2014 and Law 4332/2015. Paper presented 
at the 7th legal conference of Association of Trainees and New Lawyers “Modern Issues of 
Immigration Law: Immigration  – Citizenship  – Refugee”, Patras, 10–12 November 2017. 
http://www.eanda.gr/sites/default/files/%20%CE%A7%CE%A1%CE%97%CE%A3%CE%A
4%CE%9F%CE%A5%20%CE%A3%CE%A0%CE%A5%CE%A1%CE%9F%CE%A5.pdf
Spyropoulou, A., & Christopoulos, D. (2016). Refugees: “will we make it”? A management 
account and recommendations for a way out. Athens: Papazisi. (in Greek).
The Greek Ombudsman. (2013). Comments on the Draft Law on Ratification of immigration and 
social integration code. https://www.synigoros.gr/resources/paratiriseissxedionomou.pdf. 
(in Greek).
The Greek Ombudsman. (2015). Annual report. http://docplayer.gr/38967035- Synigoros- toy- 
politi- etisia- ekthesi.html. (in Greek).
The Greek Ombudsman. (2016). Combating discrimination-Special report. https://www.synig-
oros.gr/resources/docs/ee2016- 14- diakriseis.pdf. (in Greek).
The Greek Ombudsman. (2017). Migration flows and refugee protection Administrative chal-
lenges and human rights issues. https://www.synigoros.gr/?i=human- rights.en.recentinterven-
tions.434107
Triandafyllidou, A. (2014). Migration in Greece: Recent developments in 2014. Report prepared 
for the OECD Network of International Migration Experts. http://www.eliamep.gr/wp- content/
uploads/2014/10/Migration- in- Greece- Recent- Developments- 2014_2.pdf
Triandafyllidou, A. (2015). Migration in Greece: Recent developments in 2015. Report prepared 
for the OECD Network of International Migration Experts. http://www.eliamep.gr/wp- content/
uploads/2014/10/2015.pdf
Triandafyllidou, A., & Gemi, E. (2018). Migration in Greece: Recent developments in 2018. Report 
prepared for the OECD Network of International Migration Experts. https://www.eliamep.gr/
wp- content/uploads/2017/11/Greece- report- for- OECD_Triandafyllidou- Gemi_Nov2018.pdf
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2019). Mediterranean situation – 
Operational portal refugee situations. Accessed 21 June 2019.
Xypolytas, N. (2017). Preparation, allocation, habituation: The holistic approach to migrant exclu-
sion. Social Cohesion and Development, 12(1), 57–71.
9 Between Reception, Legal Stay and Integration in a Changing Migration Landscape…
192
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
C. Bagavos et al.
193© The Author(s) 2021
V. Federico, S. Baglioni (eds.), Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ 
Integration in European Labour Markets, IMISCOE Research Series, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67284-3_10
Chapter 10
The Labour Market Needs Them, 
But We Don’t Want Them to Stay 
for Good: The Conundrum of Migrants, 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ Integration 
in Italy
William Chiaromonte and Veronica Federico
10.1  Discussing Migration in a Challenging Economic 
and Political Landscape
Over the past 5 years, migration flows have become crucial to alleviate but not com-
pletely counter- balance the overall negative demographic balance in Italy. In 2019, 
according to the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), the resident population 
totalled 60,391,000, while the foreign resident population counted 5,234,000 indi-
viduals, representing 8.7% of the total population. In 2018, nationals have decreased 
3.3%, whereas the foreign resident population has increased 17.4%. Moreover, 
Eurostat confirms that while the Italian population is on average elderly, the foreign 
population is quite young (the average age is under 34), which means a strong net 
contribution to the available workforce.
Much has changed in the demography of the country over the last three decades. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the foreign population totalled less than one million. 
In 2019 it is five times more, representing a rise of 405%. From a country of emigra-
tion, with the Italian diaspora present in almost every country in the world, Italy has 
become a country of immigration. This transformation has been relatively abrupt; 
social, cultural, political, economic and legal categories have struggled to keep pace 
with the demography. There are critical consequences to this underlying and prob-
lematic lack of syntony, which leads to a constant mismatch between (i) social and 
This study is the product of common research and long discussions on problems and perspectives 
of MRA’s integration in the complex and fragmented Italian labour market. Nonetheless, 
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economic needs and the legal and administrative instruments to address them; (ii) 
new cultural perspectives and the public discourse and media frames that should 
represent and voice those perspectives; (iii) migration numbers and political dis-
courses about them. This chapter discusses how such disparities also permeate the 
field of labour market integration.
A brief recap of the data on migration and the Italian labour market helps to 
contextualise the discussion: among the foreign population resident in Italy, EU 
migrants represent a little more than 30%. The most numerous non- EU nationalities 
resident in Italy come from Morocco, Albania, China, Ukraine and the Philippines. 
Over the last decade, the general trend of the legal reason for acquiring the resi-
dence permit has been shifting. Residence permits issued for reasons of work repre-
sented almost 50% of the total permits released in 2011, but they have decreased 
consistently every year, under pressure inter alia of the economic crisis. In 2019 
(last available data), rates dropped to little more than 6%. On the contrary, residence 
permits for asylum or humanitarian reasons have significantly increased, peaking in 
2017 (more than 28%) and beginning to decrease in 2018 (26.7%). Nonetheless, the 
main channel for obtaining the resience permit is represented by family reunifica-
tion, which consistently represents between 40% and 45% of permits granted 
between 2011 and 2017, and reaches more than 50% in 2018.
These data suggest the migration challenge currently faced by Italy is not neces-
sarily a stand- alone state of affairs. The growing presence of foreign populations is 
more related to a slow process of stabilisation of the migratory phenomena over the 
recent two decades, rather than current international conflicts or crises. It should 
therefore be managed in such terms.
Similar to other European countries, migration trends and developments have 
been influenced by the geographical, economic, political and sociocultural pecu-
liarities of the Italian context in many regards. The geographical position of the 
Italian peninsula in close proximity to north African coasts plays a significant role. 
The relevance of the Italian geographical element juxtaposes with some peculiar 
economic traits. In particular, research emphasizes the link between immigration 
and the extended informal sector of the country and those of other southern European 
states (Testaì 2015; Ambrosini 2013). However, the formal sector, with its unmet 
labour demand, also contributes to attracting foreign workers. Thus, it is not a coin-
cidence that the majority of foreign workers are concentrated in the highly- -
industrialized and developed northern regions, while only a small quota, mainly 
seasonal workers, reside in the less- developed and more agriculture- dependant 
southern regions. Interestingly, foreign workers’ participation in Italian economic 
life remained high even after the economic crisis of 2008. Indeed, it has been shown 
(Ambrosini and Panichella 2016; Sciarra and Chiaromonte 2014) that the crisis had 
a lower impact on foreigners’ employment rate compared to the employment rate of 
nationals, except for the sector of manufacturing and construction – even though it 
should be noted that the crisis enhanced the structural problems of the Italian labour 
market, such as segmentation, disparities and pay gaps. Moreover, it is important to 
point out that: “foreign workers are strongly labour- oriented, so that the phenome-
non of the so- called ‘disheartenment’, that is giving up the search for employment, 
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is very uncommon. In fact, unemployed foreigners can be constrained to accept the 
first job they find, under the pressure to maintain themselves and their families and/
or renovate the residence permit” (Italian Ministry of Labour 2017: 41).
It is against this background that the Italian political discourse began to focus on 
immigration from the early 1990s, when the number of non- EU newcomers to the 
country started to increase, which is quite late in comparison with other European 
countries. Nonetheless, the Italian political discourse caught up with the overall 
European political trend: it was influenced by significant anti- immigrant narratives, 
particularly during the pre- electoral periods (Korkut et al. 2013). Under the slogan 
“Italians First” and the creation of a dangerous equation between immigrants and 
criminals, echoed by the mainstream media, demands to close borders and progres-
sively reduce migrants’ rights have permeated the political arena. Consequently, the 
politicization of migration featured in all recent national (2008, 2013 and 2018) and 
European (2009, 2014 and 2019) elections (Cavallaro et al. 2018).
Overall, the increasingly strident political discourse, together with the negative 
media representation of migration, have contributed to a deterioration of the Italian 
attitude toward migrants (Diamanti 2016). Furthermore, scapegoating the “other” 
for threatening Italian cultural identity, along with Italian social welfare, security 
and economic stability, has found a fertile terrain in the limited sense of nationhood 
and belonging that traditionally characterise Italian citizens (Triandafyllidou and 
Ambrosini 2011). Further, the economic crisis has exacerbated competition for 
resources, so that “Italians First” slogans have made sense for a growing number of 
voters (Cavallaro et al. 2018).
Despite this opposing trend, the labour market does need foreign workers and 
entire economic sectors are heavily dependant on foreign workforce; foreigners also 
fill societal gaps, first and foremost in the care of children, the elderly and people 
with disabilities. Moreover, the practical management of migration displays exam-
ples of openness and solidarity. Indeed, the migration crisis has shed new light on 
the long- standing tradition of volunteerism in Italy, fed by a curious interplay 
between the Catholic Church, trade unions and others secular associations of the left 
matrix (Ambrosini 2018).
The chapter goes on to discusses the Italian legal framework governing foreign 
workers’ integration into the labour market, workers’ rights and guarantees, the 
enforcement of a complex web of norms and regulations, and finally how the imple-
mentation of the legal framework is in tension with the basic principles that ground 
the Italian legal system.
10 The Labour Market Needs Them, But We Don’t Want Them to Stay for Good…
196
10.2  Labour, Workers’ Rights and the Constitution: 
The Basic Principles
Historically, Italy has been primarily a country of emigration; this is reflected in the 
Italian Constitution of 1948, which recognizes the freedom to emigrate (art. 35(4)) 
and proclaims the freedom to “leave the territory of the Republic and return to it 
except for obligations defined by law” (art. 16(2)). At the same time, only few and 
generic provisions have been devoted to the right of asylum and the legal status of 
foreigners,1 and little is stated concerning foreigners’ rights. This constitutional gap 
has been filled over the years by ordinary legislation and the Courts’ intervention.
If the Constitution is concise on foreigners’ rights, it is more vocal on the value 
of labour, labour relations and workers’ rights. In fact, the constitutional enforce-
ment of the right to work has strongly influenced labour law and its developments 
(Gaeta 2014) by providing the institutional foundations and reference values of the 
Italian social market economy, where economic efficiency and social cohesion 
should coexist. Social rights, recognized in the Constitution alongside civil and 
political rights, play a fundamental role in enforcing labour- related rights. Social 
rights are concerned with protection against the material conditions of deprivation 
that might prevent the individual from meeting his/her fundamental needs. To be 
fully enforced, social rights require either the provision of public services, delivered 
by the state or any other public authority (e.g. the right to education, art. 34 Const.), 
or the regulation of contractual relationships, as is the case with employment rela-
tionships (e.g. the right to a decent wage, art. 36 Const.).
The fundamental principles concerning labour laid down in the Constitution are 
basically all found in the first articles of the Charter. Art. 1.1 affirms that the Republic 
1 Art. 10 states that “(2) legal regulation of the status of foreigners conforms to international rules 
and treaties; [and] (3) foreigners who are, in their own country, denied the actual exercise of the 
democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian constitution, are entitled to the right to asylum 
under those conditions provided by law.” Other pivotal constitutional provisions, nonetheless, con-
tribute enhancing the national standards of foreigners’ rights. In particular, art. 117, through which 
the EU legislation and international treaties signed by Italy acquire “constitutional relevance”; the 
“personalist principle” of art. 2, according to which “the Republic recognizes and guarantees the 
inviolable human rights, be it as an individual or in social groups expressing their personality, and 
it ensures the performance of the unalterable duty to political, economic, and social solidarity”, 
and the equality clause of art. 3 that forbids unfair discrimination and entrenches substantial equal-
ity. And indeed, international conventions and jurisprudence (especially the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) and the principle of non- discrimination proclaimed by art. 14 ECHR), 
equality and the personalist principle have been frequently invoked by the Italian Constitutional 
Court to secure and extend the fundamental rights of foreigners (Corsi 2014, 2018; Carrozza 2016; 
Biondi Dal Monte 2013; Chiaromonte 2008). In particular, in several decisions the Constitutional 
Court affirmed that limiting the access to social benefits aimed to satisfy human basic needs only 
to foreigners with an EC residence permit for long- residents entails an “unreasonable discrimina-
tion” between Italian citizens and foreigners regularly residing in Italy. See, amongst the others, 
the decision of the Constitutional Court No. 187/2010, in which the Court also makes explicit 
reference to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights Gaygusuz v. Austria 16.9.96 and 
Niedzwieck v. Germania 25.10.05
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is “founded on labour”, recognizing the historical value of labour as a cornerstone 
of the state, together with the democratic principle (“sovereignty belongs to the 
people”, art. 1.2 Const). Art.s 2 and 3 recognise and guarantee “inviolable human 
rights, be it as an individual or in social groups expressing their personality”, and 
equality in its broad meaning of formal and substantial equality. Art. 4.1 recognises 
the right to work for all citizens, establishing the duty of the state to promote condi-
tions enforcing the right to work and to pursue policies aiming to achieve full 
employment. The Constitution commits the state to ensuring its citizens the right to 
work primarily through the promotion of full employment; thus, with regard to 
access to work, citizens take priority over foreigners. The guarantee of the foreign-
er’s rights, here, is therefore limited by the privileged status of the citizen.2 Art. 4 
provides the legal basis for restrictions on the entry of foreign workers in order to 
protect Italian nationals and the regular functioning of the domestic labour market. 
The Constitutional Court – which in fact has occasionally intervened on this topic – 
has supported this reasoning, assuming that it is reasonable to subordinate foreign-
ers’ access to employment to the prior recognition of the unavailability of national 
workforce (decision No. 144/1970 e 54/1979).
Even though the Constitutional Court has often ruled that, despite art. 3 making 
reference to citizens only, when the respect of fundamental rights is at stake the 
principle of equality also applies to foreigners,3 the Court’s argument is more com-
plex than a simple equalization between citizens and foreigners. It instead ascertains 
the difference between citizens and foreigners: while citizens have an “original” 
relation with the state, foreigners have a non- original and often temporary relation-
ship. Hence, the different legal status of foreigners may justify a different legal 
treatment (decision No. 104/1969) with regard to security, public health, public 
order, international treaties and national policy on migration (decision No. 62/1994), 
but not with regard to the protection of inviolable rights (decision No. 249/2010) 
since they belong “to individuals not as members of a political community but as 
human beings as such”.4
Following the same reasoning, a Constitutional Court’s consolidated case- law 
maintained foreigners’ full entitlement to social rights, such as the right to health 
and healthcare services (decision No. 269/2010) and to “essential social benefits”, 
such as invalidity benefits for mobility, blindness and deafness regardless of the 
length of the foreigner’s residence. In particular, the Court clarified that specific 
social benefits that constitute “a remedy to satisfy the primary needs for the protec-
tion of the human person”, have to be considered “fundamental rights because they 
represent a guarantee for the person’s survival”.5 The same argument, coupled with 
2 Here, reference is made to foreigner’s access to employment in the private sector, since access to 
employment in the public sector is regulated by specific provisions, which however do not fall 
within the scope of this study.
3 See the following decisions of the Constitutional Court: No. 120/67; No. 104/1969; No. 46/1997.
4 Among the others see Constitutional Court, decision No. 105/2001, No. 249/2010.
5 Constitutional Court, decision No. 187/2010. See also Constitutional Court No. 329/2011; No. 
40/2013, No. 22/2015 and No. 230/2015.
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the anti- discrimination principle, permitted the Court to extend some guarantees 
and (social) rights to undocumented migrants as well.
Alongside these fundamental principles, Title III of the Constitution devotes few 
articles to economic relations, establishing a rather conspicuous corpus of constitu-
tional principles that labour law and labour policies must respect and enforce. These 
principles are crucial for the definition of foreign workforce rights and entitlements. 
First, citizens’ priority over foreign workers when it comes to accessing work may 
be at odds with the provisions of art. 35, according to which the Republic “protects 
labour in all its forms” without any limitation. This means that, once the foreigner 
is authorised to work in Italy, the protection of labour “in all its forms” – including 
precarious or unstable employment – applies  regardless of the nationality of the 
workers, as the Constitutional Court has emphasised (decision No. 454/1998). 
Therefore, Italian and foreign workers enjoy full equality of treatment (see art. 2.3, 
of the Consolidated Law on Immigration, Legislative Decree No. 286/1998). The 
principle of equal treatment has a very wide scope, covering the internal aspects of 
the employment activity and relationship, as well as all the additional advantages 
resulting from his/her employment status. Furthermore, art. 35 states that the 
Republic “provides for the training and professional enhancement of workers”, and 
“encourages international treaties and institutions aiming to assert and regulate 
labour rights”. Moreover – as already mentioned – art.35.4 recognises the freedom 
to emigrate and ensures the protection of Italian workers abroad.
Art. 36 affirms the worker’s right to a fair remuneration that should be sufficient 
to ensure him/her and his/her families a free and honourable existence. As a further 
guarantee, the maximum daily working hours and rest days must be established by 
law, and workers “cannot waive [the] right [to a weekly day of rest and to annual 
paid holidays]”. Special conditions require special attention, and that is why art. 37 
guarantees working women in both formal and substantial terms: “women are enti-
tled to equal rights and, for comparable jobs, equal pay as men. Working conditions 
must allow women to fulfil their essential family duties and ensure an adequate 
protection of mothers and children”. The article also covers minors, whose minimal 
age for paid labour shall be defined by the law. Moreover, art. 38, while guarantee-
ing workers the right to social security, commits the state to providing social assis-
tance to those unable to work and without the necessary means of subsistence, as 
well as providing education and vocational training to people with disabilities.
Finally, art. 39 establishes trade union freedom and the right to collective bar-
gaining; art. 40, ensures the right to strike; art. 41 guarantees the freedom of private 
economic enterprise, but envisages the limit of the common good and of safety, 
liberty and human dignity; and art. 46 recognises the right of workers to collaborate 
in the management of companies.
What emerges from this brief overview is a complete but coherent system of 
binding norms that on the one hand recognizes the value of labour in its multiple 
dimensions (the funding element of the Republic, the means of self and family sub-
sistence, but also the instrument of social integration, of self- promotion and locus 
“where human personality is expressed” (art. 2 Const.)), and on the other hand sets 
the standards for human dignity in a prime place in the workplace. Unfortunately, 
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however, this system does not guarantee per se “labour rights” oriented laws and 
policies, and even less so when laws and policies target foreigners, as discussed in 
the next section.
10.3  Entering the Country and Becoming a Worker: 
A Difficult Path
The integration of MRAs into labour market is connected to the progressive tighten-
ing of immigration regulation over the last three decades (Colucci 2018, 140 ss.).
Since the 2002 “Bossi- Fini” Law (Law No. 189 of 2002), any new law and regu-
lation in the field of immigration has contributed to the narrowing of access to the 
country, and making foreigners’ legal status increasingly precarious and fragile (see 
the most recent acts: the “security package” – Law No. 94/2009, Law No. 125/2009 
and Law No. 217/2010- ; the “Minniti decrees” – Law No. 46/2017 and Law No. 
48/2017- ; and finally the “Salvini decrees”  – Law No. 132/2018 and Law No. 
77/2019, as modified by Law No. 173/2020). This has not been without conse-
quences for their integration into labour market.
If we consider employment conditions alone, in principle no subordinate employ-
ment contract (as regulated by art. 2094 of the Civil Code) can violate the “golden 
rule” of the non- derogation in pejus of the law and of collective agreements. 
Nonetheless, since the 1990s – and particularly following the severe global reces-
sion triggered by the 2007 financial crisis – the rate of flexibility allowed in the 
labour market has grown considerably. This has resulted in a (partial) liberalisation 
of the labour market, the increasing use of non- standard typologies of contract and, 
in the attempt to mitigate the impact of growing unemployment, in a simultaneous 
weakening of the protection traditionally provided to workers. The main and most 
recent expressions of this trend are embodied in the so- called “Fornero reform” 
(Law No. 92/2012) and in the so- called “Jobs Act”, a composite “package” of 
Legislative Decrees adopted in 2015.
With particular reference to the condition of foreign workers, we recall that 
Italian labour law is based on the principle of equal treatment between regular for-
eign workers and national workers, as well as workers of other EU Member States. 
The protection of work “in all its forms and practices” (art. 35 Const.) operates 
regardless of the nationality of the worker, as noted previously. According to the 
Consolidated Law on Immigration, the foreigner who holds a work permit has the 
right to receive the very same remuneration, social security and assistance as any 
Italian worker. On the contrary, undocumented foreigners willing to work can only 
resort to the shadow economy and the black market. Unfortunately, undocumented 
stays inevitably lead to irregular work (Calafà 2017), even though some forms of 
protection also exist in the black market, especially with reference to the remunera-
tion and contributory position of the worker (Chiaromonte 2018, 348 ss.).
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As mentioned, the employment contract involving a foreign worker does not 
have significant peculiarities. Non- discrimination with respect to other workers is 
particularly guaranteed (see art. 43, par. 2, letter e, Legislative Decree No. 286/1998 
and Legislative Decree No. 215/2003), contrary to the access of foreign workers to 
the national labour market, which has always been subject to specific regulation.
The system of foreign workers’ entry to the country is based on the idea of plan-
ning incoming migration flows according to national labour market needs through 
specific legislation (the Decreto flussi) that should determine quotas for regular 
entry each year (Sciarra and Chiaromonte 2014; Chiaromonte 2016). The 
Consolidated Law articulates migration policy into two levels. The first level – the 
cornerstone of Italian migration policy – is represented by a three- year plan (art. 3, 
para. 1–3), aiming in particular to define the general criteria for the subsequent 
annual determination of the entry flows and integration measures. The second level 
consists of the so- called Decreto flussi, or “flows decree” (art. 3, para. 4), which 
should be issued each year and establishes the exact annual quotas for work 
purposes.
However, the provisions of the Consolidated Law that regulate the 3- year plan 
have gone unheeded (the last plan refers to the period 2004–2006). In other words, 
the sole instrument for determining migration policy and regulating foreign work-
ers’ access to the labour market has been the Decreto flussi, a measure conceived to 
operationalise a mid- term plan, though not to strategically intervene in such a deli-
cate and crucial field as migration. And indeed, it has been issued annually exclu-
sively to allow the entry of seasonal workers, while the same frequency has not been 
respected for non- seasonal workers and for self- employment. Moreover, rather than 
determining quotas for new arrivals, the Decreto flussi has become the instrument to 
annually regularise the position of undocumented migrants already in Italy (the lat-
est regularization, linked to the Covid- 19 health emergency, was laid down by Law 
Decree No. 34/2020).
In addition, recent years have seen a dramatic reduction of the working permits 
issued annually: from 250,000 permits issued in the frame of the 2007 Decreto flussi 
to 30,850 in 2020. The reduction is complemented with a similarly dramatic increase 
in international protection applications, which indicates a distorted use of interna-
tional protection regimes by migrants whose migration may not primarily be deter-
mined by humanitarian reasons (Chiaromonte 2019, 335 ss.).
Indeed, entering Italy as a foreign worker is not easy: the process of issuing 
visas, residence and work permits is long and complex. The employer who intends 
to hire an alien worker, either permanently or on a fixed- term basis,6 must apply7 to 
6 Noticeably, unless the foreign worker has a permit to stay for other reasons compatible with the 
transformation into a work permit, it is not possible to directly hire undocumented migrants already 
in Italy, so what happens for them is to set up the whole proceeding as if they were first entering 
the country.
7 It is a nominal application, and the employers has to prove also the accommodation facilities and 
has to commit to pay for the worker’s return ticket in his/her country of origin.
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the special office for immigration (the so- called Sportello Unico) at the Police 
Headquarters once they have ensured there are no available workers in Italy.
The work permit should be issued in 60 days, provided it does not exceed the 
annual quota. The work permit being granted, the Consulate of the foreigner’s resi-
dence or origin country issues an entry visa, and the worker has 8 days from her/his 
arrival in Italy to sign the residence agreement for work reasons at the Sportello 
Unico. Only after this procedure is completed does the Police Headquarters issue 
the residence permit for work purposes. The duration of the “residence agreement” 
cannot exceed 9  months for one or more seasonal jobs, 1  year for a fixed- term 
employment contract, and 2 years for a permanent employment contract.
In the event the worker loses his/her job for whatever reason, he/she can register 
as unemployed to the employment centre for a period that cannot exceed the dura-
tion of the residence permit (art. 22, para. 11, Consolidated Law). The Law does not 
provide for the possibility of obtaining a residence permit to actively look for a job; 
moreover, the complex and lengthy proceedings make it difficult for both job seek-
ers and companies to meet their needs of finding a job on the one hand, and ensuring 
stable workforce on the other.
Beneficiaries of international protection are recognised by unlimited access to 
the national labour market. On the contrary, asylum applicants are allowed to work 
only from the sixtieth day from the submission of the application for international 
protection, if the application has not been processed yet and the delay is not due to 
the applicant. In any case, the residence permit thus granted cannot be converted 
into a residence permit for work reasons (art. 22, Legislative Decree No. 142/2015).
Neither European nor Italian Laws envisage the possibility of working for people 
in repatriation centres or those awaiting a decision of repatriation. Moreover, no 
specific incentives are provided to access the labour market for: asylum seekers, 
international protection applicants, refugees and legal economic migrants (without 
a long- term residence permit). This represents a critical aspect of the Law here, 
since the conditions for work placement are often disadvantageous due to language 
barriers, low levels of education, traumatic experiences related to separation from 
family and country of origin, the cultural gap, and, for asylum seekers and interna-
tional protection applicants, their transitional legal status. For beneficiaries of inter-
national protection and for asylum seekers and international protection applicants, 
the employment rate 1 year after arrival in an EU country is very low (around 8%).8 
On average, between 5 and 6 years are necessary for integration into the labour 
market of more than half of the refugees and individuals entitled to international 
protection. However, data for Italy (which does not monitor this phenomenon) are 
missing.
Furthermore, so far in Italy there has been a lack of specific investment into inte-
gration and inclusion programmes, while the relationship between the state and 
asylum seekers has mainly conformed to welfare assistance types of dynamics.
8 EU Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies (2016:22).
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10.4  Working to Integrate: Easy to Say, Hard to Do
Over the past 20 years, public debate about foreigners has been dominated by the 
insistence that foreign workers are welcome in Italy, as long as they contribute to the 
wellbeing of the host society and its economy (Ambrosini 2001). Yet, as a matter of 
fact, the barriers to accessing the labour market remain considerable, and, from a 
legal perspective, pertain to two different clusters of reasons: a narrow recognition 
of rights, and the weakness of measures to develop MRAs’ capabilities.
First and foremost, the right to work is not universally recognized for all those 
living in Italy. Entering the country as a worker is difficult, as discussed; obtaining 
the right to work once in the country for other reasons may also be very hard. 
Asylum seekers are allowed to work after 60 days from their asylum application, 
but if they need to receive accommodation facilities, their annual income should not 
exceed approximately 6000 euro. This forces people to make hard choices, often 
pushing them to resort to the black or grey labour market. The rigidity of their legal 
status is a second barrier that blocks full benefit of the right to work. The margin of 
manoeuvre foreign workers have depends heavily on their entry channel and the 
legal status they have been allocated: “Each legal status is subject to a number of 
conditions, which need to be fulfilled in order to obtain a specific set of rights. 
Conditions to be fulfilled and rights guaranteed vary a lot from one legal status to 
another. With more than 40 different foreigners’ legal statuses, the landscape 
becomes pretty heterogeneous and labyrinthine” (Federico and Pannia 2019).
Second, while language knowledge is a potent enabler, it becomes a barrier when 
no learning services are available. Following the Law No. 132/2018, a new tender 
specification scheme (Capitolato) was adopted by the Ministry of Interior. Under 
the new Capitolato, only few basic services are provided in CAS (centre for extraor-
dinary reception for asylum seekers), excluding language courses; there are few 
public language learning facilities for seasonal workers, either. The large majority 
of language courses are provided by third sector entities, some of which have 
become proper informal education institutions. Yet, the presence of civil society 
associations is not homogeneous throughout the country, which entails a highly dif-
ferenciated offer of opportunities that depends on geography rather than needs.
Third, the problem of recognizing professional qualifications should be noted. 
Qualifications and training acquired in the country of origin are not easy to officialy 
recognise in Italy, since long and complicated procedures are generally required. 
Moreover, applicants and beneficiaries of international protection often do not have 
certificates issued by their country of origin, meaning they cannot apply for jobs 
appropriate to their education level (Favilli 2015, 726). This opens the door to 
another possible enabler to labour market integration that may become a barrier: 
accessing education and vocational training. Access to schooling and academy is 
granted to all MRAs, except to undocumented migrants, even though the children of 
undocumented families are allowed to enter the schooling system. Yet, temporary 
economic migrants are not allowed to enroll in tertiary education unless they have 
been in Italy for at least 1 year and obtained a diploma in the country. The same 
applies to vocational training, with a sole, major problem: likewise language learn-
ing opportunities, the new tender specification scheme for CAS provided for by 
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Law No. 132/2018 excludes training services. This means that, de facto, organising 
vocational training within the reception centers has become extremely difficult and 
should be done at zero cost, which is unrealistic and undermines integration into 
labour market. Furthermore, the Law No. 132/2018 excluded asylum seekers from 
the right to be enrolled on the civil registry. This de facto, once again, prevented asy-
lum seekers from accessing a number of social services provided by local munici-
palities, such as training. The provision has been expunged by the Constitutional 
Court in a recent decision in July 2020 (No. 186/2020) for the intrinsic inconsis-
tency with the purpose of the law itself, therefore asylum seekers can be enrolled 
again, and benefit from the related services.
Finally, a full enforcement of the right to work entails the recognition and concrete 
enactment of a number of social rights as ancillary provision connected to the recog-
nition of the worker, the worker’s family and dignity. Housing is one such social right. 
Art. 40(6) of the Consolidation Law and art. 29 of Legislative Decree No. 251/2007 
guarantee refugees the right to access public housing, but public houses are much less 
than required, therefore, in practice, a widespread recourse to informal settlements is 
reported amongst refugees. The same applies to long- term economic migrants. 
Foreigners unable to provide for their housing and subsistence needs have the right to 
be accommodated in public housing at the same conditions as destitute nationals. 
However, in the long term, housing is subjected to limitations. In fact, the Consolidated 
Law on Immigration stipulates that only foreigners holding a EU long- term residence 
permit or foreign workers with a permit to stay no less than 2 years can have access 
to public housing accommodation and housing support measures (art. 40 of the 
Consolidated Law on Immigration). Under the Law No. 132/2018, asylum seekers, 
who previously could enter the SPRAR system, can only be accommodated in centres 
of extraordinary reception (CAS) activated by the Prefectures, quite often large facili-
ties, far from workplaces. A new Decree Law No. 13/2020 has readmitted asylum 
seekers in the SPRAR system (which has been renamed while maintaining the same 
organising principles), but with a non- priority admission scheme. No access to public 
housing and housing measures is granted to seasonal workers.
No unemployment benefits are recognised for seasonal foreign workers, and 
even though asylum seekers formally are recognised, the requirement of 2 years of 
contributions de facto reduces their opportunities to effectively enjoy this right. All 
other categories of MRA are entitled to the same treatment as Italian citizens. The 
case of unemployment benefits clarifies a crucial point underlying our discourse: 
from a legal perspective, much depends on the foreign worker’s legal status, which 
may become a barrier that blocks their right to work being recognised and enforced, 
or it may become one of the most potent enablers to their labour market integration.
10.5  They Should Work as Nationals Do, But This Is Not 
Always the Case
In a joint paper of December 2016, the OECD, ILO, the World Bank and the IMF 
observe that “effective labour market integration is a key factor to enhance the ben-
efits of migration  – for both origin and destination countries, but also for the 
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migrants themselves. Migrant workers are best protected where the fundamental 
principles and rights at work are effectively enforced” (OECD, ILO, the World 
Bank and IMF 2016). What is interesting in this otherwise self- evident statement is 
the qualification attributed to labor maket integration. There is consensus among 
scholars, stakeholders and policy- makers that to unleash the potential of MRAs, 
labour market integration should be “effective”, which means allowing foreigners, 
regardless their status (except from the regularity of their stay), to work as nationals 
do. In Italy, this entails three dimensions: anti- discrimination measures, contrasting 
undeclared work and accessing welfare benefits.
10.5.1  Anti-discrimination Measures
Italian labour law has no overarching equal treatment provision covering all aspects 
of employment conditions, but there are specific norms applying to peculiar aspects. 
Compared to equality, non- discrimination has a narrower and more focused scope, 
since it only prohibits differences in treatment – between workers and groups of 
workers – determined by grounds specifically listed by the law. Therefore, diversi-
fied treatments in the workplace become discriminatory and illegal only when they 
are against one of the listed grounds (Barbera and Guariso 2019). Yet, non- -
discrimination is strongly enforced at the European level (art. 10 TFEU and art. 21, 
para. 1, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) and the EU Court 
of Justice has stated that European anti- discrimination rules shall prevail over any 
eventual breach entrenched in domestic legislation.
Gender (Legislative Decree No. 198/2006), political opinions and trade union 
activity (art. 15, Law No. 300/1970), race and ethnic origins (Legislative Decree 
No. 215/2003), linguistic group and nationality (art. 2, para. 3 and art. 43, para. 2, 
lett. e, Consolidated Law on Immigration), religion,9 personal beliefs, disability, age 
and sexual orientation (Legislative Decree No. 216/2003) are all listed grounds.
Discrimination may be direct or indirect, individual or collective, but not every 
difference in treatment constitutes discrimination: “In compliance with the princi-
ples of proportionality and reasonableness, […] differences in treatment based on 
characteristics related to race or ethnic origin do not constitute discrimination […] 
if, by reason of the nature of the working activity or the context in which the latter 
is carried out, such characteristics constitute an essential and decisive requirement 
for the pursuit of that working activity” (art. 3, para. 3, Legislative Decree No. 
215/2003). Furthermore, differences in treatment which  – though indirectly dis-
criminatory – are objectively justified by “legitimate aims pursued through appro-
priate and necessary means” are considered as legitimate (art. 3, para. 4, Legislative 
9 With regard to this point, on the sensitive question of whether it constitutes religious discrimina-
tion to prohibit an employee from wearing the Islamic headscarf at work see CJEU, 14 March 
2017, C- 157/15, Achbita; CJEU, 14 March 2017, C- 188/15, Bougnaoui.
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Decree No. 215/2003). The same applies to religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation (art. 3, para. 3 and 5, Legislative Decree No. 215/2003).10
A special form of judicial protection is provided in legal cases entailing discrimi-
nation (art. 28, Legislative Decree No. 150/2011). This takes the form of the partial 
reversal of the burden of proof, so that if the worker allegedly discriminated against 
provides the Court with evidence suitable for establishing – in “precise and consis-
tent” (for discriminations on the grounds of race or ethnic origin) or in “serious, 
precise and consistent” (for discrimination on the grounds of religion, personal 
beliefs, etc.) terms – the existence of discriminatory acts, pacts or behaviours, it is 
up to the defendant employer to prove there has not be any discrimination.
Ordinary judges and the Constitutional Court have only very occasionally inter-
vened in the principle of equal treatment, they have rarely condemned discrimina-
tory treatment of foreigners in the private sector, not because of the judiciary’s 
reluctance but rather because few cases have reached the courts. The most common 
cases involving discrimination against foreigners brought to the attention of the 
judges have not been directly concerned with working conditions, but rather with 
the ban on access to public services, the guarantee of the right to group identity (e.g. 
the right to speak one’s own language) and of the neutrality of the public sphere.11 
Moreover, most of the decisions involve disputes with the public administration, the 
so- called “institutional discriminations”. This points to the difficulty of intercepting 
discriminations between individuals (even discrimination at work, for which the 
prohibition of discrimination has traditionally arisen), where the individual’s con-
tractual freedom competes with the principle of equality.
10.5.2  Contrasting Undeclared Work and Caporalato
Art. 22, para. 12 of the Consolidated Law on Immigration imposes criminal sanc-
tions12 on the employer “who employs foreign workers without a residence permit 
[…], or whose permit has expired and whose renewal, has not been requested by 
10 The parallel with discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin continues with the fact 
that those differences in treatment that, although indirectly discriminatory, are objectively justified 
by “legitimate aims pursued through appropriate and necessary means” (art. 3, para. 6, Legislative 
Decree No. 216/2003) are in any case considered legitimate.
11 See e.g. the rulings available at the ASGI (Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione 
(https://www.asgi.it/banca- dati/) database, and Guariso (2012).
12 The penalties consist of prison sentences of between 1 and 6 years, and a fine of 5000 euro for 
each worker employed. In cases of particular exploitation of the worker, art. 12, para. 5 of the 
Consolidated Law also provides for the most serious crime of facilitation of the illegal permanence 
of the foreigner for the purpose of unjustified profit. The sanctions have been strengthened by the 
Legislative Decree No. 109/2012, which has transposed Directive 2009/52/EC. The decree pro-
vides that the above mentioned penalties are increased by one third or more when the number of 
employees exceeds three, when they are minors under the working age, or when they are exposed 
to situations of serious danger, taking into account the characteristics of the services to be provided 
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law, or has been revoked or cancelled”. Legislative Decree No. 109/2012 provides 
for the extension of criminal liability to legal persons who are responsible for facili-
tation of illegal immigration (art. 12, Consolidated Law on Immigration).
Moreover, art. 22, para. 5 bis of the Consolidated Law on Immigration authorises 
the Sportello Unico for immigration to refuse the authorization to work to any 
employer who in the last 5 years has been convicted for facilitating illegal immigra-
tion or emigration, or for crimes related to the recruitment of persons for the pur-
pose of (the exploitation of) prostitution or of minors.
The employer must pay the irregular foreign worker the full wages and social 
contributions provided for lawful employment for a minimum period of 3 months, 
unless the employer or the employee prove otherwise (art. 3, Legislative Decree No. 
109/2012). However, due to the undesirable consequences, it is very unlikely for the 
worker to receive what is due before his/her removal, since the emergence of the 
unlawful presence of the undocumented worker entails her/his voluntary or forced 
removal, in accordance with the provisions of the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC).
Yet, in the event of severe labour exploitation, charging files against the employer 
and collaborating with the prosecuting authority grants the undocumented worker a 
6- month residence permit, renewable for 1 year or till completion of the criminal 
proceedings (art. 22, para. 12 quater and quinquies). The provision of a residence 
permit to the foreigner who is victim of labour exploitation is certainly an important 
novelty in the Italian legal system, especially in light of her/his subsequent integra-
tion into the (regular) labour market. However, Legislative Decree No. 109/2012 
has narrowed the typology of “serious labour exploitation”.
With regard to the additional administrative and financial sanctions provided by 
Directive 2009/52/EC against employers who have employed an irregular labour 
force, no implementation measures are found in the Legislative Decree No. 
109/2012. However, precisely these sanctions could potentially play a fundamental 
deterrent role, since the consequences for employers would be very serious and 
particularly from an economic point of view. Moreover, Legislative Decree No. 
109/2012 does not provide any specific measure against subcontracting, a common 
phenomenon of the exploitation of undocumented labour.
Concerning the phenomenon of caporalato, Law No. 199/2016, amending art. 
603 bis of the Penal Code, introduced new provisions aimed to contrast the wide-
spread and serious phenomenon of illegally recruiting labour through exploiting the 
worker’s condition of need, a phenomenon particularly rooted in the agricultural 
sector and, more generally, in the agri- food production chain (D’Onghia and de 
Martino 2018; Chiaromonte 2018; Fanizza and Omizzolo 2018).
The caporalato, which “succeeds” in keeping foreign labour in Italy that would 
otherwise be expelled, and intercepts the incoming flows attracting new labour 
force, often involves undocumented migrants, who are further particularly vulner-
able. Since reporting to public authorities would lead to those workers’ 
and the working conditions (art. 22, para. 12 bis). Together with the conviction, the judge also 
applies the accessory administrative sanction, consisting of the payment of the average repatriation 
cost of the illegally employed foreign worker (art. 22, para. 12 ter).
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expulsion – except for the already mentioned very few cases for which the law pro-
vides for the possibility of issuing a residence permit – they tend not to criticize 
their situation of exploitation, confirming the well- known difficulties of access to 
justice for foreigners (especially the undocumented) also with reference to the most 
serious cases of labour exploitation (the number of complaints is strongly condi-
tioned by their undocumented status, sanctioned by criminal law, of the worker 
victim of serious exploitation). Therefore, they accept working and living in situa-
tions of particular degradation, as well as precarious health conditions, often with 
limited access to drinking water, basic medical care and decent housing.
The most relevant innovation of the Law No. 199/2016 consists in the identifica-
tion (art. 603 bis, para. 1) of two distinct criminal conducts: (1) the caporale, who 
recruits workers (often, but not necessarily, undocumented migrants) for third par-
ties in conditions of exploitation, and taking advantage of their state of need (in this 
case the crime is that of illegal intermediation and exploitation of labour); and (2) 
the employer, who hires or employs workers, even without the intermediation of the 
caporale, subjecting them to conditions of exploitation and taking advantage of 
their state of need (in this case the illegal intermediation can only potentially occur).
Two elements characterize the criminal conduct of both the caporale and the 
employer: on the one hand, the exploitation of labour: para. 2 of art. 603 bis identi-
fies the “legal indices of exploitation”, most of which refer to the conduct of the 
employer only, which are grouped into four categories: remuneration, working 
hours, safety and hygiene at work, and the general working conditions, which means 
a systematic violation of the “hard core” labour law conditions. On the other hand, 
is the exploitation of the state of need of the workers. At stake here is the breach of 
the fundamental value of the human dignity of the worker. Unless the fact consti-
tutes a more serious crime, the caporale or employer is punished with imprisonment 
from 1 to 6 years, and with a fine from 500 to 1000 euros for each employed worker. 
Moreover, imprisonment from 5 to 8 years and a fine from 1000 to 2000 euros for 
each employed worker is given when the acts are committed with violence or threat.
10.5.3  Access to Welfare Benefits
Despite the long and rich catalogue of national and supranational regulations enforc-
ing the principle of equal treatment between Italian and EU citizens and extra- EU 
nationals concerning access to welfare benefits, the most recent legislation has 
introduced the condition of residence. This means that welfare benefits may be 
reserved for those who can prove they have resided for a certain period in a given 
region or in the country. This kind of condition, while not directly discriminatory, 
can generate indirect prejudice to foreigners’ interests (Chiaromonte and 
Guariso 2019).
The same rationale has inspired anti- poverty measures. The basic income estab-
lished by Law No. 26 of 2019, for example, targets poor Italians, EU citizens and 
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third country nationals with a long- time residence permit, that can prove having 
spent in Italy at least 10 years and the last two continuously.
The Constitutional Court does not have a unilateral position on the subject. The 
Court has often adopted the distinction between services directed to meet the funda-
mental rights and basic needs of the individual, that cannot be conditioned by any 
long- term residence requirement, and services that, on the other hand, do not address 
basic needs and can be restricted, but restrictions and conditions should not be arbi-
trary and unreasonable, as is the case for restrictions based on the public spending 
reduction (inter alia, judgments n. 187/2010, 329/2011, 40/2013, 222/2013, 
168/2014, 22/2015, 230/2015).
When services exceed the notion of essential needs, the Court takes into exam, 
case by case, the existence of a reasonable correlation between the service and the 
residence requirement. Usually, the Court has considered in breach of the 
Constitution the requirement of qualified residence when it concerns foreigners 
exclusively, who are requested by the law to prove the regularity of their perma-
nence in the country to benefit from a given service (inter alia, decisions No. 61/2011, 
2/2013, 4/2013, 133/2013, 172/2013, 106/2018, 107/2018, 166/2018). When the 
residence requirement concerns both nationals and foreigners, in some cases the 
Courts has qualified the condition as indirect discrimination, especially if it has an 
unequal impact on foreigners (decisions No.  168/2014, 172/2013, 107/2018). In 
other cases the residence condition has been judged as in line with the constitutional 
principles (inter alia, decisions No. 222/2013, 141/2014, 50/2019).
10.6  Concluding Considerations
After decades of emigration, Italy has become the gateway to the European Union 
but also a country of destination for growing numbers of people in search of protec-
tion and better opportunities for themselves and their families. Contrary to the nar-
rative of “the invasion” of Italy, the numbers of the foreign resident population 
results are in line with the European context, and data reveal that the growing pres-
ence of foreigners is not exclusively related to current international conflicts or cri-
sis but also to a slow process of stabilisation of the migratory phenomenon seen 
over the last two decades. Decision- making and law- making, nonetheless, mainly 
respond to the “invasion” narrative as opposed to real data, so that the enforced new 
measures continue to be dedicated more to combating irregular immigration (and to 
the regularisation of undocumented migrants) and to guaranteeing public security, 
than to the integration of MRAs into Italian society.
Work is certainly among the most effective instruments for ensuring the effective 
integration of foreigners into the social fabric of the host country, but the labour 
market of foreigners has some peculiar characteristics. First, the complementarity 
with the labour market of Italians, which means that Italian workers can often afford 
to avoid certain occupations traditionally are considered unattractive (the so- called 
ddd, dirty, dangerous and demeaning jobs), and migrants undertake such unskilled 
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jobs. Moreover, this suggests that the ideological rhetoric – dominant in the public 
debate on immigration – according to which migrants “steal jobs” is misleading 
(Allievi and Dalla Zuanna 2016: 12; Fondazione Leone Moressa 2017: 71).13 
Second, the Italian labour market (for both nationals and foreigners) is segmented 
into regular and undeclared (or non- regular) work. The vastness of the phenomenon 
of foreigners’ undeclared work certainly depends on a number of factors, many of 
which are of an extra- legal nature. However, the legal framework has its own 
responsibilities, with the Consolidated Law on Immigration that not only fails pre-
venting and fighting the phenomenon, but in some cases tends to favour it (Sciarra 
and Chiaromonte 2014: 124–127).
Even though the Italian legal framework is in line with both EU legislation and 
the core labour standards recognized by the eight fundamental ILO Conventions, it 
remains disorganized and fragmented. Fundamental social rights are not always 
granted at the same conditions of Italian citizens, while some social welfare allow-
ances can only be obtained through the intervention of the courts. Standards of care 
and assistance for asylum seekers and refugees vary considerably between the dif-
ferent centres of accommodation, so that the enjoyment of basic rights becomes “a 
matter of luck” (Oxfam 2017). As a result, harsh living conditions in overcrowded 
and self- organized settlements, illegal labour and exploitation represent a frequent 
outcome of the absence of efficient services supporting access to housing, employ-
ment, and more broadly to integration (Council of Europe, Commissioner for 
Human Rights 2011; UN Human Rights Council 2014).
Obstacles that hinder the full integration of foreigners into the Italian labour 
market take precendence over enablers, especially when foreign workers do not 
have a residence permit for work reasons but are instead beneficiaries of interna-
tional and humanitarian protection. Since access to work for beneficiaries of inter-
national and humanitarian protection is still very complicated, there is a strong risk 
that the progressive reduction in the number of permits granted for work reasons 
and the simultaneous increase in the number of those granted for humanitarian rea-
sons will slow down the process of integration through work. Moreover, the fact that 
it is generally possible to legally enter the country for work reasons only after hav-
ing already found a job and not to look for a job, makes the already difficult process 
of integration even more complicated. Furthermore, particularly long and compli-
cated administrative recruitment procedures would require a comprehensive review 
of the legislation to become instruments of social and economic integration and not 
of marginalization. The recently enacted measures to fight against labour exploita-
tion and caporalato could be considered a valid contribution to the enhancement of 
workers’ rights and dignity and a Italian best practice. Unfortunately, the law has 
not found full enforcement and it does not seem that the Italian legislator is cur-
rently devoting proper attention to this flaw in the original legislation.
13 It is estimated that more than two thirds of foreigners work in unskilled professions, and only 
6.7% in skilled professions. This is accompanied by the fact that they are often overeducated with 
respect to the working activities they carry out (37.4% foreigners are overeducated compared to 
22.2% of Italians) (Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, 2017)
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The Italian labour market needs foreign workers and entire sectors heavily rely 
on foreing workforce; Italians are reluctant to accept that foreign workers should 
stay for good, and the legal framework mirrors these contradictory visions.
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Chapter 11
‘Fortress’ Switzerland? Challenges 
to Integrating Migrants, Refugees 
and Asylum-Seekers
Maria M. Mexi, Paula Moreno Russi, and Eva Fernández Guzman
11.1  Introduction: Setting the Scene
Migration historically plays an important role in the Swiss economy; foreign popu-
lation recruitment has contributed to both past and recent economic growth in the 
country and today Switzerland is recognised as a country of immigration. The end 
of 2018 saw 2,081,169 legally resident foreign nationals in Switzerland, 1.3% more 
than 2017 (SEM Migration Report 2018). More than one third of the Swiss popula-
tion has an immigrant background (is an immigrant or has at least one immigrant 
parent), while over one quarter of the population over 15- years- old living perma-
nently in the country was born abroad (FSO 2018).
The country has driven active economic recruitment policies, opening doors to 
foreign labour forces when needed while retaining quite restrictive integration and 
naturalization policies (Ruedin et al. 2015). In this chapter, we argue that under-
standing how enablers and barriers to the labour market integration of migrants, 
refugees and asylum- seekers (MRAs) are shaped in relation to those historical, eco-
nomic and political dimensions that drive evolution of migration and asylum policy 
is crucial if we want to grasp Switzerland’s selective regime of migration and 
mobility.
Foreign nationals’ access to Swiss territory over the last 50 years has been mostly 
based on economic interests. Yet today, third country nationals who migrate to 
Switzerland for family reunification, education or asylum application reasons repre-
sent an important part of the immigrating population. In this context, adapting leg-
islation to ensure MRAs integrate better into the labour market is a challenge for the 
Swiss authorities. Political discussions about the implementation of art. 121a Cst. 
on the control of immigration adopted by the popular vote on 9 February 2014 and 
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the implementation of this constitutional article are, together with other legislative 
changes, a tipping point that shows that integration issues acquired more promi-
nence as an important objective of immigration policy at the federal level (Graf and 
Mahon 2018).
As observed in other European countries, awareness of the economic and social 
costs of non- integration has led Swiss policy- makers to promote integration as both 
an individual duty (conditional on the requirements and individual responsibilities 
of a foreign person) as well as a significant priority for policy stakeholders at fed-
eral, cantonal, and communal levels. This pragmatic yet in some cases restrictive 
approach to integration has indeed evolved over time. It has also been strengthened 
by the divisive debates around foreigners that surrounded the 2014 initiative against 
mass immigration (discussed later).
Against this background, the chapter aims to identify and critically analyse the 
socio- economic and political structure of Switzerland to provide a timely analysis 
of the evolving legal and policy framework that regulates the integration of MRAs 
into the Swiss labour market and society. The first part of the chapter sets the scene 
by presenting information about the constitutional principles that govern labour, 
immigration and asylum. The second part examines the relevant legislative and 
institutional framework in the fields of migration and asylum and captures how this 
framework and the Swiss approach to integration has evolved and adapted over the 
last decade. The third part contextualizes the relevant legislative and institutional 
framework that regulates labour market access for MRAs in Switzerland, drawing 
attention to historical, economic and political dimensions. The concluding part of 
the chapter summarizes the main findings of the analysis and outlines key aspects 
that (still) play an obstructing role for the integration of MRAs. We consequently 
problematize some impacts of direct democratic instruments on MRAs’ rights and 
welfare, raising questions about whether the ‘Fortress’ as a ‘public metaphor’ for 
restrictive and exclusionary migration and asylum policy resonates with 
Switzerland’s current institutional and socio- historical trajectory.
11.2  Constitutional, Regulatory and Policy Framework 
on Labour, Migration and Asylum
11.2.1  Constitutional Principles and Provisions
Provisions on labour are entrenched in the Swiss Constitution. In particular, art.110 
Cst. on employment gives the Confederation the power to legislate on employee 
protection, relations between employer and employee and the employment services. 
The article also stands provisions on the scope of application of collective labour 
agreements. The confederation has legislative powers over unemployment insur-
ance and social security (art. 114 para.1 Cst.) as well as civil law, which includes 
legislation on employment contracts (art. 122 para.1 Cst.). Regarding fundamental 
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rights in the labour area, the Constitution sets out free choice of occupation, free 
access to an economic activity (art. 27 para. 2 Cst.) and freedom of association (art. 
23 and 28 Cst.) as fundamental rights. Free choice of occupation as a fundamental 
right (art. 27 Cst) is reserved for persons admitted without restriction in the Swiss 
labour market or those who are entitled to a residence permit (SCHR 2015a, b, c).
The Constitution further sets out social objectives such as the objective that all per-
sons capable of work should be able to practise an occupation under equitable con-
ditions to assure their maintenance, and whereby children can receive appropriate 
education. Those objectives bind the Swiss lawmaker but cannot be directly invoked 
before the courts as subjective rights (art. 41 Cst.) (2007, ILO national labour law, 
Swiss profile) (International Labour Organization 2017).
Concurrently with these general principles on employment, the main constitu-
tional principles on migration and asylum are those laid down in two articles under 
section 9 of the Swiss Constitution: Residence and Permanent Settlement of Foreign 
Nationals, art. 121 Cst. on legislation on foreign nationals and asylum and art. 121a 
Cst. Moreover, Art. 25 Cst. refers to migration and asylum introducing the principle 
of non- refoulement, adopted from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, as a fundamental right. Art. 121 Cst. sets up the Confederation as the 
authority in charge of legislation on entry to and exit from Switzerland, the resi-
dence and permanent settlement of foreign nationals and granting asylum. The 
article also details the possibility of expelling foreign nationals from Switzerland if 
they pose a risk to the security of the country and it defines the offences for which 
the legal binding conviction of the foreigner may lead to the expulsion of the foreign 
national.
Crucially, and more recently, art. 121a Cst., in force since February 2014 after 
the acceptance of the initiative against mass immigration,1 sets out the main prin-
ciples controlling immigration. This must be effected autonomously by defining 
annual limits and a quota of residence permits delivered to foreign nationals coming 
to the country for gainful employment. As explained in more detail below, when 
defining the quotas of permits for gainful employment, two major principles need to 
be taken into consideration: Switzerland’s general economic interest and labour 
priority to Swiss citizens.2
1 The initiative against mass immigration, launched by the right wing party (SPV), was voted by the 
Swiss people on 14 February 2014. The vote led to the adoption of a new article of the Swiss 
Constitution on migration control. This article contained transitional provisions that gave 3 years 
to legislators to adapt the legislation on migration. Art. 121a Cst. provides full power and auton-
omy to the Swiss State to control immigration flux and policies. The article introduces a limit on 
the number of residence permits granted to foreign nationals using annual quotas (Boillet 2016). 
Art. 121 a para 3 Cst. lists the criteria to be taken into account when setting the quota: quotas and 
a ceiling must be defined in light of Switzerland’s general economic interests and they must priori-
tize Swiss citizens. The criteria for granting residence permits are primarily: the application from 
an employer, the ability to integrate, and the adequate and independent means of subsistence of the 
foreign applicant. Additionally, Art. 121a para. 4 Cst. stipulates that no international agreements 
that breach this article may be concluded.
2 In accordance with the principle of the national preference of Art.121a para. 3 Cst.
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Apart from the chapter dedicated to foreign nationals, the Swiss Constitution 
also refers to migration and asylum in its fundamental principles, by stressing the 
protection against expulsion, extradition and deportation as a fundamental right. 
Art. 25 para 2 Cst. bans the deportation or extradition of refugees to a state in which 
they will be persecuted. Art. 25 para 3. Cst. mentions that no person may be deported 
to a state in which they face the threat of torture or any other form of cruel or inhu-
mane treatment or punishment. The Asylum Act (AsylA, 26 June 1998) provides 
criteria to be met in order to be granted asylum and rules the request. It also pro-
vides, amongst others, the right to reside in Switzerland (art. 2, para 2, AsylA). As 
described by Fernández and Abbiate (2018, p. 451):
The Lasi [AsylA] is tightly linked to the Letr [FNA] which specify the particular status of 
persons admitted temporarily into Switzerland (Art. 80a para 6, Art. 86, para 2, Art. 88, Art. 
126a), the measures about the right to family reunification (Art. 3, para 2, Art. 47) and the 
departure from the country (Art. 76). (…) Contrary to the Member States of the European 
Union which are subject to European regulations concerning asylum, Switzerland’s pecu-
liar status makes the country not subject to most European directives concerning asylum. In 
this regard, Switzerland is not subject to either the Directive 2013/33 “Procedures”, or the 
Directive 2011/95 “Qualification”. This however does not mean that the country adopts a 
completely different legal framework.
In practice, after filing the asylum application and initial questioning, the State 
Secretariat for Migration (SEM) determines whether the substance of the applica-
tion can be verified. In cases where it cannot be verified, the authority rejects the 
application by refusing it without a formal procedure or by issuing a decision of 
NEM (non- consideration),3 which dismisses the application. If Switzerland is 
responsible for the examination of the asylum application, the SEM starts the pro-
cedure. After completion of the procedure, the SEM determines whether the asylum 
seeker meets the criteria in first place for refugee status and in second place, if he or 
she can be granted asylum. Accordingly, the SEM can render four types of decisions 
in addition to the NEM decision (refugeecouncil.ch 2018). After the complete 
examination procedure, the SEM can:
 1. Grant asylum (decision in favour of granting asylum) (B permit)
 2. Temporary admission as a refugee (decision against granting asylum although 
the person is recognised as refugee under international law, with suspension of 
the enforcement of the removal order) (F permit with refugee status)
 3. Temporary admission (decision against granting asylum with suspension of the 
enforcement of the removal order) (F permit)
3 The SEM can decide a ‘non- consideration’ (NEM) if the persons can return or continue: (1) to a 
safe third country under Article 6a para. 2 let. b AsylA in which he or she was previously resident; 
(2) to a third country that is responsible under an international agreement for conducting the asy-
lum and removal procedures; (3) to the country of previous residence if possible; (4) to a third 
country for which he or she holds a visa and in which he or she can seek protection; (5) to a third 
country in which persons with whom he or she has a close relationship or dependants live; (6) to 
the their native country or country of origin under Article 31 AsylA (article on recognition of asy-
lum and removal decisions made in the Dublin Regulation (Regulation 604/2013).
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 4. Rejection (decision against granting asylum with removal order) (no legal status)
According to the AsylA, asylum may be granted to persons recognized as refu-
gees under international law if there are no exclusion motivations (art. 49 AsylA). 
Those exclusion motivations are the unworthiness of the refugee status (art. 53 
AsylA) and subjective post- flight grounds (art. 54 AsylA). Individuals granted asy-
lum are entitled to receive a residence permit (B permit), which is delivered by their 
canton of residence.
In cases where asylum is denied, the SEM determines a removal order or an 
alternative measure that refers to articles 83 and 84 FNA. If the removal order exe-
cution is not permitted, not reasonable or not possible, the individual is admitted 
temporarily. In each case, the foreigner obtains a permit F, valid for 12 months, 
extendable if there are no motivations that could stop the temporary admission (art. 
41 para 2 FNA).
More precisely, removal is not permitted (art. 83 para. 3 FNA) if it contravenes 
Switzerland’s obligations under international law. It is not reasonable (art. 83 para. 
4 FNA) when the removal would seriously endanger the foreigner’s life, and it is not 
possible (art. 83 para. 2 FNA) when technical reasons prevent removal (no means of 
transportation, no travel documents issued from the native country, etc.). In that 
sense, a temporary admission is seen as an ‘alternative measure’ to removal. In 
cases where asylum is denied under the AsylA but there is a recognition of the refu-
gee status under international law, the removal is postponed and the individual is 
provisionally admitted as a refugee and receives a permit F with the refugee men-
tion. The AsylA provides for procedural guarantees and the “status” of ‘temporary 
admittance’ similar to the EU status on ‘subsidiary protection’.
Since 2010, asylum legislation began a restructuration process that is still ongo-
ing and which was not driven by the so- called 2014 Refugee Crisis. Since this 
period, urgent measures entered into force on 29 September 2012. Amongst those 
measures are: the abolition of the possibility of submitting an asylum application 
abroad (art. 19 and 20 AsylA), and the abolition of desertion or refusal to perform 
military service as asylum motivations (art. 3 para. 3 AsylA). Additional modifica-
tions entered into force stated that the removal of citizens from countries considered 
as safe is usually reasonable (art. 83 para. 5 FNA) and that persons subject to a 
legally binding removal decision for which a departure deadline has been fixed are 
excluded from receiving social assistance (art. 82 para. 1 AsylA). More recently, in 
June 2016, Swiss voters approved an amendment proposal, the main objective is to 
accelerate the procedures and shorten the time- limit for appeals. Amongst the new 
disposals of the amendment, we find: the gathering of all the persons playing a role 
in the asylum process in registration and procedure centres, managed by the federal 
authorities, the separation between applications to be processed as accelerated pro-
cedures and extended procedures with respective timelimits for the duration of the 
process and the granting of free legal representation (ODAE Romand 2017). 
However, the complete reform will enter into force by the end of 2019, but the 
accelerated procedure has already been tested in Zurich since 2014.
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11.2.2  Legal and Policy Framework Governing the Labour 
Market Integration of MRAs
Switzerland’s immigration policy is embodied in the Foreign Nationals Act (FNA),4 
approved by the Swiss electorate on 24 September 2006 and in force since 1 January 
2008. However, persons who fall under the Swiss- EU Bilateral Agreement on the 
Free Movement of Persons (AFMP) face different legal treatment compared to third 
country nationals. The AFMP applies to citizens of EU- 28/EFTA Member States 
and their family members, as well as to posted workers (regardless of their citizen-
ship) of a legal entity based in an EU- 28/EFTA Member State (SEM Migration 
Report 2018). Nationals from third countries (also called third state nationals) are 
subject to the FNA. This ‘two circles’ model of the Swiss foreign law distinguishes 
between the liberal European internal migration (first circle) and migration from 
outside Europe/EFTA (second circle) (SCHR 2015a). In practical terms, regardless 
of nationality or the motivations that influence their decisions to enter Switzerland, 
foreign nationals are subject to the ordinary regime regulated by the FNA.  Two 
special regimes complete the ordinary regime, translated by two exceptions: AFMP 
and Asylum regimes. Nationals from EU/EFTA member states are subject to the 
AFMP, whereas persons seeking protection against persecution fall under the spe-
cial asylum regime regulated by the Asylum Act (AsylA), the Geneva Convention 
of 1951 and the Dublin regulation (Amarelle and Nguyen 2017). In practice, the 
FNA is only applied where the AFMP or Asylum legislation do not contain relevant 
provisions that could be applied in cases where the FNA lays down more favourable 
provisions (Art. 2 FNA and Amarelle and Nguyen 2017).
To settle in Switzerland, people from third countries must meet very specific 
criteria (SEM 2017). These criteria differ and correspond to an administrative crite-
ria allocated to immigration reasons. The Swiss foreigners legislation admits:
 – Selected persons coming for gainful employment, which implies the person set-
tles in Switzerland because she/he has been previously hired and she/he meets 
the various relatively strict criteria mentioned in the law. Among the range of 
criteria and factors assessed are the level of specialization and qualification as 
well as the ability to integrate into Swiss society. Furthermore, the precedence 
principle must be respected.5
4 Now known as: Federal Act on Foreign Nationals (FNIA) since January 2019.
5 For a foreign national to be granted a permit with gainful employment, a set of requirements must 
be fulfilled. A principle of priority (precedence), which states that employers must prove that they 
have not been able to recruit a suitable employee from the priority categories considered together 
as the ‘internal workforce’, must be respected (art. 21 FNA). Moreover, salary and employment 
conditions customary for the location, profession and sector must be satisfied (art. 22 FNA) and 
personal qualifications are thoroughly examined (art. 23 FNA). Art. 23 FNA provides that short- -
term stays and residence permits for work purposes may only be granted to cadre, specialist and 
other qualified employees with a degree from a university or institution of higher education and 
several years of experience. Additional criteria as professional and social adaptability, language 
skills and age are examined to ensure the professional and social integration of the applicant (art. 
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 – People who do not come for gainful employment but for other specific reasons 
such as rentiers, for medical treatment or to study6 must have sufficient funds to 
support themselves.
 – Persons who come for family reunification reasons to join a Swiss or a foreign 
national with a residence permit. The right to admission by family reunification 
depends on very specific criteria such as independence from social assistance. 
The integration dimension is also required and has been reinforced in the Federal 
Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNIA).
Third- country nationals willing to immigrate to Switzerland for gainful employ-
ment face several barriers before being admitted into the territory and having access 
to the Swiss labour market. They need to have found a job beforehand in order to 
receive a residence permit. According to the economic interest principle, the Federal 
Council has the power to limit the number of first- time short stay and residence 
permits for work purposes (art. 20 FNA). Concretely, in order to regulate the admis-
sion of third- country citizens, the Swiss government publishes, at the beginning of 
each year, the maximum quantity of permits that can be allocated to third- country 
nationals. Different quotas are allocated to cantons according to their size and needs, 
while another set of quota (package of permits) is kept at the federal level as a 
reserve for cantons that have exhausted their quota (Sandoz 2016b, p. 41).
The legislative framework that organises MRAs’ labour, access to territory and 
integration has faced major changes in recent years. In September 2016, two proj-
ects were led the Swiss Parliament to decide on the amendment of the Foreign 
Nationals Act (FNA). The first concerned the implementation of the aforementioned 
Art. 121a of the Swiss Constitution on immigration control, resulting from the ini-
tiative from February 2014 against mass immigration. The article in the FNA that 
implements art. 121a Cst. places refugees and temporarily admitted persons in the 
category of a ‘native workforce’ that ought, from a legal point of view, to be consid-
ered as having priority access to the labour market.
The second project focused on provisions to improve the integration of foreign-
ers and to strengthen the application of the already well- established principle of 
‘promoting and requiring’ in the field of integration. The amendments came into 
force in several waves between June 2018 and January 2019. According to the 
amendments, the foreigner’s level of integration is assessed when renewing his or 
her residence permit and when applying for a more long term residency permit (Art. 
34 para.4 and 5 FNIA Art.42, para.3 FNIA). The amendments legally define four 
23 FNA). Furthermore, foreign nationals must have suitable accommodation to be admitted (art. 
24 FNA).
6 Art. 27–29 of the FNA: Foreign nationals may be admitted for education purposes if there is 
confirmation from an educational establishment that the person is eligible for education or training, 
if suitable accommodation is available, if the person has the required financial means and if the 
foreign national fulfils the personal and educational requirements for the planned education or 
training course. Retired persons must have reached the minimum age set by the Federal Council, 
special relations to the country and have required financial means. In case of medical treatment, 
persons must also have the required financial means and a guarantee of their return.
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criteria: respect for public safety and order, respect for constitutional values, lan-
guage skills and participation in economic life or educational training (art. 58a 
FNIA). Language requirements to obtain and renew residency permits are specified 
and reinforced according to the status of the permit and the rights related to the 
permit status.
Long term residence permits (C) can now be withdrawn and replaced by other 
residence permits7 if the conditions for integration are not met. In these cases, the 
person whose permit has been downgraded will have to wait 5 years before applying 
again for a long term residence permit. Also, the changes introduced for family 
reunification requirements demand: the spouses of holders of a residence or long 
term residence permit to provide proof of an A1 level orally, or to prove their enrol-
ment in a language course. In addition, the cantons can now conclude integration 
agreements and set specific objectives for people who do not meet the integration 
criteria (Stanic 2018). Information concerning the reception of social assistance or 
unemployment allowance may be taken into account in assessing the level of inte-
gration and the payment of supplementary benefits may constitute a criterion for 
revoking the residence permit of a person without gainful employment or become 
an obstacle to family reunification. If the use of social assistance was already a rea-
son for revoking the residence permit and sometimes even the long term residence 
permit, according to the new amendments, the long term residence permits of per-
sons who make long- term and substantial use of social assistance may also be 
revoked even if they have resided in the country legally and without interruption for 
more than 15  years. Previously, persons residing in the country for more than 
15 years without interruption were protected against this provision. It is important 
to note that most of the amended provisions do not apply to EU and EFTA nationals, 
as their stay is regulated by the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons 
(AFMP), which does not impose any integration requirements (ibid). With the 
amendments to the foreigners legislation, Switzerland has introduced a gradual inte-
gration model, according to the following principle: the higher the legal status under 
the law on foreigners, the higher the requirements for integration (Kurt 2017c).
Regarding access for refugees and provisionally admitted persons, the work per-
mit that employers used to have to apply for was replaced by a simple registration 
procedure that also extended their geographical work mobility within the country. 
The 10% tax this population had to pay on its income from gainful employment was 
abolished. In the event of recourse to social assistance, participation in integration 
programmes has been made compulsory, under penalty of reduction of benefits.
7 Other country nationals may be granted different types of permit: These include the short stay 
permit (1 year permit, named ‘L’ permit), residence permit (more than 1 year but limited to a cer-
tain number of years and renewable, named ‘B’ permit) and the permanent residence permit 
(unlimited period and newly legal criterion for Swiss citizenship, named ‘C’ permit). A fourth type 
of permit is granted for employment in a border zone as a ‘cross- border commuter permit’ (art. 
35 FNA).
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11.2.3  Integration as an Individual Duty and a Policy Priority
To better understand the legal framework for the labour market integration of 
migrants and foreign nationals linked to the asylum domain, it is important to anal-
yse the concept of integration from the point of view of Swiss law. The integration 
of the foreign population was already (from 2008) one of the fundamental objec-
tives of the FNA, and was ruled by the specific ordinance on the integration of for-
eigners (OIE; RS 142 205). Principles of integration were given by article 4 
FNA. Chapter 8 of the FNA with art. 53–58 FNA gives more focused provisions on 
integration, specifically on encouraging integration (art. 53 FNA) and the consider-
ation of integration in the case of decisions, e.g. in the cases of admission or permit 
granting, where integration is seen as a duty (art. 54 FNA). More specifically, the 
co- existence of the Swiss and foreign resident population on the basis of the values 
stated in the Federal Constitution as mutual respect and tolerance, which are the 
aims of integration. In addition to foreigners’ obligation to participate in the eco-
nomic, social and cultural life of the Swiss society (art. 4 FNA).
Integration was already crucial in the FNA, where it was emphasized as a require-
ment and an individual duty of the foreign person. Moreover, in the FNIA the strong 
connection between work and residence permits is further stressed and a model of 
gradual integration is introduced, as longer- term residence permits and renewals 
become linked to progressively stricter integration requirements (Kurt 2017c). 
Obtaining, extending and being able to keep the various residence permits and fam-
ily reunification becomes thus possible only if the assessment from the authorities 
shows that the person meets the conditions for integration.8 Additionally, if a foreign 
person relies on social assistance, an aspect also assessed, may even lead to down-
grading or revocation of a permit (Art.62 para 1 let.e, Art. 63 para 1 let. C and Art 
63 para2 FNIA).
Next to being promoted as an individual duty, integration is also emphasized as 
a policy priority that needs to be promoted by authorities at the Confederation, can-
tons and communal levels (see e.g. specific provisions in art. 53FNA). Art.53 para 
3. FNA sets goals of professional advancement and encouragement of foreign popu-
lation as a major task fulfill by the Confederation, cantons and communes, creating 
favourable regulatory conditions of equal opportunities for the foreign population. 
Additionally, in the case of integration, national and local authorities are called to 
cooperate with social partners, non- governmental organisations and expatriate’ 
organisations (art.53 para 5 FNA). Among the new elements introduced with the 
FNIA, we find: the protection against discrimination toward foreign population, the 
avoidance of underuse of the foreign population potential, the support to basic skills 
development and registration of unemployed refugees and temporarily admitted 
8 Criteria to assess integration are listed in Art. 58a FNIA. Those include respect for public safety, 
security and order; respect for the values of the Federal Constitution; language skills; and partici-
pation in working life or efforts to acquire education.
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persons in public employment agencies. The article also includes provisions for 
special needs of women, children and adolescents.
The operationalization of the FNIA (art. 54) points to existing ordinary struc-
tures at federal, cantonal and municipal level as first instances through which inte-
gration must be achieved (these structures are in charge of education and training 
programs, employment and labour issues, social security, health, among others). 
The task of ordinary structures in the promotion of integration was previously stated 
in the former OIE, yet is now enshrined in the foreigners’ act. In cases where gaps 
exist in ordinary structures or where offers are not accessible, the FNIA provides for 
a specific integration promotion that can be set at federal, municipal or cantonal 
level (art. 55 FNIA). In addition, Article 55a. FNIA requires cantons to immediately 
provide for special integration measures for foreigners with relevant needs hamper-
ing their integration (as lack of education and basic labour skills). Finally, the law 
also clearly specifies the distribution of competences between local and national 
administrations as well as financial contributions from the Confederation to other 
administrative levels (art. 58 FNIA).
According to the Swiss Law, immigrants’ social and labour integration is a duty 
of the ordinary structures, also called ‘established frameworks’, such as the employ-
ment offices, welfare or education services. The Swiss state develops integration 
through the ordinary structures in accordance with their legal mandates and their 
existing offers and services. However, ordinary structures conceived for the needs 
of the local population can often not accommodate specific categories of migrants 
because those migrants do not meet the entry criteria (e.g. level of knowledge of the 
local language, lack of basic skills, years in the canton as a taxpayer, etc.) and/or the 
services offered do not suit specific migrants’ needs. Therefore, the Law foresees 
for a specific provision on the promotion of integration of immigrants, which pro-
vides special support to foreigners to develop the required conditions to access 
existing ordinary structures. The specific provision on the promotion of integration 
of immigrants was a guiding principle of the former FNA, the new FNIA includes 
now a specific provision on this matter (art. 55 FNIA). Since 2014, Cantonal 
Integration Programs (CIPs) have been the policy instrument, which strategically 
focus on the planning and implementation of the specific provision on the promo-
tion of immigrants’ integration in collaboration with ordinary structures. Those pro-
grams are the result of a joint strategy agreed in 2011 between the Cantons and the 
Confederation. Each Canton established its own Cantonal Integration Program (CIP 
I 2014–2017 & CIP II 2018–2021) with the purpose of strengthening: social cohe-
sion, mutual respect, tolerance, participation, and equality of opportunities for for-
eigners living in Switzerland. The programmes aim to strengthen the existing 
measures, reduce disparities between cantons, to fill gaps while allowing leeway to 
take local factors into account, and letting the cantons set their own implementation 
priorities.
Additionally, to further boost integration efforts regarding migrants from the asy-
lum framework, the Confederation and the cantons established recently a joint 
nationwide integration agenda, the ‘Swiss Integration Agenda’, advanced in spring 
2018 and implemented from 2019 provides for binding measures and strengthens 
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individual support and case management for refugees and temporarily admitted per-
sons. Additionally, it increases the lump sum paid by the Confederation to the 
Cantons to fund integration measures from 6000 to 18,000 Swiss francs per refugee 
or temporarily admitted person. As explained in SEM’s Migration Report (2018, 
p. 38), the Integration Agenda foresees certain clearly measurable targets that the 
Confederation and the cantons should abide with:
All recognised refugees and temporarily admitted persons have basic knowledge of one 
national language after three years. 80% of children from the asylum system can communi-
cate in the language of their place of residence before they start school. Two- thirds of rec-
ognised refugees and temporarily admitted persons aged between 16 and 25 are enrolled in 
a vocational education and training course within five years. Half of adult refugees and 
temporarily admitted persons are integrated in the labour market within seven years. All 
recognised refugees and temporarily admitted persons are within a few years familiar with 
the Swiss way of life and have contact with the local community. Regular reviews are 
needed to ensure that these targets are being met and to evaluate the impact that integration 
measures have had. The decision was therefore taken to develop a monitoring system; its 
introduction is scheduled for mid- 2020.
Future assessments of the implementation of the Integration Agenda will be cru-
cial to assess if and how the Swiss recent approach to integration has indeed func-
tioned as an enabler to MRAs’ labour market integration – and under what cantonal 
specificities and conditions. ‘Promoting’ and ‘requiring’ are the two keywords of 
Swiss integration policy from recent years, stating the requirements and individual 
responsibilities of a foreign person with regard to integration and the policy priori-
ties involving inter alia promotion of equal opportunities (Kurt 2017b).
That said, it is relevant to consider that in practice within a context of Federalism, 
several acts and law provisions are loosely defined at the federal level: the cantons 
have a degree of flexibility and discretionality while applying the legal mandates. 
This is especially the case for decisions on admissions for family reunification, 
permit extensions and decisions involving integration as a requirement (in decisions 
for granting unlimited residence permits). For instance, one of the criteria for grant-
ing a residence permit to a spouse or child is having suitable housing. Criteria to 
assess if the foreign citizen has suitable housing can differ according to the cantons 
(e.g. number of bedrooms). On the one hand, this flexibility allows the cantons to 
adapt the provisions to its situation and needs. On the other hand, those discretion-
ary margin lead to unequal treatment of migrants according to the cantons 
(Wichmann et al. 2011). Until 2018, no official definition of integration was pro-
vided by the Swiss legislation. When determining the degree of integration of for-
eign nationals living in Switzerland for permit decisions, the practice shows that 
cantonal authorities have taken their decisions based on respect for legal order and 
the values of the Constitution, knowledge of local language and willingness to par-
ticipate in economic activities and education as well as knowledge of the ‘Swiss 
way of life’ as mentioned by the Citizenship Act. According to Wichmann et al. 
(2011), cantonal interpretation and practices diverge from ‘inclusive’ practices that 
have low requirements with many exceptions to ‘exclusive’ practices with a high 
requirement and a low number of exceptions. Cantonal differences, give rise to 
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unequal treatment, as in the case for asylum seekers, who, depending on the canton, 
can easily access the labour market, while in others, the exercise of a gainful activity 
is subject to certain restrictions. Additionally, several cantons allow asylum seekers 
to access language courses at an early application stage, while in others they have to 
wait for a positive decision on their case.
Moreover, according to the law, the integration of foreigners must first be carried 
out through ordinary structures and since these structures operate differently in each 
canton, these are additional enablers of social inequalities across cantons.
To sum up, the latest findings of a study of the Swiss Forum for Migration and 
Population Studies by Probst et  al. (2019) into cantonal discretionary powers in 
migration policy distinguishes two approaches for cantonal practices to tackle inte-
gration provisions. The first are restrictive practices, whereby integration is based 
on individual will and responsibility; this supposes high barriers to immigrants’ 
rights and privileges, translated into limited offers of support and conditional offers 
of incentives. The second comprise inclusive practices, which are enablers for 
immigrants’ access to rights, to extensive offers of support and intensive encourage-
ment of individual capacities, resulting in opportunity- based support and facilitated 
labour market access. According to the study, preferences are related to contextual 
factors such as political orientations, demographic factors, economic conditions and 
the administrative cultures of the cantons. Additionally, services in charge of inte-
gration vary according to institutional cultures and the provision of services distri-
bution and responsibility across local structures (e.g. service for immigrant 
population are in some cases responsibility of the population office, while in others 
of the security or social affairs office). Therefore the importance and the role of 
ordinary structures in promoting integration also varies from one canton to another, 
which is due as well to the lack of presence of some of these specific structures at 
the local levels (Probst et al. 2019).
11.3  Contextualizing Immigration: Historical, Economic 
and Political Dimensions
11.3.1  Seven Phases and Major Evolutions
Historical contextualization is crucial for understanding how the recent approach to 
integration put forward by Swiss policy- makers and legislators has evolved and 
crystalized. According to Etienne Piguet (2017), the country’s history of immigra-
tion can be divided into six major phases. Following Piguet’s logic, we could see a 
seventh phase starting with the 2014 initiative against mass immigration. Piguet’s 
first phase, from 1948 to 1962, can be seen as an open period. The labour shortage 
faced by the country after the Second World War drives the Government to engage 
in labour recruitments agreements, first with Italy, then with Spain. The beginning 
of this ‘Open Door’ period is also the starting point of the ‘Gastarbeiter’ 
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immigration regime (ibid, p. 19). Delivering seasonal and one- year renewable per-
mits, the government sees immigration as temporary without the possibility of long- -
term residence and makes sure the situation remains temporary.
From 1963 to 1973, increasing xenophobia within the Swiss population, housing 
shortage and the country’s struggle to deliver public goods and services, drive the 
country to attempt to decrease immigration. The country implements successive 
measures to limit labour migration and attempt to control the risks of ‘foreign over-
population’ without real results (ibid). As an example of a limitation measure, with 
the ‘simple ceiling’ that has been introduced in 1963, permits were awarded only to 
workers in companies with less than 2% increase in overall employment compared 
to December 1962. However, foreign workers came to replace high numbers of 
Swiss workers that changed their job to pass from the secondary to tertiary sector in 
that period, limiting the expected results of the simple ceiling. A new attempt was 
made with the introduction of the ‘double ceiling’ in 1965, asking companies to 
reduce 5% of the level of their foreign workforce and not to increase their total 
number of foreign workers. The measure, however, had negative effects, hindering 
the development of small enterprises. Finally, the concept of a global ceiling, which 
is still in force today,9 was introduced in 1970, with the definition of new annual 
quotas every year on the basis of the departures.
The first oil shock marked the start of the third phase, which led to a decrease in 
the total foreign population. From 1973, tens of thousands of foreigners left the 
country after losing their jobs. The precarious situation of immigrants raised aware-
ness on the living and social conditions of the seasonal workers, and led the 
Government in 1978 to propose measures to facilitate foreigners’ social integration, 
seeking to create a more enabling environment, by addressing a number of issues 
pertaining, for instance, to a person’s access to local language courses or family 
reunification as well as the status of seasonal workers. However, the relevant pro-
posals for legal revisions were submitted to a popular referendum in 1982 and they 
were rejected by a very narrow majority (50.4%).
From around 1985 to 1992, the fourth phase represents the second wave of large- -
scale immigration. With an improving economy, the need for a workforce pushes 
the authorities to implement a flexible quota system. Almost 50,000 new permits are 
issued every year between 1985 and 1995 and more than 130,000 seasonal workers 
enter the country during the same period (Piguet 2013). This new wave of immigra-
tion is primarily comprised of citizens from Yugoslavia and Portugal. The fifth 
phase begins in the early 1990s. If immigration to Switzerland in the 1970s was 
largely characterised by workers who entered the country through the quotas sys-
tem, the 1980s saw a gradual change with immigration comprised of people who 
entered the country not for work, but for family reunification, education, retirement 
and asylum, amongst other reasons. Immigrants’ countries of origin diversify as 
well, and an increasing number of migrants come from countries other than the 
9 “Quotas have continually been used since the 70’s but the categories of foreigners subject to this 
quota system have change over time and the system as undergone numerous modifications” 
(Sandoz 2016b, p.40). 
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historically traditional sending states (Piguet 2013; D’Amato 2008). Therefore, 
since the beginning of the 1990s the increase and diversification of immigrants jour-
neys and the country’s fear of being isolated in the middle of Europe while the 
continent increasingly embraces the free movement of persons, forces Switzerland 
to question its migration policy.
In 2002, the beginning of the progressively implementation of the AFMP signed 
with the European Union and approved by the voters in 2000 marked one of the 
turning points of the renewed six phase policy. This agreement provides freedom of 
mobility for EU and EFTA citizens to access the Swiss labour market. In 2008, the 
implementation of FNA completes the renewal of the immigration policy in regards 
to third countries nationals (Piguet 2013; D’Amato 2008). The new act limits with 
exceptions, the third countries nationals immigration to highly skilled workers by 
implementing the quota system, which allowed an immigration control adapted to 
the needs of the Swiss economy (Piguet 2017).
We can now advance a seventh phase, a new turning point on the politization of 
immigration issues and more restrictive immigration policies, which coincided with 
the 2014 right- wing ‘initiative against mass immigration’, supported by 50.3% of 
Swiss voters, and that requests the re- establishment of quotas for all categories of 
foreigners, including European citizens. This places the government in a delicate 
position, as reintroducing quotas would not be compatible with the principles of the 
Free Movement of Persons (Sandoz 2016a, b). As a result of the approved initiative, 
art. 21a FNA introduces measures aimed at supporting the ‘native’ workforce (or 
domestic employees) and more precisely the unemployed people registered in 
Regional Employment Office. The Federal Council, the Swiss executive power, 
established a list of professions or sectors by an unemployment rate only the sectors 
touched with a unemployment rate over the 5% are subject to these measure. In 
practice, when an employer wants to publish a job offer, she/he has first to check if 
the required profile/position is included in the list. If this is the case, she/he must 
follow a particular procedure: the employer must announce the job vacancy to the 
Regional Employment Office. During five working days, the employer cannot pub-
lish this job offer on other platforms. After 3 days, the Regional Employment Office 
has to communicate the relevant application files to the employer. The latter has to 
convene interviews or tests of professional ability with the applicants who fit the 
required profile. Finally, if the employer hires a candidate or, on the contrary, if not 
satisfied, she/he has to inform the Regional Employment Office. This measure aims 
at fostering the workforce available in Switzerland in areas affected by high rates of 
unemployment by giving priority to job seekers registered in Regional Employment 
Offices.
Interestingly, according to Boillet and Maiani (2016) the text of the initiative (art. 
121a Cst.) is a clear and direct discrimination principle towards immigrants because 
it explicitly states the national preference. The transposition from the constitutional 
art. 121a Cst. to the art. 21a FNA transforms direct discrimination into indirect dis-
crimination. In the case of nationality, a direct discrimination is to enact a different 
treatment between nationals and foreigners (as did art. 121a Cst.); an indirect dis-
crimination introduces seemingly neutral criteria but from which consequences are 
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similar to a direct discrimination principle. In that respect, the place of residence is 
considered as indirectly discriminatory (Boillet and Maiani 2016). Therefore, 
legally speaking, the art. 21a FNA is not compatible with the principle of equal 
employment opportunity (article 7 let. a AFMP) or with the principle of equal treat-
ment (art. 9, annex 1 AFMP) (ibid). In other words, the required registration in a 
Regional Employment Office is more easily fulfilled by Swiss nationals and it 
clearly disadvantages foreign nationals who are looking for a job in Switzerland. 
Nevertheless, as art. 21a FNA has included temporarily admitted persons and refu-
gees in the category of internal workforce (as mentioned above), the article should 
facilitate labour market integration for those two categories of persons (Graf and 
Mahon 2018). Although the example of the art. 21a FNA – among other changes in 
the legislation – does not seem to resolve conflicts with the AFMP act, it is indeed 
less extreme in comparison with art.121a Cst. Art. 21a FNA could be considered a 
‘light version’ of the national preference principle.
The applicability in practice of Art 21a FNA is complex. Legally, for a person to 
be registered in a regional employment office, he or she must fulfill criteria that 
demonstrate his or her employability. The assessment of this employability differs 
from case to case and canton to canton. While the light implementation does not yet 
seem to have a direct positive impact on the integration of refugees and temporary 
migrants into the labour market. The implementation of the initiative against mass 
immigration was partially transformed to accompanying legal and policy measures 
to strengthen support for the integration of refugees and temporary, reserving as a 
reminder of the availability of resources and labour potential of some groups of 
immigrants in the territory (Graf and Mahon 2018).
Additionally, further parliamentary discussions on attempts to control immigra-
tion from the European Union still polarize public opinion. The new initiative of the 
SVP (‘limitation initiative’, August 2018), currently under examination by parlia-
ment and on which the people may be called upon to vote, calls for a constitutional 
amendment to renegotiate the end of the AFMP and enact a prohibition on establish-
ing of new treaties that would grant a regime of free movement of persons to foreign 
people. The Federal Council and the National Council have already recommended 
the rejection of this initiative. The reasons given are the desire to preserve the agree-
ments with the EU, which would be threatened by a breach of the AFMP, and the 
desire to preserve the country’s economic interest.
11.3.2  Politics Matters No Less Than Economics
Over recent decades, most Swiss immigration policies and regulatory frameworks 
have been largely driven by economic considerations. As Klöti et al. (2007, p. 622) 
note, Switzerland is a country “which has successfully implemented guest worker 
initiatives with active economic recruitment policies alongside restrictive integra-
tion and naturalisation policies.” Concurrently, economic considerations have often 
provoked hostile public opinion and a general political climate that finds against 
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both immigration and asylum- seekers, as suggested by the results of a number of 
direct democratic votes. Other than the 2014 initiative against mass immigration, 
these include the ban on new Islamic minarets accepted by 58% of Swiss citizens, 
and the popular initiative of 2010 asking for the expulsion of foreign criminals, 
which was accepted by 53% of Swiss voters. In this regard, to better understand the 
migration landscape in Switzerland, it is important to keep in mind the country’s 
political ‘infrastructure’. The direct democracy component of the Swiss political 
system allows citizens’ initiatives to request revisions of the Federal Constitution 
based on 100,000 citizens signatures gathered over an 18- month period (art. 138 
and 139 Cst.) Any constitutional amendment proposed by parliament has to be 
approved by a majority of the people and the cantons. Laws that have been passed 
by parliament can be challenged through an optional legislative referendum. In this 
case, citizens have to gather by 50,000 signatures against the law within 100 days 
after it has been passed. After the Second World War, referenda and initiatives 
became more frequent and the latter became a tool to promote political innovation 
against the will of the political elite, in particularly to limit migration flux 
(Linder 2010).
In a country characterised by ‘solid’ political stability, recent changes and the 
move to the right signal the salience of immigration issues. As of 2018, the Federal 
Council includes representatives from the Liberal Party (FDP), the Swiss Social 
Democratic Party (SP), the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), and the Swiss Christian 
Democratic Party (CVP). Considerable gains made by the SVP (right- wing conser-
vative party), which has its roots in the farming community, have marked the coun-
try polarization on immigration issues over the last two decades. Between 1995 and 
2015, the SVP won additional 36 parliamentary seats, while the FDP lost 12 and the 
CVP 10. In this political context, migration has become a matter of heightened 
political dispute. On the one hand, populist parties have pledged more restrictive 
policies and promoted controversial initiatives such as the 2014 popular initiative 
against mass immigration (Ruedin and D’Amato 2015). Yet, as shown by the 
Integration Agenda and implementation of the constitutional article resulting from 
the initiative against mass immigration, the Swiss federal and cantonal authorities 
have made concrete efforts to promote a more pragmatic approach to fostering 
immigrants’ integration, considering the social tensions and additional costs of the 
non- inclusion of the MRAs into the labour market.
11.4  Conclusion: ‘Fortress’ Switzerland?
Our review of the legal and policy framework governing immigration sheds light on 
the crucial role of integration, not only when discussing the potential of professional 
integration but also as a condition in cases of granting residence permits or 
extensions.
Overall, different amendments and revisions of the foreigners and asylum legis-
lation reflect the willingness of the authorities to foster the integration of certain 
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groups of immigrants into the labour market. This is represented by adapting the 
laws and policies concerning those migrants who are likely to stay and who entail a 
cost to society in case of unemployment. Through the amendment process, some 
administrative barriers that have been removed or simplified may in fact facilitate 
labour market integration. These include, for instance, the abolishment of the 10% 
special tax that working asylum- seekers and temporary admitted foreigners without 
asylum recognition were required to pay, and the replacement of the employer’s 
request by a simple announcement. Despite positive signs, though, new barriers 
relating to certain administrative barriers have been raised. A clear example of these 
new barriers concerns immigrants who rely on social assistance as they seek to gain 
a foothold in the labour market. Indeed, as previously mentioned, according to new 
FNIA provisions, dependency on social assistance is sometimes a ground for the 
non- renewal of residence permits; also, the fear of seeking support may result in 
greater insecurity and become an important obstacle to a foreign person’s entry and 
sustainable integration into the labour market (Mexi et al 2019).
At the same time, the fluid character of certain statuses, such as those illustrated 
in the most extreme form by the “temporary admission status” (permit F), remains 
an important obstacle to integration (ODAE Romand 2015; Matthey 2015), despite 
reactions from various actors and political forces that have proposed to introduce 
changes. According to Matthey (2015), half of the foreigners with temporary admis-
sion end up staying in Switzerland more than 7 years, including the stay before the 
grant of the permit F. Though its name suggests that the person is staying temporar-
ily in the country, migrants with permit ‘F’ usually stay many years in Switzerland. 
Stigmatization and lack of information about this status are significant obstacles, as 
potential employers may be afraid to hire people they perceive as not being able to 
stay in the territory in the long term. Moreover, permit ‘F’ restricts freedom of 
movement since the foreigner is constrained to stay in the canton where she/he was 
granted the temporary admission. Low mobility makes it difficult to find a job. 
Moreover, with the recent amendments of the immigration legislation, the type of 
security bestowed upon a foreign person by other types of permits, such as the long- -
term residence permit, has been weakened. This has become more intense with the 
introduction of the gradual integration model in the FNIA, which allows for the 
possibility to have the status of a foreigner downgraded if integration is deemed 
insufficient (Kurt 2017c).
Depending on the type of permit, geographical and professional mobility can be 
either allowed or not allowed. This impacts on the professional integration of for-
eign nationals. Since permits are linked to the cantons, third- country nationals with 
short stay permits wanting to change their canton of residence must request a new 
permit from the new canton (art. 37 FNA). This can be seen as barrier when looking 
for new work positions in other cantons. Foreign nationals who have been granted a 
short stay permit with gainful employment can take advantage of professional 
mobility only under certain conditions. In those cases, since permits are linked to 
employment, beneficiaries might be afraid of being dismissed.
The recognition of qualifications also continues to be an obstacle to overcome, as 
shown by the over- qualification rates. Skills acquired in third- countries are often 
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considered as being of lower standard. This makes granting an equivalence diploma 
more difficult. Additionally, for persons under the asylum framework who had to 
flee their countries, it is often difficult to obtain documents that certify their diploma 
or past professional experience (Sandoz 2016a). As stated by the Federal Commission 
for Migration- FCM, besides the diploma and professional certificates, informal 
skills also need to be considered. It is, therefore, important to validate and assess 
practical skills to complete the current system of diploma recognition (Release 
FCM 2016).
On another – very important – note, even though the legal framework for the 
promotion of integration has significantly evolved, certain groups of the population 
are not entitled to benefit from integration programs from their first day in 
Switzerland. Art.4 para. 2 FNA specifies that integration is aimed only at “foreign 
nationals who are lawful residents in Switzerland for the longer term”. This provi-
sion excludes, therefore, asylum- seekers and irregular migrants. This is the case 
even though the stability of the protection rate shows that significant numbers of 
asylum seekers are likely to stay in Switzerland (Kurt 2017a, b). The harsh realities 
of asylum- seeking have been particularly documented in The Fortress (La 
Forteresse) – a 2008 documentary film showing how men, women and children, 
running from war, persecution and economic crises, are held in processing centers 
under conditions that closely resemble detention while they wait for the Swiss 
authorities to decide to grant them – or not – refugee status. While the documentary 
subtly problematizes the moral aspects of Switzerland’s asylum policy, a recent 
empirical study by Hainmüeller et  al. (2016) provides evidence for the fact that 
longer waiting times for asylum status determination delay refugees’ subsequent 
economic integration. The authors suggest psychological distress as the primary 
explanation for their results.
Additionally, the federalist nature of the Swiss state does not make the task of 
integrating foreigners any easier. As we have seen, cantons have a relevant margin 
of manoeuvre which leads to the unequal treatment of immigrants groups within the 
territory (Manatschal 2014). Initiatives at the federal level, such as the CIPs, are 
paving the way for immigration policy harmonisation. Policies such as the 
Integration Agenda and the amendments to the FNIA should also help to reduce 
differences across cantons in some areas of integration. However, the implementa-
tion of laws and policies still depends heavily on the diversity of the cantons’ politi-
cal positioning and institutional systems in which ordinary structures are embedded. 
That said, differences between cantons can also be seen as opportunities. As stated 
by the Laboratory Democracies metaphor in Brandeis’s decentralised democracies,10 
the different practices can serve as a laboratory, cantons and communes have the 
opportunity to learn from the experiences of others (Cattacin 1996), even if the 
exact transposition of policies is not necessarily realistic given the structural and 
organisational differences between the administrative levels.
10 Refer to New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. Supreme Court 262 (1932).
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Generally, as pointed out by the Federal Commission of Migration - FCM and 
the civil society, integration should be considered as a “dynamic and reciprocal 
process that requires the involvement of the foreign population and its hosting soci-
ety. Thus, the whole society should be responsible for the foreign nationals’ integra-
tion and this cannot be reduced to a simple measuring instrument” (OSAR 2018, 
p. 4). This assertion develops a perspective that is undoubtedly critical: over the 
years, the increase in the number of migrants in Switzerland has had a significant 
impact on public policy making and has given rise to several direct democratic votes 
(Sciarini 2017). Yet, ultimately, according to the Migration- Mobility Indicators 
from the NCCR, there has been a significant restrictive effect of referendums and 
popular initiatives on migrants’ rights (Arrighi 2017).11 Direct democratic instru-
ments have, therefore, provided important disabling barriers to migrant integration 
as they have not effectively managed to challenge ‘Fortress’ actualities and exclu-
sionary trajectories of boundary construction in the host labour market and society.
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Chapter 12
Regulating Fortress Britain: Migrants, 
Refugees and Asylum Applicants 
in the British Labour Market
Francesca Calò, Simone Baglioni, Tom Montgomery, and Olga Biosca
12.1  Introduction: From a Multicultural Society 
to the Fortress Britain
Any analysis of the legal framework concerning the integration of migrants, refu-
gees and asylum seekers should not be isolated from the socio- economic, political 
and cultural context of a country. The UK has for some time been portrayed as a 
multicultural liberal society with some studies showing that the integration of 
migrants in Britain compares relatively favourably with other countries across vari-
ous measures of social and political integration (Koopmans 2010; Wright and 
Bloemraad 2012). The emphasis from the mid- 1960s until the beginning of the 
2000s has been placed on the ‘multicultural’ society or ‘ethnic pluralism’, with dif-
ferent groups co- existing but retaining their independent cultural identities (although 
placing the blame for racial problems on the minority populations) (Ager and Strang 
2008). However, over recent years (according to some scholars from 2000 onwards – 
see for example Joppke 2004) there has been a significant shift in UK public dis-
courses regarding nationhood, prompted initially by race riots in Northern England,1 
1 For information and details about the race riots and the policy recommendations see Cantle 
Report (2001).
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then by concerns over Muslim extremism fostering terrorist threats and exacerbated 
by the economic crisis and the rise of populist xenophobia alongside anti- migration 
narratives (Ager and Strang 2008; Geddes and Scholten 2016). From being a multi-
cultural liberal society, which has witnessed a steady growth in immigration, the 
more recent policies of the UK Government have cultivated a “hostile environment 
for illegal migrants” (Theresa May speech, 10th October 20132) where nationhood 
and assimilation processes became central to policies and political narratives (at 
least at the national level). To understand why Britain changed from a multicultural 
society to a hostile one, it is important to explore briefly the recent history of 
migration.
During an earlier wave of migration, in 1948, the British Government adopted 
legislation (in the form of the British Nationality Act 1948) ensuring that the UK 
and Colonies received the status of a British subject and was thus entitled to legal, 
social and political rights. Colonial migrant labour was used to feed the post- war 
boom while being employed in the growing industrial and public sectors (Geddes 
and Scholten 2016; Hansen 2003). After 15  years of colonial migration, moves 
towards greater restriction emerged in the political agenda as a result of an increas-
ing tension within civil society, the rise of a more populist Conservative Party and 
the lack of public support for the Labour Party in opposing the introduction of more 
restrictive legislation. Between 1962 and 1970, citizens of Commonwealth coun-
tries that had previously been welcomed as British citizens, became subject to immi-
gration controls and strict regulations were applied in particular to family migration. 
Over time, these changes were reinforced by further legislation through the British 
Nationality Act 1981 that steadily reduced the rights of Commonwealth citizens.3
More recently, from the mid- 1990s up until the present day, large scale net 
migration, the freedom of movement that comes with EU membership (in particular 
the enlargement from 2004 onwards) and the rise of populist and anti- immigration 
movements in the political arena (such as UKIP) fuelling concerns in society about 
immigration were some of the forces that have shaped the contemporary context of 
migration in the UK (Geddes and Scholten 2016). As net migration increased EU 
citizens became an important part of this second wave of migrants. European migra-
tion was also accompanied by an incremental increase of non- EU net migration, 
although non- EU migration had always been based upon stricter and controlling 
policies that incentivised mainly the arrival of high skilled workers, students and 
people from former colonies with an ancestral connection to the UK.
During the 2000s, issues of asylum became a central focus of migration debates 
and the scale of the problem of people being forced to flee their home countries is 
illustrated by the fact that in 2014 there were more refugees globally than any time 
2 Theresa May speech accessible at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/10/
immigration- bill- theresa- may- hostile- environment
3 The British Nationality Act of 1981 abolished the 1948 definition of British citizenship and 
replaced it with three categories: British citizenship, citizenship of British dependent territories 
and British Overseas citizenship. Of these, only British citizenship provides the right to live in the 
UK. From 1981 all foreign nationals have had to apply for naturalisation to become British citizens.
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since the Second World War (Geddes and Scholten 2016). Strict controls and a hos-
tile environment (as will be fully explored later in this chapter) towards asylum 
applications were implemented by the British Government since the 2000s and asy-
lum applications, as well as the numbers of those in the end granted leave to remain 
consequently remained low in comparison with other countries such as for example 
Germany, Italy and France (Blinder 2017; Eurostat 2018). Policies focused upon 
controlling borders remain in place to the present day and issues relating to migra-
tion have become a permanent fixture of contemporary political campaigns in the 
UK, from parliamentary elections to referenda.
A fourth phase of the UK migration history can be traced from 2015 onwards. 
The election of a new Conservative government with a clear commitment to renego-
tiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union, the rise of populist 
political movements and the austerity measures that followed the economic crisis in 
2008 have, alongside aspects of the campaign to leave the European Union, contrib-
uted to the development of a dominant narrative in UK policymaking that empha-
sises the securing of borders and a more restrictive disposition towards migration 
more generally (Montgomery et al. 2018; Wallace 2018). Against this background, 
tighter restrictions in terms of the rights of Non- EU citizens have been implemented 
in more recent legislation such as the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016, encom-
passing stricter controls in terms of asylum applications, complemented by the opt- -
out from the European Union refugee relocation schemes and part of the Reception 
Conditions Directive.4
This changing context is part of a long- term process where anti- migrant and anti- -
refugee discourses, legislations, and policies have dominated policymaking and the 
media. For example, anti- migration narratives were placed at the centre of Leave 
campaign in the 2016 EU referendum (Cummings 2017) and they have also been 
one of the most frequent arguments advanced by the Conservative party in modern 
elections (see the Conservative Manifesto 2010 and 20155 as well as the 2005 cam-
paign led by Michael Howard). Policies and legislation prioritising the control of 
immigration instead of integration have been favoured, espousing narratives about 
the negative effect of migration on public services and on the reduction of wages:
In the last decade or so, we have seen record levels of long- term net migration in the UK, 
and that sheer volume has given rise to public concern about pressure on public services 
[…] as well as placing downward pressure on wages for people on the lowest incomes. The 
public must have confidence in our ability to control migration. (Department for Exiting the 
European Union 2017)
Fresh legislation such as the Immigration Act 2014 and 2016, the opt- out from the 
EU relocation scheme of Syrian refugees and the recent cases involving the deporta-
tion of citizens who were part of the Windrush generation6 are some of the examples 
4 https://ec.europa.eu/home- affairs/what- we- do/policies/asylum/reception- conditions_en
5 Parties policy positions and party policies manifesto are available at: https://manifesto- 
project.wzb.eu/
6 The Windrush generation refers to immigrants who were invited to the UK between 1948 and 
1971 from Caribbean countries. In 2018, these immigrants who had arrived as children on their 
parents’ passports and they never formally became British citizens have been denied services, lost 
their jobs and faced deportations, raising what it has been called the Windrush generation scandal.
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of the environment that has been created in recent years. The negative frame of the 
debates about migration has also been reflected and reinforced by the way in which 
the media portrays refugees and migrants. This hostile environment has been mir-
rored by political uncertainty following the results of the 2015 and the recent 2017 
elections. In a landscape of political tumult, marked by reductions in public spend-
ing and cuts to welfare, alongside processes of labour market flexibility, increasing 
levels of inequality have impacted upon the everyday lives of people in the UK, 
making the context for promoting and implementing integration and inclusion even 
more challenging.
12.2  Evolution and Main Stages of Migration 
and Asylum Law
Legislation concerning the integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers 
into the labour market has always been intertwined with legislation concerning the 
accessibility of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers to enter the country. In post- -
war Britain a key piece of legislation relating to migration was developed in 1948 
and it constitutes a milestone in migration law. The 1948 British Nationality Act 
formally gave all subjects of the Crown including British colonies the right to settle 
in Britain. Citizens from colonies and the Commonwealth countries were enabled to 
cement their status as British citizens and access the same formal legal, social and 
political rights as other subjects of the Crown. This relatively open migration regime 
lasted until 1962, when consequent to an increasing number of race riots and the rise 
of right- wing populism, the ruling Conservative Party introduced a new Act (the 
Commonwealth Immigration Act), restricting the flow of immigration (Geddes and 
Scholten 2016). The Act distinguished between citizens of the UK and its colonies 
and citizens of independent Commonwealth countries. The latter became subject to 
immigration and employment control through the establishment of work vouchers 
(a type of visa) which reduced the overall numbers of migrants. In addition, only a 
few of these vouchers were granted to women, setting a precedent (that is still evi-
dent today) of preventing women to enjoy the right to family reunification. In 1968 
a second Commonwealth Immigration Bill was introduced, again diminishing the 
rights of people to enter the UK, particularly those British citizens of Indian descent 
facing persecution in Kenya and Uganda. New immigration controls based upon the 
‘patriality’ rule were then established. This restrictive legislative framework reached 
its peak in 1971, with the Immigration Act (1971) which distinguished between citi-
zens of the UK and its colonies that had the right to indefinitely being settled in the 
UK (patrial rule) and those who instead had to apply for work permits to be granted, 
(definite) right to remain. More modifications regarding the categories of citizens 
were established in the British Nationality Act (1981). Three typologies of citizens 
were defined by this legislation, implying the prioritisation of the “white common-
wealth”: British citizens, British dependent territories citizens and British overseas 
citizens. New implications for the colonial citizens were then implemented, amend-
ing the status of post- colonial peoples from citizens to migrants.
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During the 1980s the issue of migration received less attention from policymak-
ers while it returned to the spotlight from the 1990s onwards. When the New Labour 
Government (1997–2001) came to power, a more liberal approach to migration was 
promoted (Hansen 2003; Wright 2017). In 2001, the High Skilled Migrant 
Programme (renamed the Tier 1 visa) was introduced which established the first 
points- based system to regulate access to the country. It allowed people entry in 
relation to factors such as their level of education and earnings, without imposing an 
upper limit on their numbers. Moreover, work permit (later renamed Tier 2 visa) 
regulations were loosened to be more responsive to the needs of employers. A key 
decision of the New Labour period was allowing uncontrolled access to Britain for 
citizens of the ten member states that joined the European Union in 2004. The UK 
was one of only three countries that decided not to impose transitional controls on 
migration from the new EU member states (Wright 2017).
However, in the latter period of the New Labour government, the rhetoric 
reflected a less open disposition towards migration and marked a return to restrictive 
policies and legislation. As part of this shift, a five- tier system for labour migration 
was imposed on Non- EU citizens: Highly skilled migrants (Tier 1), medium skilled 
migrants (Tier 2), Low skilled and temporary employment visa (Tier 3  – never 
opened), students (Tier 4) and youth mobility (Tier 5). These more restrictive poli-
cies would be continued following the election of the Conservative- led Coalition 
Government in 2010. Quotas on the numbers of Non- EU arrivals entering the UK 
(and visas granted to them) were established and a more hostile environment was 
constructed. The exemplification of this “hostile environment” and legislation were 
the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts. The 2014 Act aimed at facilitating the removal 
of people without leave to remain, overhauling the appeals process (although fol-
lowing R (on the application of Kiarie) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 42 this part of the Act was dis-
missed), limiting the access to services such as the National Health System (NHS) 
and housing to people without the leave to remain and tightening controls on immi-
gration status (Wallace 2018). More restrictive changes were included in the 
Immigration Act 2016, in which penalties (fines and imprisonment) for employers 
who hire irregular migrants and landlords who rent premises to irregular migrants 
were established and everyday necessities such as access to a bank account were 
revoked for irregular migrants.
A parallel but slightly divergent evolution in asylum law can also be distin-
guished. Until the 1990s the UK had no specific asylum legislation. The right to 
claim asylum is based upon international law and governments are obliged to pro-
vide protection to people who meet the criteria for asylum. The UK is a signatory to 
these international laws and has long since integrated them into UK legislation. 
Three pieces of international law can be used to support an asylum application in 
the UK: the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees, the 1950 
European Convention on Human rights (ECHR) and the European Union Asylum 
Qualification Directive (2003/9/EC) which lays down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers. Excluding the integration of these laws, in the UK, 
from the 1990s onwards policies and legislation were implemented aiming at 
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curbing the numbers of asylum seekers and at making life more difficult for those 
who arrived. While a more open although “managed” migration was promoted 
between 1997 and 2005 (as described above), measures concerning asylum were 
mainly aimed at reducing the number of applicants (Mayblin 2016). Measures per-
tained to three different areas: increasing the control of external borders, the reduc-
tion of welfare entitlements and denying access to labour markets and speeding up 
the legal process (Geddes and Scholten 2016). The presumption that underpinned 
this legislation (enacted both by Labour and Conservative Governments) was that 
many asylum seekers were not genuine (and were instead “bogus”) and thus were 
undeserving of welfare state support or should not be allowed access to labour mar-
kets at least until they were verified as “genuine” (Geddes 2003).
Although the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act of 1993 integrated the 
United Nations Convention 1951 definition of asylum claims, it also constituted the 
first act that reduced the benefit entitlements of asylum applicants, introduced 
tighter controls on the application process and involved the detention of asylum 
seekers. The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 extended penalties associated 
with being an irregular migrant and removed access to welfare benefits for “in- -
country” applicants as opposed to applying at the port of entry and, in 1999, support 
for asylum seekers (£35 per week using mainly vouchers) was implemented. A no- -
choice dispersal system across the UK for destitute asylum applicants was enacted 
to lessen the burden on the London and South East regions. Through the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 an asylum architecture was created to regu-
late induction, accommodation and removals including the National Asylum 
Support Service (NASS) (now the UK Visas and Immigration  – UKVI) which 
assumed responsibility for arrivals, housing and economic support provision (Meer 
et al. 2018). In 2002, the right to access labour markets for asylum applicants was 
also removed and to this day it is extremely difficult for asylum seekers to be inte-
grated into the job market (Mayblin 2016). Furthermore, the indefinite leave to 
remain (the right to stay in the country indefinitely) for refugees was modified into 
a 5- years leave to remain status with a reassessment of the situation in the country 
of origin taking place at the end of that period (Bloch 2008). After 2010, the 
Conservative- led Governments maintained an emphasis on restricting asylum. The 
focus on speeding up the asylum process and the consequent lack of appropriate 
time to seek and obtain legal assistance led the British High Court to find the fast- -
track system unlawful because of an unacceptable risk of unfairness for asylum 
seekers who have lived through specific trauma. In another example of ever restric-
tive access, the UK Government also opted out of the EU relocation schemes for 
Syrian refugees in order to reduce the number of people that the UK would receive 
(Geddes and Scholten 2016). This brief overview of the main stages of migration 
and asylum law reveals that UK Governments from the 1990s onwards aimed first 
at “managing” migration and afterwards focused upon “controlling” migration, 
imposing a mix of increased border control and reduced internal rights which have 
contributed to the emergence of the legislative and institutional frameworks of today.
To understand the complex rules that regulate contemporary immigration to the 
UK, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the right to enter and to have leave to 
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remain in the country for each category of migrants (Non- EU migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees that are part of relocation schemes). Each of these categories 
of migrants must adhere to different regulations and procedures.
12.2.1  Non-EU Arrivals
Non- EU migrants have the right to enter the country (for a period longer than 
6 months) if they have a valid entry clearance based upon a visa. A visa has to be 
released in the country of origin and this can be issued under different schemes 
which will be fully discussed later in this chapter. The visa can eventually be 
renewed in the UK based upon valid documentation. After spending a specific con-
tinuous period lawfully in the country (from 5 to 10  years depending on the 
schemes), providing specific documentation, undertaking language and culture tests 
and presenting specific characteristics (such as not being an illegal entrant), Non- EU 
migrants can apply for the indefinite leave to remain. Afterwards, they are eligible 
to apply for British citizenship.
12.2.2  Asylum Seekers and Refugees Status
Very different regulations are applied to asylum seekers in the UK. For someone to 
claim asylum in the UK, they are required to present themselves to the offices of the 
UK Border Agency immediately upon their arrival into the country (claiming UK 
asylum from outside the UK is not legally possible). A person may apply for asylum 
in relation to the 1951 Convention through fear of persecution in their own country 
or may instead make a “human rights claim” under the 1950 ECHR, indeed an asy-
lum seeker may make a human rights claim as part of a refugee claim. In terms of 
human rights, an asylum seeker may make a claim in accordance with Article 3 of 
the ECHR which protects individuals from torture, inhumane and degrading treat-
ment or in accordance with Article 8 of the ECHR which protects the person’s right 
to a personal and family life. Following a pivotal court case (Regina (Razgar) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department 2004) those seeking asylum according 
to their right to a personal and family life have their claims heard in relation to the 
“Razgar Test” which aims to balance the rights of the person seeking asylum with 
the right of the state to effectively control its borders. The Razgar test includes a 
five- stage test comprehensive of the following issues:
 1. Does the [refusal] amount to an interference by a public authority with the exer-
cise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) fam-
ily life?
 2. If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to 
engage the operation of article 8?
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 3. If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
 4. If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well- being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others?
 5. If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be 
achieved?
Once a person makes a claim for asylum they are required to undergo a “screen-
ing interview” which involves providing basic information including why the per-
son is seeking asylum and their route of travel to the UK (to assess whether the 
persons’ claim for asylum is the responsibility of another country under the Dublin 
regulations7). At the screening interview, a triage process is implemented. According 
to the Asylum operating model (2013), the purpose of ‘triage’ is to identify ‘types’ 
of cases and assess them based on the length of time it is likely to take to decide the 
claim and to finally resolve the case. The triage establishes if the case can be con-
sidered an expedited case or not. Expedited cases cover detained fast- track cases 
and cases where a person will be sent to a European country through which they 
passed en route to the UK to have the case decided there (‘third country cases’). In 
a non- expedited case, three characteristics will determine the type of cases: the 
length of time a claim; the likelihood that the claim will be granted; and, thirdly, if 
refused, the speed at which removal can take place. If asylum applicants are consid-
ered destitute, they are eligible for accommodation inside the UK dispersal scheme 
and a payment of £37.65 per week to cover their essential living needs (ELN).
If an asylum application is accepted, there are two successful forms of asylum, 
one being “refugee status”, the other “humanitarian protection”, in both situations 
the person is awarded limited leave to remain (lasting 5 years), following which 
they can apply for indefinite leave to remain in the UK and consequently British 
citizenship. Once asylum seekers have gained leave to remain, they are obliged to 
leave their accommodation  – if provided inside the dispersal scheme  – within 
28 days and register for administrated welfare support on the same basis as British 
citizens. For those whose applications are refused, some applicants may have the 
opportunity to appeal this decision which involves taking their case through a pro-
cess of tribunal and in those cases where there are challenges as to how the law has 
been applied, to higher courts, including the UK Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights.
7 An overview of the screening interview is available in the policy guidance “Asylum Screening and 
routing” published by the Home Office in 2018: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/700624/screening- and- routing- v1.0ext.pdf
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12.2.3  Refugees Under Relocation Schemes
Four resettlement schemes fully funded by the UK’s Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) budget were provided by the UK government in the period 2014 
to 2016: the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS), the Gateway 
Protection Resettlement programme, the Mandate Scheme and the Vulnerable 
Children Resettlement Scheme from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
People who can apply to these schemes are identified by the United Nations and 
brought directly to the UK (Home Office 2017b). The VPRS is a joint scheme 
between the Home Office, the Department for International Development and the 
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government aiming at relocating 
20,000 exclusively Syrian persons by 2020. The UK sets the criteria and then 
UNCHR identifies and submits potential cases (Mulvey 2015). The Home Office 
screens the potential cases and afterwards, a full medical assessment is conducted 
by the International Organisation of Migration (IOM). Full details of cases are sent 
to the local authority and after eligibility to enter the UK has been granted, visas and 
leave to remain for 5 years are issued under humanitarian protection (Home Office 
2017b). At the time of writing, 10,538 people have been involved in the VPRS. A 
similar process has been established in the Gateway Protection Resettlement pro-
gramme co- funded by the European Union, which aims at offering a legal route for 
up to 750 refugees to settle in the UK each year and for the Vulnerable Children 
Resettlement Scheme which aims at supporting vulnerable and refugee children at 
risk and their families. Up to February 2018, 539 people have been resettled with 
the MENA scheme. Finally, the Mandate Scheme is applicable to refugees that have 
been recognised as such by the UNHCR (from applications in their country of ori-
gin or in the country where they were recognised as refugees). Although Mandate 
Scheme refugees have no entitlement to asylum in the UK, the UK Border Agency 
accepts that in determining the asylum claim of a Mandate Scheme refugee the deci-
sion maker must give mandate status due weight and take it into account when 
assessing credibility and determining the risk on return.
12.3  Legislation Concerning Migrants, Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers Integration into Labour Market
The right to work is a restricted privilege to which migrants are granted unequal 
access in relation to citizens and in relation to each other. Some migrants are able to 
obtain visas to work in the UK relatively easily, while for others working is prohib-
ited (Mayblin 2016). The next section will outline the different legal statuses and the 
rights to work in the UK depending on the legal status of migration.
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12.3.1  Non-EU Arrivals
The Non- EU migrants (excepted asylum seekers and refugees) can apply to various 
visas to access the labour market in the UK. Three different visa tiers have been 
established and are currently operating: Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 5. Non- EU migrants 
can apply before arriving to the UK for Tier 1 visas if they are willing to open a 
business activity (with investment of at least £50,000), they represent an exceptional 
talent or promise in the field of science, humanities, engineering, medicine, digital 
technology or the arts (endorsement has to be granted by the Home Office), they 
aim to invest at least £2 million in the UK or if they are graduate entrepreneurs with 
an endorsed idea from the Department of International Trade or from a UK Higher 
Education institution. Until 2015, high skilled migrants achieving a high score in 
the points- based system8 were also entitled to apply to Tier 1. However, the pro-
gramme has since been closed and only extensions are considered. A Tier 2 visa can 
be requested if a non- EU migrant has received a skilled job offer by one of the rec-
ognised and licenced sponsors. Sponsors must offer a salary higher than £30,000 or 
a job that is included in the shortage occupation list.9 The Tier 2 visa also includes 
migrants who are involved in intra- company mobility, are ministers of religion or 
are an elite sportsperson. Non- EU migrants can apply for the Tier 5 visa if they are 
willing to volunteer in a charity, they have been sponsored to work as a sportsperson 
or creative worker, they are aiming to participate in a work exchange programme for 
a short time, they are employed under international law (e.g. working for a foreign 
government) or they are working for a religious order. The Tier 5 visa also offers the 
possibility for young people between 18 and 30 years of age from specific coun-
tries10 to spend a period up to 2 years in the UK (Youth Mobility Scheme).
Although eligibility rules are very different across the different schemes, all non- 
 EU migrants must have a valid clearance for entry under these routes. The majority 
of the visas request a specific endorsement from a public sector organisation (e.g. 
the Home Office) or a sponsorship from a list of licensed companies. When an 
endorsement or the sponsorship is not requested, a high level of skills is necessary, 
an amount of investment is requested (such as for Tier 1) or there are restrictions 
concerning the eligible countries (such as for the Youth Mobility Scheme). These 
regulations clearly increase the barriers to access the UK labour market for non- EU 
migrants. Most non- EU migrants who are subject to immigration control are also 
unable to access “public funds” (such as jobseekers’ allowance or tax credits), 
although they can use public services like the NHS and education. Finally, through 
the Immigration Act 2014 and 2016, an NHS surcharge (Immigration Health 
8 In order to be eligible for a visa in any of the five tiers the applicant must pass a points- based 
assessment. In work visa applications, points are generally awarded according to the applicant’s 
ability, experience and age.
9 The Shortage Occupation List revised in July 2019 is available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/
immigration- rules/immigration- rules- appendix- k- shortage- occupation- list
10 Australia, Canada, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Taiwan.
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Surcharge) to cover the entire period of the visa has been introduced in the immigra-
tion application for all non- EU migrants.
12.3.2  Asylum Seekers
A completely different system and right to work has been established concerning 
asylum seekers. Asylum policy has been identified as institutionally exclusionist, 
given that the restriction of rights demarcates asylum seekers as “other” and unde-
serving (Bakker et al. 2016). According to the Immigration Act of 1999, asylum 
seekers are explicitly excluded from the labour market. Up until 2002, asylum seek-
ers could request permission to work after 5 months of awaiting their application, 
but in 2002 this period was extended to 12 months. Moreover, the pending period 
should not be a consequence of mistakes made by the asylum seeker in the applica-
tion (“fault of the claimant”) (Home Office 2017a). This is in contradiction with the 
Reception Conditions Directive (COM[2011] 320 final) published in 2011 which 
only allows a labour market restriction for 6 months (Bales 2013). However, the UK 
government, as explored in the case law section, rejected the 2011 Reception 
Conditions Directive. After the 12- month period lapses, asylum seekers can only 
apply for jobs specified under Tier 2 of the Shortage Occupation list. The Tier 2 
restriction was justified by the UK Government due to the legislation on labour 
market access for Non- EU migrants (explored above). It is therefore very difficult 
for asylum applicants to comply with the Tier 2 shortage occupation lists and this 
clearly affects their opportunities for integration, and consequently has an impact on 
their health and connectedness (particularly of women) (Mayblin 2016; Mulvey 
2015). In addition, asylum seekers are also precluded from self- employment and 
starting a business according to Immigration Rules part 11B (Reception Conditions 
for Non- EU Asylum Applicants).
Exclusion from employment makes the asylum seekers fully dependent on the 
state for their means of their existence (Bales 2013). In addition, they are also 
immediately excluded from the provision of mainstream benefits (such as for exam-
ple Child Benefit, Disability Living Allowance). Only in those cases where the asy-
lum applicant is considered to be destitute or is likely to become destitute with the 
next 14 days (section 95 of Asylum Act 1999), do they receive support from the 
Home Office. Payments to meet essential living needs (equivalent to £37.75 per 
week) and/or accommodation on a no- choice basis are provided. There is a some-
what different situation for refused asylum seekers: they are generally not entitled 
to any help, and their accommodation and public welfare support is removed. 
However, if they demonstrate that they are taking action to leave the country or they 
can demonstrate that they cannot return to their home due to the situation in their 
country of origin they could receive basic shelter and a lower level of support.
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12.3.3  Refugees
Migrants granted refugee or humanitarian protection statuses (including refugees 
who are resettled as part of the VPRS) are entitled to work without any restrictions 
(both as an employee or self- employed) and thus have the same right to work as 
British citizens. However, the definite leave to remain for 5 years has been identified 
as a barrier to labour- market access due to the uncertainty surrounding the long- -
term future of a refugee in employment (Bloch 2008; Stewart and Mulvey 2014). 
Refugees are eligible for mainstream benefits such as the most recent Universal 
Credit reform.11 However, new refugees could face a period without any income due 
to the specific timeframe of the welfare benefit and the gap with the transition period 
of 28  days (APPG 2017). Newly recognised refugees are able to apply for an 
interest- free integration loan to negotiate this period where there is a risk of destitu-
tion. The Home Office is responsible for accepting the request while the Department 
for Work and Pensions is responsible for the payment and the recovery of the loan. 
Different experiences in terms of welfare entitlement are faced by refugees that are 
part of the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme. They, in fact, receive a pre- -
departure cultural orientation and they are immediately provided with accommoda-
tion, a welcome pack, an allowance and support for health and education services.
Table 12.1 summarises the rights to residence, work and welfare access that the 
different migrants are entitled to.
12.3.4  Constitutional Milestones Case-Law on MRA Access 
to Labour and Labour Markets
Constitutional milestones in case- law on MRA access to labour markets have been 
particularly significant in the field of asylum because of the differences in their right 
to work in comparison with refugees, migrants and citizens (Bales 2013).
Asylum seekers are explicitly excluded from the UK labour market until their 
claim has been pending for 12 months or until they have been granted refugee sta-
tus. This restriction contradicts Article 15 (1) of the amended EU Reception 
Conditions Directive published in June 2011 in which asylum seekers can access 
labour markets after 6 months. The UK Government, in fact, decided to opt out from 
the EU Directive amendment. Moreover, after a 12- month period, asylum seekers 
are limited to applying for jobs specified under Tier 2 of the Shortage Occupation 
List. This decision was introduced in September 2010 following the case of ZO 
(Somalia) and others: (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(2010) UKSC 36.12 The Supreme Court decided that restricting employment to 
11 Universal credit is a social security benefit introduced in 2013 to replace six different benefits 
and tax credits.
12 Accessible at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc- 2009- 0151- judgment.pdf
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refused asylum seekers, who had made further applications on their claim, was 
against the Reception Conditions Directive. This decision would have allowed asy-
lum seekers access to the UK labour market after 12 months from their application 
or appeals. Therefore, the Coalition Government decided to impose the Tier 2 
restriction Shortage Occupation List as the only employment possibilities available 
to asylum seekers. The list includes only very specific high skilled occupations such 
as for example classical ballet dancers who meet the standard required by interna-
tionally recognised United Kingdom ballet companies, physical scientists, engi-
neers or doctors. It is thus evidently challenging for asylum seekers to access the 
UK labour market once the 12 month period lapses (Mayblin 2016).
According to Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, asylum seek-
ers are not only excluded from the labour market, but they are also unable to access 
Table 12.1 Rights entitlement for migrants
Definition/status
Right to 
residence Right to work Welfare rights
Asylum seeker: a person 
who has applied for asylum 
and whose application has 





No (curtailed since 
2002). Can apply for 
permission to work 
after 1 year if the 
delay of initial claim 
is not their fault – 
Only Tier 2 shortage 
list
Basic accommodation and 
public welfare support. 
Must be destitute and 
willing to accept no- choice 
dispersal policy
Humanitarian protection: 
a person whose case does 
not fit the refugee criteria 
but who is given permission 
to enter or remain in the UK 
because they need 
protection from harm by 
others
Yes Yes Access to welfare rights on 
the same base of UK 
citizens. They need to wait 
3 years to access financial 
support for universities.
Granted for 
5 years in first 
instance
Refugee: a person who has 
received a positive decision 
on their asylum claim
Yes Yes Access to welfare rights on 





leave to remain 
(since 2005)
Refused asylum seeker: a 
person whose asylum claim 
has been refused
No No Not generally entitled to 
support. Accommodation 
and Public Welfare support 
removed. Basic shelter and 
support may be available 
for some hard cases
Expected to 
return to their 
country of 
origin
Non- EU migrant: a person 
who came to the UK for 
work and study under a visa 
programme
Yes. Granted 
for the time of 
the Visa
Depending on the 
Visa (Tier for work)
Education and NHS (NHS 
Surcharge)
Adapted from Dwyer et al. (2016)
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national welfare benefits. They are provided with cash/vouchers support and/or 
accommodation if they are considered destitute. According to Randall (2015) desti-
tution has been defined in two different ways. The Home Office under Section 95 of 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 defines destitution as lacking access to adequate 
accommodation or the inability to meet essential living needs (ELN). Other research 
instead has defined destitution as lacking shelter, food, heating, lighting, clothing 
and basic toiletries or having an income level so low that it is not possible to access 
minimum material necessities. Until R (Refugee Action) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2014] EWHC 1033 the definition of essential living needs was 
not clear (Bales 2015). Consequent to the decision of the Secretary of State in 2013 
of freezing the income support to asylum seekers (equivalent at that time to £36.62 
per week for a single person), Refugee Action – a charity organisation in England 
and Wales – sought judicial review of the decision. The judge responded that the 
rate was not enough to guarantee an adequate standard of living as stipulated by the 
European Reception Conditions Directive and it did not include items such as 
household goods, nappies and non- prescription medical goods considered to be 
essential (Bales 2015). However, after reconsideration by the Secretary of State, the 
decision was to maintain the same cash support (the rate was increased at the begin-
ning of 2018 from £36.95 to £37.75 according to the Asylum Support Amendment 
Regulations 2018 No.30). Although the judgement of this case is limited to the 
confines of this decision, the restrictions on which the asylum support system is 
built were questioned. The lack of an adequate rate of support for essential living 
needs affects the integration of asylum seekers, often inducing them to live in pov-
erty and can often increase their risk of exposure to forced and irregular employment.
The third case, and the most recent, dealt with what has become known as the 
‘deport first, appeal later’ provision, an amendment to the 2002 Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act, which came into force as part of the Immigration Act 
2014. The power to remove a person from the UK pending his/her deportation 
appeal, where such removal would not be unlawful, was thus established. The provi-
sion specifies that the grounds upon which such power may be exercised is that 
removing the person to the country or territory to which the Home Office proposes 
to remove them would not cause them to face ‘serious irreversible harm.’ In the case 
of R (on the application of Kiarie) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 42, the Supreme Court in March 2018 
found this section unlawful. The Court’s principal concerns highlighted the barriers 
for deportees to secure, fund, and instruct legal representatives from abroad, the 
ability to obtain expert evidence where relevant, and, crucially, the ability of the 
individual to give effective oral evidence. Therefore “deport first, appeal later” was 
considered to be a breach of the procedural requirements of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, that is, the right to an appeal against a decision 
affecting an individual’s right to respect for their private and family life. Thus, asy-
lum seekers as well as refugees and migrants who are awaiting the response of the 
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Home Office concerning their appeals, are allowed to stay in the country whilst their 
appeal is being processed.
12.3.5  Anti-discriminatory Legislation
Another piece of legislation which deals with the integration of migrants, refugees 
and asylum seekers into the labour market concerns anti- discriminatory and anti- -
exploitation laws (explored in the next paragraph). The UK race relations model has 
historically been influenced by managing diversity through racial equality, non- -
discrimination acts and limiting numbers (Scholten et al. 2017). The first attempts 
to deal with the potential for racial conflict and to tackle racial discrimination can 
be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s. Three Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968, 
1976) were enacted, aiming at banning discrimination on the basis of race, colour or 
ethnic origin through legal sanctions. Regulatory agencies were also established to 
promote greater equality of opportunity and access to employment, education and 
public facilities. However, according to several studies, these goals remained 
unfilled (Schuster and Solomos 2004).
Only after the election of the Labour government in 1997, were race relations 
modified, through the 2000 Race Relations (Amendment Act) which enforced on 
public authorities a new duty to promote racial equality. However, officials from the 
Home Office that make decisions on immigration cases were excluded. The persis-
tent underemployment of minority ethnic groups resulted in the formation of the 
Ethnic Minority Employment Task Force in 2003. In 2007 the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC) had taken on the responsibilities of the Commission 
for Racial Equality and the 2010 Equality Act superseded the four Race Relations 
Acts, combining everything into a broader framework (Geddes and Scholten 2016). 
The Equality Act 2010 sets out nine protected characteristics which are: age; dis-
ability; gender reassignment; marriage or civil partnership (in employment only); 
pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; and sexual orientation. The 
2010 Act encompasses the protections previously provided by legislation including 
the Equal Pay Act 1970, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995. Finally, included in the 2010 Act was a “public sector 
equality duty” which harmonised some of the existing duties not to discriminate 
based upon race, disability and gender in public sector organisation. However, criti-
cisms of the Equality Act highlighted that including race alongside other categories 
has watered down the protection of minorities in terms of discrimination in the 
labour market.
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12.3.6  Anti-exploitation Legislation
Irregular migrants and asylum seekers that face a limited access to benefits and a 
restriction to the rights to work are often involved in irregular and informal sectors 
of employment (Dwyer et al. 2016). However, also refugees and regular migrants 
could be exposed to severe exploitative labour because of the high barriers they face 
in finding employment (Dwyer et  al. 2016). Since 1996, it has been possible to 
prosecute UK employers for hiring irregular immigrants. Sanctions were further 
strengthened in 2004 and 2008, up to the arrival of the Immigration Act of 2016 
which again increased penalties. Today, those employers who have “reasonable 
cause to believe” that an employee has no right to work as a consequence of their 
immigration status can face up to 5 years in prison and an unlimited fine. Although 
some of the measures are directed at employers, they are likely to affect workers 
who may become more exploited through employers seeking to manage risks by 
lowering wages and/or increasing working hours (Dwyer et al. 2016). Unauthorised 
workers themselves, who became criminalised for the new offence of “illegal work-
ing” would also face deportation without appeal if they did not have the right to 
remain in the UK. The UK, then, is characterised by a strong degree of state inter-
vention to maintain formal labour markets. This legislation, more than tackling 
informal employment, seems to increase the barriers to access labour markets and 
indirectly affect the conditions of employment. This also confirms that a major 
focus, in fact, has been placed on border enforcement and the reduction of irregular 
migrants instead of improving working conditions. Trade unions and community 
organisations have thus asserted some role in campaigning and promoting better 
working conditions for migrants and ethnic minorities. For example, the Living 
Wage campaign in London is a key case example of unions and community organ-
isations working together to improve working conditions for a mainly migrant 
group of workers.
12.4  Integration in the UK Labour Market: 
Institutional Challenges
The lack of a national strategy for the integration of migrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers is one of the main institutional challenges and barriers that can be identified 
in the UK context (MacIver 2016). Integration has, in fact, remained notably absent 
from policy, at least since 2010 (Meer et al. 2018). Refugees are the only category 
for which the UK Government has introduced an integration strategy in 2000 (Equal 
Citizens) that aimed at supporting refugee access to jobs, benefits, accommodation, 
health, education and language classes (Mulvey 2015). In addition, initial policies 
were aimed at supporting the involvement of third sector organisations in service 
provision (Cheung and Phillimore 2017). A second refugee integration strategy was 
developed in 2005, firstly through the Strategic Upgrade of National Refugee 
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Integration Service (SUNRISE) and then via the Refugee Integration and 
Employment Service (RIES). These two programmes aimed at enabling integration 
through the signposting to mainstream services across key social policy areas. Both 
programmes were operated by the Refugee Councils and local authorities and they 
helped to assist refugees to recognise their own skills and experience, improving 
their ability to access employment services (Bloch 2008). However, after the 
General Election in 2010 and due to the austerity measures that followed, the inte-
gration programmes were closed, placing the responsibility of integration fully in 
the hands of local government and communities (Bales 2013). While a range of 
government departments have been under pressure to reduce their budgets, migrants, 
refugees and particularly asylum seekers were targeted as a relatively easy area for 
austerity measures. Asylum seekers are unable to vote, unable to work and are often 
portrayed negatively in the media (Darling 2016; Sales 2002). Thus, instead of 
focusing on integration policies, the major focus of the UK Government has been on 
increasing barriers at entry, investing in removals and creating an inhospitable and 
difficult environment for all migrants. In recent years the policy emphasis shifted 
from separate and specific immigrant integration policies to the broader social 
inclusion and mobilities priorities (van Breugel and Scholten 2017).
A dark picture comes out also from the potential enablers of integration into 
labour market. The UK Government identifies language learning and education as 
key facilitators of the integration of MRA (Meer et al. 2018). Acquisition of lan-
guage has been identified as central to obtain employment, increase social connect-
edness and achieve positive health and well- being (Bakker et al. 2016). However, 
despite the focus of the UK Government on English- language abilities in its poli-
cies, funds to provide courses have been reduced. Asylum seekers were excluded 
from free access to English courses in England (Mulvey 2015) and restrictions on 
the provision of courses for refugees were also established. According to Court 
(2017), between 2008 and 2015, there was a 50% funding reduction of English as a 
Second or Other Language (ESOL) classes. Increasing waiting lists and a lack of 
provision in the local community were among some of the effects of this funding 
reduction. Although a £10 million funding scheme has been announced in 2016 for 
providing free English classes, these courses are only accessible to Syrian refugees 
who arrived through the VPR Scheme (MacIver 2016). For the other refugees there 
are no specific funding streams except those that are dedicated to any other indi-
viduals who meet the eligibility criteria. As described above, education is one of the 
areas devolved to subnational constituent nations of the UK.  Thus, the level of 
access to education differs across these nations. In Scotland, for example, education 
policies have worked alongside Scottish Government integration approaches to pro-
vide access for both refugees and asylum seekers to education (Meer et al. 2018). 
All children and young people from different backgrounds including asylum seek-
ers and refugees have universal access to compulsory education in Scotland. For 
those over the age of 16, fees for attending college and studying full or part- time 
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course are waived. In addition, ESOL classes are offered to all migrants indepen-
dently from their legal status and programmes to integrate local communities and 
migrants through English language courses have been provided.
Concerning education, the UK exercised its right under Protocol 21 not to opt- in 
to the Qualification Directive (Directive 2011/95/EU). Thus, the UK does not apply 
the Directives with respect to procedures for the recognition of qualifications, in 
particular, the equal treatment between refugees and nationals and access to schemes 
for the assessment and validation of prior learning. The UK has a National 
Recognition Information Centre (NARIC) who is responsible for providing infor-
mation and advice on the skills and qualifications of all migrants and it provides 
international qualifications conversion. Support for university access is fragmented 
and dependent upon the legal status of the migrant. For example, refugees have the 
same access to University as British students (with the same fees as home students) 
and scholarships alongside loans are often offered. Migrants that arrive with the aim 
of studying in the UK have to pay a higher level of fees than home students and do 
not have access to the same levels of financial support (APPG 2017).
Some vocational programmes of work placement and job intermediation initia-
tives have also been implemented. Examples of this are the Phoenix Mentoring 
Project or the Bridges Programmes which arrange short- term placement and men-
toring activities. The Phoenix Mentoring project in Newcastle aims at supporting 
young asylum seekers and refugees between 16 and 25 years old in a process of 
learning and development based upon a one- to- one mentor support programme. The 
Bridges Programmes based in Scotland aims at providing employability support to 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, investing in further education, short work 
placement programs (not paid placement) and vocational training. However, the risk 
of losing Job Seekers Allowance during the work placement programmes has been 
identified as a disincentive for participation in vocational schemes (MacIver 2016) 
and the entry criteria ascribed by the professional standards required in the UK, the 
difficult process of re- qualifications and examinations have been identified as barri-
ers to access the labour market in these sectors (Piętka- Nykaza 2015). Some train-
ing schemes have been developed to incentivise refugees to be self- employed and 
run their own businesses. The Refugees into Business scheme, for example, sup-
ported applicants in each of the steps necessary to set up a small enterprise. However, 
the lack of a national strategy and policies in terms of educational access and train-
ing, multiplies the risk of creating a fragmented and project- based response to inte-
gration issues, a response that risks being insufficient to address the complex and 
multifaceted path of inclusion.
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Scotland
Migration is one of the policy fields where the divergence between Westminster 
and Holyrood (Scottish Parliament) is evident (Mulvey 2015). Outside of the 
borders issues and the naturalisation process, most policies that could affect 
integration processes, such as health, education, some aspects of welfare and 
housing are devolved. Recently, a narrative of a dynamic two- way integration 
process and engagement was promoted in the New Scots 2014–2017 strategy 
and an integration infrastructure based upon this dynamic two- way process 
was advocated by the Scottish Government (Meer et al. 2018). In fact, the 
recent New Scots Refugee integration 2018–2022 strategy defined clearly the 
integration path detailing the responsibility both on the displaced and the set-
tled population in different fields such as employability, welfare, housing, 
education, health and social connections. A specific Race Equality Framework 
for Scotland was also enacted in 2016 to promote race equality and tackle 
racism and very recently a campaign about the integration of migrants 
(#WeAreScotland) has been launched.
Concerning asylum applicants, the Scottish Government decided to focus 
on integration from the moment asylum seekers arrive in Scotland and not only 
when refugee status has been granted. This means that while rights to work 
and to access mainstream benefits are still restricted for asylum seekers (due to 
the Westminster immigration rules above explored), education, healthcare, and 
free English courses are instead available not only to refugees but also to asy-
lum applicants and rejected asylum seekers. However, for some services the 
jurisdiction remains contentious (Meer et al. 2018), for example, in the hous-
ing sector, while the Home Office is responsible for the dispersal accommoda-
tion, the standards of housing are regulated by the Scottish Government.
Multi- agency networks that include several different stakeholders have been 
established in Scotland and in particular in Glasgow to promote services aimed 
at integrating MRA (Meer et al. 2018). For example, the Holistic Integration 
Service has been provided at regional level through a partnership of non- profit 
organisations and educational organisations and is aimed at supporting people 
that have recently been granted the refugee status, facilitating finding accom-
modation, applying for welfare benefits and accessing the labour market (see 
Strang et al. 2018 for more information). Two specific programmes were also 
promoted at a regional level to support integration into employment: the 
Refugees into Teaching in Scotland programme implemented between 2004 
and 2011 and the New Refugee Doctors Project from 2016, subsequent to the 
UK wide Refugee Doctors scheme. Another initiative, the Bridges programme 
(non profit organisation) was also established from 2002 aiming to connect 
employers and migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, to introduce people to 
the labour market. These are just some of the examples of the programmes 
sustained in Scotland which are useful to highlight the different approach that 
has been endorsed. However, a fragmented approach with diverse initiatives 
and projects promoted by different organisations has been also identified as a 
barrier to long- term integration, with the risking of simply moving people from 
one project to another without a long- term outcome (Meer et al. 2018).
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12.5  Conclusion
Our analysis of the UK context presents a very challenging environment for the 
integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The legislation of previous 
decades has been mainly based on increasing border control and decreasing entitle-
ments to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Scarce attention has been placed 
upon strategies of integration and inclusion, based upon the idea (dismissed by sev-
eral studies) that employment will constitute a pull factor in terms of migration and 
that the presence of migrants, in a period of economic crisis, affects the displace-
ment of national workers. The main legislation has emphasised control of borders 
and have systematised a hostile environment towards migration, involving employ-
ers, landlords, banks, universities and even the NHS in controlling the presence of 
irregular migrants. This hostile environment has seen its peak in the Spring of 2018, 
in which the former Home Secretary has been forced to resign after the scandal of 
Windrush generation deportation and admitting to there being targets for the removal 
of irregular migrants.
Wales
Tensions between the levels of governance involved in migration policy can 
be evidenced also in the Welsh case. Although the Welsh government is not 
responsible for UK migration policies, as in the case of Scotland it is respon-
sible for several devolved competencies such as housing, social services, edu-
cation and healthcare. Contrary to Scotland, Wales has not yet developed an 
integration strategy, but it has published a specific approach towards migrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers in several pieces of legislation, such as the Well- -
Being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, the Social Services and Well- -
Being (Wales) Act 2014, or in policies plans such as the Community Cohesion 
and Refugee and Asylum seeker Delivery plan (Spencer and Sanders 2016). 
The Social Services and Well- Being (Wales) Act established that people who 
do not have leave to remain in the UK are not excluded from the provisions of 
services. In the Community Cohesion Delivery Plan 2016–2017, a specific 
outcome on raising awareness on migration has been promoted, while key 
actions to increase the availability of information for migrants and the com-
munities where they live have been undertaken. The specific plan concerning 
refugees and asylum seekers details collaborative actions in sectors such as 
housing, social care, education and employment. Concerning employment, 
programmes aiming at increasing the skills and opportunities for MRAs have 
been promoted in collaboration with non- profit organisations and educational 
institutions.
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This lack of integration policies in the UK has been highly criticised by the 
UNHCR.  Diversity has been mainly managed through racial equality and non- -
discrimination acts. But this does not seem enough to stimulate a process of integra-
tion and inclusion, which has been defined as a complex multidimensional path that 
affects different policy areas. The cross- cutting nature of policymaking in the field 
of integration has also generated tensions between the national and subnational 
level of government. Scotland and Wales, in fact, have promoted a different narra-
tive and they have promoted integration strategies (Scotland) or specific delivery 
plans (Wales) in their devolved responsibilities, which not only include migrants 
and refugees but also asylum seekers and failed asylum applicants. Although local 
authorities and third sector organisations have a fundamental role in trying to 
address issues of integration, they have been affected by the austerity measures and 
their funds have been depleted in recent years. This alongside a lack of strategic 
coordination has generated a fragmented approach that risks undermining the aim 
of facilitating long- term inclusion.
Migrants, refugees and particularly asylum seekers represent a relatively easy 
target for austerity measures due to the increasingly negative narrative promoted by 
policy- makers and the UK media. Asylum seekers are the main targets of such poli-
cies. The prohibition of working, the lack of access to mainstream benefits and the 
freezing of support implemented in the last 20  years of legislation have deeply 
affected the lives of people that are waiting for their asylum claim to be processed. 
Increasing poverty and health inequalities among migrants with different legal sta-
tuses and between citizens and migrants have been increasing. Some of the rhetoric 
distinguishing between those who are deserving and undeserving in terms of wel-
fare appears to lead us to question if there is now a tangible dividing line between 
the valorisation of high skilled immigrants who invest or work in jobs with occupa-
tional shortages compared to those with low skills or those who seek asylum. This 
division most probably will not improve with the results of the Brexit referendum. 
The risk of opting out from the European directives that have invested in promoting 
an adequate standard of living and the fair reception of migrants and refugees and in 
improving workers’ rights will certainly have an impact on migrants in the UK.
However, rather than conclude that as a consequence of social, cultural and insti-
tutional change, the only future is a hostile environment for migrants, asylum seek-
ers and refugees alongside a lack of integration, we argue that there is space to 
promote positive processes of integration. Through understanding the barriers and 
enablers that could facilitate or hinder inclusion into labour markets, it would hope-
fully be possible to counteract the hostile environment of today. However, the only 
way to test this idea thoroughly is to undertake a more in- depth analysis into what 
constrains or hinders integration processes into employment at macro (policies), 
meso (civil society and social partners) and micro (individuals) levels. This is our 
intention in the future stages of our research agenda.
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